Exchange Fees Research Articles

Exchange Competition and Order Splitting

The emergence of new trading platforms has intensified order fragmentation. Yet, little is known on how this phenomenon affects the behavior of profit maximizing exchanges. I show that fragmentation may allow competing exchanges to retain market power. When order splitting is beneficial for traders, competing exchanges are complements. This leads to non-competitive equilibrium exchange fees. Although trader welfare is higher than under a monopoly exchange, it further rises if order splitting is prohibited. Exchanges are then substitutes and pressure on fees strengthens. Moreover, order splitting discourages exchanges from investing in liquidity enhancing technology, while prohibiting order splitting encourages such investments.

How Beneficial Has Competition Been for the Australian Equity Marketplace?

We analyse the impact of two major financial frictions on market quality in a high-frequency environment: market fragmentation and exchange fees. We find fragmentation significantly improves market quality, with benefits increasing with greater fragmentation. Fragmentation significantly reduces spreads for stocks that are least constrained by the minimum tick size, whilst constrained stocks experience significant increases in depth. These changes are driven by the entry of fee-sensitive electronic liquidity providers (ELPs). Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find reductions in exchange trading fees are passed through to market participants. The main improvement in market quality, however, is driven by the entry of new ELPs who benefit from cross-venue market making strategies.

THE TRADESPORTS NFL PREDICTION MARKET: AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND BETTOR PREFERENCES

We investigated 1,587 Tradesports point spread contracts for NFL games during the 2005/06 season. Differing point spreads create differing odds, meaning we could test for the traditional favorite long shot bias in NFL betting. We found that there was no favorite long shot bias. However, the market underestimated the chances of the favored team winning by about 10% across all odds categories, and this bias persisted throughout the season. We found relatively low transaction costs. For a price-taker, the Tradesports “Vegas-line” point spread had a 2.2% total takeout including exchange fees, about half of the 4.55% takeout of traditional legal bookmakers. Contracts with a price around 50, creating even money returns to bets on both teams, and higher volume contracts, had lower transaction costs. Participants were found to prefer the Las Vegas line point spread contract followed by the straight-up contract. Trading volume during the game (in-running) was about twice the trading volume leading up to the game. Teams with better season records and from cities with larger populations generated a higher volume of trades. Sunday night and Monday night games generated about four times more volume than regular Sunday games.Helpful comments were provided by Adi Schnytzer and participants of the 2007 University of California-Riverside Growth of Gambling and Prediction Markets Conference, and an excellent anonymous referee. We thank Jared Hunt for computer assistance.

Arbitrage of Single Stocks Versus Futures in India

Whether for hedging, investing or trading purposes, securities regulators and stock exchanges along with domestic and foreign institutional investors all have a common interest in having fairly priced futures contracts. Achieving and sustaining fairly valued equity futures depends heavily on the existence of active arbitrage in which stocks and futures are paired off against one another by professional arbitrageurs seeking to exploit any mispricing. Current constraints on efficient arbitrage in India include the high costs of brokerage, government, exchange and regulatory fees, an underdeveloped securities lending business to support short selling and, to a lesser extent, an electronic stock execution platform in need of speedier execution. The result of these costs and constraints is that stock versus futures arbitrage in India is presently confined almost entirely to intraday transactions between selected single stocks and their stock futures contracts. Using recent single stock futures data this article explores specific arbitrage details of single stocks vs. their futures in the India market. The zero arbitrage band width for this type of arbitrage was found to be typically at least twice that occurring in mature global markets and in serious need of narrowing. If India regulators, exchanges and taxing authorities wish to encourage the growth of valuable arbitrage business, then steps will be needed to reduce the costs that widen this band. Knowledge of the requirements for successful arbitrage detailed in this paper can suggest to regulators and exchanges steps necessary for improving market liquidity and increasing participation in India's rapidly growing stock and futures markets.

Liquidity on the Budapest Stock Exchange 2007-2010

The Budapest Liquidity Measure (BLM) was created by the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) in 2005 to provide the market with a simple index which assists market participants in making investment decisions by showing how liquid the single securities and the entire market is at the moment. Liquidity is calculated as the sum of the adverse price movement created by the transaction of the investors and the liquidity premium to be paid for the transaction. These two factors together are also referred to as the implicit cost or indirect cost of trading. The extent of this cost depends on the current state of the order book. Trading also incurs explicit or direct costs, e.g. brokerage fees and commissions, stock exchange fees and taxes (Kutas-Vegh [2005]). These costs are not included in the BLM as these can easily be identified and quantified, and the aim of the BLM is to measure the effect of implicit costs not measured earlier. Our study presents the methodology of the BLM and compares it to the other liquidity proxies used in the market.

A brighter future with lower transactions costs?

AbstractRecently, the OMX Nordic Exchange reduced the exchange fee for trading the OMXS 30 index futures with more than 22%. The reduction in exchange fees provides this study with a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of a change in fixed transaction costs on futures market liquidity, trading activity, volatility, futures pricing efficiency, and the futures exchange's revenues. The results show a ceteris paribus increase in futures trading volume with 19%, a 27% decrease in futures bid–ask spread, and a 27% increase in volatility, as a result of the futures exchange fee reduction, whereas the pricing efficiency of the futures contract and the exchange's revenues are unaffected by the change in transaction costs. The exchange fee reduction has improved futures market liquidity at the cost of higher volatility. Moreover, the attractiveness and competitiveness of the futures exchange has increased relative alternative trading venues, without a loss of revenues in the process. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:775–796, 2009

A Brighter Future with Lower Transactions Costs?

Recently, the OMX Nordic Exchange reduced the exchange fee for trading the OMXS 30 index futures with more than 22%. The reduction in exchange fees provides this study with a unique opportunity to investigate the effects of a change in fixed transaction costs on futures market liquidity, trading activity, volatility, futures pricing efficiency, and the futures exchange's revenues. The results show a ceteris paribus increase in futures trading volume with 19%, a 27% decrease in futures bid-ask spread, and a 27% increase in volatility, as a result of the futures exchange fee reduction, whereas the pricing efficiency of the futures contract and the exchange's revenues are unaffected by the change in transaction costs. The exchange fee reduction has improved futures market liquidity at the cost of higher volatility. Moreover, the attractiveness and competitiveness of the futures exchange has increased relative alternative trading venues, without a loss of revenues in the process.

Market-oriented regional fisheries management—an analysis of four fish regions in the North Atlantic

What influence do exchange methods have on ex-vessel prices and what are the potential implications for the regional management of the fisheries? This paper undertakes an empirical analysis of exchange methods and ex-vessel prices for specific demersal fish controlled for fish size and quantity in four North Atlantic regions, including Iceland, North-Norway and Scotland. The methodology consists of a comparative analysis of total average price (TAP) and Anova analysis of monthly average prices of cod and plaice landed fresh during the period 1990–1999. Scotland's auctions have the highest TAPs for the species analysed whilst the lowest TAPs are returned from contract sales in Iceland and North-Norway. Icelandic auctions and Møre–Romsdal auctions adopt intermediate positions in this price hierarchy. Price differences are still present even when correcting for factors such as legal barriers, transport costs from different geographical locations, exchange fees and seasonal variations in supplies. The implications of these findings for current and prospective systems of regional resource and coastal management are then considered and the scope and need for further study is established.