Evolutionary Equilibrium Research Articles

A mathematical framework for evo-devo dynamics

Natural selection acts on phenotypes constructed over development, which raises the question of how development affects evolution. Classic evolutionary theory indicates that development affects evolution by modulating the genetic covariation upon which selection acts, thus affecting genetic constraints. However, whether genetic constraints are relative, thus diverting adaptation from the direction of steepest fitness ascent, or absolute, thus blocking adaptation in certain directions, remains uncertain. This limits understanding of long-term evolution of developmentally constructed phenotypes. Here we formulate a general, tractable mathematical framework that integrates age progression, explicit development (i.e., the construction of the phenotype across life subject to developmental constraints), and evolutionary dynamics, thus describing the evolutionary and developmental (evo-devo) dynamics. The framework yields simple equations that can be arranged in a layered structure that we call the evo-devo process, whereby five core elementary components generate all equations including those mechanistically describing genetic covariation and the evo-devo dynamics. The framework recovers evolutionary dynamic equations in gradient form and describes the evolution of genetic covariation from the evolution of genotype, phenotype, environment, and mutational covariation. This shows that genotypic and phenotypic evolution must be followed simultaneously to yield a dynamically sufficient description of long-term phenotypic evolution in gradient form, such that evolution described as the climbing of a fitness landscape occurs in “geno-phenotype” space. Genetic constraints in geno-phenotype space are necessarily absolute because the phenotype is related to the genotype by development. Thus, the long-term evolutionary dynamics of developed phenotypes is strongly non-standard: (1) evolutionary equilibria are either absent or infinite in number and depend on genetic covariation and hence on development; (2) developmental constraints determine the admissible evolutionary path and hence which evolutionary equilibria are admissible; and (3) evolutionary outcomes occur at admissible evolutionary equilibria, which do not generally occur at fitness landscape peaks in geno-phenotype space, but at peaks in the admissible evolutionary path where “total genotypic selection” vanishes if exogenous plastic response vanishes and mutational variation exists in all directions of genotype space. Hence, selection and development jointly define the evolutionary outcomes if absolute mutational constraints and exogenous plastic response are absent, rather than the outcomes being defined only by selection. Moreover, our framework provides formulas for the sensitivities of a recurrence and an alternative method to dynamic optimization (i.e., dynamic programming or optimal control) to identify evolutionary outcomes in models with developmentally dynamic traits. These results show that development has major evolutionary effects.

An evolutionary game theory-based study examining the relationship between fiscal policy, stability of farmers' cooperatives, and environmentally friendly digital management.

To increase the degree of implementation of the rural revitalization strategy, it is crucial to conduct a scientific investigation of the relationship between fiscal policy, fiscal decentralization, green digital management, and contract selection. This research develops an analytical framework for the application of fiscal policy and the choice of cooperative association contracts based on the contract theory. On the basis of a theoretical analysis of the external factors that influence the choice of residents' cooperative association contract and behavior, it goes on to investigate the interest game relationship and stability of three different cooperative associations (production type, service type, and industrial chain type). Additionally, it runs an empirical test using survey information from cooperative associations in China's Gansu Province. The findings indicate that the cooperative association is more likely to select the factor contract model depending on the strength of the fiscal policy support, the union's brand influence, and the regional market share change of the primary products. Evolutionary equilibrium is inhibited by the association's input costs, but a stable contract is created more favorably the more average the cost distribution is. The stability of the contract and its detrimental effects on pro-environmental behavior are worse the more damage other residents' breaches of the contract have caused. The research findings in this paper may serve as a basis for decision-making and a source of information for encouraging the high-quality growth of cooperative groups.

3-Strategy evolutionary game model for operation extensions of subway networks

With the growing demand for night travel and the development of the night-time economy, extending the operation time of metropolitan subway networks has become essential. This paper proposes a 2-population 3-strategy evolutionary game model for subway network operation extension decisions, which considers the interests of subway companies, passengers, and the government while addressing transfer failure between lines due to uncoordinated subway operation time adjustments. The study resolves the Evolutionary Equilibria (EEs) of the replicator dynamics system and identifies key factors influencing the evolutionary path using theoretical calculations and a ternary phase diagram. Additionally, an extended game model investigates the impact of adjustment minutes. To verify the models, a case study based on the Beijing subway network is conducted. We show that the rule of maximum total fitness ensures the priority of EE strategies for all lines, selecting Nash equilibrium strategies for the lines which cannot select EE in a vastly reduced network strategy profile space (from 729 to 2). The study concludes that combining subsidy measures can eliminate multiple equilibria produced by implementing only penalty measures, and combining penalty measures can have the effect of making small subsidies as effective as large subsidies. The variation of the satisfaction/loyalty affects the system equilibrium only when both game players value passenger satisfaction/loyalty. Finally, we find that the proper adjustment minutes not only can make operation extension a long-term best strategy but also increase the payoff (106,158 RMB/year) and enhance the occupancy rate (20 %) of the last train. The study provides a theoretical foundation for the government to regulate the operation extension of subway companies from multiple perspectives.

Exploring the reform of live e-commerce talent training based on the four-way collaboration of “government, industry, enterprise and school”

Abstract This paper takes universities and enterprises as the basic game subjects of collaborative innovation of live e-commerce talent cultivation and defines the involved interest subjects as government, school, enterprise and industry to construct a multi-party evolutionary game model. The model’s evolutionary stable equilibrium point can be calculated using the replicated dynamic equations of multiple parties. MATLAB was used to analyze the numerical simulation to explore the sensitivity of the relevant parameters for the three parties. Finally, according to the game results, a four-point practical path to optimize the live e-commerce talent training program is proposed. The results show that under the satisfaction of the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0), the critical value of the active participation willingness of the four parties is between 0.4 and 0.5, and the final equilibrium point tends to (1, 1, 1). In this paper, the cooperation between schools and enterprises is prompted to change from limited rationality to full rationality in order to realize the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the final game.

Evolutionary game theory and simulations based on doctor and patient medical malpractice under government regulation

Physicians-patients are the two crucial participants in medical malpractice. The government, as the central authority responsible for addressing medical malpractices, plays a pivotal role in this matter. Guided by governmental agencies, its regulations, administrative orders, and policies serve as the primary governance mechanisms to address medical malpractice, providing an effective means to balance the doctor-patient relationship and foster social harmony and stable development. A doctor-patient evolutionary game model developed based on the principles of information asymmetry and finite rationality. The study explores the strategic decision-making process of these two players within the context of medical malpractice. Through the manipulation of various parameters, the model's evolutionary equilibrium strategy is demonstrated using Vensim PLE Version 6.4 simulation. The findings reveal that government regulation, patient cognition, and the benefits associated with standardized medical practices are the pivotal factors influencing the doctor-patient evolutionary game system under government regulation. It is possible to mitigate medical malpractice through adjusting relative weights of differing strategic options, adding penalties for unlawful conduct, and normalizing malpractice charges on the basis of physicians' income from standardized practice. To effectively address medical malpractice, proposed measures include adjusting the regulatory framework, reasonably determining the strength of regulations regarding medical practitioners' illegal practices and patient medical malpractice behavior, diversifying regulatory approaches, establishing comprehensive physician–patient management systems for information to resolve medical malpractices.

Research on the tripartite evolutionary game promoting the transformation of traditional buildings to prefabricated buildings.

The practices of prefabricated buildings illustrate the incentives in prefabricated markets as well as the decision-making behavior of stakeholders, which can influence the transformation, upgrading, and sustainability of the buildings sector. The game between the stakeholders in the prefabricated buildings market becomes complicated by the fact that they dynamically adjust their strategies in response to changing market conditions. With the aim of quantitatively studying the implications of the dynamic decision behavior of prefabricated construction stakeholders on the prefabricated construction market, this study introduces component suppliers as participating agents and government subsidies and penalties as the main measures. And a three-way model of the evolutionary game involving government subsidies and punitive schemes is constructed by this study. The essay examines the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of each game subject as well as the effect of original strategies and different parameter choices on the decision-making of each subject using MATLAB. The findings reveal that (1) decision-making behaviors among the government, component suppliers, and developers are both interrelated and constrained, but governments are the dominant agents in the evolution of prefabricated buildings. (2) Parameters such as subsidies, penalties, costs, and benefits affect the stability of the tripartite evolutionary model, which remains consistent with the previous research. (3) Component suppliers have an equally important position in the development of prefabricated buildings as recognized entities such as developers and contractors. (4) When subsidies are kept at 40% of the incremental cost and penalties at 80% of the incremental cost, the model combines a fast evolutionary rate with stable model evolution. In conclusion, the article's research findings not only validate the rationality and feasibility of component suppliers as research subjects and confirm the importance of component suppliers but also propose a more reasonable boundary value for penalties and subsidies, which provides a reference for the government to improve the incentive and punishment measures as well as the dynamic adjustment strategy of stakeholders and also provides a new perspective to achieve the goal of sustainable development of construction.

Environmental regulation, green credit, and farmers’ adoption of agricultural green production technology based on the perspective of tripartite evolutionary game

The adoption of agricultural green production technologies (AGPTs) is crucial for achieving agricultural green development in developing countries. This paper establishes a tripartite game model to explore the evolutionary influence mechanism of government environmental regulation policies and bank green credit policies on farmers’ adoption of AGPT under different initial conditions and strategy choices. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we systematically deduce the evolutionary path and equilibrium conditions, as well as examine the synergistic evolutionary effect of these policies. The results demonstrate that government environmental regulation and banks’ implementation of the green credit policies effectively encourage farmers to adopt AGPT. However, conflicts may arise during the dynamic evolution process when banks choose to implement the green credit policy. These conflicts can be mitigated by utilizing market-oriented mechanisms such as loan interest rates, improving bank supervision efficiency, and enhancing farmers’ expected income. The findings of this research provide valuable insights into the development of external incentive mechanisms to promote the adoption of AGPT among farmers and foster green agricultural development.

Evolutionary game analysis of inter-organizational trust and technology sharing behavior in enterprise collaborative innovation

In the era of the knowledge economy, how integrating into the network of collaborative innovation and promoting technology sharing has become the key to enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises. It is well known that inter-organizational trust is essential to technology sharing. Firstly, this paper discussed how inter-organizational trust plays a role in technology-sharing behavior. Secondly, based on “organization is bounded rational”, we established an evolutionary game model to analyze the influencing factors of technology sharing. Finally, we used the numerical simulation method to verify the model. Research shows that affective trust facilitates technology acquisition and cognitive trust facilitates technology sharing. The synergetic benefit distribution coefficient influences the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of technology sharing, and there is an optimal synergistic benefit distribution coefficient that maximizes the willingness of both enterprises to share technology. Technology transfer cost and technology leakage risk negatively affect technology-sharing behavior. The degree of technology complementarity, trust coefficient, incentive coefficient, and the ability of shared technologies to transform into synergistic benefits positively influence technology-sharing behavior. The research provides a new way to solve the practical problem of collaborative innovation technology sharing among enterprises.

Negative density‐regulated contest performance promotes conflict resolution in a tree lizard

Abstract Territoriality is a behavioural adaptation resulting from intraspecific competition and reflects the strategy of how individuals share limited resources in the environment. As a consequence, territorial contests and levels of aggressiveness are strongly influenced by population density. The positive relationship between population density and the intensity of intraspecific competition may appear straightforward. However, empirical evidence regarding this association remains inconclusive. This ambiguity may be attributed to studies that have predominantly focussed on specific fight‐associated traits while overlooking potential interactions between multiple phenotypic characteristics and population dynamics. To examine the effects of population density and other ecological factors on the variation in fight behaviour as well as fight‐associated morphology and performance. We conducted population surveys and behavioural experiments using the Swinhoe's tree lizard across eight populations. Our findings revealed that males from higher density populations tended to engage in less intense fights and exhibited a weaker resident advantage in fights, which coincided with our findings on lower rates of injuries, weaker bite forces and smaller body sizes (and vice versa). Male‐specific variation in fight behaviour, morphology and performance along a density gradient suggests different evolutionary equilibria in territoriality influenced by local costs and benefits. Our study supports the significant role of negative density dependence as a fundamental regulator of eco‐evolutionary dynamics. The observed phenotypic variation emphasizes the importance of ecological and social factors in shaping ontogenetic growth and life‐history strategies. Our findings provide a basis for future investigations into pace‐of‐life syndromes and shed light on how phenotypic adaptation may shape population structure. Read the free Plain Language Summary for this article on the Journal blog.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

This World Affairs 2023 special issue contains six contributions, including this one, exploring some of the key political consequences of traditional beliefs such as magic and superstition in the developing societies of the Global South as well as in certain industrially advanced societies of the Global North. To show why traditional beliefs matter, we provide an explanation in this introduction for why traditional beliefs exist in developing countries, why they survive in developed countries, and why they may become more popular over time. By utilizing a simple game theoretic approach, we explain why rational people can sometimes increase their payoffs by subscribing to a superstition while superstitious people never gain by switching to rationality. In fact, the superstition—which has no causal connection with the natural course of events—may even yield better results, not only for the individual but also for the group. This is the reason why, in the framework of evolutionary stable equilibrium, superstitious people can demographically dominate an entire population over time. In addition to explaining the existence and the persistence (or the popularity) of traditional beliefs, we highlight the key findings presented in the articles included in this special issue. All of them underline a cardinal point: traditional beliefs matter. They shape electoral behavior, they shape attitudes toward democratic governance, and they influence voters’ assessment of political figures and historical events. Precisely because traditional beliefs have such extensive implications for a country's political life, we believe that in the future scholars will have to pay greater attention to such beliefs to have a better understanding of political phenomena and trends.

The emergence of social inequality: A Co-Evolutionary analysis

Social inequality is an important issue at the core of economic thought. Based on a stylized pie-sharing game, this article proposes a co-evolutionary computational model to study the interaction between social classes, aiming to answer the following questions: Why do social classes exist, and how do they affect social efficiency and individual effectiveness? Why are wealth inequality and social exclusion persistent? From a methodological perspective, this article extends the pie-sharing game to include a network of interactions and classes, social mobility, evolving wealth, and learning agents. The results show that social inequality is self-emergent. Surprisingly, in the simulations, the existence of social classes increases individual effectiveness, mainly benefiting the poor. Nonetheless, flatter societies (where social classes exist) have a higher average individual effectiveness. As expected, it was observed that wealth inequality is persistent in hierarchical societies, and the upper classes keep a higher proportion of wealth. Furthermore, the analysis extends the bargaining game to include social mobility, showing that, surprisingly, it increases the robustness of the class system and wealth inequality. Finally, the simulation of dual societies shows that these are an evolutionary equilibrium: social exclusion is persistent and accepted by wealthy and poor individuals, and resources are efficiently used.

Analysis of vertical displacement events in tokamaks removing the evolutionary equilibrium assumption

A key parameter for the vertical stabilisation system of future fusion devices like ITER is the maximum allowable vertical displacement which can be recovered by the magnetic control system (Gribov 2015 Nucl. Fusion 55 073021). The computation of this figure of merit is based on MHD evolutionary equilibrium models: the perturbation of the vertical position implicitly considers a perturbation of the external passive currents which guarantees MHD equilibrium. In this paper, we quantify the consequences of considering non-equilibrium perturbations of the vertical position. In this case, one has to specify separately the initial perturbation of the vertical position and of the external currents. We show in particular under which circumstances the evolution of the vertical position, as predicted by the evolutionary equilibrium models, coincides with that obtained considering also plasma inertia.

Emergency Volunteer Participation in the Evolutionary Game of Public Security Governance under Community Incentives

The outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic has brought profound changes to all aspects of our society and also reflects the importance of community emergency volunteers actively participating in epidemic prevention and control in the face of unexpected public security events. As a bridge between the implementation of government policies and the masses of the community, community emergency volunteers have the characteristics of high efficiency and low cost, which has a great impact on the advancement of modern social governance. In order to motivate volunteers, the community will introduce incentive mechanisms. How does the evolutionary process of a dynamic game between volunteer engagement and community motivation change? How should communities maximize the service investment of volunteers in the game process? However, the current research rarely focuses on the role of community volunteers in the modernization of Community Governance. In order to clarify this game process, this article constructs a public safety governance incentive game model consisting of communities and emergency volunteers. Based on evolutionary game theory, we obtain the evolutionary stable equilibrium point by solving the replicator dynamic equations of all parties in the dynamic system under different constraints. Finally, some numerical examples were provided to simulate the selection of agents. The research results show that the degree of community public security risk, the degree of active involvement of volunteers, the degree of inactive involvement of volunteers, and the level of community incentives have an important impact on the enthusiasm of volunteer community service investment decision-making behavior. In addition, the choice of community incentive-volunteer service investment strategy is a dynamic process, which can converge to the ideal state under certain conditions after continuous adjustment and optimization. In addition, this study puts forward suggestions and measures conducive to the game between both sides, which can provide valuable guidance for the practice of community public security governance and the improvement of government efficiency in China.

Can Green Finance Drive the Development of the Green Building Industry?—Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

The construction industry has a significant impact on the environment, and green buildings provide an effective means of reducing environmental impact. Green finance can facilitate industrial transformation and upgrading, reduce construction costs, attract investment, and promote green industry development. However, traditional financing models still dominate the financing of green building projects, even if they are not in line with the core principles of green building. To solve this problem, this paper establishes a three-party evolutionary game model, which, based on the assumption of finite rationality, considers three core stakeholders: bank and financial institutions, developers, and consumers. The conditions for evolutionary stable equilibrium are identified through an equilibrium analysis of the strategic behavior of each subject, followed by a replication dynamic analysis. Simulation analysis was used to study the effects of key parameters on cooperative behavior and evolution. The results of the study show that (1) The high initial willingness of bank and financial institutions and consumers has a significant driving effect on the market. (2) When the market willingness is high, the government can steer the market towards the desired goal at relatively low policy costs. (3) With the support of green finance, green buildings can still flourish even if the return is slightly lower than traditional building projects. The results of the study reveal cooperative behavior and its evolutionary patterns, which help stakeholders coordinate their goals and promote the development of the green building industry.

A biological employment model of reproductive inequality.

Continuing the centuries-long exchange between economics and biology, our model of reproductive skew is an adaptation of the principal-agent relationship between an employer and an employee. Inspired by the case of purple martins (Progne subis) and lazuli buntings (Passerina amoena), we model a dominant male whose fitness can be advanced not only by coercing a subordinate male but, where coercion is impossible or not cost-effective, also by providing positive fitness incentives for the subordinate that induce him to behave in ways that contribute to the dominant's fitness. We model a situation in which a dominant and subordinate contest over a variable amount of joint total fitness, both the level and division of which result from the strategies adopted by both. Thus there is not some given amount of potential fitness (or 'pie') that is to be divided between the two (or wasted in costly contests). The fitness incentives that in evolutionary equilibrium are conceded to the subordinate by the dominant maximize the dominant's own fitness. The reason is that the larger pie resulting from the subordinate's increased helping more than compensates for the dominant's reduced fitness share. But the conflict over fitness shares nonetheless limits the size of the pie. This article is part of the theme issue 'Evolutionary ecology of inequality'.

Analysis of Social Capital and the Whole-Process Engineering Consulting Company’s Behavior Choices and Government Incentive Mechanisms—Based on Replication Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

Under the ‘PPP + EPC + whole-process engineering consultation’ mode, this article constructs a replication dynamic evolutionary game model of the main participants, namely, the government, social capital, and the whole-process engineering consulting company. In this paper, we analyze the evolutionary trajectory and evolutionary equilibrium strategy of tripartite interaction and three parties’ strategy choices under the influence of different parameters. Using the Python numerical simulation method to simulate the tripartite evolutionary paths under different parameters, this article finds the relationship between social capital, the whole-process engineering consulting company’s behavior choices, and government incentive mechanisms. There is a strong synergistic effect between the behavior choices of social capital and the whole-process engineering consulting company.

Effects of season length and uniparental care efficacy on the evolution of parental care.

Parental care patterns differ enormously among and even within species. This is exemplified by Chinese penduline tits Remiz consobrinus, where biparental care, female-only care, male-only care and biparental desertion all occur in the same population; moreover, the distribution of these care patterns differs systematically between populations. The eco-evolutionary determinants of this diversity are largely unknown. We developed an individual-based model that allows us to investigate the effects of season length and offspring needs (expressed by the efficacy with which a clutch can be raised by a single parent) on the evolution of parental care patterns. The model is largely conceptual, aiming at general conclusions. However, to keep the model realistic, its set-up and the choice of parameters are motivated by field studies on Chinese penduline tits. Exploring a wide range of parameters, we investigate how parental care patterns are affected by season length and offspring needs and whether and under what conditions diverse parental care patterns can stably coexist. We report five main findings. First, under a broad range of conditions, different care patterns (e.g. male care and biparental care) coexist at equilibrium. Second, for the same parameters, alternative evolutionary equilibria are possible; this can explain differences in care patterns across populations. Third, rapid evolutionary transitions can occur between alternative equilibria; this can explain the often-reported evolutionary lability of parental care patterns. Fourth, season length has a strong but nonmonotonic effect on the evolved care patterns. Fifth, when uniparental care efficacy is low, biparental care tends to evolve; however, in many scenarios uniparental care is still common at equilibrium. In addition, our study sheds new light on Trivers' hypothesis that the sex with the highest prezygotic investment is predestined to invest more postzygotically as well. Our study highlights that diversity in parental care can readily evolve and it shows that even in the absence of environmental change parental care patterns can be evolutionary labile. In the presence of directional environmental change, systematic shifts in care patterns are to be expected.

Government regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation strategy, and following firms imitation strategy: An analysis based on evolutionary game theory.

In the innovation ecosystem, the knowledge-based game behavior of each subject not only pertains to its own survival and development but also affects evolution of the innovation ecosystem. The present study investigates the choice of government's regulation strategy, leading firms' innovation protection strategy and following firms' imitation strategy from the perspective of group evolutionary game. Based on the cost-benefit perspective, an asymmetric tripartite evolutionary game model and a simulation model are constructed to analyze the strategies and stability of the evolutionary equilibrium of each subject. We focus mainly on the protection intensity of innovation achievements by leading enterprises and the difficulty of imitation and substitution by following enterprises. The cost of patent operation and maintenance, government subsidies, and the relative difficulty of technology substitution and imitation were identified as the key factors affecting the evolutionary equilibrium of the system. Based on different scenarios resulting from the aforementioned factors, four equilibrium states are observed in the system, namely {no government regulation, technology secrecy, substitution}, {no government regulation, technology secrecy, imitation}, {no government regulation, patent application, imitation}, and {government regulation, patent application, imitation}. Finally, the study suggests corresponding recommendations for the three parties, which can help governments as well as the leading and following firms to choose appropriate behavioral strategies. At the same time, this study offers positive insights to participants in the global innovation ecosystem.

Carbon Offsetting-Driven Multi-Actor Low-Carbon Collaborative Evolutionary Game Analysis

The proactive strategic choice for low-carbon collaboration among various sectors of society is to promote low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain through carbon offsetting. This study delves into the strategy selection and game process of carbon offset actions with participation from businesses, government, and public, thus revealing the dynamic evolutionary relationship of the behavior of each stakeholder. A multi-agent low-carbon collaboration evolutionary game model is established, driven by carbon compensation. The game process undergoes an evolutionary trend simulation, strategy evolution analysis, and key parameter sensitivity analysis, ultimately identifying the optimal cooperative mode and key influencing factors among various stakeholders. The study found that an evolutionary equilibrium and stable strategy exists in the game process of enterprise, government, and public participation in carbon offsetting. The initial participation willingness of each stakeholder has an impact on the strategy choices of other stakeholders. Behaviors such as leading by example, punishment for violators, reasonable subsidy intensity, and active public supervision have a positive effect in promoting carbon offsetting policies and low-carbon collaboration. The research findings offer theoretical insights into promoting efficient multi-party green cooperation and accomplishing low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain under the ‘dual-carbon’ goal.

Regulating the Big Data-Based Discriminatory Pricing in Platform Retailing: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Nowadays, with the rapid development of the platform economy, Big Data-based Discriminatory Pricing (BDDP) has become a common phenomenon in which big data and algorithms are applied to excessively seize consumer surplus and thus damage the rights and interests of consumers. This work aims to explore the equilibrium strategies of the consumers, the government, and the service platform and discuss factors affecting the BDDP practice of the service platforms. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among consumers, service platforms, and the government. Two evolutionary equilibrium strategies are derived and validated using simulation. Numerical experiments are conducted using MATLAB to reveal players’ evolutionary stability strategies under various settings. The study shows that (1) the strategies of the government and the platform always influence each other, (2) a reasonable adjustment of tax rate helps regulate the platform’s behavior, and (3) the proportion of consumers who switch the platform after they realize themselves suffering BDDP is an important factor influencing platform’s strategy. This study lastly summarizes the managerial insights for dealing with the platform’s BDDP behavior and safeguarding consumers’ rights from the perspectives of macro-regulation and privacy data protection. The conclusions of this study can help promote the high-quality development of the platform economy.