Federal Europe Research Articles

The process of British integration with European Union

The relations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are of the great importance for the European Union as well as for the United Kingdom, since the latter is dependent on the EU policies to some extent. As British nation has formally started the process of leaving the organization, it is important to investigate the process that led to the current state of affairs. To understand the current problem between sides, the history and process of establishing the relations should be studied. The problems appearing throughout the time still remain unresolved and prove the mutual interdependence and importance of their addressing for both the United Kingdom and the European Union. The article researches the main stages of British integration with the EU and their influence on the international relations within the European community. Since the first failed application to join the EEC in 1961 and later accession in 1973, the UK managed to occupy the leading position in the European Community with a number of beneficial rights. However, within the state the European integration provoked conflicts, i.e. between those who believe that Britain's future lies with Europe and those who believe it does not. In 1980-s the UK politicians stressed that the state paid a lot more into the EC budget than other members due to its relative lack of farms. The situation was worsened by J. Delors’ policy towards a more federal Europe and a single currency. T. Blair’s government was more European in its outlook than its predecessor, as he actively advocated the expansion of the European Union. However, Blair’s desire to get closer with the US dissatisfied Europeans. In 2011 D. Cameron became the first UK prime minister to veto a EU treaty. After winning reelection in May 2015, D. Cameron started the process of renegotiating the UK-EU relationship, putting on the list such issues as changes in migrant welfare payments, financial safeguards and easier ways for Britain to block EU regulations. On 23 June 2016 UK voters, inspired by Cameron, elected to withdraw from the European Union. The consequences of Brexit caused serious challenges the UK has to overcome in the nearest future.

The Fear of ‘Yellow Peril’ and the Emergence of European Federalist Movement

ABSTRACTAs an outcome of the dialectical narrative of European superiority in the nineteenth century (expressed in racial terms), the military and economic development of Japan and China created anxieties that have been shown to have a place in the history of Europe from the 1890s to the late 1930s. The term ‘yellow peril’ gave descriptive value to this anxiety. This essay argues that fear of the ‘yellow peril’ contributed to the emergence of the European federalist movement between the early 1900s and the 1930s. Fear of the ‘yellow peril’ was not the only factor responsible for the emergence of federalist movements, but operated alongside numerous other influences and discourses, many of which historians have identified. My concentration on the ‘yellow peril’ is due to its complete neglect by historians to date.

Colonial or Continental Power? The Debate over Economic Expansion in Interwar France, 1925–1932

In the 1920s various French elites argued that the nation state was not viable in an increasingly interdependent world economy dominated by ‘continental blocs’ such as the United States and the Soviet Union; instead, they hoped to expand French economic power through larger political structures, whether France's existing empire or a federal Europe. French foreign minister Aristide Briand called for the organisation of Europe at the same time that other elites advocated the consolidation of the French empire. Although imperial rivalry would trump European cooperation in the interwar years, the 1920s created a framework for post-1945 debates about whether France would achieve economic growth and maintain political independence through colonial development, continental cooperation or some combination of the two. Conventional narratives locate the origins of European integration in the devastations of the Second World War and the crisis of empire. This article argues that integration was conceived within and in tension with, not outside of, an imperial framework.

Debating federal Europe in the British Parliament, c. 1940–49

Federalism, or the fear of it, worked as a catalyst in the British pre-referendum debate on Brexit in June 2016. In this paper, we focus on the pre-European integration context and ask what kind of an alternative federalism was seen to afford in British politics during and after the Second World War. We limit our discussion to parliamentary debates, which have only rarely been used as primary sources for studying European integration history. The British Parliament was one of the key political arenas for debates on foreign policy, not just in terms of informing the party lines but also guiding the public discussion. In the early part of the 1940s, the British federalist movement was able to generate political debate on the issue and gain the attention of many leading politicians. We argue that the approach to the use of the concept was politically charged but remained open to various context-based interpretations, which did not eventually lead to any concrete proposals. During the latter part of the 1940s, the majority of British MPs were open to different ways of creating unity in Europe. The emphasis on national sovereignty, however, continued. As a result ‘federalism’, attached to structures for unity, gave way to more pragmatic political solutions.

Still waiting for Paris: Germany’s reluctant hegemony in pursuing political union in the Euro Area

After decades proposing the creation of a political union to make the euro sustainable, Germany has not utilised the ‘window’ offered by the Eurozone crisis to pursue this goal. Using the conceptual devices of the ‘Chartalist theory of money’ (which states that a monetary union cannot work without a political union) and ‘hegemony’, three possible explanations are explored in this paper. (1) Germany is slowly becoming a ‘normal’ power; (2) The German public has lost its enthusiasm for European integration; (3) Germany remains a reluctant hegemon and once it has seen that France is still not ready for political union it has refrained from actively promoting this ideal. The conclusion of the paper is that the first two explanations have merits, but the third remains more convincing. Berlin is still determined to build a more federal Europe. The question is rather whether Paris is ready to participate in this endeavour.

Comments: Federalists Never Give Up. The 70th Birthday of the Union of European Federalists (UEF)

Comments: Federalists Never Give Up. The 70th Birthday of the Union of European Federalists (UEF)

Constitución y mercado en la crisis de la Unión Europea: consideraciones preliminares

En el nuevo orden mundial globalizado, la competencia entre bloques económicos condiciona la orientación e intensidad del proceso de integración europea afectando a los fundamentos constitucionales de los Estados nación (principio democrático, dignidad humana y Estado social). Nos preguntamos si la solución a estos problemas se encuentra en una mera reforma de los mecanismos de integración o si por el contrario resulta inevitable desembocar en una Europa Federal.

Communicating Europe: Journals And European Integration 1939–1979, edited by Daniele Pasquinucci, Daniela Preda, and Luciano Tosi

Communicating Europe: Journals And European Integration 1939-1979, edited by Daniele Pasquinucci, Daniela Preda, and Luciano Tosi. Bern, Peter Lang, 2013. 610 pp. $137.95 US (paper). This book is a treasure trove for readers deeply interested in the history of European integration. Its thirty-three chapters explore the ways in which various political parties, civic groups, and other entities disseminated information on and ideas about the European unity movement from the 1940s to the 1970s. Given that the publication came out of a conference of the Italian university association for European studies (UASE-ECSA Italy), it is not surprising that the vast majority of chapters deal with the situation in Italy. Other chapters cover France, with a stray chapter on Spain and on the coverage of European politics in the American journal Foreign Affairs, from 1976-1979. Most of the chapters are in English; the rest in French. The book has all the strengths and weaknesses of having originated in a large conference. Some chapters are very narrow in scope; others very broad. Some are too long; others surprisingly short. Most are written by academics; a few by practitioners. Footnotes are copious and full of interesting information. The organization of the book is haphazard, reflecting the sheer variety of topics covered. The chapters, which are not numbered, are arranged in four sections, which seem arbitrary. There is redundancy and overlap. For example, the chapters by Angelita Campriani, on information outreach by the European Communities in the 1950s and 1960s, and by Fabio Casini, on the launch of the Joint Press and Information Service (1958-1960), could have been combined. Inevitably, Campriani devotes a number of pages to the work of the new Joint Service, without reference to Casini's succeeding chapter on the subject. The problem would seem to be a lack of editorial oversight and direction. The introduction for such a long and wide-ranging book is short--only four pages. Moreover, it is written by only one of the editors (Tosi). The book does not have a concluding chapter. In view of the plethora of organizations and publications mentioned in the book, a glossary, a list of abbreviations and acronyms, and an index would be extremely useful. In short, the book is less an edited volume than a conference proceeding. The publication is nonetheless highly valuable. A number of substantive points emerge. These include the bitter disappointment of federalists with the incremental progress toward European unity in the 1950s, a theme that recurs in a number of chapters. What looks in retrospect to casual observers like a series of great leaps forward for the European movement--the Schuman Declaration, the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community, the launch of the European Economic Community--looked at the time to European federalists like a series of setbacks. …

La fuorviante utopia degli Stati Uniti d’Europa

The present European crisis is the consequence of a momentous world transformation to which the old European federalist doctrine has been unable to find adequate responses. We know that only by joining forces can the European countries face the globalization challenge: so as to manage to preserve not only their unique social model, but also the institutional and cultural achievements that are the most admirable heritage of their history and their distinctive contribution to world civilization. How is this task to be carried out? Not by the generous utopian proposal of the United States of Europe, for this requires a centralization of sovereignty at present unacceptable to the national States. Rather, by a new “material constitution” based on the only outstanding example successful in combining social justice and economic efficiency: the German model. Unified Germany has already been leading the path to these objectives by its principles of social market economy and by leaving its imprint on the European Central Bank.

What Does the 1930s' Experience Tell Us about the Future of the Eurozone?

If the eurozone follows the precedent of the 1930s, it will not survive. The attractions of escaping from the gold standard then were massive and they point to a strategy of devalue and default for today's crisis countries. A fully federal Europe with a banking union and a fiscal union is the best solution, but it may be politically infeasible. However, it may be possible to underpin the euro with a ‘Bretton Woods Compromise’ that accepts some retreat from deep economic integration and provides greater policy space since exit entails risks of financial crisis that were not present 80 years ago.

A United States of Europe? Amerykańscy ojcowie zjednoczonej Europy u progu zimnej wojny (1945-1957)

It was George Washington who many authors claim first expressed the wish, often reported by Americans, that „one day, on the model of the United States of America a United States of Europe will come into being”. In fact, the idea seems to have been launched by 19th century European federalists, yet it could not materialize until the dawn of the Cold War. Not only did the Truman administration’s reappraisal of US global security interests and its role in the world lead to their support, but to their relentless promotion of Europe’s economic, political and military integration. Out of their mixed idealistic and pragmatic motivation, the Washington establishment argued that, if united along the American model, a federal Europe would overcome its traditional problems (national rivalries and wasting its economic potential) while, on the other hand, it would also reduce US responsibility for the well-being of the Western world. However, as post-war normalization set in, the leaders of Western Europe grew increasingly skeptical of American federalist visions, while Washington responded with ever more resolute threats of withdrawing its forces from Europe. It was not until the ultimate failure of the EDC/EPC project that the Eisenhower administration modified its European policy, coming to terms with the end of federalism and the triumph of functionalism.

Посткризисные модели европейской интеграции

The article analyses post-crisis methods and models of European integration that are at the center of political debate in the EU leading member-states. The current debate about the future of European integration is often portrayed as a choice between the federalist and intergovernmental approaches. The reality is far more complex, since European integration at its late stage is a combination of all integration methods. Nowadays it is more expedient to speak about flexible integration, or "variable geometry" that constitutes the most realistic approach to the post-crisis EU. The euro crisis led to a massive transfer of power to the EU level, and made political union a genuine possibility. However, although pro-Europeans now agree that political union is necessary to save the euro, they often have in mind very different things. Three models – asymmetric integration, full-fledged federation and two-speed Europe – are being discussed by the EU analysts and policy-makers. Whatever the future model, it is clear that it will require finding a balance between the greater flexibility and the rules that would allow EU to claim legitimacy for its actions.

European Union grand strategy and defense: strategy, sovereignty, and political union

In its purest essence, the European Union (EU) is a political project with a commitment to reaching a finalite politique of a federal Europe. The paper focuses on EU grand strategy with special reference to defense cooperation in Europe in a transatlantic context. The paper analyzes the prospects for an EU strategy in the defense field and also looks at ways to explain this using suitable theoretical lenses as frameworks for analysis, including concepts drawn from the fields of comparative strategy and international relations. The EU is a political project and the paper will also ask how far the defense field is a necessary and contingent part of the drive toward political union in Europe and what this tells us about the prospects for an EU grand strategy in a transatlantic context. The paper will, in particular, focus on a series of case studies to analyze the prospects for a coherent EU politico-military culture, how such a culture operates, and what it means for EU grand strategy in a transatlantic con...

Europe in crisis: Bolt from the blue, by Ivan T Berend

Reviewed by: Edelgard Mahant, Glendon College, York UniversityIn Europe in Crisis , Hungarian historian Ivan Berend explains the causes of the euro currency crisis and makes some recommendations about how to resolve it. His viewpoint is that of a convinced European federalist, and his conclusion is that the euro will survive (131).Berend begins with three case studies. He explains how the Icelandic, Irish, and Greek economies fell into serious economic crises over the four years from 2008 to 2012. The following chapter includes three further case studies--Portugal, Italy, and Spain. This time the case studies aim to show how the effects of the 2008 financial crisis in the US, together with mistakes made in Europe by both the EU and national governments, combined to cause a fiscal and financial crisis in the latter three countries. All six case studies are informative, even if one does not agree with Berend's view that the crises were to a large extent caused by the movement of the European economies away from industrial production to what he terms financialization.What Berend ignores is the fact that most of the world's successful economies have progressed from a reliance on the production of things to a reliance on the production of services, which, of course, includes financial services. The economies of all of the wealthy industrialized now derive a majority of their wealth from tertiary industries. Germany is unique in that it has preserved a significant manufacturing sector, but even Germany derives the majority of its wealth from service industries. Along with Poland, Germany is one of the more successful European economies, but it is not logical to derive prescriptions from a sample of one. That said, Berend does have a point when he ascribes some of the Western economies' financial problems to the creation of ever more refined financial instruments, derivatives of derivatives, that make it all but impossible to determine the creditworthiness of the original products.Having diagnosed the problem, Berend suggests possible solutions. These include a more federal Europe with direct European supervision of the banking sector and a European Central Bank that could raise money in the bond markets. But, he writes, if the euro survives, as he predicts, then the Union may have to allow some irresponsible or peripheral (134) or totally bankrupt countries (136) to leave.The above statements point to one unfortunate aspect of this book. The author has a tendency to be judgmental and stereotypical toward some people and countries. Writing about Greece, Spain, and other he terms peripheral, he claims that clientelism, networking, corruption, a different work ethic and lifestyle . …

L'ereditŕ intellettuale di Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was a contemporary historian who combined the political historian's method of consulting the written record with the economic historian's use of statistical data and the social scientist's preference for general theory. On the strength of the resulting research methodology he produced a series of original histories of Nineteenth and Twentieth century Europe which tackled the big historical issues of his time: the nature of Nazism; of total war; of economic development in Nineteenth and Twentieth century Europe; and the reasons for the sustained economic boom in western Europe after 1945 and for the origins of European integration. In so far as his conclusions on each separate theme challenged the dominant theories, they stimulated considerable debate. Indeed, his implicit theories of historical change and European integration continue to resonate in the current political and economic crises facing Europe. Unlike neo-classical economists, European federalists and many integration theorists, Milward argued that economic and monetary union would not necessarily lead to a democratic political union in Europe and the end of nation-state. Indeed he predicted in 2000 that if the European Monetary Union was beset by asymmetric shocks, it would weaken progressively until its desired effect had been so reduced as to defeat the Union's original purpose. As we live through such asymmetric shocks, Milward's predictions seem to carry more force than any of teleological theories of European integration.

Europe is Divided Again: This Time Between Creditors and Debtors

The future of the European Union has never been more in doubt than at the very moment it has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its historical accomplishments.When the heads of Europe's weakest institutions—the Commission, the Council and the Parliament—collected the prize in Oslo on December 10, 2012 they spotlighted the nub of the problem. Unless these institutions can garner the legitimacy of European citizens and transform into a real federal union with common fiscal and economic policies to complement the single currency, Europe will remain at the mercy of global financial markets and the fiscally authoritarian dictates of its strongest state, Germany.Moving beyond this state of affairs was the focus of a recent “town hall” gathering in Berlin sponsored by the Berggruen Institute on Governance. The meeting brought together current power brokers—such as the contending voices of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who rarely appear in public together—as well as Europe's top former leaders, key thinkers and young people who will govern in the future.The peace‐building project of the European Union was born out of the ashes of World War II and the anguish of the Cold War. Yet, as George Soros points out, its current inability to resolve the eurocrisis by forging greater union is dividing Europe once again, this time between creditors and debtors. Former Greek premier George Papandreou has warned that this division is fomenting a new politics of fear that is giving rise to the same kind of xenophobic movements that fueled the extreme politics of the Nazi era.To avoid a repeat of the last calamitous century, Europe first of all needs a growth strategy both to escape the “debt trap” it is in—and which austerity alone will only deepen—and to create breathing space for the tough structural reforms that can make Europe as a whole competitive again in a globalized world. To sustain reform, it needs a clear path to legitimacy for the institutions that must govern a federal Europe.The proof that Europe can escape its crisis through a combination of growth, fiscal discipline and structural reform comes from the one country so many want to keep out of the union: Turkey.Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rightfully boasts of Turkey's accomplishments that resulted from the difficult changes carried out after its crisis in 2001—ranging from quickly cleaning up the banks to liberalizing markets to trimming social benefits to make them more affordable in the long run. As a result, Turkey today is the fastest growing economy in the world alongside China with diminished deficit and debt levels that meet the eurozone criteria that many members states themselves cannot today meet. Turkey has even offered a 5 billion euro credit through the IMF for financial aid to Europe.Germany itself also provides some lessons for the rest of Europe. The obvious reason Germany rules today is because it is the most globally competitive country in the European Union. That is the result of a series of reforms that were implemented starting in 2003 under the leadership of then‐chancellor Gerhard Schröder.Aimed a bolstering Germany's industrial base and its collateral small and medium enterprises which are the foundation of its middle class society, those reforms introduced more labor flexibility and trimmed benefits to make them sustainably affordable while investing in training, maintaining skills and research and development.Even if Europe's individual nation states can shrink imbalances by following Turkey and Germany in getting their act together, the only ultimate way to save the euro, and thus Europe itself, is to build the complementary governing institutions at the European level. For those institutions to become effective, they must be empowered and legitimated by European citizens themselves. To this end, Tony Blair has suggested a bold move: the direct election of a European president.Symbolically, the Oslo ceremonies were a historical turning point for Europe. By recognizing the European Union's peace‐making past, the Nobel Prize challenged Europe to escape once and for all the destructive pull of narrow national interests and passions.

The Politics of Fear

The future of the European Union has never been more in doubt than at the very moment it has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its historical accomplishments.When the heads of Europe's weakest institutions—the Commission, the Council and the Parliament—collected the prize in Oslo on December 10, 2012 they spotlighted the nub of the problem. Unless these institutions can garner the legitimacy of European citizens and transform into a real federal union with common fiscal and economic policies to complement the single currency, Europe will remain at the mercy of global financial markets and the fiscally authoritarian dictates of its strongest state, Germany.Moving beyond this state of affairs was the focus of a recent “town hall” gathering in Berlin sponsored by the Berggruen Institute on Governance. The meeting brought together current power brokers—such as the contending voices of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who rarely appear in public together—as well as Europe's top former leaders, key thinkers and young people who will govern in the future.The peace‐building project of the European Union was born out of the ashes of World War II and the anguish of the Cold War. Yet, as George Soros points out, its current inability to resolve the eurocrisis by forging greater union is dividing Europe once again, this time between creditors and debtors. Former Greek premier George Papandreou has warned that this division is fomenting a new politics of fear that is giving rise to the same kind of xenophobic movements that fueled the extreme politics of the Nazi era.To avoid a repeat of the last calamitous century, Europe first of all needs a growth strategy both to escape the “debt trap” it is in—and which austerity alone will only deepen—and to create breathing space for the tough structural reforms that can make Europe as a whole competitive again in a globalized world. To sustain reform, it needs a clear path to legitimacy for the institutions that must govern a federal Europe.The proof that Europe can escape its crisis through a combination of growth, fiscal discipline and structural reform comes from the one country so many want to keep out of the union: Turkey.Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rightfully boasts of Turkey's accomplishments that resulted from the difficult changes carried out after its crisis in 2001—ranging from quickly cleaning up the banks to liberalizing markets to trimming social benefits to make them more affordable in the long run. As a result, Turkey today is the fastest growing economy in the world alongside China with diminished deficit and debt levels that meet the eurozone criteria that many members states themselves cannot today meet. Turkey has even offered a 5 billion euro credit through the IMF for financial aid to Europe.Germany itself also provides some lessons for the rest of Europe. The obvious reason Germany rules today is because it is the most globally competitive country in the European Union. That is the result of a series of reforms that were implemented starting in 2003 under the leadership of then‐chancellor Gerhard Schröder.Aimed a bolstering Germany's industrial base and its collateral small and medium enterprises which are the foundation of its middle class society, those reforms introduced more labor flexibility and trimmed benefits to make them sustainably affordable while investing in training, maintaining skills and research and development.Even if Europe's individual nation states can shrink imbalances by following Turkey and Germany in getting their act together, the only ultimate way to save the euro, and thus Europe itself, is to build the complementary governing institutions at the European level. For those institutions to become effective, they must be empowered and legitimated by European citizens themselves. To this end, Tony Blair has suggested a bold move: the direct election of a European president.Symbolically, the Oslo ceremonies were a historical turning point for Europe. By recognizing the European Union's peace‐making past, the Nobel Prize challenged Europe to escape once and for all the destructive pull of narrow national interests and passions.

Portugal and the Straitjacket of the European Financial Crisis

The austerity program negotiated with the Troika (IMF-ECB-EC) and adopted by Portugal in 2011 is having a devastating impact on the Portuguese economy. Although the Portuguese government is clearly fulfilling the measures agreed with the Troika, the final outcome of the adjustment program is not entirely in its hands, but rather awaiting further EU decisions involving measures to stimulate economic growth, mutualisation of public debt and additional steps towards a federal Europe. As time goes by, the negative repercussions – in particular social and political instability, as well as the erosion of the Portuguese democratic regime – are inevitable if there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

The Contribution of the Italian Liberal Thought to the European Union: Einaudi and His Heritage from Leoni to Alesina

The Italian classical liberal tradition of Federalism and European integration is well founded. Starting with Luigi Einaudi, who took up the heritage of Carlo Cattaneo, it has continued with Giovanni Malagodi, Giovanni Demaria, and Bruno Leoni, not to mention the liberals of Einaudi’s times. The same reflection continues today. Alberto Alesina is a prominent personality among the scholars who can be considered as full heirs of Einaudi. A foresight, often impressive, is the thread linking Einaudi’s writings on European federation. Between the twenties and the early fifties of the 20th century, Einaudi traced with great precision the profile and many details of a politically and economically unified Europe. Today, we do not have the federation that he wished for, but the economic sovereignty among EU countries has been shared to a great extent. Other prominent Italian liberal thinkers and politicians have reflected on the idea of a federal Europe and on the incipient European construction: thinkers such as Bruno Leoni, Giovanni Malagodi and Giovanni Demaria. Giovanni Malagodi, for many years a member of the Italian Parliament and secretary general of the Italian Liberal party, in his speech for the ratification of the Treaty of Rome, advocated a European monetary union with a single currency substituting those of the Member States of the EEC. Both Giovanni Demaria and Bruno Leoni warned against the danger of Government interventionist policies in the European common market. Alesina, in various scholarly contributions on European integration and in the essay The Future of Europe, adopts a liberal perspective for his critical analysis of EU policies.

Europe's Climate Energy Package Must Be Reformed or Abandoned

INTRODUCTION From the Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso downward, all deciders and observers agree that today the European Union is confronted with its most serious crisis, ultimately of confidence, since the Economic Community was founded in January 1958: for many leaders only a federal Europe can now save the day. The history of the Community and then Union has always featured proposals and initiatives for moving further towards political and economic union, but the 2008 “climate-energy package”, like those initiatives, may be doomed to failure.