European Defence Research Articles

Face to face: France, Germany and the future of the European defence industry

ABSTRACT France and Germany agree on the need to further European defence-industrial cooperation, but boast radically different preferences on how to structure such cooperation. Why? To answer this question, we introduce the distinction between the two faces of market size – the first exclusively related to defence, the second including the broader commercial-industrial base. Since Germany is, overall, more competitive than France in the commercial sector but less competitive in the defence one, it will advocate for a full-fledged integration of the European defence market but seek to protect its less competitive defence industry from France by championing autonomy in ad-hoc arms programmes. In turn, France would prefer to leverage its defence-industrial advantage by injecting efficiency on arms programmes but resist pan-EU initiatives to integrate the defence market, which would benefit Germany more over the long-term. To test our argument, we examine French and German preferences towards the European Defence Fund and the Future Combat Air System.

Perroux's 1949 Note sur la Politique Économique du Fédéralisme

L'Europe sans rivages, published in 1954 mostly as a reaction against Monnet's idea of functional Europe, is considered Perroux's most relevant (critical) contribution to European integration. Its final section contains critiques to unionism, functionalism, and federalism. His skepticism towards a functional strategy towards a federal Europe, though, was dependent upon the specific attitude of the most renown (especially French) federalist intellectuals to build a supranational actor that might become, in Perroux's eyes, protectionist and inward-looking, thus jeopardizing the perspectives for a genuine world integration. Perroux's book was allegedly targeting the Coal and Steel Community established in 1951 and the process towards a European Defense Community that, although unanimously agreed upon, would soon be failing the ratification process. An unpublished typewritten Note on the Economic Policy of Federalism dated February 9th, 1949, addressed to Alexander Marc (Secretary General of the Union of European Federalists) challenges this interpretation, and helps understanding that Perroux had been working on these arguments much earlier. Together with a letter that Perroux sent at the end of 1949 to Ambassador Eirik Labonne and Jacques Racine (both reproduced at the end), such archival material further highlights the role that federalism played in Perroux's reflection on the economics of dominance.

Legal basis of defense standardization of the European Union

Legal basis of defense standardization of the European Union

US–UK–France relations amid the Russia–Ukraine war: a new strategic alignment?

Abstract The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the recognition of the rising challenge from China have resulted in a closer alignment of American, British and French strategic interests. This policy paper explores how the strategic relationship between the United States, the United Kingdom and France has evolved amid this changed threat environment. The Russia–Ukraine war exposed the limitations of France's policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ and reasserted the importance of an American role in European security. The war has re-focused attention upon the Lancaster House framework in which the UK and France have the potential to enhance their contribution to European defence. The UK still regards its ‘special relationship’ with the US as being of critical importance to its foreign policy. But the UK's diminishing military power makes it a less valuable ally to the US whose attention is increasingly upon the Indo-Pacific region. The paper argues that the alignment between the three countries has been closer over the Russian war in Ukraine compared to attitudes towards China, where tensions between France and the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ persist. France has been unwilling to adopt the American approach towards China and has stuck to its vision of a multipolar world. The AUKUS deal arranged between the US, UK and Australia had the effect of alienating France. The policy paper contends that the temporary alignment between US, UK and French interests will erode as long-standing conflicts of interest re-emerge. In particular, the unpredictability of US leadership will damage the trilateral relationship if Donald Trump regains the presidency in November 2024.

Ad hoc coalitions in European security and defence: symptoms of short-term pragmatism, no more?

ABSTRACT Ad hoc forms of military cooperation have become commonplace in European security and defence. The EU has even voiced the ambition to strengthen mutual support between its CSDP operations and European-led ad hoc coalitions. We ask whether and how this mutual support is strengthened and what it means for European defence integration. We focus on two cases: Task Force Takuba deployed to the Sahel region and the European Maritime Awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Our analysis shows that European-led ad hoc coalitions are driven by short-term pragmatism, focused on providing quick fixes to collective problems and achieving particularistic gains. Plans to strengthen mutual support with the EU mostly emerge gradually and bottom-up, from military-operational experiences. However, formal integration is often hindered by political quarrels. We conclude that the EU needs a strategic vision for the position of ad hoc coalitions in European security and defence.

THE DEFENCE POLICY OF DENMARK AFTER THE 2022 REFERENDUM

The article deals with the impact of the special relationship with the US on the three aspects of Danish foreign policy: the approach to the EU strategic autonomy, regional defence policy priorities, and Denmark’s readiness to escalate relations with Russia. Using the method of qualitative content analysis of Danish foreign policy strategies, Copenhagen’s current views on the alliance relations with the US are assessed, especially within the framework of Denmark’s turn towards «pragmatic idealism» in foreign policy, which Denmark announced in May 2023, and scrapping the EU defence opt-out following the outcome of the June 2022 referendum. The analysis has shown that maintaining the status of an «exemplary» or «model» ally leads both to contradictions and ignoring traditional mores within the Danish political system and the skewed priorities in financing military and non-military instruments of the Danish foreign policy. Moreover, even in Denmark’s military support of Ukraine, there is a gap between the symbolic value and practical effect of the measures taken by the Danish side. It is concluded that greater involvement in building the EU’s strategic autonomy will reduce Denmark’s interest in further escalation of the conflict in Ukraine and its readiness for rhetorical and practical confrontation with Russia. At the same time, based on open sources, the U.S. is not exerting significant pressure on Copenhagen in connection with select gaps in compliance with the sanction regime. In case D. Trump is elected as the US president in the 2024 elections, Denmark, as one of the most pro-Atlantic EU member states, will probably face the acute task of linking the course of strategic autonomy with a broader vision of the future of transatlantic relations, as well as overcoming the dilemma between the concentration of defence capablities either in the Baltic Sea or in the North Atlantic and Arctic area including Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

The effects of the Russia–Ukraine war and the Wagner Group coup on defense stocks in Europe: an event study analysis

Purpose This study aims to examine the impact of the beginning of the Russia–Ukraine war and the Wagner Group’s attempted military coup against Putin’s regime on the European defense sector, consisting of weapons manufacturers. Design/methodology/approach The authors use the event study methodology to quantify the impact. That is, the authors assume that markets are efficient, and abnormal stock returns around the event dates capture the magnitudes of the impacts of the two events studied on European defense sector companies. The authors use the capital asset pricing model and two different multifactor models to estimate expected stock returns, which serve as the benchmark necessary to obtain abnormal returns. Findings The start of the war on February 24, 2022, when the Russian forces invaded Ukraine, was followed by high positive abnormal returns of up to 12% in the next few days. The results are particularly strong if multiple factors are used to control for the risk of the defense stocks. Conversely, the authors find a negative impact of the rebellion initiated by the mercenary Wagner Group’s chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin, on June 23, 2023, on the abnormal returns of defense industry stocks on the first trading day after the event. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the defense sector. Furthermore, this is the first study to measure the financial implications of the military coup initiated by the Wagner Group. The findings contribute to a rapidly growing literature on the financial implications of military conflicts around the world.

Habitat changes explain shifts in bird community composition in abandoned military training areas: Lessons for conservation

Military training areas are important biodiversity refuges and may serve as viable components of regional conservation networks, mainly due to the blocking of ecological succession by the disturbance regime creating a heterogeneous open habitat mosaic hosting many threatened species. However, European armies have undergone downsizing over the past decades and numerous military training areas have been abandoned. The assessment of the consequences of this abandonment for biodiversity would show us whether these abandoned areas still provide conservation benefits. For this purpose, we carried out bird surveys in 30 abandoned military training areas in Czechia. The surveys were performed in two periods (2009 and 2020–2021) to track small-scale changes in land cover and bird abundance after the areas were abandoned in the 1990s. We tested (i) whether changes in bird abundance were related to land cover changes and (ii) whether the observed bird species’ responses to the land cover changes can be explained by species-specific characteristics. Multivariate spatial analyses uncovered significant shifts in land cover composition towards a higher representation of dense shrub, forest and built-up areas at the expense of open areas represented by grassland and sparse shrub. These land cover changes explained a small but significant part of bird abundance variation across the areas. Correspondingly, species benefiting from these land cover changes were associated with dense scrub or forest, such as the Common Chiffchaff, Willow Warbler, or Eurasian Blackcap, whereas species suffering from these changes were associated with grassland, such as the European Stonechat and Eurasian Skylark. Phylogenetically informed interspecific analysis aiming to explain changes in bird abundance between periods confirmed that population declines were linked to open habitat preference, while population increases were linked to the preference for dense shrub and forest. In addition, we found that protected species increased their abundance, most likely due to the existence of conservation management that kept their habitats available. These patterns indicate that military training areas transform toward later successional stages after their abandonment with corresponding changes in bird community composition. However, these changes may not necessarily be negative provided that species of conservation concern enjoy the support of conservation management.

Half-Hearted or Pragmatic? Explaining EU Strategic Autonomy and the European Defence Fund through Institutional Dynamics

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy introduced the ambition of strategic autonomy, referring to the ability to protect the Union against external threats autonomously. To realise this ambition, the EU also launched various capability development initiatives, in particular, the European Defence Fund (EDF). Much of the available literature presents rationalist explanations of the EU’s development of strategic autonomy and the EDF. These studies attribute strategic autonomy ambition to external conditions and consider it as an act of strategic hedging or bandwagoning. However, the subsequent limited progress in actual capability development casts doubt on these explanations. By drawing on historical institutionalism, this study examines the EU’s current approach to strategic autonomy to see whether internal factors would offer an alternative explanation to the disjunction between the ambitions and actions. For this aim, the study scrutinises the evolution of the EDF as an instrument and the role of the Commission as an agent of change. Based on primary and secondary data, the analysis shows that even though external crises have created critical junctures that compel the EU to reorient its goals, the endogenous elements of institutional change have significantly influenced the EU’s choice of means and redistribution of resources. The findings reveal that the Commission’s ability to reinterpret the original rules and exploit gaps and ambiguities in their local enactment in a path-dependent manner has considerably affected the outcome of this change.

Profitability of Defense Companies in the US and Europe

ABSTRACT The profitability (ROA) of US and European defense companies are influenced by past profitability, debt policy, company size, and defense specialization. Taking into account the effect of these variables, individual company characteristics and time specificities, the profitability of US defense companies remains higher than that of European companies. Moreover, US defense firms are more profitable when specialized in defense, while European companies are more dependent on the civilian market and its evolution. The position of a company in the SIPRI ranking has a negative impact on American companies’ profitability, while it positively influences European companies’ profitability. These results could be due to excessive fragmentation (of orders and industries) on the European market and high concentration on the US market.

From Quasi-Sovereignty to Full Sovereignty? The Interpretations of Strategic Autonomy and Sovereignty in the European Union

The concept of European sovereignty has been in the focus of attention since Emmanuel Macron's speech at Sorbonne in 2017. Our multidisciplinary research provides a chronological overview of the efforts to establish EU strategic autonomy and sovereignty. Concept analysis examines the link between sovereignty and autonomy and their content in political discourse. Finally, the two concepts are placed in a schema of practical reasoning to explore the future vision outlined. The discourse analysis of strategic documents related to the autonomy and sovereignty of the EU from 1998 to 2023, following the Strategic Compass and the Russian invasion in Ukraine, has revealed the difference between strategic autonomy and sovereignty and the evolution of the idea of European defense as the core of sovereignty. Attempts to make these concepts and related EU actions acceptable are highlighted.

THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO MALI’S FRAGILITY PROBLEMS AND THE OPERATION EUCAP SAHEL MALI

In light of recent events that have brought Mali back to the focus of the international community, this article aims to analyse on the basis of the various strategies adopted by the European Union to address the complex problems affecting the Sahel region, the basic pillars of the action of the International Organization for European Integration in this area of the African continent, and in particular in Mali, following a diagnosis of the situation on the ground, focusing the analysis on the civilian mission of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, EUCAP Sahel Mali.

Disaggregated defense spending: Introduction to data

Theoretical and empirical research on causes and consequences of defense spending is plentiful. Most of this research uses ‘top line’ defense spending data, either as a share of GDP or as a raw monetary figure. Empirical research has been limited, however, by the ‘blunt’ nature of this data, which does not help to explain what countries are spending on. We introduce a dataset that provides information on disaggregated defense spending from 35 NATO and EU members over as many as 51 years. We discuss the main features of this data in the paper, and the replication files will enable other scholars to automate accessing it in the future. In addition to automating the extraction of NATO and European Defence Agency data on overall military expenditures, we make data on equipment, personnel, operating, and infrastructure spending available in a single dataset. We illustrate the utility of the disaggregated defense spending dataset by replicating canonical and newer analyses using both the overall data and its disaggregated components. The findings differ depending on which type of spending is considered. We found that differences in the relationship between national wealth and defense spending depended on the category of spending considered, as did the tendency toward ‘free-riding’. These exercises shed new light on seminal theories on burden-sharing and the political economy of security. Our initial analysis suggests that disaggregating defense spending is likely to improve the analysis of old and emerging research questions of considerable policy importance, and points to several opportunities to do so.

EU arms collaboration, procurement, and offsets: the impact of the war in Ukraine

ABSTRACT In the last twenty years, the EU has made increasingly greater efforts to boost defence cooperation among MS. To strengthen the EDTIB and avoid duplication of capabilities, the EU has encouraged “European preference” in arms procurement and MS’ defence collaborative projects, also by seeking to expunge defence offsets from the single market. Against this backdrop, on 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. What impact has the war in Ukraine had on EU defence cooperation? Has the war impacted MS in a similar fashion or unevenly, reinforcing defence integration dynamics for some, while kickstarting disintegration for others? Two years on, a thorough analysis of the impact of the war on EU defence cooperation is still missing. This paper fills this gap by exploring three levels of analysis – arms collaboration, arms procurement, and offsets – and by comparing pre-invasion evidence with data from the post-invasion period. The analysis suggests that the Russo-Ukrainian war has negatively impacted EU defence cooperation, potentially increasing both fragmentation and non-EU dependencies. However, although MS’ threat perception and their ability to reap industrial benefits remain important to explain EU defence cooperation, integration or disintegration dynamics do not neatly map onto the geographical or size divides identified by the literature.

Сотрудничество в области безопасности ЕС и Латинской Америки: история и эволюция

Introduction. This article aims to analyze the process of security cooperation between the European Union and countries in Latin America from the perspective of historical institutionalism and the methodological tools proposed by the Copenhagen School. The author covers the main stages of the development of relations between these two regions, starting with early initiatives in the field of political and economic support and moving towards deeper cooperation in the field of security. Methods. The main theoretical and methodological support of this study is historical neo-institutionalism, which focuses attention on the role of institutional choices made earlier in the historical past, i.e., the “path dependence” principle. The research uses the sector-specific approach to security analysis developed by the Copenhagen School. Analysis and results. In the historical context, three main stages can be distinguished in the development of relations between the EU and the countries of the LCA in the field of security. The first bipolar stage (1945–1991) was characterized mainly by political and economic support from the United States and NATO as the main structure of regional security. Relations between the EU and Latin American countries at this time were sporadic, largely complicated by multiple crises within Latin American countries. However, in the 1960s, relations in the fields of economic cooperation and economic security began to be built between the regions. In the conditions of the second stage, post-bipolar (1991–2014), the concept of strategic partnership begins to be actively developed between regions, not only in the economic but also in the political and military spheres. Also, the EU, trying to simultaneously institutionally build its own security policy and the European army, began to conduct peacekeeping operations during this period with varying success (since 2003). The current stage (from 2014 to present) is characterized by growing contradictions between Russia, Ukraine, and the collective West, consolidated around the United States, as well as the destruction of the newly created post-bipolar regional security system. The LCA countries, which are afraid of being drawn into a conflict, are trying to develop their own course in the field of security policy.

From Liberalisation to Industrial Policy: Towards a Geoeconomic Turn in the European Defence Market?

AbstractThe European defence market can be described as a geoeconomically relevant sector that forms part of Europe's overall economy, not least in the way that it is a producer of military capabilities and technologies and a repository of scientific skills. Traditionally, European Union (EU)‐level steps to support and liberalise the sector have reflected a regulatory approach marked by soft law, but in recent years, the EU has also developed financial tools to incentivise defence co‐operation. Looking specifically at the European Defence Fund (EDF), this article views this transition as evidence of a ‘geoeconomic turn’ in European defence market policy that is a response to structural challenges related to technology control, security of supply and geopolitical competition. Employing relative gains theory and liberal intergovernmentalism, this article charts the transition from market liberalisation to industrial policy in EU defence market initiatives based on specific intra‐ and extra‐political dynamics.

Franco-German leadership in the context of EU defence policy: from Brexit to the strategic compass

ABSTRACT Leadership is crucial for the success of a collective actor in reaching common goals. Its relevance is particularly visible in the EU, due to the difficulty in managing and converging a wide range of interests, especially in the intergovernmental field of defence. This article analyses Franco-German transactional leadership throughout the evolution of the EU’s security and defence policy, with a focus on the effects of Brexit. By highlighting the concept of leadership in international relations, this study identifies Franco-German actions and strategies within the Common Security and Defence Policy, reflecting on how these have shaped European defence and how Brexit changed existing dynamics. We conclude that France and Germany have led the EU’s security and defence project, albeit with limited success, with a shift towards a successful relaunch of EU defence in the aftermath of Brexit, aided by doubts over NATO and war in Ukraine. At the core of that limited success and representing the main obstacle lay diverging interests and strategies.

South Korean Military Power

The war in Ukraine has highlighted that, although the major European powers are among the largest defence spenders, they cannot efficiently translate their financial resources into military power. Bence Nemeth argues that South Korea and its military may offer some useful lessons for European NATO members. Seoul has a powerful military with a larger armed forces and more firepower and armour than European militaries. It also produces high-quality weapons systems and conducts larger military exercises than NATO, while having a smaller defence budget than European powers.◼

ISAF and European military transformation: German, Swedish and French counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003–2014

This article examines the role of a subset of European militaries in responding to the Afghan insurgency during their deployment as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While part of a multinational coalition, their heterogeneous military transformation was crucial to fighting the insurrection and confronting American pressure. In comparing the counterinsurgency innovations of Germany, Sweden, and France, we find that Germany acted reluctantly, Sweden largely emulated American doctrine, and France became a counterinsurgency pioneer. We argue that these developments took time and were accompanied by conflicts within ISAF and between the respective national military and political leaderships.

EU Defence Policy: Between Functionalism, National Interests, and Transatlantic Realities

Abstract Existing insights into recent defence integration, including against the backdrop of Russia’s war, largely stem from EU governance studies. Although these studies might not explicitly delve into the EU’s politico-strategic role, when combined with the broader framework of International Relations (IR), they imply the EU’s effective progression, at least relatively, as a defence actor. However, a closer analysis of certain key developments and transatlantic dynamics suggests a persistent lack in the political and strategic dimensions of EU defence policy. This disparity arises when IR concepts are tailored to fit the EU context in integration studies.