Exclusion Argument Research Articles

The Pitfalls of Microphysical Realism

Microphysical realism is the position that the only real entities and properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature. In this article, I challenge microphysical realism concerning properties and natural kinds. One argument for microphysical realism about entities, the “nothing-but argument,” does not apply to properties and kinds. Another argument, the “causal exclusion argument,” cannot be sustained in light of modern physics. Moreover, this argument leads to an objection against microphysical realism, based on the “illusoriness of macroproperties.” Another objection is based on the possibility that there is no fundamental level but a “bottomless pit.”

Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination

Jaegwon Kim argues that unreduced mental causes are excluded from efficacy because physical causes are sufficient in themselves. One response to this causal exclusion argument is to embrace some form of overdetermination. In this paper I consider two forms of overdetermination. Independent overdetermination suggests that two individually sufficient causes bring about one effect. This model fails because the sufficiency of one cause renders the other cause unnecessary. Dependent overdetermination suggests that a physical cause is necessary and sufficient for a given effect, but it necessitates a mental cause of the effect as well. This model fails because the necessity of the mental cause renders the physical cause individually insufficient.

POSTMODERN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW, OR WE ARE ALL COASTAL STATES NOW

AbstractInternational fisheries law is no longer driven by the clash of interests between coastal and distant-water fishing States, but is increasingly about how States in existing international fisheries, mostly with some degree of responsibility for their depletion, are striving to exclude newcomers. The residual freedom of fishing on the high seas is an obstacle to regulation by international commissions since States outside are not bound by treaties to which they are not party—which in turn creates a disincentive for States inside to accept the necessary restraints. Rules to limit entry to international fisheries are therefore now needed, and articles 8 and 17 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement come close to this, but their transformation into custom (or that of regulations adopted by fisheries commissions into objective regimes) so as to bind non-parties is being stunted by commissions' self-serving views on what cooperation with them by new entrants to the fisheries entails for the latter. The result is that the modern arguments for exclusion of newcomers bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the discredited 1950s abstention doctrine. This article suggests why those arguments are now meeting little resistance, despite being advanced by States collectively unwilling even to restore depleted stocks to the biomass corresponding to their maximum sustainable yield, as the doctrine would have required (and the current law also does).

Intralevel Mental Causation

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.

Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?

A quite popular approach to solving the Causal Exclusion Problem is to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation. In this paper, I distinguish three versions of the Causal Exclusion Argument. I argue that the counterfactualist approach can block the first two exclusion arguments, because the Causal Inheritance Principle and the Upward Causation Principle upon which the two arguments are based respectively are problematic from the perspective of the counterfactual account of causation. However, I attempt to show that the counterfactualist approach is unable to refute a sophisticated version (i.e. the third version) of the exclusion argument in that the Downward Causation Principle, a premise of the third exclusion argument, is actually implied by the counterfactual theory of causation. Therefore, even if other theories of causation might help the non‐reductive physicalist to solve the exclusion problem, the counterfactual theory of causation cannot.

Searching for the Fourth Amendment: Looking for Law in All the Wrong Cases

Whether we are speaking of Hudson v. Michigan, Herring v. United States, Arizona v. Gant, Thornton v. United States or even though slightly older Illinois v. Wardlow, these cases represent a trend by the high court to limit the scope of both the 4th amendment and the exclusionary rule. The result is that law enforcement will obtain greater freedom to engage in stop and frisk as well as search and seizure without fear that the evidence may be excluded during the course of any subsequent criminal trial. The problem with these cases may be that they fail to recognize the societal costs of giving police such free reins without consequences. In this 25 page paper, the author summarizes and examines these and other recent United States Supreme Court cases and concludes that they are often being interpreted by lower courts to create broader powers in the police than the cases themselves actually provide. In some respects, this article is both an examination of what the cases could stand for if interpreted either broadly or narrowly. There is much for prosecutors in these cases, but there is also a surprising amount left to be argued by defense counsel, who may still find arguments for exclusion in the modifiers that are provided by either an essential 5th vote concurrence or by the majority opinion itself. If nothing else, this article provides a quick summary of the essentials of these transformative cases.

Lessons from Causal Exclusion1

Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument has rarely been evaluated from an empirical perspective. This is puzzling because its conclusion seems to be making a testable claim about the world: supervenient properties are causally inefficacious. An empirical perspective, however, reveals Kim’s argument to rest on a mistaken conception about how to test whether a property is causally efficacious. Moreover, the empirical perspective makes visible a metaphysical bias that Kim brings to his argument that involves a principle of non‐inclusion.

Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism

One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call themaster argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.

Proportionality and omissions

In response to the exclusion argument against mental causation, Yablo ( 1992, 1997) proposes a proportionality constraint on what can count as a cause: where distinct, simultaneous putative causes involve properties that stand in the determinable/determinate relation, only the property that is proportional to the effect counts as the cause. The having of property C is proportional to effect E if and only if (i) for any determinable C* of C, had C* obtained without C, E would not have obtained, and (ii) for any determinate C′ of C, had C obtained without C′, E would still have obtained. In Yablo’s terminology, where (i) holds we say C* does not screen off C from E, and where (ii) holds we say C screens off C′ from E. So C is proportional to E iff none of its determinables screen it off, and it screens off all its determinates (Yablo 1997: 267). Proportionality is itself an exclusion principle: only one in a set of properties related by the determinate/determinable relation can be proportional to a specific effect.Sophie, the pigeon, is trained to peck at red objects. When presented with a scarlet object, she pecks. Scarlet is a determinate of red, while red is a determinate of coloured. Being presented with a scarlet object does not cause the pecking, since had she been presented with a red object that is not scarlet she would still have pecked; whereas being presented with a red object does cause the pecking, since had she been presented with a coloured object that is not red she would not have pecked. Being coloured doesn’t screen off being red from pecking, but being red screens off being scarlet. Similarly, had some mental property M obtained without its corresponding determinate brain …

Causal Exclusion and the Preservation of Causal Sufficiency

The causal exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of non-reducible mental properties relies on a causal closure principle for the physical domain, and on a causal exclusion principle ruling out systematic causal overdetermination. The notion of causal sufficiency is typically used in formulating both these principles. I argue that the causal exclusion principle has to be substantially revised in light of counterexamples where causal sufficiency is preserved among closely related cause candidates. This crucially affects the causal exclusion argument, and I specify which among several versions of the causal closure principle are compatible with the causal efficacy of mental properties.

Functions and emergence: when functional properties have something to say

In a recent paper, Bird (in: Groff (ed.) Revitalizing causality: Realism about causality in philosophy and social science, 2007) has argued that some higher-order properties—which he calls “evolved emergent properties”—can be considered causally efficacious in spite of exclusion arguments. I have previously argued in favour of a similar position. The basic argument is that selection processes do not take physical categorical properties into account. Rather, selection mechanisms are only tuned to what such properties can do, i.e., to their causal powers. This picture seems ultimately untenable in the light of further exclusion problems; but at the same time, it meets our explanatory demands. My purpose is therefore to show that there is a real antinomy with regard to evolved emergent properties. I develop a physicalist exclusion argument and then I go on to consider an argument that seems to establish that evolved emergent properties are causally efficacious, and propose a compatibilist solution. Finally, I very briefly consider what the proposed model may imply for the issue of mental causation.

Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non‐reductive Physicalism

The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable to cases of downward causation involving supervening macro properties or to render corresponding causal claims meaningless. In sum, the paper argues that, contrary to what many non‐reductive physicalists claim, interventionism does not render non‐reductive physicalism immune to the problem of causal exclusion.

Parmenides' Modal Fallacy

AbstractIn his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of is and of is not, joined later by a third, "mixed" way of is and is not. Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades – is becomes cannot not be, and is not becomes necessarily is not (B2, 3-6) – and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of is not, Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete.

Structural Realism and the Relationship between the Special Sciences and Physics

The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or at least the concreteness of them. The aim of this paper is to show that the causal exclusion problem derives its force from a false dichotomy between Humeanism about causation and a notion of productive or generative causation based on a defunct model of the physical world.

Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation

This Article examines zero-price regulation, the major distinguishing feature of many modern network neutrality proposals. A zero-price rule prohibits a broadband Internet access provider from charging an application or content provider (collectively, content provider) to send information to consumers. The Article differentiates two access provider strategies thought to justify a zero-price rule. Exclusion is anticompetitive behavior that harms a content provider to favor its rival. Extraction is a toll imposed upon content providers to raise revenue. Neither strategy raises policy concerns that justify implementation of a broad zero-price rule. First, there is no economic exclusion argument that justifies the zero-price rule as a general matter, given existing legal protections against exclusion. A stronger but narrow argument for regulation exists in certain cases in which the output of social producers, such as Wikipedia, competes with ordinary market-produced content. Second, prohibiting direct extraction is undesirable and counterproductive, in part because it induces costly and unregulated indirect extraction. I conclude, therefore, that recent calls for broad-based zero-price regulation are mistaken.

A Limited Defense of Epiphenomenalism

After showing that the causal exclusion argument provides substantial support for epiphenomenalism, I argue that this is a more defensible position than commonly assumed in four respects. First, epiphenomenalism can allow for the use of mental states in counterfactual dependency relations. Second, epiphenomenalism can preserve the intuitive observation that we experience our mental states as causal. Third, recent experiments in cognitive psychology challenge our traditional view of mental causation and are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Fourth, epiphenomenalism can offer a psychological account of why we experience our mental states as causal, when in fact they are not.

The Limitations of Kim’s Reductive Physicalism in Accounting for Living Systems and an Alternative Nonreductionist Ontology

Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument is a general ontological argument, applicable to any properties deemed supervenient on a microproperty basis, including biological properties. It implies that the causal power of any higher-level property must be reducible to the subset of the causal powers of its lower-level properties. Moreover, as Kim's recent version of the argument indicates, a higher-level property can be causally efficient only to the extent of the efficiency of its micro-basis. In response, I argue that the ontology that aims to capture experimentally based explanations of metabolic control systems and morphogenetic systems must involve causally relevant contextual properties. Such an ontology challenges the exclusiveness of micro-based causal efficiency that grounds Kim's reductionism, since configurations themselves are inherently causally efficient constituents. I anticipate and respond to the reductionist's objection that the nonreductionist ontology's account of causes and inter-level causal relations is incoherent. I also argue that such an ontology is not open to Kim's overdetermination objection.

Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties.

The Causal Exclusion Argument

Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that once we get clear on overdetermination, there is a way to reject the exclusion principle upon which the causal exclusion argument depends, but third that this should not lead to the belief that mental causation is easily accounted for in terms of counterfactual dependencies.

Reductionisms and physicalisms

Causal exclusion arguments, especially as championed by Kim, have recently made life uncomfortable for would-be non-reductive physicalists. Non-reductive physicalism was itself, in turn, partly a response to earlier arguments against reductionism. The philosophy of science, though, distinguishes more forms of reduction than philosophy of mind generally cares to. In this paper I review four major families of reductionist thesis, and give reasons for keeping them more carefully separate than usual.