Executive Branch Of Government Research Articles

Tensions in Japanese Politics: Coal and Korea

In recent months, parliamentarism in Japan has once again been afflicted with serious troubles. The extraordinary session of the Diet last December was marked by almost continuous turmoil. One major source of difficulty was the legislation sponsored by the Liberal-Democratic Party relating to the coal-mining industry. Socialist attacks upon this legislation were bitter and unrelenting, resulting in a virtual impasse in the Diet. A second controversy pertained to the field of foreign affairs. Prime Minister Ikeda's attempt to push ahead with the normalization of Japanese-South Korean relations provoked violent Socialist opposition. In general, public reaction to these developments has been to blame the Socialists, whose obstructionist tactics have not enhanced their popularity. Yet an analysis of Japan's current parliamentary problems must encompass a variety of factors in addition to Socialist intemperance. One problem is of an institutional nature, namely, the subordination of the Diet to the Cabinet. Parliamentary supremacy, writ large in the 1947 Constitution, may have been enthroned as Japanese constitutional theory, but it remains to be articulated in practice. Whether the Japanese Diet will ever attain supremacy or even a rough equity with the executive branch of government is doubtful. One cannot ignore a nearly universal trend towards the growing impotence of representative assemblies throughout the world. This impotence is especially apparent if the legislature is viewed as a creative participant in the legislative process. The power of legislatures becomes somewhat more impressive if emphasis is placed upon the veto function the act of approving or disapproving executive policies and programs. Like most legislatures, the Japanese Diet finds its primary function in this role, but it lacks the tradition of authority that might buttress its position. But to -what extent can the Diet veto Cabinet policies, or scrutinize them carefully? The current opposition parties, the Socialists and Democratic Socialists constantly lament the fact that their views are disregarded by a 44tyrannous conservative government. As a result, the minority, especially the Socialists, rationalize the use of any tactics that will obstruct or slow down the Diet machinery. Unable to play a positive role, they constantly seek to enlarge their negative role. The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has enjoyed substantial majorities in both Houses of the Diet in recent years.' Hence, on matters

Congress and Administrative Regulation

In the long history of the development of the process of administrative regulation in this country, the controversies that have taken place and the decisions that have been made have inevitably centered in the Congress of the United States. In our governmental system, the action of Congress has been required to put into effect programs of government regulation, to create the agencies of implementation through which these programs are to be achieved, to determine the balance of relationships between the government as regulator and the private regulatees, and in general to determine the characteristics of administrative regulation in our increasingly complex social and economic system. This is not to imply by any means that Congress has been the exclusive agent of authoritative choice in these matters. The courts have shaped the administrative process in a multitude of cases reflecting judicial views as to the permissible scope and method of regulatory action. The President is in a constitutional position to participate with Congress in the enactment of legislation and has frequently done so with decisive effect in this area. Moreover, and of even greater importance, the President, as chief of administration, can easily influence the development of regulatory administration, especially as it has become more closely identified with the executive branch of government. Spokesmen for organized groups outside government, particularly representing the legal profession and economic interests subject to regulation, have vigorously pressed their views upon the responsible governmental officials. At the center of this array of contending forces, however, is Congress. It may often play a passive rather than an initiating role, but its sanction must be secured. This is so because of its constitutional status and because of the impressive combination of legislating, appropriating, investigating, confirming, and related powers at its disposal. Our purpose here is to describe the history of the efforts of Congress to cope with the problems of administrative regulation. If what has already been said is substantially correct, then it follows that the administrative process as it now functions is primarily the consequence of congressional action and reflects the cumulative judgment of Congress as to proper public policy in this area of governmental concern. In general and in the long run, Congress has been the sponsor and molder of our present system of administrative regulation, and has resisted strong urgings for its drastic reform or elimination. As Kenneth C. Davis has commented,'

United States ex rel. Tom Man v. Shaughnessy.

States — Recognition of — Recognition of Governments — Effect of Non-Recognition — Deportation to Territory Controlled by Unrecognized Government — Necessity for Prior Inquiry — The Law of the United States of AmericaAliens — Expulsion of — Procedure of — Deportation to Territory Controlled by an Unrecognized Government — Discretionary Powers of Executive Branch of Government — The Law of the United States of America.

United States ex rel. Leong Choy Moon v. Shaughnessy.

Recognition — of Governments — Deportation of Alien to Territory Controlled by Government Not Recognized by Deporting State.Aliens — Expulsion of — Denial of Asylum — Discretionary Powers of Executive Branch of Government — Deportation to Territory Controlled by Unrecognized Government — The Law of the United States of America

Strengthening the Management of Federal Programs

D URING a period of national emergency, when it is imperative that we make maximum use of our national resources, the effective execution of federal programs assumes critical importance. In his last budget message to the Congress, the President pointed to timely advances in the organization and management of the executive branch of the federal government. Impetus for these improvements can be traced in part to the work of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, but the greatest momentum has been generated within the departments and agencies as the result of a continuing concern for management improvement that has been built up over a long period of years. Improvements currently being made in the management of the executive branch are the logical sequel of a long series of efforts. The current government-wide drive for management improvement, officially known as the President's Management Program, has the objective of increasing the effectiveness and economy of federal programs. This objective is achieved through comprehensive efforts (1) to improve government-wide organization, (2) to improve processes or activities common to all agencies, and (3) to strengthen the management of federal programs. Important steps have been taken to improve government organization structure and clarify responsibilities during the past two years.' Landmarks also have been established in the

The Reports of the Hoover Commission

In late May of this year the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, commonly known as the Hoover Commission, submitted its concluding report to the Congress. This was the nineteenth in a series of reports released at intervals beginning early in February. The relatively brief individual printed reports of the Commission were accompanied by appendixes containing the most important substantiating evidence garnered from an estimated total of two and a half million words contained in studies made for the use of the Commission.This documentary output contains the results of the most extensive study ever made of the problem of executive reorganization in the federal government. The Commission on Organization, created by act of Congress in the summer of 1947, started under the most auspicious circumstances, was liberally supplied with appropriations for its work, and has enjoyed widespread public interest in its recommendations. With a distinguished membership drawn from public and private life, from the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, and from both major political parties, the Commission was given an extremely broad assignment by die Congress.

Party Government and the Swedish Riksdag

I. The General Character of PartiesSwedish experience highlights the simple logic of political science that popular electoral democracy calls for a clear line of undivided responsibility reaching from the policy-initiating executive branch of government through a thoroughly representative and deliberative legislature to the great body of voters. Contrariwise, Swedish experience seems to refute certain notions about the “parliamentary-majority” basis for judging of “strong government” in a democracy as these expressions often have been interpreted from the experience of Britain, France, and the United States. From both the positive and negative points of view, Swedish institutions merit examination, especially since they have successfully endured severe tests. The Swedish political system came through the prewar depression years with an enviable record, and, despite enormous international pressures and the accompanying domestic anxieties, it is surviving the war years with a consistent policy of its own, without sacrificing free and regular elections. Sweden provides, therefore, an excellent laboratory for testing principles of democracy, of representation, and of party government.

Government

During the past decade the functions of our national government have expanded tremendously. There has been a development of the administrative state, a political response to the economic problems of a technological civilization. A new understanding of the divisions of national and state powers has been reached by the federal entry into numerous fields once thought the exclusive domain of the states. There have been important changes in the judiciary. Relatively small changes have occurred in Congress. The most striking change in the actions of this body is the practice of delegation. The executive branch of government has been consolidated into a more unified and more responsive instrument of the popular will. This has been accompanied by an increase in the participation of the electorate in national elections. The basic problem of modern democracy may be thought of as the new definition of freedom. The changes in government in the last ten years would seem to indicate that although the decade has seen a good deal of economic regulation, personal liberties have been protected and advanced.

Banco de España v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Conclusiveness of Statements of the Executive Branch of Government — Limits of — Statement as to Title in Property.Diplomatic Representatives — Position of — After Cessation of Sending Government — Testimony by.Recognition of Acts of Foreign Governments — Acts of Governments Succeeded by a Revolutionary Recognised Government — Challenge of Acts of Former Government by Successful Government — Limits of the Conclusiveness of Statements of the Executive Branch of the Government — Statements as to Acquisition of Title — Spanish Civil War — Testimony of Former Ambassador.