European Union Common Fisheries Research Articles

Fishing against the odds: fishers\u2019 motivations to carry on fishing in the wake of the hindering EU Common Fishery Policy\u2014a case study in North Shields, UK

The UK’s fishing industry has contracted considerably since 1972 due to overfishing, increased fuel prices, and implementation of the European Union (EU) Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Despite this decline affecting the industry at large and the incomes of fishers, some fishers have carried on, or even freshly started or returned to the business. Why have these fishers done so despite the challenges they encounter in the fishing industry? In this article, we investigate why some fishers still choose to fish in the wake of all the EU regulations designed to control overfishing by reducing the size of the industry and discouraging entry by taking measures that affect revenues. Our data are collected through ethnographic research involving participant observation and interviews with fishers in North Shields, England. Based on our findings, we argue that the decision to carry on fishing, or even to return, is predominantly based on so-called intrinsic motivations, rather than on cost-benefit calculations, and stems from three interlinked basic human emotional needs which fishing seems to fulfil: the need to connect (sometimes also defined as the need to relate or belong); the desire for autonomy; and the desire to show competence (and have that competence recognized by relevant others). As such, the findings offer a fresh way to explain fishers’ decisions, based on a deliberated choice, to remain or leave the sector, and to understand and interrogate the challenges confronting present-day fishing both on a local level in the UK and also for Europe at large.

A tale of two seas: a meta‐analysis of crustacean stocks in the NE Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea

AbstractMeta‐analysis of marine biological resources can elucidate general trends and patterns to inform scientists and improve management. Crustacean stocks are indispensable for European and global fisheries; however, studies of their aggregate development have been rare and confined to smaller spatial and temporal scales compared to fish stocks. Here, we study the aggregate development of 63 NE Atlantic and Mediterranean crustacean stocks of six species (Nephrops norvegicus, Pandalus borealis, Parapenaeus longirostris, Aristeus antennatus, Aristaeomorpha foliacea and Squilla mantis) in 1990–2013 using biomass index data from official stock assessments. We implemented a dynamic factor analysis (DFA) to identify common underlying trends in biomass indices and investigate the correlation with the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) index. The analysis revealed increasing and decreasing trends in the northern and southern NE Atlantic, respectively, and stable or slowly increasing trends in the Mediterranean, which were not related to NAO. A separate meta‐analysis of the fishing mortality (F) and biomass (B) of 39 analytically assessed crustacean stocks was also carried out to explore their development relative to MSY. NE Atlantic crustacean stocks have been exploited on average close to FMSY and remained well above BMSY in 1995–2013, while Mediterranean stocks have been exploited 2–4 times above FMSY in 2002–2012. Aggregate trends of European crustacean stocks are somewhat opposite to trends of fish stocks, suggesting possible cascading effects. This study highlights the two‐speed fisheries management performance in the northern and southern European seas, despite most stocks being managed in the context of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy.

An alternative reference point in the context of ecosystem-based fisheries management: maximum sustainable dead biomass

Abstract Under the 2013 Reform of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), fisheries management aims to ensure that, within a reasonable time frame, the exploitation of marine biological resources restores and maintains populations of harvested stocks above levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The CFP also calls for the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management (EBFM). In this paper, we present the concept of maximum sustainable dead biomass (MSDB) and its associated management reference points for fishing mortality and spawning-stock biomass as alternatives to those associated with MSY. The concept of MSDB is illustrated by a dynamic pool production model of a virtual fish stock which takes into account variations in natural mortality (M), fishing mortality (F), and exploitation pattern. Our approach implies a compensatory mechanism whereby survivors may benefit from compensatory density dependence and is implemented through progressive substitution of M with F for varying rates of total mortality (Z). We demonstrate that the reference points for fishing mortality and spawning-stock biomass associated with MSDB are less sensitive to increasing compensation of M with F than those associated with MSY and more sensitive to changes in selection pattern. MSDB-based reference points, which are consistent with maximum stock productivity, are also associated with lower fishing mortality rates and higher stock biomasses than their MSY-based counterparts. Given that selection pattern can be influenced through fishery input measures (e.g. technical gear measures, decisions on areas, and/or times of fishing), whereas variations of M in response to F are not controllable (indeed poorly understood), that the results of many fish stock assessments are imprecise, that maximum stock productivity corresponds to MSDB and that MSY-based reference points may best be considered as limits, we propose that MSDB-based reference points provide a more appropriate basis for management under an EBFM.

The short-term impacts of implementing catch quotas and a discard ban on English North Sea otter trawlers

Abstract A key objective of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy reforms is the elimination of discards and a reduction in unwanted catches. Combining a discard ban with catch quotas, where all fish, independent of size, count towards quotas could create economic incentives for more selective fishing, reducing unwanted catches. We use fishing activities data from English North Sea otter trawlers to examine the impact of these measures on this fleet. Initial impacts depend on the scale of increase and distribution of quotas and are unevenly distributed, depending on catch and discard characteristics of vessels. Selective fishing will be rewarded as vessels that currently have low discards could increase catches and profits. Fishing by less selective vessels will be curtailed, reducing profits by 1–14%. This could be partially mitigated through reducing regulated catches but will require changes to fishing patterns as using currently available selective fishing gears may impact on profitability. So, catch quotas and a discard ban create strong incentives for more selective fishing practices, but also for non-compliance with full documentation of catches. A high level of monitoring and enforcement will be required to ensure that fishers improve profitability through more selective fishing practices rather than illegal discarding.

The transformation of Scottish fisheries: Sustainable interdependence from ‘net to plate’

The European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is often considered inflexible and inherently failing. Yet, the recent experience of Scottish fisheries suggests that change is possible. Not confining themselves to limiting visions of the CFP, private collective and public actors across the industry in Scotland have worked to give new meaning to fisheries practices through institutionalizing their own understandings of sustainability. This is not just rhetoric. Rather, industry conditions of collapsing stocks have been re-problematized; new spaces of public/private action have been created and engaged in; new incentive-based policy instruments have been designed and operationalized. Throughout, interconnections between natural and social orders have been acknowledged and built into policymaking processes. However, these transformations could not have been achieved if other forms of political and economic interdependence had not also been recognised and worked upon. These include techno-political interdependencies of knowledge; spatial interdependencies of territory and domain interdependencies of production and commercial practices. It is active awareness of these which ultimately enabled actors to transform their fisheries from ‘net to plate’.

The Problem of Regulation in EU Fisheries

The European Union's common fisheries policy is undergoing reform but the essential problem, in that those exploiting the resource bear no responsibility for its sustainable maintenance, is not addressed. The proposals devised by the Commission for reform are expressly predicated on the tragedy of the commons. The Commission subscribes to the concept of property as regulation and proposes to address the problems of overfishing and overcapacity through an ecosystem-based approach with a ban on discards, the adoption of multiannual plans and the introduction of a target to restore stocks, together with a system of transferable fishing concessions for appropriators to engender a greater sense of responsibility. However, the inability of complex fisheries regulation to redress degradation suggests its utility may be coming to an end and that the Commission should look to market-based solutions and impose the cost of marine fisheries depletion on those permitted to extract from the resource.

Atlantic Salmon Fishery in the Baltic Sea — A Case of Trivial Cooperation?

This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting countries, under the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy, has been superficial. Combining a two-stage game of four countries with a comprehensive bioeconomic model, we conclude that cooperation under the Relative Stability Principle is not a stable outcome. In contrast, the equilibrium of the game is full non-cooperation. The paper also addresses the possibility of enhancing cooperation through more flexible fishing strategies and sharing schemes. The results show that partial cooperation can be sustained and that there are substantial economic benefits to reallocating fishing effort among harvesting countries.

Rebuilding EU fish stocks and fisheries, a process under way?

Abstract As a signatory to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), the European Union (EU) has made a commitment to maintain or restore fish stocks to levels that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and where possible not later than 2015. So how has the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) fared in trying to achieve this objective? The development of the status of 41 commercially exploited fish stocks from the North East Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea (FAO Area 27) was analysed together with the economic performance of the fleets exploiting those stocks. The analyses indicate that the exploitation status for many of the stocks has greatly improved during the last 10 years while the economic performance of the fleets over the same period has been highly variable. The main economic indicators (gross value added (GVA) and operating cash flow (OCF)) have gradually improved at a time when the general economic situation, which has a great influence on the markets, costs and purchase power, has worsened. While recognizing that much remains to be done to achieve the objective of the WSSD, the analyses indicate that actions implemented in the last decade under the CFP have led to an improvement in the status of many commercially important fish stocks and their fleets towards levels that are closer to those producing MSY.

Estimating the impacts of eliminating fisheries subsidies on the small island economy of the Azores

A major problem affecting world fisheries today is overcapacity of which overfishing is both a cause and a consequence. There is a general consensus that fisheries subsidies cause great harm to the resource by exacerbating the problems resulting from the common resource issues of fisheries leading to overexploitation of the resource through a new set of perverse incentives. Many now advocate that subsidies should gradually be terminated, and that capacity enhancing and fuel subsidies should be terminated immediately. On account of the global fisheries crises, highly subsidised fisheries and the anticipated reforms of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy this study aimed to estimate the impact of eliminating fisheries subsidies on various macro and micro economic variables pertaining to the regional economy of the Azores using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model based on a social accounting matrix. The simulation results suggest that reduction, and in particular, elimination of fisheries subsidies would have a substantial effect on the region, however, the negative social and economic effects would be largely confined to the fishing sector. Conversely, the augmentation of fishery subsidies would benefit the fishing sector with an overall adverse effect on the rest of the economy.

Reform of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy: Making Fisheries Management Work

On the eve of the long awaited debate on reforming the CFP, Making Fisheries Management Work offers a new perspective on why some systems succeed and others fail. The authors contrast the smooth transfer between policy formulation and implementation in Norway with the weaknesses inherent in a two-tier governance system involving Denmark and the EU where implementation drift can subvert the original policy intention. The Commission's Green Paper on reforming the CFP recognises the symptoms but not the causes of poor implementation. Rather than seek to bring discipline to the implementation process, the main thrust of its proposals is to rebalance management responsibilities by devolving decision making to the regions and in effect creating a three-tier system of governance. An interesting debate is likely between those who favour a relaxation of central management and those who fear its consequences.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism, and British and German perceptions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy

The aim of this paper is to determine whether British and German sea fisheries policies have been shaped by domestic factors or by European Union (EU) institutions. To achieve this aim, British and German perceptions of the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) were compared using two alternative theories of EU integration: Moravscik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Pierson's Historical Institutionalism. The perceptions of three sets of respondents—fisheries scientists, fishers, and politicians—were investigated in each country to determine whether they saw the CFP as a means of attaining their own nation's domestic fisheries agenda (as Liberal Intergovernmentalism would argue), or as an institutional champion of European fisheries as a whole (as might be predicted by Historical Institutionalism). The article concludes that although there were elements of both theories evident in each country's perceptions, British perceptions were more strongly indicative of Historical Institutionalism than Liberal Intergovernmentalism, and German perceptions were more strongly indicative of Liberal Intergovernmentalism than Historical Institutionalism. This difference is exemplified in Britain's euroscepticism (which sees EU institutions as obstacles to British fisheries’ interests), and Germany's environmentalism (which sees EU institutions as synchronising with Germany's national priorities).

Taking Actors' Preferences and the Institutional Setting Seriously: the EU Common Fisheries Policy

The recent bifurcation of European studies into state-centric and new institutionalist camps has resulted in a sterile theoretical debate that says little about an empirical world where bargaining outcomes cover both member states' preferences and the institutional setting. This article is an attempt to move beyond the theoretical debate. It juxtaposes a conceptual framework for analyzing EU negotiations with an analysis of the bargaining process on the settlement of the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy. The conceptual framework will identify a set of variables that can explain the bargaining outcome: preferences of national government representatives, preferences of the European Commission, and the institutional setting.

Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a study of failure in the European Union's Common Fisheries Policy

Abstract Within the European Union, scientific fisheries research and advice is passed down a chain of central European institutions before being incorporated into policy. However, advice is often poorly or only partially implemented and the system has largely failed to achieve sustainable fisheries management. This paper aims to explain why, by examining the use of fisheries science within the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The problem is examined with respect to both the political system and fisheries science, to show that the factors in both the supply, and the subsequent use, of scientific data inhibit effective fisheries management.