European Financial Stability Facility Research Articles

Investor demand in syndicated EFSF/ESM bond issuances

The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were set up at the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis to issue bonds and lend to countries under current funding stress. This study analyses investor demand in syndicated bond issuances of EFSF and ESM from 2014 to 2020 on an unprecedented granularity level using a dataset of individual orders with statistical inference. Particularly, we investigate orderbook dynamics for three main aspects: first, we determine the main factors segmenting investor demand. Second, we analyse price dynamics in the transactions and their relation to investor demand. Third, we investigate whether any indications of orderbook inflation might explain the increased volatility in orderbook volume. We identify issuance tranche and tenor as the main determinants of investor demand that are largely anticipated in the notional. Further, we note that ESM is doing economical pricing, where the new issue premium tends to be lower in a market context with larger demand. Lastly, we find a mixture of an increasing number and an increasing volume of orders as drivers of large order books. This confirms that there are no indications of orderbook inflation tendencies in the analysed time period.

Investor demand in syndicated EFSF/ESM bond issuances.

The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were set up at the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis to issue bonds and lend to countries under current funding stress. This study analyses investor demand in syndicated bond issuances of EFSF and ESM from 2014 to 2020 on an unprecedented granularity level using a dataset of individual orders with statistical inference. Particularly, we investigate orderbook dynamics for three main aspects: first, we determine the main factors segmenting investor demand. Second, we analyse price dynamics in the transactions and their relation to investor demand. Third, we investigate whether any indications of orderbook inflation might explain the increased volatility in orderbook volume. We identify issuance tranche and tenor as the main determinants of investor demand that are largely anticipated in the notional. Further, we note that ESM is doing economical pricing, where the new issue premium tends to be lower in a market context with larger demand. Lastly, we find a mixture of an increasing number and an increasing volume of orders as drivers of large order books. This confirms that there are no indications of orderbook inflation tendencies in the analysed time period.

Lessons for Left-Wing Populism from the 2010s Austerity Wave in Europe

Lessons for Left-Wing Populism from the 2010s Austerity Wave in Europe

Tug of War over Financial Assistance: Which Way Forward for Eurozone Stability Mechanisms?

This article analyses the development of financial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. It argues that reforms to instruments and bodies, notably the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, and the current Covid-19 recovery fund, are best explained by a re-occurring pattern of negotiations between potential creditors and debtors based on common Eurozone interests and national cost-benefit considerations. Building on a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, this article shows how this pattern influenced the step-by-step reform of financial assistance in the Eurozone. The threat to Eurozone stability served as a constant factor encouraging member states to expand and deepen the assistance formula. Creditors’ cost-benefit considerations were key for retaining disincentives, a limited liability for common debt, and intermediary borrowing and lending within the financing design. However, on the back of common Eurozone interests, debtors were able to push for an increase in assistance, an expansion of assistance into areas of banking sector support, and a softening of moral hazard elements in the more recent Covid-19 pandemic. Due to creditors’ continuous insistence on safeguards and limited burden-sharing, reform outcomes were repeatedly unable to resolve the difficulties at hand.

DETERMINANTS OF THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN FIRMS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF EFSF/ESM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The present study has investigated the moderating effect of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) / European Stability Mechanism (ESM) support to the firms’ indebtness. Using dynamic panel data, three models were estimated and aimed at the determination of the way that EFSF/ESM financial assistance programs could influence the impact of five firm-specific characteristics, namely growth, profitability, size, tangibility and non-debt tax shield on the capital structure of European firms. Data from 2,086 firms for the period 2003 – 2016 were used, and two dummy variables; one for the EFSF/ESM support period and one for any kind of economic crisis period were formed. The results indicated that pecking order prevailed over trade-off theory. Economic crises did not affect severely the firm-characteristics’ effects, but the EFSF/ESM programs influence appeared in three cases. During the period of EFSF/ESM assistance, profitability’s negative effect on long-term debt ratio disappeared and on total debt ratio strengthened, growth’s positive impact on total debt ratio diminished and non-debt tax shield acquired positive influence on total debt ratio. These changes might be explained by the increased levels of tax rates and decreased levels of uncertainty that the EFSF/ ESM programs caused, as well as by the reluctance of lenders to provide new funds.

Transnational Representation in EU National Parliaments: Concept, Case Study, Research Agenda

This article introduces the notion of ‘transnational representation’ to refer to claims by national parliamentarians on behalf of citizens of other national constituencies. Thus defined, transnational representation combines insights from the constructivist turn in the theory of democratic representation with a renewed focus on national parliaments as the prime institutional sites of representation. A focus on transnational representation advances the debate on democratic representation in an age of internationalisation in two ways. First, it allows for a systematic and comparative analysis of how representation in parliaments responds to internationalisation. Second, it suggests a new perspective on the possible alignment of political representation with the range of affected interests. We illustrate these two claims with a case study of transnational representation in parliamentary debates on the European Financial Stability Facility and by outlining an agenda for further research.

The Role of the EU Institutions in Establishing the European Stability Mechanism: Institutional Leadership under a Veil of Intergovernmentalism

AbstractThis article traces the role of the EU institutions in setting up the European stability mechanism (ESM). There have been many scholarly assessments but few empirical reconstructions of decision‐making on the intergovernmental ESM and its predecessor the European financial stability facility. The instruments clearly constituted a step away from supranational entrepreneurship and the Community method. However, we question the intergovernmentalist interpretation in terms of institutional competition and decline. Using a historical analogy of the Delors model(s), we identify two types of institutional leadership and show how the ESM was characterized, first by an uneasy combination and then a shift from political championship to the engineering type of leadership. Using two case studies, we trace the negotiations for increasing the size and scope of the ESM. The analyses show that this was a bottom‐up process in which the institutions laid out the tracks and provided the link between the control room (European Council) and ‘machine room’ (Eurogroup/Eurogroup Working Group/ Task Force on Coordinated Action) proceedings.

A Model Disagreement: The Fall of the Slovak Government during the Eurozone Crisis in 2011

In October 2011, the four ruling coalition parties in Slovakia failed to agree upon updating the European Financial Stability Facility. It was ultimately approved with the help of the opposition in exchange for an early election. This self-destructive behaviour by the ruling coalition remains a puzzle with the only available explanations merely referring to the irrationality of the domestic political elite. Our research tackles this problem using game theory. By focusing on the preferences of the key leaders, this article shows that although the fall of government was the only rational outcome, other factors beyond the scope of rational choice theory can suggest a possible explanation.

European Stability Mechanism Sebagai Upaya Uni Eropa Menangani Krisis Finansial Spanyol

Global Financial Crisis has revealed major weakness in the design and implementation of the existing economic governance framework of the European Union. In addition, the first temporary fiscal backstop is EFSF (The European Financial Stability Facility) as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism by the Euro area Member States. In this case, The EFSF does not provide any further financial assistance, so the task of EFSF being replace by the new mechanism that includes the establishment of a permanent crisis management mechanism as the safeguard against imbalances in individual countries that is ESM (European Stability Mechanism).
 Spain as one of the Eurozone Member States that fall on financial crisis caused by disproportionate growth in the real estate sector, along with the expansion of credit, on 25 June 2012 made an official request for financial assistance through ESM for its banking system. In accordance with MoU, Spain must conduct a structural adjustment program through identifying individual bank capital needs, recapitalising and restructuring.

Private and Public Risk Sharing in the Euro Area

This paper investigates the contribution of private and public channels for consumption risk sharing in the EMU over the period 1999-2015. In particular, we explore the role of financial integration versus international financial assistance for private consumption smoothing in this set of countries. In addition, we present a time-varying test which allows estimating how risk sharing has evolved since the start of the EMU, and in particular during the recent crisis. Our results suggest that, whereas in the early years of the EMU only about 40% of output shocks were smoothed, in the aftermath of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis about 65% of output shocks were absorbed, therefore reducing consumption growth differentials across countries. This progressive improvement of the shock absorption capacity is due to a higher financial integration, but also to the activation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) channelling official loans to distressed euro zone economies. We also show that cross-border holdings of equities and debt seem to be more effective than cross-border bank loans in isolating households from country-specific shocks, therefore contributing to consumption smoothing.

Financial assistance conditionality and human rights protection: What is the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?

EU institutions are deeply involved in the making of European financial assistance conditionality. Nevertheless, mechanisms providing financial assistance to Eurozone States are still regarded as foreign to the EU legal order. This paper assesses financial assistance conditionality as applied by the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism to Eurozone States from an EU human rights perspective. First, the hybrid nature of European financial assistance is illustrated through a series of institutional and substantive links between the international and the EU legal order. Second, the relative responsibility of European institutions under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is addressed. To what extent are the major European actors bound by the human rights of the Charter when preparing financial assistance conditions? Third, the question is tackled whether Member States implementing financial assistance conditions are bound by the Charter.

Does Greece Need More Official Debt Relief? If So, How Much?

Creditor countries and international organizations continue to disagree whether Greece should receive additional official debt relief, and if so how much. This paper first shows that these disagreements can be attributed to competing assumptions about Greece’s future capacity to repay, particularly about economic growth and the fiscal primary balance. It next evaluates the plausibility of alternative primary balance assumptions using international evidence about fiscal adjustment experiences. It concludes that primary balance paths required to make Greece’s debt sustainable are not plausible and that Greece will therefore require additional debt relief. Finally, the paper shows that the debt relief measures suggested by the Eurogroup in May 2016 (albeit with significant caveats on whether they will in fact be granted or not) could be sufficient to address Greece’s sustainability problem, provided the Eurogroup is prepared to accept both very long maturity extensions on European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) debt (to 2080 and beyond) and interest deferrals that could lead to a large rise in EFSF exposure to Greece before it begins to decline. If the Eurogroup wishes to avoid the latter, it will become necessary to either (1) extend the scope of the debt restructuring, (2) lower the interest rates charged by the EFSF significantly below current predictions, or (3) extend European Stability Mechanism (ESM) financing beyond 2018 and delay Greece’s return to capital markets for a protracted period.

Private and Public Risk Sharing in the Euro Area

This paper investigates the contribution of private and public channels for consumption risk sharing in the EMU over the period 1999-2015. In particular, we explore the role of financial integration versus international financial assistance for private consumption smoothing in this set of countries. In addition, we present a time-varying test which allows estimating how risk sharing has evolved since the start of the EMU, and in particular during the recent crisis. Our results suggest that, whereas in the early years of the EMU only about 40% of country-specific output shocks were smoothed, in the aftermath of the euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis about 65% of these shocks were absorbed, therefore reducing consumption growth differentials across countries. This progressive improvement of the shock-absorption capacity is due to a higher financial integration, but also to the activation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) channelling official loans to distressed euro zone economies. We also show that cross-border holdings of equities and debt seem to be more effective than cross-border bank loans in isolating households from country-specific shocks, therefore contributing to consumption smoothing.

Whom to represent? National parliamentary representation during the eurozone crisis

ABSTRACTThe eurozone crisis is commonly associated with a politicization of public debate along national lines. With money being redistributed between member states, national parliamentarians (MPs) seem likely to pit national interests against each other. There is, however, an overlooked second force. Interdependence between eurozone states may lead national MPs and their voters to take into account other European Union citizens. Looking at MPs’ parliamentary speeches, this article fills a gap by investigating if and under which conditions individual MPs claim to represent Europeanized constituencies during the crisis. The analysis based on original data from a representative claims analysis of plenary debates on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in Austria, Germany and Ireland reveals such Europeanized representation. Interestingly, being pro-European does not lead to Europeanized representation. Instead, we witness a ‘Eurosceptic Europeanization’ in that (left-wing) Eurosceptic MPs voice opposition to the crisis measures, but in the name of European citizens.

The Transmission of Euro Area Sovereign Risk Contagion: Evidence from Intraday CDS and Bond Markets

We examine the role of the CDS and bond markets during and before the recent euro area sovereign debt crisis as transmission channels for credit risk contagion between sovereign entities. We analyse an intraday dataset for GIIPS countries as well as for France and Germany. Our findings suggest that, prior to the crisis, the CDS and bond markets were similarly important in the transmission of sovereign risk contagion, but that the importance of the bond market waned during the crisis. We find flight-to-safety effects during the crisis period in the German bond market. By using an exogenous macroeconomic news shock, we can show that, during the crisis period, sovereign credit risk was not related to economic fundamentals but rather driven by the announcements of the economic adjustment programmes (EAP) as the magnitude of risk contagion spreading from the country under the EAP did strongly decrease following these announcements. Only after the enlargement of the European Financial Stability Facility in July 2011, we find a strong decrease of interlinkages and a stabilising effect on the joint credit risk contagion across all GIIPS countries.

An anatomy of credit risk transfer between sovereign and financials in the Eurozone crisis

In this paper we assess the effectiveness of large scale bailouts aiming at preventing a financial crisis from further propagating into a systemic risk. We examine the structural changes in the relationship between the sovereign and financial institutions’ credit default swap spreads during the European sovereign debt crisis. Before the first Greek bailout by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the sovereign and financial sectors exhibit a two-way feedback effect for both the short and the long runs. Crucially, we find that after the first Greek bailout, shocks in the financial sector either exert significantly negative impacts or lose influences on the sovereign sector. In contrast, all the later bailouts by the EFSF (the second Greek bailout, Irish and Portugal bailouts) do not show this pattern change in the two-way risk transfer relationship.

EU Financial Stability Mechanisms: Few Certainties, Many Lingering Doubts

This article examines the institutional reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The response has so far consisted of three new financial mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the European Stability Mechanism. These have each a different legal basis and a specific regime, and display a varying degree of compatibility with EU law. The institutional quick .x employed by Eurozone countries was essentially a resort to private law and traditional international law techniques. Even after the well-known Pringle decision, several doubts still linger on. This framework constitutes a setback from the evolution of the EU, at the expense mainly of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.

Regulatory response to the financial crisis in Europe: recent developments (2010-2013)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Europe during the period 2010-2013 and an analysis of how the relevant authorities reacted to the crisis. Design/methodology/approach – These actions included measures taken by central banks, governments or fiscal authorities, and by regulatory or supervisory bodies. In a previous study covering the regulatory developments during the financial crisis up until 2009, issues such as the implementation of Basel III rules in Europe and the (mostly ad hoc and unilateral) resolution mechanisms set in most European countries to fight the crisis were covered. This study focuses on developments since 2010 with a focus on the concerns and actions that emerged with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In particular, the transition from the European Financial Stability Facility to the European Stability Mechanism is assessed. The focus after 2012 has progressively turned to the challenges of the European banking union. Findings – These issues are jointly covered, along with some updates on the views of the ESFRC on recent advances in other areas, such as solvency regulation. All in all, the authors find that the weaknesses of the global financial system remain to be addressed, and they believe that the banking union is one of the main tools and opportunities for an improved and efficient crisis management in Europe. Originality/value – The paper aims at contributing to the study of financial regulation after the banking crisis. The experience of the euro zone in this context is assessed in this article from a wide range of perspectives.

How Domestic Politics Shaped the French Government's Position During the Euro Crisis

Throughout the euro crisis, the French government has pushed to invert the rules of the Maastricht Treaty. After the height of the crisis had been overcome, one can see the success of the French government. The European Central Bank (ECB) has assumed a fiscal policy role by its extensive government bond buying, the no bailout clause has been replaced by the permanent European Financial Stability Facility and negotiations over a stronger political union have gained new impetus. This contribution traces the influence of different societal actors on the French government's preferences, which have largely shaped the outcome of the European summits. By following the domestic politics approach, it systematically juxtaposes the support or the discontent of the business community, namely that of the financial industry and the industrial interests, with the electoral pressures by the broad French public.The paper asks whether the economic interests trumped the electoral concerns and shows that the strong ties between the French financial sector with the southern periphery have been a driving factor in the first years of the euro crisis. As public opinion grew more and more disgruntled, it constrained the French government, which in turn changed its substantive position in the negotiations and sought to allot many of the responsibilities to the ECB, to avoid further unpopular financial commitments and bank bailouts.

A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU's responses to the euro area financial crisis

ABSTRACTHow can we understand the European Union's responses to the euro area financial crisis? This contribution examines this question through a historical institutionalist (HI) lens. First it reviews the design of existing institutions. With the help of HI it examines what challenges the institutional design posed on the European Union (EU) when the crisis hit. Next, the responses to the crisis by member state leaders and by EU-level actors are reviewed. An analysis is made of selected new EU institutions created to address the crisis: the European Financial Stability Facility; the European Stability Mechanism; the Six-Pack and Two-Pack; the European Semester; and the Fiscal Compact. Four ideal types – ‘displacement’, ‘layering’, ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ – are examined and found not to fit well. In some cases institutions were ‘layered’ on top of existing institutions. Perhaps an amendment could be made by offering the ideal type ‘copying’ in those cases where new institutions that borrow from earlier institutions. Although no complex problem can be truly understood by looking at it through one single theoretical lens, this contribution argues that a large of part of the problems that emerged, and the solutions adopted, can be understood by examining it through an HI lens.