European Union Sanctions Research Articles

Cape Town Convention and international sanctions: the case of European Union sanctions against Russia

The Cape Town Convention, while focused on a relatively specialised area of international finance, forms part of the broader system of international law and interacts in various ways with the other rules of that system, including international sanctions. This article explores the relationship between sanctions and the Cape Town Convention regime, taking as a case study the implications of the recent EU sanctions regime against Russia for the Registry established under the Aircraft Protocol and based within the EU. The increasing prominence of sanctions as a tool within the international legal system requires those who interact with the Convention regime, and their advisers, to keep international sanctions under review. In the case of EU sanctions against Russia, notwithstanding their very wide reach, the sanctions appear to have very limited effect on the activities of the Registry. Moreover, the privileged status of the Convention within the EU legal order arguably provides a significant level of protect...

Beyond Intergovernmentalism: The Europeanization of Restrictive Measures?

The functioning of the European Union (EU) has been explored extensively in recent years. The dominant prism through which to look at the EU is still one of locus: i.e. whether decisions are made in the capitals of its member states or in Brussels. This debate is contained in the dualism between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, but drawing the boundaries between the two concepts is still undone. This article attempts to contribute to solving this problem by investigating the restrictive measures policy of the EU in order to identify three conditions under which intergovernmentalism should be used. First, when EU institutions are dependent on EU member states for information and expertise; second, when decision-making powers rest mainly in EU capitals; and three, when there are no exclusive fora for decision-making in Brussels. The study of the restrictive measures of the European Union does not meet any of these three conditions; therefore the article argues that the concept of supranational intergovernmentalism offers useful insights to understand the EU security governance of CFSP sanctions. The article is divided into four parts. The first introduces the debate on security governance and justifies the selection of this specific approach to the study of sanctions. The second part presents the restrictive measures policy of the European Union and justifies its pertinence to the field of security. The third part of the article investigates the emerging patterns in security governance by testing the three conditions on the decision-making process for EU restrictive measures. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main argument and indicates ways forward in the study of EU sanctions from a governance perspective.

The effectiveness of UN and EU sanctions: lessons for the twenty-first century

A fractious UN Security Council has contributed to the decline in effectiveness of a number of UN sanctions adopted in recent years. Yet they remain a tool of the Council, for example with regard to Libya in 2011. The challenge is to understand how UN, country (US) and regional sanctions (EU, AU, Arab League) can be meaningful in such a climate. The four books reviewed make various suggestions, from clarity of mandate to better evaluating impact. Mikael Eriksson's Targeting peace seeks to evaluate the complexity of the sanctions policy process. He argues that effectiveness comes partly from understanding politics (episodes of sanctions), but also from institutional reform—‘black box’ processes, as he calls them. Sanctions are more successful as part of a wider package. Clara Portela in European Union sanctions and foreign policy examines the use of sanctions as a political tool, including the suspension of development aid and the withdrawal of trade privileges. She shows how the EU plays an important role in signalling and constraining when UN sanctions are weak. For example, informal measures like the 2003 EU decision to invite only dissidents to national day receptions in Havanna resulted in the release of detainees that it had aimed for. The high rate of success of development aid cut-off stands in sharp contrast with EU Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions. The unintended consequence of good intentions is also highlighted by both Portela and Eriksson—Zimbabwe in particular but also Cote d'Ivoire and Iran pose similar challenges. The imposition of EU or UN sanctions is easier than reaching consensus to lift them, although events in Burma (Myanmar) in 2012 have resulted in smooth suspensions of most US and EU sanctions. All four books show that targeted sanctions cannot be seen as stand-alone measures, nor assessed in isolation. Sanctions are multi-faceted and require detailed assessment of political context, episode and institutional process.

Decision-Making in the Dark? – Autonomous EU Sanctions and National Classification

In the past decade, the European Union (EU) has taken an active role in counter-terrorism. Amongst the EU’s counter-terrorist policies, sanctions (asset freezing) remain the cornerstone. The EU runs two different regimes of counter-terrorist sanctions: autonomous EU sanctions and EU sanctions implementing UN lists of terrorist suspects. The core problem under both regimes remains that the high level of secrecy makes fair procedures impossible. The effective sharing of information between the EU and its Member States is crucial to the quality of decisions under the autonomous EU sanctions procedure where the Council lists a person as a terrorist based on the decision of a competent national authority. The Council cannot simply take over a national decision that someone is a terrorist without independently assessing the situation. In this regard, national classification as confidential will not be enough to justify not sharing the relevant information with the judiciary. However, sharing confidential information with the EU Courts requires a legal framework under which this information can be protected. In an area as sensitive as counter-terrorism, closed material procedures should not be ruled out without further consideration.

Book Review: European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy. When and Why Do They Work?, by Clara Portela. (London/New York: Routledge, 2010)

Book Review: <i>European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy. When and Why Do They Work?</i>, by Clara Portela. (London/New York: Routledge, 2010)

From Bilateral Trade to Multilateral Pressure: A Scenario of European Union Relations with Sudan

This paper investigates the economic consequences of a scenario in which the European Union (EU) imposes economic sanctions on Sudan. The idea of the paper is motivated by the deteriorating relations between Sudan and the EU arising from the devastating conflicts in Darfur region and related implications involving the International Criminal Court (ICC). Another factor supporting the idea is the U.S. encouragement of multilateral pressure on the country to change the behavior of the government. The global CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model of GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) and its Africa Database is employed in this paper. The simulation bans importation into the EU from Sudan as well as exportation to Sudan from the EU. The results suggest that both income and expenditure of the Sudanese GDP will decline due to sanctions. The trade balance will witness a surplus due to the big decline in the country’s imports, as all imports will fall. However, the major impact is coming from the decreasing EU-sourced imports like light manufacturing, petroleum-coal products, and heavy manufacturing, which represent big shares in the total Sudanese import value. While Sudan is the clear loser, the results show that the East Asian countries, led by China, will gain in this situation. Most of Sudanese trade with the EU seems to be shifting to these countries. However, the ‘Rest of Africa’ region does not have any welfare losses, while it has gains in some sectors. Domestic output in MENA, Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia in some sectors will fall due to the EU sanctions on Sudan, reflecting the regional dimension that sanctions can have.

Anti-terrorist Blacklisting in the European Union: The Influence of National Procedures on the Judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities

The most prominent example of anti-terrorism measures is undoubtedly the freezing of funds of individuals or entities suspected of committing or supporting terrorist acts. The European Union (EU) implements United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions and maintains its own anti-terrorist blacklist. This article looks at fund-freezing decisions taken on the basis of both the UN sanctions regime and the autonomous EU sanctions regime and the resulting jurisprudence of the Community courts. Discussion of recent judgments of the Court of First Instance (CFI) in the Sison and OMPI cases, both concerning EU level sanctions, will illustrate that the underlying national procedures can have considerable influence on the Court’s judgments in this field. Central to the discussion will be the relevance of national procedures and judgments on the validity of blacklisting decisions and their review.

Urgent emergency issue in Poland

The paper refers to the problem of emergency medical service in Poland, which is the only European Union Member State not having activated the emergency phone number 112. This fact has caused the threat of European Union sanctions. In this context, we try to discuss the chances of finalizing reform of the dramatically inefficient Polish emergency services. Except for the lack of the integrated emergency call centres, there is no appropriate network of emergency hospital departments in Poland and no clear regulations concerning emergency professions. The necessary law was enacted in 2001, but it did not come into force. The threat of European Union sanctions may hasten its implementation; however, the weak position of the present government may cause a further delay of the reform.

Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management

This article offers a conceptual framework that broadens and enhances our understanding of the role of ‘history’ in contemporary governance and the attempts by policy‐makers to ‘manage’ critical issues. Building upon the literature on historical analogies in policy‐making, we distinguish three dimensions that clarify how the past may emerge in and affect the current deliberations, choices and rhetoric of policy‐makers. We apply this in a comparative examination of two cases of crisis management where historical analogies played an important part: the Swedish response to (alleged) submarine intrusions in 1982, and the European Union sanctions against Austria in 1999. We induce from the case comparison new concepts and hypotheses for understanding the role of historical analogies in public policy‐making and crisis management.

Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft

Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions that Do Work Chapter 3 Targeted Financial Sanctions: The U.S. Model Chapter 4 Targeted Financial Sanctions: Harmonizing National Legislation and Regulatory Practices Chapter 5 European Union Sanctions against the Federal Republic of yugoslavia from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting Chapter 6 Arms Embargoes: In Name Only? Chapter 7 Putting More Teeth in the UN Arms Embargoes Chapter 8 The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions Chapter 9 Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions Chapter 10 United Nations Economic Sanctions: Minimizing Adverse Effects on Nontarget States Chapter 11 Smart Sanctions in Iraq: Policy Options Chapter 12 Appendix A Chapter 13 Appendix B