European Defence Identity Research Articles

The Problem of the Eu's Defense Identity: the Peacekeeping Experience in Africa

The article is devoted to the problem of the defense identity formation of the European Union (EU) in the context of peacekeeping operations in Africa. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that there is still no consensus in the EU countries regarding the deepening of integration and the need for military operations outside the area of responsibility of the organization member states. Contradictions on the issue of defense identity have an impact on cooperation with individual state and non-state actors in world politics and generally affect stability in the European security system. Using the example of the EU military operations in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and the CAR (EUTM RCA), the process of forming the EU's defense identity is considered. Constructivism is proposed as the theoretical basis of the study, which explains the behavioral model of an individual actor, fully revealing his identity. The methodology is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining historical and political aspects. Thus, a historical and genetic method was used to track the evolution of the EU's peacekeeping potential and a comparative method was used to compare the potential of EU operations in Africa. The instrumental and empirical analysis allowed not only to collect the necessary data on operations in Somalia and the CAR, but also to correlate the results obtained with the criteria that the authors identify as necessary for considering role identity. In conclusion, an assessment is given of how far the EU has progressed in the process of building a European defense identity, taking into account the achievements in military operations in Somalia and the CAR.

НАТО versus PESCO: экономические аспекты

The article is devoted to economic consequences of the demands of the U. S. President Donald Trump to European NATO allies to increase defense spendings in the context of intensified European defense cooperation (in particular, the implementation of the PESCO initiative). Within NATO, a line of tension “West-East” or “old-new members” has been identified, due to both economic (the size and level of the economies’ development) and political (attitude to the USA as a guarantor of security) reasons. European states have committed to increase spendings both within NATO (defense investment pledge) and within PESCO. On the one hand, the development of the European defense identity and the growth of defense spendings will in any case serve to strengthen the overall NATO capabilities. On the other hand, in the medium and long term these measures are unlikely to lead to real strategic autonomy of Europe, although they are aimed at strengthening support for the military-industrial complex of the largest European states. The U.S. considers such policy as a challenge, given that American defense contractors have traditionally been involved in the distribution of defense orders in Europe (while the U.S. market is nearly closed for European companies). Under conditions of growing uncertainty and the crisis of globalization, support for defense industry enterprises can create additional impetus for internationalization of this economy sector, without which European products are unlikely to remain competitive in the global arms export market. The analysis shows that France as a country with one of the most technologically advanced military-industrial complexes will be the main “motor” and, most likely, the beneficiary of strengthening defense cooperation in Europe. Moreover, an additional factor of French ambitions may be a significant share of state participation in the defense sector of the economy and, in general, the strongest (in comparison with Germany and the UK) “national link” of the industry.

The European Union in international relations of Canada at the end of XX – beginning of XXI century

Canada and the EU had a common vision of the fundamentals of the international relations system in the late XX – early XXI century and the need to respect the principles of international law. Canada in this matter has always acted together with other international actors on a coalition basis, accumulating defense potential.
 The EU has seen in Canadians close partners who share its values and have similar approaches to resolving conflict, so there are prospects for development of bilateral cooperation in the international arena.
 This was possible also due to the emergence of the Common foreign and defense policy of the EU and the implementation of important steps towards the development of European security policy and defense (ESDP). Therefore, at least a hypothetical European defense identity allows Canada to establish international cooperation with the EU in the defense sphere.
 Ottawa sought to demonstrate that Europe remains important to Canadian and international security interests, so he ESDP must not lead to the destruction of traditionally close relations between Canada and the European partners. Constitutive remains also link Europe with Canada in the framework of NATO.
 After the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the terrorist attacks of 2001, the EU is particularly interested in boosting relations with Canada. Despite the unity of views and approaches to solving most of the problems of international relations in the late XX – early XXI century between Canada and the EU, a common component in bilateral relations is still far from perfect, leaving the prospects for improving the Canadian-European cooperation on the international arena.
 Keywords: Canada, the European Union, international relationships, foreign policy

Mitterrand, France, and NATO: the European transition

With the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Mitterrand on the one hand perpetuated the Gaullist tradition of independence in defence as a gauge of national sovereignty. On the other hand, he inherited the Gaullist tradition with regard to NATO, especially in the matter of a European defence identity apart from NATO. Although fiercely protective of France's position outside NATO's integrated command, Mitterrand's official acceptance of the New Strategic Concept of NATO in 1991 and his participation in the Gulf War and other Western actions were such that arguably they helped pave the way for France's eventual rapprochement with NATO.

The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) marks an important political moment when European integration has been extended to the issue of defence. Understandably, there has been extensive commentary on the ESDP, most of which has focused on the ESDP's institutional, industrial or military deficiencies. These commentaries have been illuminating but by concentrating on the manifest weaknesses of the ESDP, scholars have perhaps neglected to discuss explicitly how a coherent ESDP could develop. Drawing on recent work by Ben Tonra, this paper discusses the social conditions which are likely to be necessary if the ESDP is to develop into a robust policy. Above all else, a coherent ESDP depends upon the development of a binding sense of mutual obligation between France, Germany and Britain. These nations need to commit themselves to collective defence goals. The paper goes on to argue that for this collective commitment to be developed between these nations, the ESDP requires missions. Only through missions, in which these nations together experience a shared threat, will enduring collective interests and the political will to address them be developed. The future of the ESDP will thus be finally determined by the actions which are carried out in its name. In the end, this may mean that a European defence identity develops not through an independent ESDP but through NATO.

What tasks for the torrejón centre?

The efforts under way in Europe since the 1990s to, define a European defence identity have led to an awareness of Europe's dependence on the United States. The problem is not that Europe is incapable of defending itself, but that its security has up until now been organised to fit into the Atlantic Alliance mould. The integration of American and European forces in a common structure, together with the United States' financial power and capacity for innovation, have gradually led Europe to depend closely on American logistics, transport and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence) capabilities.

Developing a European Intervention Force

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ATTEMPT by members of the European Union (EU) and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to work out the political details of a European intervention capacity. In the so- called Berlin model of June 1996, which built on the agreements reached in Brussels in January 1994, NATO members agreed to construct the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) inside their organization; if, however, the European members needed to act on their own (that is, without the United States), NATO would make its assets available.(f.1) To give substance to the plan, NATO began to develop Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) - a force model that combines different services such as army, navy, and air force with different national contributions into one command and control framework - that would allow the Western European Union (WEU) to conduct operations with NATO's agreement and with NATO assets.Two events precipitated preparations for a European intervention force. First, in late 1998 at an Anglo-French summit in St Malo, Britain dropped its opposition to substantial EU involvement in military affairs and joined France in calling for an autonomous European crisis response capacity. The second key event was the 1999 war in Kosovo. In the words of NATO's new secretary general, George Robertson, 'The European Security and Defence Identity is no longer just an attractive idea, it has become an urgent necessity.'(f.2) The general consensus in the aftermath of the war was that Europe had to enhance its political and military machinery so that it could respond to crises such as Kosovo without relying completely on the United States.(f.3)Behind NATO-EU manoeuvring, there are deep worries on both sides of the ocean about the future of Euro-Atlantic co-operation. The Europeans want to be able to handle a crisis like Kosovo on their own, but they do not want to lose NATO to congressional overreaction, especially as they peer anxiously over their shoulders at Russia. They also worry about unilateralist and high-tech strategies emanating from Washington that might dictate all future security operations in Europe. Americans, for their part, want the Europeans to stay interoperable with them in their rapid ascent into technologically sophisticated military capabilities. But they realize that with such capability comes the potential for independent European interests, and they know that France and others would be keen to articulate this. They are also apprehensive about a perceived European desire to be free of American leadership.The British move at St Malo towards a practical and semiautonomous European defence capacity changed the inter-organizational landscape between NATO and the EU to an extent not seen since the end of the cold war. Although it seems premature to herald, as some have done, the St Malo declaration as the 'final stage of European integration,'(f.4) it goes a step beyond the ESDI-in-NATO agreed upon in 1996. It adds: ready access to key NATO assets for a European force that sequences its decisions with NATO but might not operate under NATO's auspices. The Americans and Europeans have both made compromises to create a space in which European decision-making and military capabilities can grow without violating the dogmas of unnecessary duplication, unilateral decoupling, and no discrimination against non-EU members. The formula works as follows: in a crisis, the Europeans give NATO the first shot at dealing with it. If NATO declines, the Europeans may act autonomously with a reasonable expectation of using certain NATO assets, including those directly supported by the United States.In analyzing developments over the last two years, it is apparent that the politics of European security and defence are far from settled and that European-American tensions over the essence of a European defence identity remain acute. Since Kosovo, the Americans have been bent on the rapid build-up of military capability, while the Europeans have pursued more independent 'say and do' from NATO. …

Towards a European Defence Identity - Thank You Mr Blair!

Towards a European Defence Identity - Thank You Mr Blair!

NATO transformed: the Alliance's new roles in international security

NATO TRANSFORMEDThe Alliance's New Roles in International SecurityDavid S. YostWashington: US Institute of Peace, 1998, xvii, 450pp, US$19.95 paperWinston Churchill once observed that if we do not take change by the hand, it will one day seize us by the throat. One can hardly think of a more fitting adage for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the Alliance lurches into its fiftieth year it seems at once united and divided, resolute and timid, decisive yet paralyzed. One could attribute this rather bizarre state of affairs to the pseudo-war in Kosovo, which is a departure from not only the Alliance's core activity (that is, self-defence) but also from the practice of defining goals in a clear and strategic (that is, long-term) manner. These four works on NATO's future do not explore these issues, as each was published before the outbreak of fighting. They do, however, provide as comprehensive an examination of the political and military factors affecting the Alliance's longevity as one is likely to encounter. Together, they examine the issue from a variety of angles ranging from the future orientation of United States foreign policy, efforts to forge a more solid (and competing?) European defence identity, and relations with the other major player in the European security equation: Russia.David Yost's NATO Transformed focuses on what is perhaps the most fundamental question underpinning the Alliance's future. He asks whether NATO has transformed itself from an organization dedicated to collective self-defence into one with a wider, more inclusive mandate which will contribute to, rather than detract from, post-cold war security in Europe. By surveying its efforts to reach out to the states in the former Soviet orbit and its pre-occupation with crisis management in the Balkans, he concludes that NATO has demonstrated the attributes of a collective security body. Although there is little doubt that its core purpose remains intact, its 'open-door' policy toward central and eastern Europe and its sojourn into the world of peacekeeping illustrate both the internal 'push' for a new strategic rationale and the external 'pull' exerted by those regions of Europe which crave peace and stability.Yost is careful not to paint an overly optimistic picture. American hesitancy to take the lead and Europe's decades-old habit of deferring to United States leadership on security matters has compounded the difficulty of forging a strategic identity in the absence of the Soviet threat. He points put that new and enduring objectives - namely, enlargement and collective action based on consensus - are bound to clash since the former will almost inevitably make the latter more difficult. Another challenge will be accommodating Russian sensitivities without fatally compromising either autonomy or the timeliness of a response to emerging crises. Clearly, 'NATO Transformed' is an ironic choice of title. As Yost makes clear, the transformation of the institution and its strategic mind-set is quite unfinished. The volume, therefore, serves as a timely warning to policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic: the cold war may be over but the amount of work yet to be done should not be underestimated.One would think that the question of NATO's role in any future European security architecture would be more problematic if examined from the perspective of states on the periphery of the Alliance. Surprisingly, the contributors to NATO Looks East see few problems and stress that enlargement presents virtually unlimited opportunities for co-operation and confidence-building. …

NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity

NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity

Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspectives of Britain, France and Germany

Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspectives of Britain, France and Germany

Defence policy and integration in Western Europe

This article considers the recent debates over the possible creation of a European defence identity, focusing in particular on the links, if any, such an organisation might have with the European Union and its institutions. It is divided into three sections. The first considers discussions concerning such a European defence organisation prior to the end of the Cold War. The second examines the debates which led to the signing of the EUT and examines the content of that Treaty. Finally, the article investigates debates on European defence in the framework of the current review of the Maastricht Treaty. It demonstrates that, since the early 1950s, defence has featured sporadically, if at all, on the agenda of European integration. It goes on to argue that whilst, especially in the aftermath of the EUT, some commentators expressed confidence that a corner had been turned and that Europe was on the way to providing itself with a defence identity of its own, less than month into the IGC called to review the Maastricht Treaty, it appears that European union will not succeed in providing itself with such an organisation.

Integrating European security through space

For decades, Western European nations have been comparatively uninterested in the military use of space, largely content to rely on the far greater resources of the USA in this area. Today, however, the traditional belief that the security requirements of ‘the West’ are synonymous with those of the USA is increasingly open to challenge. A new European defence identity is emerging, keen to achieve greater autonomy in the security field, albeit remaining within the overarching framework of NATO. Consequently there is a growing requirement for indigenous European capabilities in terms of military space assets. This requirement has been met in part by the establishment, by the Western Union, of a satellite centre in Spain, which currently analyses commercially procured satellite imagery. The centre's capabilities may be expanded if the WEU states decide to add a space-based element — either their own satellite system, or participation in an existing multinational programme. Such a decision is due to be taken towards the end of 1995. This paper concludes by briefly examining the political and security implications of such a decision.

From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European security

The end of the Cold War necessarily called into question the role of Europe's security institutions, and the attitudes of the major Western powers towards them. After 40 years of monotonous stability, reform became a necessity. Yet whereas its partners (notably Britain and the United States) pressed ahead with the reform of NATO structures in order to ensure the survival of the alliance after 1989, France, although having criticized the workings of the transatlantic security system for many years, was unable to stamp its influence on the shifting European security landscape. French policies towards European security institutions are, however, undergoing a major transformation. Although the roots of this change can, in part, be traced back to previous Socialist governments, it was under the Balladur government that it became most marked. Yet belated adjustment to the security imperatives of post-Cold War Europe has come too late to aid the realization of the French vision of an independent European defence identity emerging out of the ashes of the Cold War.*

Is there a Common European Defence Identity? The Views of Officers of Eight European Countries

Is there a Common European Defence Identity? The Views of Officers of Eight European Countries

Western European Union: Rhetoric and Reality (Essay)

This paper briefly outlines the historical evolution of the Western European Union, from its origins in the Brussels Treaty to WEU’s recent linkage with the process of European integration. Particular attention is paid to the political and military development of WEU as this relates to the apparent goal of eventual Western European defense integration. It is argued that in spite of the clamour to establish a European Defense Identity under WEU, however, the Europeans do not have a practical short-term alterative to the present situation of military dependence upon the United States and NATO.

France and West European defence identity

France and West European defence identity

The United States’ commitment to Western Europe: strategic ambiguity and political disintegration?

During the last twenty years there has been frequent, albeit intermittent, speculation regarding the possible emergence of a West European defence identity which would give the allies a degree of self-reliance which has been lacking throughout the postwar period. Such speculation had two major sources-hopes for Europe and fears about the United States. On the one side, West European economic integration and the advances made in political cooperation not only appeared as a possible precursor to greater unity in defence, but also seemed precariously incomplete without comparable progress in this area. On the other side, discussions about a more independent Western Europe have increasingly been prompted by anxiety about the United States security guarantee. It is essential, therefore, to analyse the American commitment to Western Europe in an attempt both to identify its strengths and weaknesses and to assess its durability and resilience. Although this task is formidable, there are several key distinctions which, if made at the outset, may help to render it more manageable. The first distinction is that between the strategic dimension of the commitment (which may be inherently ambiguous) and the political commitment of the United States to underwrite West European security. Indeed, so long as the political relationship between the United States and its European allies is in good repair, even a high degree of ambiguity in the strategic guarantee will not necessarily prove inimical to the security of the allies. The difficulty is, though, that the political relationship itself has two distinct dimensions, corresponding roughly to the difference between structure and process. The first of these dimensions concerns the underlying political, economic and strategic interests which give the United States a very substantial stake in the security and integrity of Western Europe; the second concerns day to day management of diplomatic relations within the Alliance. At this second level the relationship between the United States and Western Europe has appeared increasingly fragile as the allies have confronted a wide range of highly divisive issues. The key questions, however, concern the relationship between the two levels. Are the current strains and tensions simply another example of the discord and frictions which are perhaps endemic amongst close allies? Is it the case, as one Congressional report suggested, that 'NATO controversies in general resemble the controversies which enliven democratic societies but do not undermine their legitimacy',1 or is this too sanguine a view? Do the diplomatic squabbles that seem to have become a major characteristic