Evidentiary Hearing Research Articles

Peranan Jaksa Penuntut Umum dalam Pengembalian Barang Bukti Kepada Pihak Korban Tindak Pidana di Wilayah Hukum Kejaksaan Negeri Tanjung Jabung Timur

The criminal act committed is very closely related to the evidence or goods, while the evidence will be used to prove the criminal act committed before the court by the prosecutor. An item of evidence will be presented at the evidentiary hearing at trial. Regarding evidence, if the trial verdict states that the evidence will be returned to the party who has the rights, then this action is carried out by the prosecutor in accordance with his authority in implementing the judge's verdict which already has permanent legal force and the basis for this implementation is guided by the quote from the judge's decision. This research aims to study the legal regulations on the implementation of the judge's decision regarding the return of evidence and examine the obstacles to returning evidence to its owner by prosecutors. This type of research is empirical juridical research that uses primary data through interviews with the East Tanjung Jabung state prosecutor's office, as well as secondary data obtained through analysis of secondary, primary and tertiary legal materials. From the results of the research, it was concluded that the legal regulations regarding the process of returning evidence for criminal acts in the jurisdiction of the East Tanjung Jabung district court have gone through a process that involves determining the legal force of the decision and making a letter extracting the judge's decision. Generally, an extract of the decision is issued within approximately one week after the inkracht decision. The prosecutor will receive an excerpt from the decision to prepare a BAP for the judge's decision and prepare a BA for the return of evidence. Then the evidence will be handed over to the individual whose name is listed in the text of the decision made by the judge. There are no time provisions governing the collection of evidence by the owner whose name has been mentioned in the contents of the verdict, so the prosecutor must immediately return the evidence, this is due to concerns that the evidence could pile up at the Prosecutor's Office.

Proposed basic timetables for expedited arbitration

Abstract This article sets out two basic procedural timetables for the hearing of arbitration within 6 months after the constitution of the Tribunal and rendering of an award within 30 days thereafter. Two of the key complaints about international arbitration relate to time and costs. In the author’s view, these can be addressed by moving away from what have become the default timetables for international commercial arbitration. In this respect, the most obvious issue is the 2-month documentary production period. However, that is not the only issue, and documentary production has a role in arbitration. Another issue relates to expert evidence. A further issue relates to defining the issues and having input from the Tribunal regarding the issues prior to the evidentiary hearing. Yet another issue relates to the conduct of the evidentiary hearing itself. And a final issue is the time to finalize the Award. These expedited procedural timetables are based on the adversarial rather than the inquisitorial approach, although with the active participation of the Tribunal in the evidentiary hearing. They are intended to be used for mid-sized or larger arbitrations with a three-member Tribunal, although they could be used for smaller arbitrations or with a Sole Arbitrator.

You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Appealing CMS Enforcement Actions

You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Appealing CMS Enforcement Actions

Remote Criminal Justice

The coronavirus pandemic has forced courts to innovate to provide criminal justice while protecting public health. Many have turned to online platforms in order to conduct criminal proceedings without undue delay. The convenience of remote proceedings has led some to advocate for their expanded use after the pandemic is over. To assess the promise and peril of online criminal justice, I surveyed state and federal judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys across Texas, where virtual proceedings have been employed for a range of criminal proceedings, starting in March 2020. The survey responses were supplemented with direct observations of remote plea hearings and the first criminal jury trial conducted via Zoom. The survey responses paint a complicated picture. They suggest that, on the whole, online proceedings can save time and resources for the participants in criminal cases and can provide broader access to the courts for the public. Yet respondents also noted the dangers of remote justice, particularly in contested or evidentiary hearings and trials. These include the inability of the parties to present evidence and confront witnesses effectively, and the challenges of providing adequate legal assistance remotely. Respondents also expressed concern that the court’s perception of defendants may be negatively skewed by technology and that indigent defendants might be disproportionately harmed by the use of remote hearings. Defense attorneys were especially likely to be concerned about the use of the online format and to believe that it tends to harm their clients. Federal judges and prosecutors were also more likely than their state counterparts to be skeptical of the benefits of online criminal proceedings outside the context of the pandemic. Based on the survey responses, an analysis of scholarship and case law, and first-hand observations of virtual criminal proceedings, the Article concludes with several recommendations about the future use of online criminal justice. It argues that states should be wary of expanding the use of remote proceedings after the pandemic is over. Online technology could be used more broadly to conduct status hearings and hearings on questions of law and to increase the frequency of attorney-client consultations. Beyond these narrow circumstances, however, remote hearings post-pandemic should be used only sparingly, as they carry too many risks to the fairness of the proceedings. If jurisdictions make the choice to use virtual proceedings in circumstances beyond status hearings and legal arguments, this should be done only after obtaining an informed and voluntary consent from the defendant, and with great care taken to reduce the risks of unfairness and unreliable results.

Welcome to Normalton

This design case details the critical design decisions used in the development of an e-learning module library for North Carolina local government officials focused on land use regulations. These modules cover topics from an introduction to land use regulations, to evidentiary hearing conduct guidelines, defining vested rights, and explaining how to adopt and amend an ordinance. This project was in response to the North Carolina League of Municipalities (NCLM) members’ increased requests for training in this subject area. This organization requested the assistance of the two faculty members at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Government (SOG) who specialize in this content area. Additionally, the professional organization wanted to mitigate risk from cases going to litigation for improper land use decisions. The Target Accomplishment Past Prototype Artifact (TAPPA) Process (Moore, 2016) was used for the module development. This five-step process emphasizes the rapid development of distance education content artifacts in close collaboration with subject matter experts. Between 2013 and 2018, the TAPPA iterative design process guided the development of sixteen modules moving from initial script to finished modules. This design case is relevant for instructional designers who need to develop comprehensive e-learning modules covering complex and often complicated tasks. Examples of design decisions, informed by Clark and Mayer (2016)’s principles of multimedia design, are dispersed through the design case.

Evidentiary Hearings in Civil Proceedings – Selected Problems

Evidentiary Hearings in Civil Proceedings – Selected Problems

Rulemaking by Fiat in a Most Unsuitable Case: A Critique of the Texas Supreme Court's Creation of a Catchall Sham Affidavit Rule in Lujan v. Navistar, Inc. (Tex. 2018)

In Lujan v. Navistar, Inc. the Texas Supreme Court incorporated the federal sham affidavit doctrine into Texas summary judgment practice and turned the doctrine into a rule. Although this change in civil procedure could have been accomplished through the rule-revision process, the adoption of the doctrine through a precedent-setting opinion is not particularly remarkable because a number of intermediate courts of appeals in Texas had already recognized it. CASE CITE IN SOUTHWESTERN REPORTER AND WESTLAW: Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., No. 16-0588, 555 S.W.3d 79, 2018 WL 1974473 (Tex. Apr. 27, 2018)(sham affidavit doctrine adopted as part of summary judgment practice and adjudication in Texas) What is remarkable is that the Texas High Court blessed the statewide application of the doctrine in a case that did not even present a conflict in the same party’s deposition testimony and affidavit on the dispositive issue for summary judgment motion at issue (nontransfer of ownership of trucks from individual to a corporation of which the same individual was the sole owner, which was the pivotal issue for purposes of legal standing). The conflict the Court found significant was instead based on extrinsic tax-related documents and on a transcript of attorney argument in open court from a hearing on a pretrial motion unrelated to the motion for summary judgment. By recognizing the materiality of these other forms of evidence to the sham determination, the Court fundamentally altered the character and scope of the sham affidavit doctrine. It also rejected the elements of the test that intermediate appellate courts in Texas had used to determine whether the doctrine should be applied in a particular case; a test that involved the comparison and evaluation of the substance of the affidavit and the substance of the prior deposition on the material fact question at issue. The reliance on evidence other than the party’s deposition then allowed the Court to assert that it was not overruling existing Texas Supreme Court precedent that stands for the proposition that inconsistent deposition testimony may not be given effect over a summary judgment affidavit, and that a conflict between the two creates a fact issue for the trier of fact, rather than a sham issue that the trial court may resolve summarily. See Randall v. Dallas Power & Light, 752 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1988); Gaines v. Hamman, 358 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1962). The Texas courts of appeals will soon have to grapple with how Texas trial courts are to exercise—and not abuse--their vastly expanded discretion under the summary judgment regime as judicially amended by Lujan, without accompanying guidance or a clear set of criteria on how to go about determining the existence of a sham sufficiently serious to warrant disregard for the affidavit and grant of summary judgment for the movant. Although Lujan v. Navistar makes the sham affidavit doctrine viable throughout the state, it provides no guidance as to how the trial courts are to handle the vastly increased array of potentially sham-relevant evidence that may now be considered under an infinite set of case-specific circumstances; when and in what form such evidence should be proffered within the timeframes that govern summary judgment motions and responses; and how pertinent exculpatory evidence may be offered by the party accused of having run afoul the sham affidavit rule. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit an evidentiary hearing on motions for summary judgment and many are upon submission without an oral hearing even merely for argument. By acknowledging that each case is unique and that the caseload as a whole is diverse in the particulars, the Lujan opinion itself makes a good case for the leaving the matter of amending the summary judgment rules to the Court’s rule-making process, rather than devising a new rule to fit the idiosyncrasies of a particular case brought before the Court for a decision.

İtalyan Ceza Hukuku Sisteminde İstinaf: Hukuk Reformları ve İçtihat Hukuku

This article deals with the crucial and vital issue of the appeal in the Italian criminal justice system. The first part of this study is focused on the historical framework and the main legislative reforms that have characterized the issue of appellate remedies. After this general overview, the article analyzes the different types of appellate remedies and the fundamental principles that govern them. However, the core of this article is devoted to the appeal, which has recently been affected by important legislative reforms that have reshaped it. After some preliminary remarks regarding the nature of the appeal in the Italian criminal justice system, the work deals with the form of the appeal, identifying the subjects who are entitled to lodge an appeal and the preconditions that justify the filing of it. The article is then focused on the appellate procedure, dedicating particular attention to the renewal of the trial evidentiary hearing in case of appeal of the public prosecutor against a first-instance acquittal. This case of renewal has recently been introduced by the Italian legislator following the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Italian Court of Cassation. After analyzing such issues, this work identifies the outcomes of the appellate procedure. Finally, the article draws some conclusions about the issue of the appeal in light of the recent legislative reforms and case law.

Child Marriage as Child Abuse and Constitutional Violation

According to a study conducted by the Tahirih Justice Center, more than 200,000 children under age 18 were married between the years 2000 and 2015 in the United States. Although all states have statutory minimum age requirements for marriage, there are exceptions in some states that allow children as young as eleven years old to marry with the consent of parents or courts. While the parental and judicial consent requirements are intended to protect children, sometimes parents are complicit in the exploitation of the child, and judges are often unwilling or unable to determine whether the marriage is in the child’s best interests. In fact, in many cases, young girls who were impregnated in violation of statutory rape laws were encouraged to marry their rapists. In those cases, the parents and courts are not protecting the child; they are legalizing child abuse. The Constitution protects children as well as adults. If minors are legally incapable of giving informed consent to marry, then parental and judicial consent exceptions allow minors to be married without their consent. This Article argues that such marriages violate minors’ rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing adults to marry young girls and take advantage of the marriage exception to states’ statutory rape laws deprives the girls of the protection that the laws provide to unmarried girls. Furthermore, allowing minors to marry when they lack the maturity to understand or appreciate the consequences of marriage deprives them of their fundamental right to choose whether and who they will marry. In order to protect their constitutional rights, children who are incapable of giving informed consent should never be allowed to marry. While some older minors may be mature enough to make an informed choice about marriage, the Article concludes that states may restrict marriage to those over eighteen years of age. The mature minor’s constitutional rights are not violated because the restriction merely delays a minor’s ability to exercise their right to marry rather than foreclosing it entirely. If states choose to allow those mature minors to marry, they should take their parens patriae obligation seriously and conduct an evidentiary hearing to verify that the minor is not being forced or coerced into the marriage, and that marriage is in the minor’s best interests.

Adverse Inference of Intent to Deceive USPTO As a Sanction for Litigation Misconduct

In a July 2017 decision, Regeneron Pharms., Inc. v. Merus N.V. (“Regeneron II”), a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s judgment that Regeneron’s asserted patent was unenforceable for inequitable conduct in its prosecution. The full Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a 10-2 vote in December 2017. The notable and troubling aspect of Regeneron II is the panel majority’s approval of the district court’s imposition of a sanction against the patentee for its misconduct in the infringement litigation with Merus. Much of that litigation misconduct involved Regeneron’s failure (having waived attorney-client privilege) to produce documents requested during discovery that pertained to its prosecuting attorneys’ decision not to submit certain prior art references to the USPTO. The Federal Circuit was not mistaken in reading Second Circuit precedent as conferring broad discretion on district courts to fashion appropriate sanctions, including imposing adverse inferences. Nevertheless, the substance of the district court’s adverse inference dealt with a key component of inequitable conduct—intent to deceive the USPTO—unquestionably a matter of substantive patent law on which Federal Circuit law controls. Although not without its critics, the Circuit’s 2011 en banc decision in Therasense is, for better or worse, the current defining framework for establishing inequitable conduct. Therasense tightened the standards for rendering patents unenforceable in an attempt to stem a perceived “plague” of inequitable conduct accusations. The en banc court required that the deceptive intent prong of inequitable conduct be independently proved based on clear and convincing evidence. By relying on Second Circuit law dealing with litigation sanctions and adverse inferences generally, the Regeneron II majority allowed satisfaction of Therasense’s substantial evidentiary burden of proof by a court imposing an adverse inference as a sanction for litigation misconduct, without conducting any evidentiary hearing or trial, on the fact question of intent to deceive the USPTO.

I principi generali, la CEDU e le responsabilità dei giuristi sulla rinnovazione dell'istruttoria in appello come condizione per un'assoluzione

Purchase online the PDF of I principi generali, la CEDU e le responsabilità dei giuristi sulla rinnovazione dell'istruttoria in appello come condizione per un'assoluzione, Pasta, Alessandro - Pisa University Press - Article

PROTECTING TAXPAYERS AND CRIME VICTIMS: THE CASE FOR RESTRICTING UTAH’S PRELIMINARY HEARINGS TO FELONY OFFENSES

When prosecutors file serious criminal charges in Utah, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing. At this hearing, witnesses will testify and be cross-examined to determine if the defendant should be bound over to face trial. For many decades, however, Utah has held such hearings only for felony offenses, not misdemeanors. In this respect, Utah practice tracked that of the vast majority of other states, which limit the use of preliminary hearings to more serious felony crimes. The reasons for limiting preliminary hearings to more serious felony cases are easy to understand. Preliminary hearings are costly and time consuming. They can also burden victims of crime with the need to testify and be cross-examined about the details of crimes committed against them. These clear costs are not outweighed by the very limited value that preliminary hearings provide, namely allowing judicial review of a prosecutor’s evidence. For misdemeanor prosecutions, a judge can easily decide the question of probable cause based on the information recounted in the charging document without holding an evidentiary hearing. Recently Utah suddenly became the only state in the nation to interpret its constitution to require preliminary hearings for certain classes of misdemeanors. In State v. Hernandez , the Utah Supreme Court held that for “Class A” misdemeanors (misdemeanors punishable by up to a year in jail), article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution required preliminary hearings. Article I, section 13 provides for preliminary hearings for “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment.” The court concluded that the phrase “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” referred not only to felony offenses but under Utah’s modern classification of offenses, to Class A misdemeanors as well. The court’s analytical approach was quite properly historical. The court noted that the decisive question when interpreting the state constitution is “to ascertain the drafters’ intent.” Yet strong arguments suggest that the drafters did not truly intend to require preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors. Section 13 appears to refer to federal law that “heretofore” controlled the Territory of Utah. At the time the Utah Constitution was drafted, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution directed that capital and infamous crimes—felonies—be screened through the requirement of a grand jury indictment. [ The framers of the Utah Constitution, it can be argued, simply continued this approach and then authorized a new alternative method for screening such felony prosecutions—a preliminary hearing instead of a grand jury. This was the argument the state advanced in Hernandez , although the court ultimately found it unpersuasive. This Article does not debate the historical accuracy of the court’s decision. Rather, it asks whether the decision is sound public policy. This Article concludes that requiring preliminary hearings for Class A misdemeanors is undesirable for two simple reasons. First, the court’s decision will result in hundreds of additional preliminary hearings a year, thus imposing substantial costs on taxpayers and burdens on an already overwhelmed criminal justice system. Second, the decision will create substantial hardships for crime victims, who will now be twice subjected to cross-examination by defense attorneys—once at the preliminary hearing and again later at trial. And these costs will generate no significant benefit in return.

Analysis of the evolution and current status of the Austrian civil procedural law

The paper analyses the rules contained in the Austrian Civil Procedure Act. Although this act was adopted back in 1895, it is still in force. This continuity is a proof of the great value of this legislative document. This Act has had a significant influence on the Central and Eastern European procedural laws. From the period of its enactment, despite preserving its fundamental components, the Austrian Civil Procedure Act has been through a number of modifications, including the amendments that were introduced towards the end of 20th and in early 21st century. More recent modifications are a result of the influence of common European procedural law and concern the issues like jurisdiction, enforcement of decisions, proceedings concerning payment orders, special litigations, non-contentious proceedings. The Austrian civil procedural law, as a normative system, accompanied by a rich literature and creative judicial practice, has influenced the Serbian law, whose system and particular institutes have accepted the solutions contained in the Austrian law. The paper gives an overview of the systems and basic institutes of the Austrian civil procedure: complaint, response to the complaint, preliminary hearing, main hearing, evidence and evidentiary hearing, court's ruling. The aim is to consider the existing contents of the Austrian Civil Procedure Act in the context of reforms of the Serbian Civil Procedure Act.

Contemporary Evidence from California: Who Gains When Evidentiary Hearings Are Held?

Traditionally, evidentiary hearings were held during almost all of the energy ratemaking proceedings of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). This is often referred to as the “litigation model” of regulation. In recent years, the CPUC has often used a “collaborative model” of regulation, in which proceedings are dominated by workshops and by several rounds of comments from practitioners (representatives of parties). My research reviews a number of CPUC energy regulatory proceedings, and compares the results of litigation proceedings with collaborative proceedings.I review the literature concerning both the collaborative and the litigation models of regulation, and interview CPUC practitioners (attorneys and advocates) to determine their views on regulatory processes. I briefly discuss the arguments of the proponents of the collaborative and the litigation models.

Alternate Routes: Circumventing Rule 606(B) When Alternate Jurors Improperly Participate in Deliberations

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark plain-error decision in Olano v. United States, an evidentiary issue has plagued federal criminal trials. Though forbidden by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), alternate jurors frequently enter deliberations with regular jurors. Despite the strong likelihood of prejudice, in most jurisdictions any testimony about the deliberations is barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). As a result, many criminal defendants are unable to present testimony or evidence that could result in a new trial free from undue prejudice. This Article examines the Constitutional context of the Olano decision as well as past and present approaches to this evidentiary issue from federal and state jurisdictions. After discussing these approaches and their various advantages and drawbacks, the Article argues that evidentiary hearings, through Remmer v. United States, provide the best answer to protecting defendants’ rights while respecting the privacy of jurors.

Arizona's Domestic Violence Victims Need a More Safety-Centered Approach in Their Pursuit of Family Court Orders

The current procedural process for family court litigants in Arizona aggravates the ability of domestic violence victims to safely and quickly obtain custody, parenting time and support orders. Thus, the process should be modified to allow for an expedited route when domestic violence issues are present. There is a legislative presumption in Arizona that equal parenting time is in the best interest of minor children. While family court litigants with domestic violence issues can rebut this presumption, it requires a fact-finding process that normally occurs during an evidentiary hearing, which is generally scheduled thirty days after the initiation of an action. This extensive waiting period not only inhibits the court’s ability to enter timely orders with respect to custody and parenting time, but also frustrates the ability of domestic violence victims to protect themselves and their children while they await their day in court. This article proposes the creation of a new procedural process for cases that give rise to a presumption that domestic violence issues are present. Specifically, it is recommended that courts implement an initial screening process to identify cases involving domestic violence. Once identified, these cases would proceed through an expedited evidentiary process so that safety-centered orders concerning custody, parenting time, and support are accomplished quickly. Additionally, it is recommended that all cases involving domestic violence be assigned an advocate to assist the victim in navigating the judicial system, creating a safety plan, and ascertaining services and other resources needed to survive.

Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation-of-Powers Problem

The various doctrines of subject-matter jurisdiction represent some of the most important limitations on the powers of the federal judiciary, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that Article III standing, which enforces the Constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement, is the most important of these jurisdictional doctrines. So a federal court that exercises its coercive power over litigants by entering a final judgment without first ensuring that the plaintiff has Article III standing would plainly violate the separation of powers. This much should be indisputable. But what if a federal court exercises its coercive power over litigants before entry of final judgment — say, by unlocking the doors to general discovery that is likely to be so expensive that it effectively coerces the defendant into an in terrorem settlement of a weak claim? Simple logic would suggest that the court should correspondingly shift earlier its resolution of the plaintiff’s Article III standing as well. Yet courts inexplicably defer resolving contested issues of standing when raised by defendants, instead treating Article III standing as if it were just another merits issue: something to be plausibly alleged in a complaint, supported by substantial evidence (taken as true) at summary judgment, and eventually proved by a preponderance of evidence at trial. We argue that this approach is wrong, because it potentially subjects litigants to years of coercive proceedings absent a genuine case or controversy. Instead, we propose that courts exclusively and definitively resolve contested issues of Article III standing, no matter when they arise in the litigation, using Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — including by holding evidentiary hearings and making credibility determinations as necessary. This approach would ensure that courts do not stray beyond the constitutionally dictated boundaries of their power by coercively affecting the primary conduct of litigants without first ensuring the existence of a genuine case or controversy.

No More Excuses: Toward a Workable System of Dispositive Motions in International Arbitration

This article focuses on the potential uses of dispositive motions in international arbitration. Although dispositive motions have been used sporadically in arbitration in recent years, the prevailing practice remains that arbitral claims are typically adjudicated through full documentary disclosure, the submission of witness statements, and an evidentiary hearing with testimony by fact and expert witnesses. For claims that could have been resolved on pretrial dispositive motions had they proceeded in court rather than in arbitration, this practice undermines the alleged advantage of efficiency and speed that is a selling point of arbitration. The article advocates for a workable system of dispositive motions that fits into the existing framework of international arbitration practice and institutions. It addresses some of the most commonly raised objections to the practice of dispositive motions in international arbitration, which range from the necessity of increased fact discovery to problems of enforceability. It then explains why these objections do not pose a major stumbling block. The article concludes with a discussion of possible rule changes and agreement clauses that can provide for dispositive motions.

The Meaning of “Not Innocent”

Mark MacPhail was murdered. The body of the white police officer was found fatally shot in Savannah, Georgia on August 19, 1989. Black and poor, Troy Anthony Davis was convicted of the murder and sentenced to death. Many people believe Davis innocent. In 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the District Court in Savannah to grant Davis an evidentiary hearing. Davis was found “not innocent.” Post-conviction, “not innocent” is a complex signifier. In this case it was constructed by the District Court through four interpretive lenses: Georgia's relation to the death penalty, the Anti-terrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Supreme Court rulings, and the District Court's subjective imaginary. As each of these interpretive lenses is imbued with racism, the question of whether Georgia will execute an innocent man becomes starkly real. In this paper, I examine the post-conviction construction of “not innocent” as it relates to the Troy Davis case.

Deportation, Effective Counsel, and Collateral Sanctions: Padilla v. Kentucky (2010)

In its March 31, 2010 PadiUa v. Kentucky decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that defense counsel's failure to advise a noncitizen client of the deportation conse quences of a conviction constituted ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Hailed by advocates as "momentous" (Immigrant Defense Project, 2010) and a "Gideon decision for immigrants" (Rojas, 2010), the PadiUa ruling has been greeted by supporters and detractors alike as a landmark in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Immigration statistics illustrate the decision's importance: from 2000 to 2009, more than 920,000 people were deported from the U.S. because of their crimi nal status (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010:97-103), Beyond the immigration law context, PadiUa will affect the provision of indigent defense and influence the work of prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges negotiating and accepting plea deals in state and federal courts. PadiUa's logic may prove to have even broader implications, as it could undercut the longstanding but increasingly controversial distinction between "direct" and "collateral" consequences of criminal convictions in the United States. Drugs, a Plea, and a Deportation Order: PadiUa Arrives at the Court. Jos? PadiUa lived in California and worked as a licensed truck driver. Born in Honduras, Padilla had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years. In September of 2001, the tractor-trailer truck Padilla was driving was searched in Kentucky and found to contain a large amount of marijuana. Padilla accepted a deal under which he would plead guilty to some charges and face a total sentence of ten years, with the latter five served as probation. PadiUa's attorney had told him he did not need to worry about deportation "since he had been in the country so long." This was badly wrong: virtually every drug infrac tion is a deportable offense under federal law, and deportation is now rnandatory for trafficking crimes. Padilla sought relief, arguing that his lawyer had provided ineffec tive counsel and that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known that deportation would follow a conviction. A Kentucky circuit court denied PadiUa's motion, but an appeals court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the appeals court, declaring that since "collateral consequences are outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel," Padilla was not entitled to post-conviction relief