Excessive Risk-taking Research Articles

Audit committee characteristics and audit quality on risk-taking behaviour of banks in an emerging economy

The study examined the effect of audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit quality on bank risk-taking behaviour in Ghana. The study collected data on 18 out of 24 commercial banks in Ghana over a 10-year period. The study relied on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) to establish the relationship between the variables mentioned above. The results of the study showed that audit quality reduces bank risk-taking behaviour in Ghana. The study also found that audit committee independence reduces excessive risk-taking behaviour by banks in Ghana thereby increasing their Z-scores. The study also found that even though there was a positive coefficient between audit committee size and the Z-scores of commercial banks in Ghana, the relationship was statistically insignificant. On the control variables, the study found that bank liquidity reduces risk-taking behaviour whiles non-performing loans increases bank risk-taking behaviour. The implication of the finding is that the Bank of Ghana should emphasize the need for banks to have independent audit committees and high-quality audits to help reduce their excessive risk-taking behaviour to prevent another financial sector clean-up. The study is important as it demonstrates the importance of audit quality and audit committee independence in reducing excessive risk-taking by commercial banks in Ghana which is critical for the sustenance of the financial system of Ghana. The study also supports the theoretical view that quality audit helps to improve the monitoring of management and ensure that banks are run properly

Impact of Risk-Taking on Firm Value

This paper investigates the relationship between managerial risk-taking and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. We conduct OLS regressions to examine the relationship between firm value and managerial risk-taking. To consider differential behaviors by different levels of risk-taking, we conduct separate tests on different risk-taking levels and on a dummy variable for risk-taking. We also adjust for industry fixed effects and address potential endogeneity issues with a two-stage least square (2SLS) approach. We find that risk-taking is positively related to firm value, and that this relationship is driven mainly by firms with relatively higher levels of risk-taking. We confirm the findings with various sub-periods, with industry fixed effects, and with two-stage linear regressions. Finally, we show that excessive risk-taking is not value-destroying. Subsequent tests report that higher risk-taking manifests as positive but slightly reduced capital allocation efficiency. When managers engage in more risk-taking, they increase the efficiency of capital allocation, suggesting that both immediate payoffs as well as long-term gains contribute to the boost in firm value. While the prior studies examine managerial risk-taking, none of them explicitly investigate its relation to a variable of particular importance to shareholders: firm value measured as Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, prior studies do not examine whether high levels of risk-taking can lead to the acceptance of negative NPV investments and consequently destroy firm value.

The gift that keeps on giving: corporate giving and excessive risk-taking

Corporations have recently started incorporating employees’ prosocial preferences into their incentive schemes, including charitable donations (corporate giving). These donations are mainly discussed in conjunction with the external effects of a firm’s CSR strategy. However, this experiment examines the effect of donations on internal firm operations. Specifically, we investigate whether the presence and structure of corporate giving influences employees’ excessive risk-taking. Such prosocial activities may remediate misaligned incentives often cited as drivers for employees to take excessive risks. Contrary to widespread practice, our experimental evidence suggests that firms could constrain employees' excessive risk-taking by linking existing contributions to project rather than corporate performance, thus providing boundaries around an employee’s involvement in CSR initiatives. We identify project-level giving as an unexplored CSR benefit and infer that personal responsibility effectively changes an employee’s incentive package. Our findings suggest an inverted U-shape curve of effectiveness.

Effects of human capital and fund characteristics on mutual fund performance in Malaysia

Background: The evolution of the mutual funds industry has changed investors’ perspective. Instead of just focusing on which fund performances are best, investors pay great attention to who is managing and delivering superior returns in their investment portfolios. Nonetheless, it is very scant of comprehensive studies concern with human capital managerial characteristics that link with fund performances. Hence, this study proposes the integration of fund performances, managerial characteristics, systematic risk, expense, and turnover ratio, with single and simultaneous equations based on asset pricing models. Methods: Using a sample of Malaysian fund managers, data from fund management companies, Thomson One database, and fund master prospectus over the periods of January 2012 to December 2014, the fund performance was measured using Jensen alpha (CAPM single factor), and Fama and French three-factor model on single and simultaneous equations. The examination was further carried out by employing the ordinary least squares and three-stage least squares methods. Results: The results suggest that for fund managers, holding a business degree was the key factor to determine the fund performance, while having Master’s degree was not the primary concern. Fund performance and risk behavior varied across fund managers of different gender. Conclusions: The expense ratio, turnover ratio, and fund objective were significantly correlated with fund performance. This study provides ultimate implications for fund management companies, when it comes to the efficient allocation of human capital. Fund management companies should focus more on the team-managed funds phenomenon, instead of on single-managed funds. Overall, this study provides significant guidance for the Malaysian Securities Commissions and fund management companies, to develop a more competent funds market in Malaysia. Specifically, by strengthening the fund industry policies, the typical agency problems, such as too-high managerial expenses, and excessive risk-taking can be alleviated.

Failure of Lehman Brothers

Abstract This study assessed the failure of the Lehman brothers. The aim was to evaluate the causes of Lehman's bankruptcy and determine the strategies that could prevent bankruptcy in the banking sector going forward. Findings indicated a close relationship between regulations and the actions of management. In particular, the failure of Lehman showed that regulation and supervision are critical to the success and continuity of the banking sector. The analysis also showed that the demise of Lehman was a result of complex factors. These included unethical management practices, deregulation, excessive risk-taking, poor corporate governance structure, fraud, and lack of a robust ethics code. Keywords: Derivatives, Hedging, Subprime Mortgage, Bankruptcy.

Sentiments–Risk Relationship across the Corporate Life Cycle: Evidence from an Emerging Market

The influence of market sentiments on the bankruptcy risk propensity of firms has been extensively explored in the literature. However, less attention has been paid to whether the corporate life cycle plays any role in this nexus. The purpose of this research is to unveil how the corporate bankruptcy risk propensity responds to market sentiments, and whether this sentiments–risk relationship varies over different stages of the corporate life cycle. Using a sample of 301 Pakistani non-financial listed firms for 2005–2014, we employ two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) regression estimation to address the issue of endogeneity. Empirical evidence reveals that managers tend to escalate a firm’s bankruptcy risk during high market sentiments. Further analysis indicates that during the period of positive market sentiments, introduction stage firms prefer to assume the highest bankruptcy risk followed by decline and growth firms, while mature firms continue to be risk-averse. This research contributes to the corporate finance literature by suggesting that managerial risk-taking is influenced by market sentiments and corporate managers show a different attitude towards risk at different stages of the corporate life cycle. Therefore, to ensure enterprise sustainability, capital market regulators should have a robust risk management framework in place to discipline the excessive risk-taking by firm managers over different stages of the corporate life cycle. Moreover, investors and creditors shall take into consideration the respective life cycle stage of the firm to minimize the risk exposure of their investment portfolios. Our results are robust to alternate econometric specifications and alternate variable specifications.

Bank Risk Appetite Communication and Risk Taking: The Key Role of Integrated Reports.

This article investigates whether qualitative information provided by banks about risk appetite (RA) sheds substantive insight on their effective risk taking (RT) and whether this latter in turn affects RA disclosure, as well as the role played by specific types of banks' reports (i.e., integrated report, annual report, Pillar 3 report) on such relations. Using a sample of 134 reports representing 52 banks, a generalized structural equation model is applied. The article hypothesizes and empirically finds a reciprocal relation between RA disclosure and banks' RT. More specifically, in line with agency theory, the analysis displays a predominance of the inverse relation according to which banks showing higher RT provide greater disclosure. In addition, RT is found to play a mediator role between the adoption of a specific type of report-the integrated report-and RA disclosure, independently of the context in which the banks operate. Results also highlight that RT in banks adopting an integrated report is lower than the one of matched banks. Overall, this study extends risk science by complementing the literature stream on banks' accounting discretion and risk disclosure, supporting the impact of market discipline in promoting new forms of corporate reporting. Results indeed emphasize the key role of integrated reporting on RT, suggesting that integrated logic should be strengthened by policy makers to curb banks' excessive RT and leading them to provide substantive disclosure.

Customer concentration and corporate risk-taking

This study empirically investigates the relationship between customer concentration and corporate risk-taking. We find that overall customer concentration significantly reduces corporate risk-taking. However, the relationship varies across different settings. Specifically, the negative relationship between customer-base concentration and corporate risk-taking is only significantly present in more marketized regions, more competitive industries, firms with lower market shares, less innovative and non-state-owned firms, and those without major governmental or state-owned-enterprise customers. Moreover, our panel threshold models indicate significant threshold effects. When customer-base concentration is below the first threshold (low concentration level), it is positively associated with corporate risk-taking. When customer-base concentration increases to above the second threshold, the association turns significantly negative, suggesting that a highly concentrated customer base prompts suppliers to take more precautionary measures and avoid excessive risk-taking. Overall, our findings suggest that the concentration of a supplier’s customer base significantly impacts its risk-taking behaviours.

Heterogeneity in the Relationship Between NPLs and Real Economy: Evidence from the Mongolian Banking System

Abstract The paper analyses the relationship between the banks’ credit risk and macroeconomic conditions by addressing the following questions; (i) How are macroeconomic shocks transmitted to lending risk depending on the ban-specific features? (ii) Are the effects of macroeconomic shocks different across the loan portfolios in various economic sectors? Unlike the common assumption in the literature, the empirical analysis considers banks’ heterogeneity and diversification across borrowers. It employs heterogeneous panel SVARs and standard SVAR models on a dataset from 2002. Q1 to 2019.Q1. The results suggest that the deterioration in credit quality is affected by both macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, with substantial heterogeneity in the magnitudes and timing in terms of the type of loans in various business sectors and bank characteristics. In particular, we find strong evidence of cyclical sensitivity of loan quality, and about 1/4 of banks’ NPLs increases stronger in response to the shocks to growth, exchange rate, interest rate, and profitability. The highly profitable banks tend to less engage in excessive risk-taking, resulting in lower NPLs, whereas the relation of asset size to NPLs is not significant for the sample. A growth shock plays a prominent role in explaining the variation of NPLs for the trade and mining sectors. Similarly, the loan supply shock is the main determinant for the construction sector’s NPLs, while the exchange rate shock is the most responsible for the manufacturing sector. The interest rate shock and exchange rate shock are the most effective factors on NPLs of consumer loans. Finally, the feedback effect of NPLs shows that deterioration of credit quality slows down economic growth.

Board gender diversity, power, and bank risk taking

Having female board members brings ethical/societal perspectives and new resources to decision making. However, there is lack of evidence on whether it mitigates bank excessive risk-taking; hence, this paper addresses this question. It complements the normative corporate governance literature by combining agency theory and approach/inhibition theory of power from social psychology. For a sample of 195 U.S. commercial banks during 2002–2018, banks invest in more risky assets when female directors perceive the positive rewards of risky investments (in banks that have larger regulatory capital ratios and/or are well-capitalized) and when power shifts away due to CEO equity ownership. On the other hand, banks invest in less risky positions when female directors perceive the penalties inherent in a risky investment during the financial crisis. This paper provides novel evidence on the effect of gender diversity, as a governance mechanism, on risk taking in a social-psychology context. It offers insights on the effect of gender diversity on bank riskiness.

Dynamic Bank Capital Regulation and Optimal Macroprudential Policies in the Presence of Non-Regulated Financial Intermediaries

I embed shadow banks, i.e. financial intermediaries without regulatory oversight, in a quantitative general equilibrium model in which both regulated banks and shadow banks finance firms that have production technologies with different riskiness. In the model, shadow banks 1) do not have deposit insurance, 2) do not face capital regulation, and 3) have a relatively lower price of taking risk compared with regulated banks. Limited liability and deposit insurance can lead regulated banks to provide socially inefficient risky loans; this excessive risk-taking can be activated by economic shocks that reduce the return on safer loans and can be prevented by higher bank capital requirements at the cost of lower liquidity provision. I propose a novel channel that additionally boosts excessive risk-taking incentives associated with migration of credit from shadow banks toward regulated banks when the returns to safer projects are depressed. The failure to account for the interaction between regulated banks and shadow banks does not only underestimate the impact of business cycle shocks on Ramsey optimal capital requirements in a range from 10 basis points to 1 percentage point in the U.S., but may also lead to calling for increases in capital requirements when a decrease would otherwise be warranted. I show that capital requirements should also react to shocks that originate in the shadow banking sector even if these shocks do not influence regulated banks directly. The results stress the importance of considering the interactions of regulated banks and shadow banks for designing macroeconomic policies.

Editorial: Advances in corporate governance practices

Corporate governance has gone through three decades of profound changes in terms of new regulations, new practices, and environmental conditions. Many countries drafted guidelines for best corporate governance practices following Cadbury report (Cadbury, 1992). These practices were mainly related to the board of directors (composition and functioning), internal controls, and internal audit. The Enron scandal followed by the collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the big five audit firms, and the enactment of the “Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act” (Sarbanes-Oxley law) in 2002 were other milestones in the evolution of corporate governance. This law brought about significant changes related to public company accounting oversight, auditor independence, financial disclosure, and corporate responsibility. The financial crisis in 2008 started in the United States and has shaken the world economy. This crisis was due to weak corporate governance that led to fraudulent financial reporting and excessive risk-taking. Grove and Victoravich (2012) consider CEO duality, lack of board independence, weak management control systems, short-termism, weak codes of ethics, and opaque disclosures among the main drivers of this crisis. The COVID-19 has consistently shown that firms with better corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices were the most resilient entities during the first quarter of the pandemic (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020). All these topics are addressed in this collection of high-quality research papers of this year’s first issue of Corporate Board: Role, Duties, and Composition.

Do We Become More Cautious for Others When Large Amounts of Money Are at Stake?

A considerable proportion of financial decisions are made by agents acting on behalf of other people. Although people are more cautious for others when making medical decisions, this does not seem to be the case for economic decisions. However, studies with large amounts of money are particularly absent from the literature, which precludes a clear comparison to studies in the medical domain. To address this gap, we investigated the effect of outcome magnitude in two experiments where participants made choices between safe and risky options. Decision-makers were not more cautious for others over large amounts. In fact, risk-taking was accentuated for large amounts in the gain domain. We did not find self-other differences in the loss domain for either outcome magnitude. This suggests that the caution observed in medical decisions does not replicate in financial decisions with large amounts, or at least not in the same way. These results echo the concerns that have been raised about excessive risk-taking by financial agents.

Customer Concentration and Corporate Risk-taking

This study empirically investigates the relationship between customer concentration and corporate risk-taking. We find that overall customer concentration significantly reduces corporate risk-taking. However, the relationship varies across different settings. Specifically, the negative relationship between customer-base concentration and corporate risk-taking is only significantly present in more marketized regions, more competitive industries, firms with lower market shares, less innovative and non-state-owned firms, and those without major governmental or state-owned-enterprise customers. Moreover, our panel threshold models indicate significant threshold effects. When customer-base concentration is below the first threshold (low concentration level), it is positively associated with corporate risk-taking. When customer-base concentration increases to above the second threshold, the association turns significantly negative, suggesting that a highly concentrated customer base prompts suppliers to take more precautionary measures and avoid excessive risk-taking. Overall, our findings suggest that the concentration of a supplier’s customer base significantly impacts its risk-taking behaviours.

Improving the regulation of the derivatives market as an objective prerequisite for sustainable development of the global financial system

The development of financial markets is characterized by the emergence of new financial instruments, in particular derivatives, the risk level analysis of which is complicated. Counterparties are not always fully aware of and do not adequately assess the potential risks of derivatives, which may lead to large financial losses and sometimes bankruptcies. The purpose of the study is to generalize approaches to regulating derivative markets and analyse the adequacy of regulatory influence to ensure sustainable development of the global financial system. The article analyses the approaches of scientists and regulators of the USA and the EU to the regulation of the derivatives market before and after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Prior to the crisis, most scholars took a liberal approach to derivatives market regulation and recommended monitoring new instruments and not restricting their circulation in any way, emphasizing that effective counterparty risk management and their propensity for self-preservation can prevent excessive risk-taking. The authors analyse the potential risks of derivatives and conclude that exchange-traded derivatives can cause similar processes of liquidity crisis, and, therefore, need additional regulatory tools to ensure the stability of the financial system

Universal Banking, Optimal Financing Structure, and Banking Regulations

We study how universal banking, that is, allowing banks to take equity positions in firms to which they lend, affects optimal financing structure and social welfare. Financing a firm through equity holding can improve a bank’s risk-taking incentive in restructuring the firm in bad times, but it is costly due to information asymmetry about the firm payoff in good times. We show a small increase in firm quality or bank capital ratio can cause the financing contract to switch from too much equity holding to too much debt financing, resulting in substantial welfare loss. Therefore, an equity holding restriction aiming at limiting banks’ excessive risk-taking may reduce welfare by overcorrecting the problem, and the optimal capital ratio may inevitably induce too much risk-taking.

An Overview of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020

The amendment and replacement of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 2004 had long been touted to be the next major milestone in the country’s ambitious drive towards creating an enabling business environment in the country and improving the Nigerian investment climate. The now-repealed Act had been in operation for about 16 years without amendment, despite progressive innovations in the banking and finance sector globally and the increasing complexities as a result of disruptive technologies and their associated risks. Also, lax corporate governance under the old Act had given room for insider abuse and corruption, culminating in the humongous increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) in the country’s banking system. Additionally, the erosion of faith in the Nigerian banking system as a result of the 2004 and 2008 financial crises which can be traced to the excessive risk-taking, reckless credit facilities, and other unethical practices in the system had resulted in the long and growing public clamour by stakeholders for the review of the regulatory framework for banking and finance in Nigeria. The enactment of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 2020 is, therefore, intended to update the existing Act to tackle some of these debilitating challenges in the Nigerian banking and financial services industry occasioned by an Act which has proved to be grossly inadequate in the present ecosystem and to bring it in line with global best practices. In view of the above, this paper gives an overview of the provisions of the Act as they affect and/or update the regulatory framework for banking and the business of other financial institutions in Nigeria.

Do markets encourage risk-seeking behaviour?

ABSTRACT Excessive risk-taking in markets can have devastating consequences as the latest financial crises have highlighted. In this paper, we ask whether markets as an institution encourages such excessive risk-taking. To establish causality, we isolate the effects of market interaction in a laboratory experiment keeping other possibly confounding factors constant. We find that the opposite is true. Markets decrease participants' willingness to take risks. This finding can be explained by social comparison utility in the presence of negatively correlated risks.

Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts

Empirical evidence suggests that managerial overconfidence and government guarantees contribute substantially to excessive risk-taking in the banking industry. This paper incorporates managerial overconfidence and limited bank liability into a principal-agent model, where the bank manager unobservably chooses the level of risk. An overconfident manager overestimates the returns to risk. Our main result is that managerial overconfidence necessitates an intervention into banker pay. This is due to the bank’s exploitation of the manager’s overvaluation of bonuses, which causes excessive risk-taking in equilibrium and is amplified by government guarantees. Moreover, we show that an optimal bonus tax rises in overconfidence, if returns to risk-taking are positive. Finally, the model indicates that overconfident managers are more likely to be found in banks with large government guarantees, low bonus taxes, and lax capital requirements.

Fine-tuning Bank Governance and Resolution: The Case for Remunerating Bankers through Bail-Inable Debt

This paper proposes a radical change in the current remuneration practices, including bail-inable debt within the variable component of remuneration packages. In supporting such claim, the paper sets the economic rationale for remuneration and explains the quintessential role of debt in banking. Against such theoretical framework, the incumbent EU regulation reveals to be severely flawed. Consequently, the paper shows why including bail-inable debt in remuneration packages provides incentives towards optimal risk-taking and develops a detailed policy proposal that focuses both on the content of the regulation and on the possible implementation strategies. Bank Governance, Remuneration, Capital Requirement Directive, Bank Resolution, Bail-inable debt, Stability, Resolvability, Managerial Incentives; Excessive Risktaking; Material Risk-Takers