Abstract
This article examines the institutional reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The response has so far consisted of three new financial mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, and the European Stability Mechanism. These have each a different legal basis and a specific regime, and display a varying degree of compatibility with EU law. The institutional quick .x employed by Eurozone countries was essentially a resort to private law and traditional international law techniques. Even after the well-known Pringle decision, several doubts still linger on. This framework constitutes a setback from the evolution of the EU, at the expense mainly of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice.
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