European Security Architecture Research Articles

What can European security architecture look like in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine?

ABSTRACT The paper outlines the most likely scenarios of the future European security architecture based on an analysis of several drivers, such as Russia’s leadership’s perception of Ukraine, the mindset of the Putinist elite, Russia’s state geopolitics, the domestic situation and prospects of a regime change in Russia, economic sanctions against Russia, energy and the export of Russia’s energy resources, and the positions of key Euratlantic actors. The current “unstable balance model” will remain the most likely scenario in case of a conservation of the situation on the Ukrainian battlefields. Since the concert model of security architecture entails a lack of a revisionist agenda among all the actors, the only reasonably probable security management upgrade is a “positive stable balance”. This scenario is conditioned on degrading Russia’s military capacity, Ukraine’s military advancements on the battlefields, a weakening of the Russian economy and maintaining the support for Ukraine in the EU and NATO.

Ukraine-NATO: Problems and Prospects of Partnership

The article contains an overview of the evolution of Ukraine-NATO relations from the beginning of our state’s independence to the present. The author made an attempt to identify and characterize the main periods of the formation of Ukraine-NATO relations, to identify the key problems of partnership development. It is noted that at the beginning of independence, Ukraine chose a neutral and non-aligned status, and then declared multi-vectorism as the basis of foreign security policy, which was a historically determined necessity in the transition period. At that time, Ukraine remained in the field of interests of Russia, which sought to restore its position in the post-Soviet space, and therefore did not have the opportunity to fully integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures.
 Due to the difficult geopolitical situation, Ukraine was forced to maneuver between the East and the West in order to establish itself in the international field and take its place in the European security architecture. In the 1990s, Ukraine-NATO relations developed quite briskly, but not enough for Ukraine to become a NATO member. However, Ukraine managed to gain the status of a special partner, which subsequently contributed to the deepening of bilateral relations.
 In the 2000s, Ukraine-NATO relations first intensified, and after Yanukovych came to power, Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration was suspended. The situation changed after the Revolution of Dignity, when pro-European democratic forces came to power. Further policy is aimed at deepening Ukraine’s relations with the Alliance. Ukraine has finally decided on its course, but the necessary conditions must be met for successful integration. Also, for its part, NATO should conduct a more targeted policy regardless of Russia, which is not as strong as it has created an image of itself through propaganda. Ukraine receives the undisputed support of the Alliance, but, unfortunately, this is not enough to end the war and restore territorial integrity. Ukraine’s accession to NATO would guarantee Ukraine’s security on the one hand, and strengthen the Alliance’s values on the other. Therefore, NATO needs more determination in Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance.

Zeitenwende: German Foreign Policy Change in the Wake of Russia's War Against Ukraine

Russia’s war against Ukraine has severely damaged the European security architecture. This article examines the consequences of this rupture for German foreign and security policy. Just a few months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Germany saw the transition to an unprecedented three-party coalition government of Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals. In a special address to the Bundestag three days after the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz described Russia’s war initiation as a historical Zeitenwende (“watershed”) that called into question long-held beliefs about European security. In the wake of this, Scholz proclaimed far-reaching changes, including the announcement that military expenditure would be drastically increased, additional military capabilities would be procured, and new deployments would be committed to NATO’s eastern flank. This article argues that the Zeitenwende amounts to an international orientation change in German foreign and security policy. Apart from identifying areas of significant change, the article also documents political contestation over the Zeitenwende’s nature and extent as well as gaps between proclaimed changes and actual implementation.

Germany: Leader of the New European Security Architecture

Germany: Leader of the New European Security Architecture

We All Fall Down: The Dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the End of the Cold War in Eastern Europe

Abstract Using new evidence from Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian archives, a reconstruction of Eastern European diplomacy at the end of the Cold War shows that it was not just the superpowers that shaped events during this pivotal period: the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact also had agency. From 1989 to 1991, these states recognized that the world was changing and that their relationship with the Soviet Union, codified in the Warsaw Pact politico-military alliance, would impede their success in the post–Cold War world. Eastern European policymakers resolved to destroy the Warsaw Pact that bound them to the Soviet Union, and they decided to align with Western Europe. They also sought to exclude the Soviet Union from the European security architecture, including the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. They sought security and wanted to hedge against a hard-line takeover in the Soviet Union; but their primary aim was to reap the West's economic benefits.

Эволюция военной политики Франции

The article studies the evolution of the military-political course of the French Fifth Republic. The authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the four editions of the French White Paper, which are the conceptual foundations of the country’s defense and national security strategy. Particular attention is paid to the impact of the domestic political situation, international political and economic processes, as well as membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance on the formation of France’s defense policy. The methodological basis for the study of the French military policy evolution is a systematic approach: a comprehensive study of the Fifth Republic’s defense and national security strategy as parts of the global European security architecture, which consists of closely related components. In addition the authors use the concrete-historical method, as well as induction, deduction, content analysis and comparative analysis of the Fifth Republic’s regulatory and legal documentation in the field of national defense and security, which allowed identifying elements of the specifics and continuity of the military-political course of France. With the help of forecasting, as well as a statistical method based on official data from government departments and research centers, the authors assessed the state of the French Republic Armed Forces. The excessive involvement of the French armed forces in various external and internal military operations, accompanied by a reduction in the number of personnel and deterioration of their equipment, weakens of the combat potential of Paris.

NATO and the CSDP after the Ukraine War: The End of European Strategic Autonomy?

Abstract The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?

Back to Spring: Towards a New European Security Architecture

Back to Spring: Towards a New European Security Architecture

The Position of the European Security Architecture within the International Legal Order

Abstract With the universal architecture for peace and security centred upon the UN Charter of 1945 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 being built on great power foundations, there are manifest problems when there is no consensus amongst those great powers in the face of existential threats to peace and security. The question considered in this article is whether the European Security Architecture (ESA), consisting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU), can forge a different and distinct path that can provide security for States and individuals while remaining within the international rule of law. In contrast to the executive-dominated universal collective security system, power and authority in the ESA are much more diffuse, fluid and overlapping, with a mixture of foundational documents ranging from the constitutional/supranational (the EU), contractual (NATO) and political (the OSCE), as well as a range of overlapping competences, powers and practice in: peaceful settlement; the promotion of human rights and democracy; the enforcement of fundamental rules of international law by non-forcible measures; collective defence commitments; crisis management; and nuclear deterrence. The ESA, though less constitutional in a hierarchical sense when compared to the UN/NPT system, promises greater connection between security and law, but is it capable of deterring and confronting naked aggression and other egregious violations of international law?

Features of the Transformation of the EU’s Foreign Policy Behavior Paradigm After a Full-Scale Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has put on the agenda the question of consolidating the international community’s efforts in order to oppose Russian aggression in Europe and create conditions for preventing armed confrontations in the future. Without exaggeration, it can be stated that the European Union plays a special role in creating a system of collective repulsion of the aggressor and ensuring its effective functioning. Its unprecedented “geopolitical awakening” in response to another Russian aggression against Ukraine has immediately become the subject of numerous scientific investigations by foreign and domestic experts. In addition, the change in the behavioral logic used by the EU in defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine between 2014, when the Russian Federation’s armed invasion of Crimea took place, and the events of February 2022 has not gone unnoticed by scholars.
 The article analyzes the main behavioral models of foreign policy actors and also makes the assumption that Russia’s full-scale military offensive against Ukraine, which destroyed the established European security architecture, has led to the transformation of the behavioral paradigm of the EU, which is primarily seen in the change of its foreign policy goals. The conducted analysis of the EU’s behavioral logic confirmed the assumption and allowed us to conclude that before the invasion, the bloc acted as an actor pursuing a policy of the status quo, but after – its role changed to a normative one.

The (false) promise of Germany’s Zeitenwende

Germany’s role as a security actor has evolved considerably over the past decades. While in the twentieth century neighbouring countries feared a resurgence of German militarism, in the twenty-first century the country has come under increasing pressure to adopt a more proactive military posture. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered the European security architecture, many hoped for a groundbreaking reorientation at Europe’s economic centre. However, it is unlikely that the historic turnaround announced by Chancellor Scholz will become a reality, as the Russian war will not fundamentally change Germany’s international status, nor the key domestic factors that have historically determined its approach to security and defence policy. As Germany’s historical baggage continues to weigh heavily, it seems that reforms will not go beyond a better equipped Bundeswehr and a more power-political approach to the defence industry, which already poses a costly challenge for current and future decision-makers.

Future of the European Union: challenges and prospects

The article covers the pressing issues that Brussels is challenged with, key points of its current foreign policy and a possible role of the European Union in the international arena in the near future. As the system of international relations has been transforming increasingly following the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, the present-day capacities of the Union are signifi cantly aff ected by several matters. Elaborating on them, the author focuses on the vulnerability caused by the weakened European security architecture, pivotal peculiarities of the EU engagement with Russia, its dialog across the Atlantic and with the countries in Asia, especially China, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, as well as mounting unsolved questions within the EU itself. At the same time the future of the EU disposition on the global stage is likely to be modifi ed by a multipolar world order which is taking shape right now. In this context, further collaboration across the Eurasian mainland may be formed within the so-called `Big Eurasia` format proposed by Russia.

The Russo-Ukrainian war as seen from nato Eastern flank

The Russo-Ukrainian war – which began in late February 2014 with the special operation in Crimea and which intensified as a result of the Russian large-scale invasion initiated eigth years later – evolved into the largest military conflict in post-war Europe. The conflict as such has impacted not only the European security architecture but also has had a great influence globally. This essay seeks to analyse its causes, course, and consequences free from emotions that often accompany war-like situations.

A new alliance in Europe: the September 2021 defence agreement between Greece and France as a case of embedded alliance formation

ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.

The Expanding Concepts of “Peace and Security” in International and European Law: Protecting Sustainable Peace and Human Life in Dignity

On the UN as well as the European level, the concepts of peace and security have been broadened. Negative peace has been extended to positive peace and security from inter-State security against military and hybrid attacks to inter- and intra-State human security from numerous other threats. Security as a multidimensional concept includes democratic, rule of law and human rights, economic and environmental security as well as cybersecurity. Within the framework of the UN collective security system, a European Security Architecture has been established consisting of four complementary organisations: NATO, the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE. They jointly contribute to maintaining, promoting or building positive peace and human security in Europe and the wider world. With their different focusses, expertise and strengths – military, political, legal, economic, financial, moral – they strive together to prevent, repel and remove threats in any (including hybrid) form to sustainable peace and human life in dignity. In thus pooling their forces, the four organisations have come a long way, but have an even longer way to go. Especially the EU needs to transform itself into a supranational European Defence Union with its own defence forces.

Russia's Special Military Operation in Ukraine and Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank: Why Russia – NATO Tensions Grows

A sharp escalation of the Russia - West confrontation starting in February 2022, manifested itself primarily in the Eastern European region, directly affected by the Ukraine war. The article examines the key measures by the United States and its NATO allies during this period to increase their military presence in the countries forming the eastern flank of the alliance. Escalation of the conflict provides an opportunity for Washington to further strengthen its military-political dominance in Europe, taking advantage of pro-American NATO states resource, as well as to complete a continuous “NATO chain” by admitting Finland and Sweden to the alliance. However, Eastern Europe is not homogeneous in its approach to further increasing military support for Ukraine. The key factors are analyzed - both military and “hybrid” - which in these circumstances can provoke a clash between Russia and NATO in their contact zone, as well as conflict-mitigating factors within NATO, seeking to prevent such a clash. Breaking the spiral of escalation and easing the Russia - NATO tension is possible only if the opposing sides are ready to develop a fundamentally new, non-discriminatory approach to the European security architecture.

Die Verantwortung der Europäischen Union in der Welt – eine deutsch-nordisch-baltische Perspektive

Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a reorganisation of the European security architecture, which is particularly evident in the North and Baltic Sea regions. Europe reacted to the aggression in a united manner and faced up to its geopolitical and humanitarian responsibilities. The European Union (EU) and its member states made a remarkable turnaround in security policy and abandoned hitherto irrevocable principles regarding arms exports and neutrality. Yet the question of how best to manage the direct and indirect costs of the war divides EU member states. Moreover, the persistent challenges posed by matters as diverse as industrial, migration and asylum policy, foreign policy towards China and the climate crisis, have not gone away. The EU must leverage its power so that these can be mastered jointly and proactively.

GRAND STRATEGY AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NEW RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE IN 21ST CENTURY: GEOSTRATEGIC ASPECTS OF HYBRID WARFARE STRATEGY AGAINST GEORGIA AND UKRAINE

: A paper reflects new dimensions of New Cold War geostrategic balance implications at pan-regional (European) and regional (Black Sea) levels that already has been transformed into classical hybrid warfare between the Russian Federation and NATO due to the Russia’s invasion into Ukraine. Currently adopted military doctrine of the Russian Federation envisages engagement into two military conflicts simultaneously and constructed its strategic operational framework founded on incorporation of three combat elements: military, non-military and information warfare measures and proper concepts. Hence, it means that Russia can begin war-game scenarios at the same time against two neighboring nations as it occurs at time being against Ukraine and Georgia. At that respect, the incumbent Russian military leadership in aegis of so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” is promoting hybrid warfare as a key dominant grand strategy with relevant theater strategy and operational art elements (for instance, operational – strategic command HQ “South” and 5 Army Corp HQs). The military “muscle” could easily skew and twist European security environment that is much unprepared to the geostrategic challenge – Crimea occupation and annexation in 2014, war with Georgia in 2008, hybrid attack to Estonia in 2007 and very recently large-scale military intervention in Azov Sea and pending regional hegemony conditions in Caspian Basin. These military asymmetric challenges and risks deriving from the arms race derailed by the Russia’s incumbent authority, and security dilemma embroiled with by the elements of WMD are sufficient indications why the European security is plausible fragile against such challenges. From academic standpoint, the thesis deals in analyzing with the most dangerous threat targeting the European security architecture – asymmetric military challenge and realization of which is pursued in wagging hybrid war against Georgia and Ukraine. The new type of warfare is a probe stone perfected against these two post-Soviet nations indicates and poses real menace, mainly geostrategic origin, easily targeted NATO member-states, including Poland. The article predisposes reflection and understanding true meaning of so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” and the whole new version of Military Doctrine of Russia and how it is implemented at the stage. A shift transformation takes place in realms of contemporary century warfare doctrinal planning and the transformation has already implicated of identifying new type of warfare strategy – asymmetric war with representation of hybrid warfare that contributing in re-shaping a grand strategy that allows policymakers to steer through the uncertainties of a complex international security environment; Elaboration real content and new definition of “hybrid war” and its dualfold implications how to quell and deal with asymmetric military challenges and risks and how to cause the challenges on its matter. Moreover, it describes and review reformatting modality in planning and wagging war due to the military technology development that contributed to a far more complicated strategic environment for war than that of previous century. In that respect is to be identified new style of warfare – Urbanistic warfare presented in 2008 August Russia-Georgia war as well as in war in Ukraine (Mariupol battle) new definition of the warfare in general matter.

Percepție, disonanță cognitivă și descurajare nucleară în era informațională. Posibile implicații pentru arhitectura de securitate euroatlantică în contextul noului concept strategic al NATO

"The February 2022 military aggression on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across European capitals as well as across the Atlantic. This “new normal”, namely a conventional war in twenty-first century Europe, is both hard to process and inherently ominous as to the future of the European security architecture and strategic stability on the continent. The aim of the article is to analyse the combined effects of technological advances in information/computing technologies and human cognition on strategic choices such as nuclear deterrence strategies. The paper is looking to address the proposed research questions through a cognitive psychology lens, with a particular focus on perception and cognitive dissonance. The plasticity of both the geopolitical environment and the information space present the optimal conditions for propagation of cognitive errors in human decision-making. The article is taking a closer look at what said vulnerability means for the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, most specifically for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Percepție, disonanță cognitivă și descurajare nucleară în era informațională. Posibile implicații pentru arhitectura de securitate euroatlantică în contextul noului concept strategic al NATO

"The February 2022 military aggression on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across European capitals as well as across the Atlantic. This “new normal”, namely a conventional war in twenty-first century Europe, is both hard to process and inherently ominous as to the future of the European security architecture and strategic stability on the continent. The aim of the article is to analyse the combined effects of technological advances in information/computing technologies and human cognition on strategic choices such as nuclear deterrence strategies. The paper is looking to address the proposed research questions through a cognitive psychology lens, with a particular focus on perception and cognitive dissonance. The plasticity of both the geopolitical environment and the information space present the optimal conditions for propagation of cognitive errors in human decision-making. The article is taking a closer look at what said vulnerability means for the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, most specifically for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."