EU Engagement Research Articles

THE MUTLISTAKEHOLDER INITIATIVE APPROACH TO EUROPEAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT. CIVILIAN CSDP AND ENGAGEMENT WITH LOCAL NONSTATE ACTORS

: The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions are deployed in complex operational environments, where a plethora of national, regional and international actors are present. These present circumstances enable the existence of an - either direct or indirect - but inexorable engagement between all stakeholders involved in similar activities. While the vast majority of current debates and research focus solely on the cooperative dimension of the CSDP in the framework of multilateralism and regionalism, the topic of the EU's engagement with local stakeholders is scarcely explored. Therefore, drawing on the multistakeholder initiative approach (MSI) in economic theory, this paper assesses the engagement of CSDP missions with civil societies and private sector entities in theatres of operations. Employing a single case study approach of inquiry, consisting of the EUCAP Somalia mission this paper aims at answering the research questions: how does EUCAP Somalia engage with local non-state actors, what are the opportunities associated with this engagement and to what extent can a MSI approach be implemented by EUCAP Somalia?By deploying a qualitative research design, this paper uses document analysis within a single case study approach of inquiry. The results of this approach show two distinct tendencies. While EUCAP Somalia informally engages with local non-state actors, this engagement is rather insufficient. Results of this research further show that CSDP missions represent an important tool of EU diplomacy and their engagement with local non-state actors positively impacts the implementation of two of their core principles: local ownership and human security.

Central European strategies in the new Cold War: between balancing and bandwagoning

This article argues that the security of Central Europe – defined as stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black See–is based first and foremost on the viability and engagement of the Western alliance, understood as NATO and the European Union. The security and defense policies in the region are designed in relation to NATO and bilateral relations with the United States, with limited attempts to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency. Therefore, to understand the security of Central Europe and its individual nations, it is essential to understand their attitudes and fears related to alliances as well as their perceptions of Russia’s intentions. It is posited here that the concept that can best explain the behavior of the nations of the region, allowing also for forecasting future behavior, is the balance of threat theory, as put forward by Stephen Walt. According to the theory, the nations facing threat chose to either balance the threatening power by joining forces with other actors and forming alliances or joining in with their predator, which constitutes a bandwagoning behavior. Historically, especially during the interwar period, these strategies have been employed by Central European nations. Today, the security environment is arguably very different– we have NATO, EU, and American engagement in the region. However, the international environment has deteriorated recently, especially since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Arguably, Central European states have responded by falling, to some extent, into patterns of behavior familiar from the past, with some clinging to closer relations with their external patron (the United States) and some hedging their bets and opting for relative neutrality or even closer relations with Russia. The article argues that four factors determine states’ behavior vis-à-vis the Russian threat: geography, history, predator intentions, and the perception of allied reliability.

When and how the ‘Neighbours’ matter: ‘Immediate’ opportunity structures in the Eastern neighbourhood and policy frame-alignment by the EU

ABSTRACT The paper examines the external opportunity structures of the EU’s eastern neighbours during times of high security threat. The research investigates when and to what extent opportunities in the neighbourhood affect EU engagement and shape policy-frame alignment. The study introduces the concept of an ‘immediate’ opportunity structure and concludes that the EU’s decisions to initiate or alter policy frames towards countries in the Eastern neighbourhood are driven by immediate security-related opportunity structures that exist at the moment of decision-making. Furthermore, the EU’s decision to engage depends on whether the security threat in the region and the neighbourhood directly affects the Union’s security architecture. As the political environment in the neighbourhood becomes more open and concessions towards the EU increase, the EU boosts its engagement, reflected in its policy alignment. The paper claims that the EU strategy prioritises immediate opportunity structures over indicators of long-term achievements in target countries. This focus on immediate opportunities aims to address, create, and further expand long-term opportunity structures.

Why the European Union Needs to Clarify and Codify its Engagement with Religion

Religion was outside the European Union’s original remit and the classic secular paradigm predicted it should remain there. However, the opposite happened: religion gradually seeped into the EU legal order. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty created a legal basis and political mandate for EU engagement with religion. This article shows the new treaty provisions represent a shift towards the post-secular paradigm, but implementation of this legal obligation lack coherence and has had mixed success. The case is made for a more systematic and orderly post-secular approach to EU policy and law making, which could help the EU reach certain key objectives.

The Impact of the EU Engagement in Serbia and Albania During the First Wave of COVID-19

The Impact of the EU Engagement in Serbia and Albania During the First Wave of COVID-19

Navigating a ‘Shrinking Space’: Selective In/Visibilities and EU Engagement with Civil Society in Azerbaijan

In a context of legal and political repression, wherein even EU funding came to be politicised, Azerbaijan’s civic space has been shrinking. This article problematises EU engagement with civil society in the neighbourhood by examining its on-the-ground negotiation in a complex field of visibility. It argues that human rights groups in Azerbaijan strategically activate selective in/visibilities to navigate the competing understandings of civil society's role mobilised by the European Union and the authoritarian state. While EU support deepens the dichotomy of independent versus government-organised civil society, the emergence of new subject positions beyond the NGO realm prefigures a critique of neoliberal donor–recipient ties.

The EU and non-recognized territorial entities – the CJEU's judgment in Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo)

The coming of age of the EU as a global actor and the proliferation of its activities on the international plane entail that its courts are increasingly faced with complex and politically laden questions pertaining to territorial entities whose international legal status is far from clear. The EU's engagement with Kosovo is a salient example. Due to strong opposition by some Member States, the EU has not recognized Kosovo as an independent State, but it has developed a policy of engagement therewith. However, this pragmatic approach does not resolve the underlying political tensions and legal questions arising from the EU's dealings with non-recognized territorial entities, as Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo) attests to. The judgment is significant: (a) for the EU's growing engagement with non-recognized territorial entities since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of ‘third country’ and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies; (b) for the EU's engagement with Kosovo – particularly in the light of Kosovo's 2022 bid for EU membership; and (c) more broadly, for answering institutional questions pertaining to third-country participation in EU agencies.

The prospects and challenges of Kosovo's accession to the EU in light of the EU's policies and priorities

IntroductionThis paper analyzes the extent to which the EU's involvement in Kosovo's political and economic development has contributed to the country's progress toward democratization and European integration.MethodsThe study employs a comparative analysis of the EU's engagement with Kosovo versus other Western Balkan countries. It also utilizes a case study approach to identify the unique challenges presented by Kosovo's contested statehood. Data sources include official EU reports, agreements, commentary from experts, and economic indicators.ResultsThe findings show the EU has played a pivotal role in Kosovo through deploying its assistance instruments, facilitating the normalization dialogue with Serbia, and laying out a potential accession path. However, non-recognition by five member states, disputes with Serbia, and struggles meeting EU reform criteria impact Kosovo's integration prospects.DiscussionDespite its substantial involvement, the EU faces credibility issues in Kosovo due to ongoing hurdles thwarting Kosovo's advancement toward accession. The EU must increase its leverage over Serbia, incentivize internal reforms, and align member state positions to support Kosovo's European integration. A clearer pathway to membership in Kosovo would reinforce the EU's role in fostering peace, democracy, and prosperity in the Western Balkans.

EU cultural heritage protection actions in post conflict countries

This article provides an overview of EU policy in the field of cultural heritage protection with particular emphasis on post conflict countries. The analysis describes and evaluates the overall EU’s approach in all areas of EU engagement in this domain, towards the subject of effective mandate implementation of civilian CSDP Missions with the protection of cultural assets in their field of operation. The concluding remarks compare achievements and shortcomings of ongoing missions against their mandates and objectives, outlining some selected EU initiatives which aim at improving the EU’s performance and propose further steps in the protection of cultural heritage.The EU has contributed to reconstruction, restauration or revitalisation of cultural heritage affected by recent conflicts and crises in Libya, Iraq, Yemen, promoting at the same time social cohesion, new job creation and reconciliation. Part of recovery processes, the projects in Cameroon, Somalia, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Kosovo, Republic of Moldova, etc. have contributed to improved inter-community trust through cultural heritage protection. Resent Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has caused thousands of deaths and major economic damages, brought destruction of civilian infrastructure and considerably affected cultural heritage. Monuments, museums, archaeological sides and archives, etc. were fully destroyed or brutally damaged. This triggered EUto recognise the importance of ensuring synergies and coordination between the EU and its Member States for maximization of the impact of our actions in support for cultural heritage in conflicts and crises, and in line with the EU Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises.

Future of the European Union: challenges and prospects

The article covers the pressing issues that Brussels is challenged with, key points of its current foreign policy and a possible role of the European Union in the international arena in the near future. As the system of international relations has been transforming increasingly following the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, the present-day capacities of the Union are signifi cantly aff ected by several matters. Elaborating on them, the author focuses on the vulnerability caused by the weakened European security architecture, pivotal peculiarities of the EU engagement with Russia, its dialog across the Atlantic and with the countries in Asia, especially China, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, as well as mounting unsolved questions within the EU itself. At the same time the future of the EU disposition on the global stage is likely to be modifi ed by a multipolar world order which is taking shape right now. In this context, further collaboration across the Eurasian mainland may be formed within the so-called `Big Eurasia` format proposed by Russia.

Engaging Without Recognizing? Western Approaches to the Eurasian De Facto States

From being a relatively neglected fi eld, the study of de facto states has developed rapidly in recent years. As the break-up of the Soviet Union produced seven de facto states – four that still exist to this day (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) and three that are now defunct (Chechnya, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic) – scholars from this region have contributed greatly to the development of this fi eld. Russian scholars have been particularly active, with Russia serving as the patron state of three of the extant entities (having reintegrated/absorbed the three defunct ones), as well as of the patron of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia. But Western scholars have also made a sizeable contribution, although often working in relative isolation from “local” research. Whereas local researchers excel in in-depth knowledge of the history and culture of the region, their Western colleagues add to the comparative and theoretical approaches. And just as Russian researchers naturally focus on the relations of the Eurasian de facto states with their Russian patron, their Western counterparts often analyse the policies of their own countries towards these entities. Thus, we argue, two separate “ecosystems” of research into Eurasian de facto states have gradually developed: a “local” one and a “Western” one, each with its own peculiarities. In this article, we survey the “Western” literature on de facto states, noting the various assessments of the possibilities for US and EU engagement with the Eurasian de facto states. The scholarly literature discussing Western engagement emerges as partly analytical, explaining what Western states are doing and not doing and why, and partly normative, o ff ering policy recommendations on how best to engage. Implicit in the concept of “engagement,” however, is the understanding that engagement is preferable to “ignoring” or “sanctioning.” According to this view, Western cooperation with de facto state authorities is inevitable.

Who takes the lead? A disaggregate analysis of the EU's engagement in the Clean Energy Ministerial and Mission Innovation

Action is needed from all the major emitting economies if we are to achieve global net-zero carbon dioxide emissions. Climate action takes place at various levels of the political system. In this study, we concentrate on cooperation between the major economies on clean energy technologies in the frame of the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM; initiated in 2010) and Mission Innovation (MI; initiated in 2015). More precisely, building on research on the European Union's (EU) leadership in international climate politics, we concentrate on how the EU Commission and the EU member states have exerted leadership in these two organizations in the period 2013–2022 (for the CEM) and 2017–2022 (for MI), respectively. We use descriptive techniques and cluster analysis to investigate our original dataset. We find that, first, the EU Commission has been more active in MI than in the CEM. Interestingly the EU Commission's leadership in MI even surpasses that of the United States. Second, the EU Commission has been more active than the EU member states in MI but not in the CEM. Third, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with Italy, the Netherlands, and Denmark, stand out as particularly active in terms of (co-)leading workstreams.

Contested statehood, complex sovereignty and the European Union's role in Kosovo

ABSTRACT The emergence, longevity and resilience of contested states have redefined the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality. While fully-fledged states uphold the monopoly of authority, contested states seek to rewrite the sovereignty playbook and gain a seat among sovereign equals. This atypical antagonism, propped up by post-Westphalian statehood aspirations, has changed the way sovereignty is perceived and understood nowadays. Approaching sovereignty as multi-faceted, this article discusses contested statehood in the context of the EU's engagement overseas. Drawing on the literature of Europeanisation and complex sovereignty, it accounts for the influence of contested statehood on the EU's role and policies in contested states. Specifically, by delving into Kosovo's complex sovereignty (internal/external), the analysis measures the fluctuating impact of contestedness on the EU's employed policy frameworks and deployed crisis management tools unfolding a paradox that has defined the EU's foreign policy in Kosovo for years.

Effective Human Rights Promotion and Protection? The EU and its Member States at the UN Human Rights Council

AbstractThis article examines the EU's role as a global human rights actor through the example of its activity in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). Whilst the EU has aimed to become an effective actor in the UN overall, the key focus is the extent to which the EU can be considered an effective actor in the HRC. Here, EU action is interpreted as the combined contribution of the EU and its Member States, thereby providing a comprehensive picture of EU engagement. The EU's effectiveness is evaluated by studying its input, engagement in negotiations and goal achievement. Furthermore, perceptions of effectiveness, based on interviews, are incorporated into the analysis. The article claims that the EU can be considered an effective actor in terms of its input and achieved outcomes. It has also improved its effectiveness in negotiations. However, EU effectiveness remains conditioned by the political context of the HRC.

Switzerland: 2022 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Switzerland

Recovery was strong in 2021, but there are headwinds from the war in Ukraine. 2021 output was 1 percent higher than in 2019, but 2 percent below pre-Covid trends; unemployment is back to pre-crisis levels. Inflation has picked up (2.5 percent in April), but below other advanced economies. Strong exports/merchanting led to a higher current account surplus. Although the energy mix (nuclear, hydro) has limited exposure to Russia, exposures of commodity traders and indirect channels could be important. Growth is likely to slow to 2¼ percent in 2022 (¾ ppt. drag from the war). Risks are to the downside (war escalation, Covid developments, real estate). Covid outlays are lower in 2022, but still large (1.2 percent of GDP). Outlays related to Ukraine are likely to be accommodated as extraordinary. The Swiss National Bank is closely monitoring inflation, seeing it returning to the 0–2 percent range this year. The authorities reactivated the sectoral CCyB for residential real estate. They are pursuing pension and labor reforms, climate initiatives, energy security, and renewed EU engagement.

Italy's embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative: populist foreign policy and political marketing

Abstract Are populist governments harbingers of foreign policy disruption? The foreign policy of western Europe's first all-out populist coalition government constitutes a good window to address this question. Italy's ‘Yellow–Green’ government's decision to embrace China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019 has been understood as an important rupture from Italy's traditional Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. On the basis of substantial empirical research, especially elite interviews and official documentation, this article finds instead continuity with previous administrations' overtures to Beijing, including non-opposition from the EU and active engagement by the bureaucratic establishment. This article makes a contribution to the study of populism and foreign policy by positing that political marketing constitutes the key intervening variable that accounts for populist governments' rhetorical differentiation to local electorate and international counterparts alike. The Italian case demonstrates that populist ‘ruptures’ may well be about style and electioneering tactics, over substance and policy strategy. Considering the still growing number of governments that decide to sign into the BRI, most lately that of Argentina, policy-makers and observers ought to assess to what extent these are real commitments, or rather a smokescreen of marketing practices that does not change the relationship between China and the target country in any substantial manner.

EU Engagement with Contested Refugee Returns in Lebanon: The Aftermath of Resilience

ABSTRACT While much literature has concentrated on the EU’s policy to return people from within its borders, this article seeks to understand how the EU cooperates with refugee-hosting states beyond its borders, in its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, to uphold conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns. We build on the case of Lebanon, which hosts the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide after receiving more than one million displaced Syrians in the wake of Syria’s 2011 war, and where the EU has made tremendous investments to help build ‘resilience’ in the face of displacement. Although the UN concludes that conditions for safe return to Syria are not in place, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are now facing increasing pressure to return to their country of origin. We show that the EU’s policy rhetoric and practice on returns in Lebanon has been defined by incongruities that cast a pall on its ability to contribute to rights-based returns. In rhetoric, the EU aligns itself with international principles on return in dignity and safety – without, however, explicating its own role in realising such principles. In practice, its resilience-building approach remains at odds with such framings because it leaves the question of how resilience-building interacts with negative push factors for return in the host country unaddressed. ‘Resilience’ then contributes to the formalisation of precarity that prompts refugees to return prematurely. It is, moreover, co-opted by Lebanese politicians who argue for rash returns while pointing at the destabilising effects of what they see as imposed integration. These contestations incentivise the EU to opt for non-engagement with actual situations of contested returns so as to maintain partnerships for externalisation.

АРКТИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА ЕС: ПРАВОВОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ НА СОВРЕМЕННОМ ЭТАПЕ

The article examines in detail current & fundamental document of the EU about the Arctic — Joint Communication of the Commission and High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions № JOIN(2021) 27 final «A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic» (13.10.2021), which acts as new basic document of the EU’s Arctic policy, and defines it for the nearest 4-5 years. The context of document adoption, role & interests of the European Union in Arctic are considered. While sequentially analyzing the document, for each of its goals & sections author of the article examines relevant sources of law (treaties, EU acts), sets forth his legal assessment and proposes recommendations on the most disputable aspects (issues of oil & gas resources extraction and application of Svalbard treaty [1920]). Following the results of analysis, the progress advantages and omissions of the document are highlighted. Author of the article draws a conclusion, that such gaps are reserves for upgrading future EU documents on Arctic.

Moving Beyond Geopolitical Boundaries to Secure Democracy in Southeast Asia: Projecting EU in The QUAD

COVID-19 Pandemic has changed state’s view about development. After several economic damages, the plan to bounce back from pandemic impacts is by adopting GDP-ism development which sacrificing democracy. In Southeast Asia, The trend of deconsolidation of democracy indicated by several events such as military coup in Myanmar and protest against Omnibus Law in Indonesia. At the same time, 2020 also marked a revival of Quadrilateral talk between US, Australia, Japan, and India concerning China’s growing influence in Indo-Pacific region. Many scholars observe this cooperation is involving security strategy to contain China’s influence. But yet there are not many writings about democratization process as a way to hold China’s influence especially in Southeast Asia region. This paper is aimed to show that maintaining democracy is important for QUAD to secure their interests and this effort can involve parties beyond geopolitical boundaries. Hence, this paper would like to seek how EU engagement in QUAD can support democratization process in Southeast Asia by considering its economic influence and domestic politic situation in the region. Furthermore, as post-COVID-19 development is concerned in this paper, It is important to seek how democracy can contribute to foster state economic development and become alternative to Chinese development.

Community Resilience in Belarus and the EU response

Community Resilience in Belarus and the EU response