Reviewed by: Berlin Rules: Europe and the German Way by Paul Lever Randall E. Newnham Berlin Rules: Europe and the German Way. By Paul Lever. London: I.B. Tauris, 2018. Pp. xiv + 274. Paper $15.95. ISBN 978-1788314138. The premise of this book by the former British Ambassador to Germany is clear from its title: Germany is in charge of the European Union and thus clearly the dominant power in Europe. Is this merely an alarmist argument? There are, after all, those in Britain whose views about Germany seem to be frozen in 1940, when the heroic RAF fended off waves of Nazi bombers. Lever strives to be seen as more thoughtful, as one would expect from an author with many years of experience with Germany, including as British Ambassador to that country in 1997–2003. Lever has written a comprehensive book on Germany's role in the EU in recent years. It focuses first on Germany's economic strength, then turns to the views on federalism held by successive governments, and finally to German history. In these chapters, Lever argues convincingly that German support for the EU is strengthened by two factors. First, Germany itself is federal, so a federal Europe seems familiar and nonthreatening to German leaders. Second, Germany's negative view of its own history makes it more willing than some other states (notably Britain) to leave national history behind and embark on a pan-European project: "As Germans they [End Page 440] are constantly reminded of their past. As Europeans they can escape from it" (122). Lever next focuses on Germany's relations with its major European partners, especially France and Poland. Finally, he addresses the EU's progress toward greater unity and the possibility of an EU army. All of this seems initially to be part of a reasonable discussion of Germany's place in Europe. Indeed, Lever is not entirely negative about what he sees as Germany's leading role. He argues that Germans are safely democratic and that their current influence is much closer to the ideas of "soft power" than the "hard" power exercised by Germany before 1945. For example, when discussing Germany's leading role in the EU, Lever notes that this role is rooted in ideas, not threats. When Volker Kauder of the CDU famously said in 2011: "Jetzt auf einmal wird in Europa deutsch gesprochen," he did not mean this literally (1). He meant that Germany's ideas now seemed to be widely shared in the EU. In Lever's view, the size of the German economy and its large role within the European Commission and Parliament enable Berlin to be "first among equals" in EU decision-making: "others may propose," he writes, "but in the end it is the German government which will decide" (viii). Nevertheless, Lever clearly still sees this situation as a serious threat, and this gives his work a very polemical cast. His book is dominated by bottomless cynicism about both Germany and the EU. Lever seems utterly convinced that European politics is a zero-sum, state-centered game, where clashing state interests are the only explanation for EU policy. The EU has little or no independent worth, in his view. German and EU leaders are regarded as hypocrites, who preach unity and common values while promoting a purely self-centered agenda. As Lever puts it: "Is there anything more to Germany's leadership of the EU than a simple wish to get results which are good for Germany? German politicians like to pretend that there is. They pontificate about the need for a so-called 'political union'" (27). Lever does not think it possible that Germans can sincerely believe in the EU as a project. Similarly, he does not think that they have any real interest in the environment or social rules of the EU. Lever claims that "they use lofty European rhetoric about social progress and environmental stewardship, [but] in reality they want to ensure that Germany's competitors are not able to benefit from laxer rules than apply in Germany itself" (187). Indeed, he claims that Germany's entire economic model is based on the premise that "It is not enough...
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