THE RETURN OF DEMOCRACY?____ BRAZIL AND THE SOUTHERN CONE Riordan Roett V^lentral America and the Caribbean have come to dominate the newspaper headlines in the United States in recent months. Just a few years ago, the region seldom attracted sufficient attention to merit frontpage coverage—save for the occasional coup d'état or a presidential trip. Today, all the ingredients of high drama are present: the civil war in El Salvador; the visit to the area by Pope John Paul II; the precarious condition of Mexico's economy and the fears of a spillover into the United States; and the confrontation between East and West, dramatized by the administration of Ronald Reagan and symbolized by the conduct of Cuba and Nicaragua. Far less attention is given to events in the Southern Cone and in Brazil. It is arguable, however, that the outcome ofthe gradual process of political liberalization now under way in Argentina and Brazil will, in the long run, be more important to the United States than the passion play now being acted out in Central America. Both states are important actors in the Third World. Each independently defines and pursues goals in the global arena, even if they conflict at times with those of the United States. The two states possess abundant human and natural resources that allow them to aspire to increasing influence in Latin America and the world. In addition, the eventual political outcome in the neighboring countries of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile will depend more on events in Argentina and Brazil than on those in the United States. The same cannot be said for Central America, which is currently relevant to U.S. interests only because the incumbent administration has Riordan Roett is professor of Latin American studies at SAIS, where he is also director of the Latin American Studies Program and the Center of Brazilian Studies. 59 60 SAIS REVIEW decided to make it so—not because it is as intrinsically important as the Southern Cone and Brazil. Few doubt that American power should be used to fashion a Central American and Carribean area compatible with our national interests, intelligently defined and articulated. Whether it will or not is central to the current debate about the American role in Central America. Regardless of how hard the United States "huffs and puffs," we are not in a position to blow down any houses in the southern part of South America. The nations of the region are largely autonomous and will become increasingly so as the century draws to a close. It is in the interests of the United States to do what it can to assure that the maturation process is relatively smooth, contributing to a sense of hemispheric and global responsibility. The United States must understand that divergence on a particular policy or approach to a problem does not constitute Latin American betrayal or disinterest. There should be sufficient room for differences in opinion while agreeing on a general framework for hemispheric and global affairs. In a curious way, less, rather than more, U.S. public policy in South America is most appropriate at this time. Strong support for the role of the international lending agencies and a reasonable attitude about private bank lending are, indirectly, the most positive contributions that the Reagan administration can make, together with pursuing a global economic policy that provides opportunities for growth. It is critical for the United States to avoid sending the wrong bilateral signals, such as reviewing arms sales. In that sense, a "magic of the marketplace" approach to public diplomacy is best—let the Latins determine, on their terms, both the time and the way in which they will deal with their problems. The Brazilian process of abertura (opening) has beerLthe least painful of all the moves toward redemocratization in southern South America. The military regime that seized power in 1964 wisely chose to withdraw before it was confronted with a level of popular discontent that would have precluded a dignified and nonviolent exodus. The 1964 "revolution " had been popular with the middle and upper classes, foreign investors, and the nation's moderate-conservative civilian leadership. The military-civilian regime that ensued initiated...
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