Evil Demon Research Articles

Speaking Sense: A Hybrid Source of Justification for Self-Knowledge

Abstract Nico Silins [(2012). ‘Judgment as a Guide to Belief.’ In D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds), Introspection and Consciousness, pp. 295–327. Oxford: Oxford University Press; (2013). ‘Introspection and Inference.’ Philosophical Studies163, 291–315; (2020). ‘The Evil Demon Inside.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research100, 325–343] argues that conscious judgements justify self-attribution of belief in the content judged. In defending his view, he makes use of Moore's paradox, seeking to show how his theory can explain what seems irrational or absurd about sentences of the form, ‘p and I do not believe that p’. I show why his argument strategy is not available to defend the view that conscious judgements can justify the self-attribution of belief in the content judged. I then propose an amended version of his theory, which holds that sincerely asserting a proposition – whether aloud or silently – justifies self-ascribing belief in the proposition expressed. In doing so, I draw on an argument which I made in Gregory [(2018). ‘The Feeling of Sincerity: Inner Speech and the Phenomenology of Assertion.’ Thought7, 225–236] that there is something it is like to make a sincere assertion which is different from what it is like to make an insincere assertion. The phenomenology of sincere assertion provides immediate justification for self-ascription of belief in a proposition which has been sincerely asserted; nonetheless, it may be that we need to interpret our own assertions in order to determine which propositions they express. This paves the way for showing how two competing schools of thought about self-knowledge – one which holds that self-knowledge is immediate and one which holds that self-knowledge is inferential – might be combined.

Memory in Philosophy of Religion

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes’ assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise.

The new evil demon problem at 40

The new evil demon problem at 40

Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question

Abstract In this paper, I examine Thomas Kelly’s account of the epistemic significance of bias presented in Bias: A Philosophical Study. Kelly draws a parallel between the skeptical threat from bias and the skeptical threat from disagreement, and crafts a response to these skeptical threats. According to Kelly, someone who is not biased can rely on that fact to conclude that their disagreeing interlocutor is biased. Kelly motivates this response by drawing several parallels to recent lessons in epistemology: that some question-begging reasoning is permissible, and that there are important asymmetries between epistemological good cases and bad cases. I argue that there are several reasons to resist Kelly’s response. In brief, there are problems with each of the motivations Kelly gives for his picture. Each parallel faces significant obstacles. In addition, his response also fails to take the new evil demon intuition seriously.

Ойратский текст дхарани-сутры Ганапати

Introduction. The tradition of worshiping Ganapati in Buddhism, including in religious traditions of Mongols, is an interesting — though understudied — issue. In Hinduism, this ancient deity was believed an evil demon (Vinayaka) inclined to create obstacles. Subsequently, when included in the Buddhist pantheon, its tantric forms became widespread enough in Tibet and Mongolia. In Buddhist teachings, Ganapati is seen as an emanation of Avalokiteshvara, and in some of its forms is associated with Chakrasamvara and Tara, hence having little in common with the Hindu Ganesha, the son of Parvati and Shiva, the Lord of the Ganas. The cult of Ganapati in Buddhist countries shows how the ancient deity of Hinduism had lost its original essence — to become an organic part of the Buddhist tantric tradition. Goals. The paper aims to introduce Oirat texts of the Ganapati Dharani Sutra. Materials and methods. Collections of Mongolian manuscripts in Russia and other countries contain a total of seven dharani sutras in the Oirat Clear Script. The study focuses on a Kalmyk manuscript from the Saxon State and University Library Dresden (Mongolian Collection) and a manuscript from the Mongolian Academy of Sciences (Institute of Language and Literature, Oirat Collection). The work employs textual research methods and tools of comparative historical analysis. Results. Some manuscripts in the Clear Script are literary works of minimal size that include two parts — Dharani Sutra of Lord Ganapati (Oir. Xutuqtu čuulγani ezen kemēküyin toqtōl) and Collected Dharanis of the Five Chapters of Pancharaksha (Oir. Pañcaragšyin tabun bölögiyin xurangyui). The combination of the two texts in a single work makes it possible to assume the worshipping practice of Ganapati be somewhat tied to that of the five Pancharaksha protector goddesses. In Buddhism, the Ganapati Dharani Sutra is recited for various purposes, such as welfare, virtuous reincarnation, new knowledge, and spiritual progress. Conclusions. Texts of the Ganapati Dharani Sutra and various iconographic images (forms) are integral to tantric practices believed instrumental in acquiring, cognizing and organizing new knowledge, thus forming milestone spiritual experiences on the path towards the ultimate goal of Buddhists.

Kazak ve Kırgızlarda Bakşılığın Yadigârı Tabiplik

Kazak ve Kırgızlarda bakşıların yadigârı olan tabipler varlıklarını devam ettirmek için İslam inanışına uygun şekil alarak kendilerini topluma kabul ettirmiş ve Şamanizm’in izlerini daha çok geleneksel yönüyle günümüze kadar taşımışlardır. Günümüzde kendilerini tabip olarak adlandıran bakşılar, ritüellerine başlarken yardımcı cinleriyle beraber Allah’tan medet umarlar. Bu durum İslam’ın etkisiyle Şamanik ritüellerin içeriğinin değiştiğinin göstergesidir. Çalışmanın amacı İslam dinini kabul etmelerine rağmen Kazak ve Kırgızların günümüzde de Şamanizm’in kalıntılarını yoğun olarak hayatlarında barındırdıklarını ortaya koymak ve bunun nedenlerini irdelemektir. Ayrıca bağımsızlık sonrası Kazakistan ve Kırgızistan’da popülerleşen ve günümüzde de devam eden tabipliği ve uyguladıkları pratikleri analiz etmektir. Kazak ve Kırgız tabiplerinin tabip olma şartları, ata kökeni, yardımcı cinleriyle ilişkisi, hastayı muayene etme yöntemleri ile seansları, araçları, toplumun tabiplere karşı tutumu, hastaların gidiş sebepleri, başvuranların memnuniyeti, bu çalışmanın odak konusudur. Çalışma günümüzde tabipliği meslek edinen Kazak ve Kırgız tabipleri ve onlara başvuran kişiler örneği üzerinden hazırlanmıştır. Görüşme tekniğinin kullanıldığı bu çalışma, söz konusu bakşılar ve katılımcılar ile yüz yüze, daha az olmakla birlikte telefon aracılığıyla yürütülmüştür. Tıbbi yollarla sıkıntılarını gideremeyen veya geleneği tıbbi bilimlere tercih eden kişilere hizmet veren söz konusu tabiplerin en önemli görevleri hastalara musallat olan kötü cinleri kovarak iyileştirmek, insanlara sorunlarını çözmede yol göstermek ve gelecekten haber vermektir. Ritüel esnasında tabiplerin kullandıkları tedavi araçları hastalığa göre değişmekte ve genellikle bıçak, kamçı, çam ağacı, bozkırda yetişen bitkiler, kırk veya yedi taş, hayvanın aşık ve kürek kemikleridir. Tedavi seansının sayısı ve süresi hastanın durumuna ve hastalığın derecesine bağlıdır. Tabipliğin de atalarından miras kaldığına inanan tabipler, cinlerine ve onlarla iletişim kurma yeteneklerine içtenlikle inanırlar. Ele aldığımız her iki tabip de yardımcı cinlerini rüyalarında sık sık görürler ve onlardan aldığı talimat ve işaretler üzerine işlerini yürütürler. Tedavi esnasında İslami dualar okumayı da ihmal etmezler ve kendilerini dindar Müslüman olarak görürler. Ayrıca Kazak ve Kırgızlarda henüz uzman psikologdan yardım alma alışkanlığı olmadığından söz konusu tabipler aynı zamanda toplumun psikoloğa olan ihtiyacını da gidermektedirler. Sonuç itibariyle derdine derman arayan Kazak ve Kırgızlar kaderlerini bakşı/tabiplerin yardımıyla değiştirebileceklerine inanırlar. Buna çalışmada ele alınan tabiplere Kazak ve Kırgız toplumunun her kısmından eğitimli, eğitimsiz, genç, yaşlı, erkek, kadın demeden başvurması kanıttır. Dolayısıyla bakşılığın yadigârı olan tabiplik gibi geleneksel uygulamalar teknolojinin geliştiği modern dönem ve mekânlarda işlevlerini kaybetmeden günümüzde de canlı bir şekilde sürdürmekte ve yaşatmaktadırlar. Günümüz tabiplerine yönelik Kırgızistan ve Kazakistan devletlerinin herhangi bir baskısı söz konusu değildir, lakin destek de görmezler. Tabipler hem devlet hem de toplum tarafından geleneksel tedavi uzmanları olarak kabul edilirler. Çalışmanın yayımlanması için etik kurul raporu alınmıştır.

A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism

The new evil demon problem amounts to a difficult challenge for the externalist about epistemic justification. Many solutions to the problem have been proffered in the almost 40 years since its first appearance in the literature. Among the more promising responses is indexical reliabilism, a combination of two versions of actual world reliabilism where “actual” denotes either the world of utterance or a rigidly determined actual world. This paper does three things. First, it attempts to clarify indexical reliabilism and how it purports to solve the new evil demon problem. Second, it attempts to mitigate some of the prominent criticism that has been leveled against the theory. Third, it poses an explanatory challenge for the theory which remains even after all of the premises supporting indexical reliabilism are accepted. The conclusion is that indexical reliabilism is not tenable until a linguistic mechanism for the use of “actually reliable” has been offered that explains how the theory avoids collapsing into a two-concepts response to the new evil demon problem.

Why Dreaming Worlds aren’t Nearby Possible Worlds

Abstract A familiar anti-sceptical response (à la Sosa) to radical sceptical scenarios employs the safety of knowledge. Radical sceptical scenarios are purported to be too modally remote to really threaten knowledge of ordinary propositions. Why? Because knowledge requires safety, and safety requires the target belief to be true in all nearby possible worlds, but radical sceptical scenarios purportedly take place at distant possible worlds. Hence, the safety theorist claims that radical sceptical scenarios don’t challenge our knowledge of ordinary propositions. But it's alleged by Sosa and others that there's one radical sceptical scenario that can’t be dismissed so easily: the dream scenario. After all, unlike evil demons and brains in vats, ‘dreaming is a daily part of our lives…it is too close for comfort’. In this paper, I sketch an argument to the effect that there's good reason to think that the dream of dream scepticism describes a modally remote possibility, in which case I argue that if the safety-based anti-sceptical response is successful against the evil demon sceptical scenario, the brain in a vat sceptical scenario, and other Cartesian sceptical scenarios in this mould, then it's successful against the dream sceptical scenario as well.

Dispositional Reliabilism and Its Merits

In this article I discuss two counterexamples (the New Evil Demon Problem and Norman‘s Clairvoyance) to reliabilism and a potential solution: dispositional reliabilism. The latter is a recent addition to the many already-existing varieties of reliabilism and faces some serious problems of its own. I argue here that these problems are surmountable. The resulting central argument of the article aims to demonstrate how viewing reliabilism as an intrinsic dispositional property solves many of the issues facing reliabilism to date.

Смыслопорождение, знакопорождение и безошибочное время в Декартовском cogito

The processes of sense generation and sign generation are obviously not isomorphic. We consider Cogito taking into account this fact. Decartes supposes the сogito-style sentences (Cogito, Dubito, Ego sum res cogitans, etc.) are unconditional and unfalsifiable. We argue that Descartes, while considering the sign version of Cogito, uses some hidden premises in spite of the well-known declaration there are none. They are:1) there is a time interval Δt over which I cannot be wrong on the matter of what happened during Δt (infallible time); 2) there is a time interval Δt upon which I cannot be wrong (say, if an event happened quickly from I-viewpoint then if measured in some standard units, one will qualify it as “quick” as well). We investigate the advantage the evil demon can take from that. This is the sign manipulation we propose. Cogito, as a sign object, а) has to have a sense-data component and b) can be built only through time by consecutive generation of one elementary sign after another. Then an (elementary) sign manipulation is the following: (1) I is [not am] building the sign si (or some part of it, which is not a sign any longer), (2) I thinks wrongly that the previous signs just built are s1 , ... , si-1 (the evil demon’s work), (3) I is [not am] going to built signs si+1 , ... , sn. For example, one thinks of self as thinking Cogito, while in fact the real event is the building of t (the part cogi, which is prior to t, is in the past and as such can be manipulatively substituted instead of what really happened in the life of I before building the sign t - whatever it is; probably, nothing; probably, I didn’t exist before generating t). We investigate the source which makes the manipulation possible and the gravity of the destruction of such sort. The crucial reason for the possibility of such misconception turns out to be the sense-data component in any linguistic (sign) constructions.

An African Response to Karl Barth's Notion of Evil as Nothingness

In African spiritual exercises, there is so much talk about the menace of demons or evil spirits. These spirits are conceived of as the antithesis of God or as the spiritual opposition to the benign activities of God. Modern African religion sees them as the causes of sicknesses and any form of catastrophe in the lives of people. The paper takes off from Karl Barth's conception of evil and demons as nothingness and argues that when correctly understood, the so-called evil spirits or demons are nothing but the active agents of God in His relationship with humans. Since African cosmology sees the world as a universe of forces held in harmony by God, it seems that the African idea of the deities and spirits as subordinates of God better captures the idea of the evil spirits or demons as nothingness outside the purview of God than the Barthian conception.

Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem

The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have developed a number of strategies for responding to the problem. A popular line of response involves distinguishing between a belief’s being epistemically justified and a subject’s being epistemically blameless for holding it. The apparently problematic intuitions the New Evil Demon Problem elicits, proponents of this response claim, track the fact that the deceived subject is epistemically blameless for believing as she does, not that she is justified for so believing. This general strategy—which I call the “unjustified-but-blameless maneuver”—is motivated, in part, by the assumption that the distinction between epistemic justification and blamelessness is merely an extension of the familiar distinction between moral justification and blamelessness. In this paper, I consider three ways of drawing the distinction between justification and blamelessness familiar from the moral domain: the first in terms of a connection with reactive attitudes, the second in terms of the distinction between wrongness and wronging, and the third in terms of reasons-responsiveness. All three ways of drawing the distinction, I argue, make it difficult to see how an analogous distinction in the epistemic domain could help externalists explain away the intuitions which underwrite the New Evil Demon Problem. Motivating the unjustified-but-blameless maneuver, I conclude, is a much less straightforward task than its proponents tend to assume.

Cogito’s Hidden Premises Found through Two Aspects of a Sign

In the article we argue that Descartes while considering sign version of cogito does use some hidden premises in spite of well-known declaration there are none. They are:1) there’s such a length of time Δt over which I cannot be wrong on the matter of what happened over Δt (infallible time); 2) there’s such time extent Δt upon which I cannot be wrong (say, if an event happened quickly from I-viewpoint then while being measured in some standard units, one will appraise it as“quickly” as well). We investigate the advantages the evil demon can take from that. This is a sign manipulation we propose. Cogito as a sign object has to have a) a sense-data component and b) can be built only through time by consecutive generation one elementary sign after another. Then an (elementary) sign manipulation is the following: (1) I is [not am] building the sign si(or some part of it, which is not a sign any longer), (2) I thinks wrongly that the previous signs just built are s1, …, si-1 (the evil demon’s work), (3) I is [not am] going to built signs si+1, …, sn. For example, one thinks of self as thinking cogito, while in fact the real event is building “t” (the part “cogi” being prior to “t” is in the past and as such can be manipulatively substituted instead of what really happened in the life of I before building the sign “t” (whatever it is; probably, nothing; probably, I didn’t exist before generating “t”)). We investigate the source which makes the manipulation possible and the gravity of the destruction of such sort. The crucial reason for the possibility of such misconception turns out to be the sense-data component in any linguistic (being sign) constructions.

Lying: Knowledge or belief?

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

The Cartesian evil demon and the impossibility of the monstrous lie

In this paper, I address the issue of whether the evil demon could have caused the idea of God. In order to determine the capabilities of the evil demon, I perform a thought experiment in which I reaffirm the conclusion that an imperfect being could have never caused an idea of perfection and infinitude, i.e., the idea of God. The article is divided into five sections and a conclusion. While the first section is introductory, the second looks at the problem of God and knowledge certainty. Elucidating how reality is gradual according to Descartes, in the third section I address the distinction between objective, formal and eminent reality. In turn, in the fourth section, I argue that if the objective reality of God exists, that is, an idea of perfection, the imperfect evil demon could have never caused it. The last section examines the reverse argument of the fourth section, viz, whether God could have caused the existence of evil and imperfection. Keywords: God, evil demon, imperfection.

Mythological Xullyukuns in Beliefs of Yakuts (Sakha) (Expedition Materials)

Information about the mysterious supernatural water creature “xullyukun” is summarized in the article. It is emphasized that it takes its place in the pantheon of deities among the Yakuts (Sakha) — one of the indigenous peoples in the North-East of the Russian Federation. It is noted that Russian and foreign travelers, political exiles, and research scientists wrote about the traditions, life and religion of the Yakuts (Sakha) at different times. The descriptions of the beliefs of the Yakuts (Sakha) are given, in which there are references to the water creatures “xullyukuns”. The author has reviewed the literature where the “xullyukuns” are mentioned. The version proposed by scientists is analyzed, that “xullyukun” is a blending of the ancient spirit-master of water and an evil demon, which became possible due to the fact that this image correlated with the idea of the migration of aquatic animals from water to land and back. The author of the article is critical of such judgments. The data collected by the author of the article during numerous expeditions to the north-east of Yakutia, where the old image of the creature of the pre-Christian period has been preserved, is presented. On the basis of research, the author comes to the conclusion that the image of “xullyukun” is incomparable with the devil. It has been proved that “xullyukun”, according to ancient beliefs, is a creature — the arbiter of human destinies, and the new image is associated with Christmas divination, where the influence of Christianity is seen. The author of the article shares the original sources. Information collected in the field during conversations with informants is introduced into scientific circulation.

Epistemology’s Prime Evils

Abstract This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon; and Schaffer’s Debasing Demon. These demons threaten the epistemic statuses of our beliefs—in particular, the statuses of knowledge and justification—and they present challenges for our theories of these epistemic statuses. This paper explains the key features of these three central demons, highlights their family resemblances and differences, and attempts to show that a certain kind of internalist view of justification provides the resources to handle these demons well.

Solomon and Ashmedai Redux: Redaction Criticism of bGitin 68b

This paper deals with the redaction criticism of a story from the Babylonian Talmud, bGit 68b. This study aims to distinguish further between the diverse sources of this complex narrative and to differentiate between the Eastern and Western elements that it contains. The conclusion is that the unusually long story in bGitin is a product of a late and tendentious editing. It is based on a minimum of three once-independent narrative traditions. The first told of how King Solomon built the Temple with the help of a friendly demon; the second told of how King Solomon built the Temple with the help of a miraculous object called shamira. It seems that these stories were in competition with each other; that is, one of them clearly appeared as an antithesis to the other. The late editor decided to harmonize them, transforming the two tales into a single story about how a friendly demon built the Temple with the help of a miraculous object. This composite story served as an introduction to the third narrative tradition, mobilized by the editor. According to this account, the throne of King Solomon was captured by an insidious demon, and the king went into exile. Blending the story of how a friendly demon built the Temple with one about how the throne was usurped by an evil demon was the last stage in the tortuous emergence of this extraordinary tale.

Reliabilists Should Still Fear the Demon

In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal.

The New Evil Devil Problem and Deontological Internalism

The article defends an internalist version of the virtue epistemology. This point contradicts many contemporary theories of epistemic virtues, as they are mostly externalistic. This is partly due to the fact that externalism is more consistent with cognitive science, situationism and the social epistemology. Another reason is that it was the externalists who revived interest in the aretic approach within the framework of modern epistemology. Nevertheless, the author shows that it is internalism that offers the best answer to the question about the essence of epistemic virtues. In the introductory part of the article, the classical definitions of internalism and externalism are given. It is explained that the author use an extended definition of internalism, which is characterized by the inclusion epistemic virtues in the structure of justification. The second part is devoted to critic of externalism. The New Evil Demon Problem is the instrument of analysis. The author shows that there are scenarios in which the function of justification as a reliable “guide” to truth cannot serve as a criterion for epistemic evaluation. Situations are possible in which the subject has a false but justified belief. Externalism cannot explain such scenarios, which motivates to abandon this approach. The third part of the article discusses internalism as a possible response to The New Evil Demon Problem. The author believes that justification should be considered as a deontological concept. The condition of reliability, which is an important element of externalism, must be replaced by the condition of correct motivation and epistemic debt. This means that the assessment of beliefs and subjects should be based on what motives they have and how they manifest them in cognition.