Any French political scientist who has the ambition to write The French Voter to match the American study will now have to take into account Converse and Pierce's monument, Political Representation in France. Not only does it tell us a great deal about the subject treated, it also in the first five hundred or so pages deals at the highest intellectual level with both the common and the original traits of voting behavior, of parliamentary behavior, and of demonstrating behavior in France. It is a rare achievement of professional skill and political culture. The least inspiring part of the book was added to the initial project and deals with the unexpected events of May 1968. The variations in the number and origins of the demonstrators and of the strikers comes as no surprise, nor does the idea that they included many people who had never demonstrated or gone on strike before. The paradox of the June electoral tidal wave in favour of the government is classically explained by the excesses of a movement which was far from unpopular at the beginning. The responsiveness of the political elites once everything had returned to normal is also well known. Two interesting points, nevertheless, are worth noting. The first is that 40% of the electorate thought that the risks of a civil war were high, as against 31% only 10 years earlier, during the Algiers crisis, when a military rebellion put an end to the Fourth Republic. The second point is that the striking difference between the election results in March 1967 and those in June 1968 was due to the 16%7 of voters who changed their votes, of whom 7 out of 10 went from left to right. The finest part of this impressive book is the first half, devoted to the French parties and voters. It leaves no stone unturned and provides some convincing answers to many questions we have long asked ourselves. The unequal visibility of the parties in the French system is nicely matched with the expectations of the voters, who want an ideal system of some three or four parties. Such a system would force the parties to ally for the presidential contest and for the general election,