Eurosceptic Attitudes Research Articles

The media coverage of the European Union and the extreme right. A comparative study between Spain, France, and Italy

The parliamentary representation of far-right political parties is growing in several European Union countries, particularly after the Great Recession. This has increased the media attention they receive. These parties share eurosceptic positions or question the idea of European integration, but does their rise alter public discussion on the European Union? Using a quantitative content analysis (N=974) conducted in 6 media outlets: El País and El Mundo (Spain), Le Monde and Le Figaro (France), and Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica (Italy), the research describes and compares media coverage on issues related to the European Union before and after the Great Recession and how the rise of the far-right has affected the European public sphere. The results indicate that public discussion about the European Union is in decline and that national and top-down Europeanisation approaches are on the rise, coinciding with increased coverage of the far-right.

The hidden side of Social Europe: Revealing welfare Euroscepticism through focus group discussions

AbstractWhile the public opinion literature on Social Europe is growing, so far, it relies on quantitative survey evidence that hides some of the arguments and motivations lying behind the standardized results. This article reveals through qualitative research that ‘welfare Euroscepticism’ (i.e., opposition towards Social Europe) needs more attention in the literature and explains why. Specifically, this article uses qualitative focus group discussions on Social Europe collected in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain (134 participants in total). The participants filled out a quantitative survey before the discussions started and these survey results are in line with the usual public opinion literature on Social Europe, that is, relatively supportive of the social dimension of the EU. However, multi‐faceted welfare Eurosceptic attitudes appeared throughout the discussion. While participants may support the general idea of a Social Europe, they are highly critical about how it actually works in practice. The analysis reveals that the public is sceptic towards both harmonizing social policies on the EU level and redistributive social policy instruments on the EU level. Three overarching and partly overlapping rationales appear to drive welfare Euroscepticism: (1) economic self‐interest, (2) cultural ideology and (3) the democratic deficit. The results emphasize the public preferences for more conditional redistributive policies and the need to make Social Europe more visible to the public.

Euroscepticism and anti-establishment parties in Europe

ABSTRACT This article explores the relationship between party-based Euroscepticism and parties taking anti-establishment positions in contemporary Europe to map the relationship between these positions. The paper reports on an expert-informed qualitative comparative classification (EiQCC) of parties in 30 European countries conducted 2018–2019 to present a classification of 77 parties as Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. With this, we show that there were a number of different clusters of parties with various relationships between anti-establishment and Eurosceptic positions. The largest cluster showed a strong association between anti-establishment discourses and Euroscepticism. But there were also significant clusters where there was little or no interaction and were either anti-establishment and not Eurosceptic, or Eurosceptic without being anti-establishment. We also identify clusters where there was a weak association between anti-establishment and Eurosceptic positions and where anti-establishment parties had Eurosceptic stances but their position on European integration was either very weakly articulated or of very low salience.

정당차원의 유럽회의주의

Assuming that party-based Euroscepticism could expand to citizens’ Euroscepticism and bring about changes in party system in European countries, this study seeks to understand the characteristic of Eurosceptic parties and to explore the motivations leading these parties to adopt Eurosceptic positions. In particular, it tests whether their Eurosceptic positions are driven by differentiation-strategy motivation or by ideology based motivation. Analysing parties from 17 Western European member states and 11 Central and Eastern European member states, this study demonstrates clearly that parties’ Euroscepticism is driven first and foremost by the ideology based on nationalism or populism. This finding implies that party-based Euroscepticism could affect not only sustainability of European integration but also party system in Europe.

Sovereignty-based euroscepticism

As globalisation trends have broadened, the problem of sovereignty has arisen to what extent can a state be free to shape its own policies when, as a member of international organisations, it has surrendered part of its sovereignty in favor of certain benefits. The aim of my presentation is to introduce the Eurosceptic position and to try to outline the extent to which objections to the Union can be considered legitimate in terms of the sovereignty issue. To examine this, I will mainly use examples from Hungary, while I will mainly try to support the pro-EU position with international literature. My basic hypothesis is that the rise in anti-EU sentiment today is mainly since those different social groups and institutions, such as the state, civil society and individuals, interpret EU policy through different dimensions of the concept of sovereignty, which significantly distorts the information communicated by EU institutions.

The reverberations of British Brexit politics abroad

How do foreign political events shape voters’ evaluation of policies whose outcomes are hard to observe? We argue that policy-specific political processes abroad provide information about the policy's feasibility and desirability that allows voters to update their preferences. We analyze how key events in British Brexit politics affected attitudes towards the European Union in other European countries. The results of ‘unexpected events during survey' designs, a natural experiment, and a panel analysis show that events highlighting the difficulties of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union led to a higher support of European integration in remaining member states, whereas an event highlighting the opportunities of Brexit resulted in more Eurosceptic attitudes. The article demonstrates that foreign events can influence voters’ policy attitudes in other countries, highlighting the systemic consequences of events like Brexit.

Measuring Receptivity to Eurosceptic Media Discourses in the Vicinity of War: Evidence from Romania

Ever since its accession to the EU, Romania was considered an exceptional case among member states, given the unwavering high levels of popular support for the EU. However, the most recent elections held in Romania brought about the unexpected emergence of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), a far-right populist party that strongly opposes the European project, which it accuses of resembling “a harmful hegemony.” The war in Ukraine represented another chance for AUR to bash the EU for its reaction in supporting Ukraine. The current article examines the degree to which anti-EU appeals of AUR influence Eurosceptic attitudes in Romania. In doing so, the present research pursues two distinct, but complementary goals. The first is to perform a content analysis of Eurosceptic narratives disseminated by AUR through its main social media channels since the start of the war. The second goal is then, employing four logistic regression models and using unique data collected through an online interactive survey, to test which of these narratives matter the most in shaping Eurosceptic attitudes. The article allows us to develop a nuanced understanding of what triggered a change of heart in a significant part of the Romanian electorate vis-à-vis the EU and the influence of Eurosceptic media discourse in this sense.

The ‘pure polish people’ vs the ‘European elite’ – how do populism and Euroscepticism interact in Polish politics?

ABSTRACT There is a notable correlation between Eurosceptic and populist political actors, discourses and agendas across Europe. Since 2015, the ongoing conflict between Poland and the European Commission concerning the rule of law has brought European integration to the centre of Polish politics. The main focus of this article is on the relationship and interaction between populism and Euroscepticism, as analysed through the example of Polish political parties. To this end, the article investigates the different forms of EU contestation by Polish populist right-wing parties and assesses the extent to which these are expressed through populist discourse. We find a strong correlation between populist and Eurosceptic attitudes of Polish political parties. With the growing number of populist parties entering the mainstream and ‘uncivil society’ actors transforming into political parties, the anti-elitist discourse generates a need to locate the ‘corrupted elites’ outside of the national power structures.

Brexit Dilemma and the Future of Euroscepticism

The United Kingdom (UK) has always been sceptical towards the European integration initiative and European Union (EU) membership has been a controversial issue in UK politics throughout the decades. Following the historic referendum questioning the UK’s EU membership, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU (Brexit) has been on the top of the agenda both in the UK and the EU. Brexit referendum result raised concerns about the impact of UK’s exit from the EU on other EU member states’ (MS) perceptions on EU full membership and the future of EU integration. Thus, there were concerns whether Eurosceptic tendencies would increase among the political parties. In this framework, the purpose of the article is to discuss the extent to which the UK's decision to leave the EU has affected the Eurosceptic attitudes of political parties towards the EU. Although there were concerns whether Brexit would trigger a domino effect that would pose a threat to European integration, the public and political support towards EU integration and full membership remained mostly moderate. Devoting specific focus to the impact of Brexit on the future of Euroscepticism, this paper also discusses why Brexit appears to have less impact on Eurosceptic tendencies of political parties than it was anticipated. However, Euroscepticism in the MSs is likely to depend on the series of future crises the EU would face and the future success of the UK-EU relations.

EU-sentiment predicts the 2016 Dutch referendum vote on the EU’s association with Ukraine better than concerns about Russia or national discontent

This article utilises large-N panel data to compare two theories of referendum voting behaviour in order to understand the ‘for’ or ‘against’ vote in the 2016 Dutch referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It studies the extent to which voting behaviour was predicted by Eurosceptic attitudes and fear of upsetting Russia (issue-based theory), versus dissatisfaction with the Dutch government and general political discontent (second-order theory). Our findings indicate that issue-based determinants predict the referendum vote better than second-order predictors. However, Eurosceptic attitudes and government satisfaction both outperform concerns about the relationship with Russia as a predictor. We thus provide evidence that the issue-based and second-order approaches to explain voting in EU referendums are complementary, but not equal in explanatory strength.

Being European, the nationalist way: Europe in the discourse of radical right parties

European radical right parties (RRPs) have recently experienced strong electoral success and have strengthened their positions within the European Parliament. While their Eurosceptic positions are well documented in the literature, the fact that most RRPs refer not only to their nations but to Europe in general in order to ground their nationalist visions remains understudied. We investigate this issue by analyzing the discourses of MEPs from 24 radical right parties in the 8th legislature of the European Parliament (2014–2019). Relying on a vast corpus (36,413 speeches) and using quantitative text analysis, this research sheds light on the various notions of Europe that are used by radical right MEPs. We find evidence of three visions of Europe: as a civilization; as an ethno-religious community; and as a liberal society. The use and preferences for these visions vary according to ideological positions, strategies and national contexts.

Politicisation of Immigration in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from Plenary Debates in Two Countries

ABSTRACT The research on the party politicization of immigration almost exclusively focuses on West European countries. To address the lack of studies of party politicization (hereafter understood as salience) of immigration in Central and East European countries, we investigate all the parliamentary speeches in Czechia and Slovakia between 2013 and 2017. Descriptively, we show that immigration was almost invisible before the 2015 refugee crisis. On the explanatory level, we show that party placement toward the TAN-pole of the GAL–TAN dimension, Eurosceptic positions, and government participation make it more likely for parliamentarians to politicize immigration.

Does immigration boost public Euroscepticism in European Union member states?

A number of studies have established a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes. But does this relationship necessarily imply that more immigration would increase public Euroscepticism in member states of the European Union? I evaluate this question by analyzing immigration data and Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2009–2017. The analysis shows no evidence that individual levels of Euroscepticism increase with actual levels of immigration. This result suggests that a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes does not necessarily translate into a strong link between immigration levels and public Euroscepticism. Public Euroscepticism can still be low even if immigration levels are high.

Fellow travelers or Trojan horses? Similarities across pro-Russian parties’ electorates in Europe

Scholarship analyzing Russia’s influence in Europe has focused primarily on the supply-side of this relationship, especially on the links between the Kremlin and specific parties. Surprisingly few studies have focused on the demand-side. My paper fills in this gap. First, I compile a dataset of pro-Russian parties in the European Union and show that Russia-sympathizers are found across different (left and right) party families. Second, I demonstrate that supporters of these parties across different party families show stronger Eurosceptic attitudes than the electorates of mainstream parties. This finding explains the endorsement of narratives and policies indirectly favorable to the Kremlin by political actors whose electorates harbor Eurosceptic sympathies. It also sheds some light on the opportunistic rather than ideological nature of Russia’s influence operations in the European Union, which exploit opportunities presented in respective regions. In other words, these parties are the Kremlin’s fellow travelers.

Indifferent and Eurosceptic: The motivations of EU-only abstainers in the 2019 European Parliament election

Despite the dramatic voter turnout increase in 2019, the participation level in European Parliament elections is still considerably lower than in national elections. How can we explain this persistent ‘Euro gap’? This article analyses the motivations of citizens who participate in national but not in European electoral contests, the so-called ‘EU-only abstainers’. The empirical analysis based on the EES 2019 voter study reveals that EU-only abstention is driven by low levels of general political interest and EU-specific political sophistication, as well as by distrust towards EU institutions. Therefore, the Euro gap results from the widespread perception that there is ‘less at stake’ during EP elections, but it is also an aggregate-level consequence of individual Eurosceptic attitudes. These findings have important implications for our understanding of present-day European elections and the debate between the two most common theoretical approaches in EP election research.

Ιs ‘Old Southern Europe’ Still Eurosceptic? Determinants of Mass Attitudes before, during and after the Eurozone Crisis

ABSTRACT One of the consequences of the eurozone crisis in the countries of ‘Old Southern Europe’ is the shift from pro-European to eurosceptic attitudes. Our overarching goal is to assess whether these critical stances towards the EU are more conjunctural or long-lasting. We further aim to analyse the determinants of euroscepticism at the micro-level before, during and after the emergence of the eurozone crisis. Our analysis reveals that euroscepticism is of a more conjunctural nature in Spain and Portugal, yet more structural in Italy and Greece. Moreover, our findings show that cultural and political/institutional approaches, but also political/ideological ones, better explain South European euroscepticism before, during and after the crisis when compared to utilitarian/economic approaches.

Beyond Europe: Alternative visions of Europe amongst young activists in self-managed spaces in Italy

ABSTRACT This article explores the attitude towards Europe of young activists in self-managed spaces in Italy, and the extent to which the crises the EU endured in the last decade shape their visions. Unlike pre-financial crisis social movements, in the second decade of the 2000s progressive social movements adopted radical Eurocritical attitudes and shifted towards Eurosceptic positions. The article indicates that young activists in Italian self-managed spaces mainly criticise the economic element of the European integration process and the functioning of the EU institutions. They still refer to the European sphere as the principal field of political intervention, but propose an alternative organisational model oriented by the principles of democratic confederalism and libertarian municipalism in which local, autonomous communities are horizontally connected. This article contributes to the study of Europeanisation and social movements literature by shedding light on a political alternative to the EU grounded on prefigurative practices and a self-managed society.

Antecedents of leaving the European Union: The role of nostalgia and attitudes towards diversity in Spain, Italy, and Greece

ABSTRACT This study analyzes public attitudes towards Euroscepticism in three Mediterranean countries: Spain, Italy and Greece. Specifically, drawing upon cultural backlash theory, we investigate how the general feeling of nostalgia and the rejection of neoliberal values like social and cultural diversity affect citizens’ Eurosceptic attitudes and thus their willingness to leave the European Union. Based on survey data from the Pew Research Centre, we first find that attitudes towards ethnic, religious and racial diversity predict citizens’ willingness to leave the European Union in Spain and Italy, but not in Greece, whereas citizens with higher levels of nostalgia are more prone to leave the European Union in Spain and Greece, but not in Italy. Finally, attitudes towards diversity are explored as a moderator over the relationship between citizens’ perceptions of their country’s economic situation and Eurosceptic attitudes. This article contributes to current discussions on Euroscepticism, arguing that cultural backlash theory might play a crucial role in accounting for citizens’ cultural and political attitudes towards the EU.

The Eurosceptical and Autonomous Discourses on the Process of European Integration of the Czech Republic

The peculiarities of the attitude of the two leading Czech political parties regarding the process of European integration through the prism of the effectiveness of the protection of national interests at the supranational level are analyzed in the given article. While conducting this study, it was revealed, that once it became clear that accession to the European Union would inevitably require certain national concessions from the Czech Republic, the leading Civic Democratic Party began to declare an increasingly Eurosceptic position. Gradually, EU membership was considered by it only through the prism of realizing the economic interests of the country. Civic Democrats have become even more vigorous opponents of deepening European integration and have strongly opposed the adoption of a common EU Constitution and federalization and have opposed any attempt to alienate part of national sovereignty in favor of the EU, since the Czech Republic joined the European Union. The author emphasizes that the disapproval by CDP of further European integration is explained by the historical fears of many Czechs, who are convinced that the development of the EU in a federal direction is in line with German interests and aspirations to dominate in Europe. The author also stresses on the fact, that the anti-German attitude of the Civic Democrats stems from the history of relations between two nations which have never been friendly and is explained by fears about further economic expansion of Germany in the Czech Republic. It was found that the discourse of Czech Communists on European integration is quite autonomous, because, in contrast to the CDP (and in general to all other parliamentary parties of the country), which although remains critical of the EU, but it does not question the Czech Republic membership in the European Union, the Communist Party does not consider any prospects for the functioning of the EU at all, and it does not consider the expediency of Czech Prepublic membership in it. Key words: Czech Republic; European integration; Civic Democratic Party; Communist Party of the Czech Republic and Moravia; Euroscepticism; Autonomist discourse.

Євроскептичний і автономістський дискурси щодо європейської інтеграції Чехії

The peculiarities of the attitude of the two leading Czech political parties regarding the process of European integration through the prism of the effectiveness of the protection of national interests at the supranational level are analyzed in the given article. While conducting this study, it was revealed, that once it became clear that accession to the European Union would inevitably require certain national concessions from the Czech Republic, the leading Civic Democratic Party began to declare an increasingly Eurosceptic position. Gradually, EU membership was considered by it only through the prism of realizing the economic interests of the country. Civic Democrats have become even more vigorous opponents of deepening European integration and have strongly opposed the adoption of a common EU Constitution and federalization and have opposed any attempt to alienate part of national sovereignty in favor of the EU, since the Czech Republic joined the European Union. The author emphasizes that the disapproval by CDP of further European integration is explained by the historical fears of many Czechs, who are convinced that the development of the EU in a federal direction is in line with German interests and aspirations to dominate in Europe. The author also stresses on the fact, that the anti-German attitude of the Civic Democrats stems from the history of relations between two nations which have never been friendly and is explained by fears about further economic expansion of Germany in the Czech Republic. It was found that the discourse of Czech Communists on European integration is quite autonomous, because, in contrast to the CDP (and in general to all other parliamentary parties of the country), which although remains critical of the EU, but it does not question the Czech Republic membership in the European Union, the Communist Party does not consider any prospects for the functioning of the EU at all, and it does not consider the expediency of Czech Prepublic membership in it.