European Defence Fund Research Articles

Perspektywy reformy Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej do 2025 roku. Autonomia strategiczna UE?

PROSPECTS FOR REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY TO 2025: EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY? The research objective of the paper is to highlight the prospects for the implementation of the main directions of the reform of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union until 2025. The caesuras of the work are marked by two events: the adoption of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union by the European Council on 28 June 2016 and the decision of the European Council of 24 March 2022 on the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defense. First of all, the research hypothesis should be established that the full implementation of CSDP reform, which was initiated with the adoption of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, and the resulting projects can significantly strengthen the position of the EU in the international arena. This will lead to the establishment of the European Security and Defense Union and the EU Rapid Reaction Force (5,000 troops) by the end of 2025. However, since many of the planned reform elements have not yet been completed or initiated, much will depend on the political will of individual member state governments, the level of spending on reform implementation by member states and the EU, and the progress of other reforms already underway (including addressing the economic and social consequences of the pandemic crisis and implementing eurozone systemic reform). The following research questions should then be asked: (1) How has the implementation process of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy gone so far? (2) How has the implementation of new projects (including the European Defense Fund, PESCO, and the Strategic Compass) affected EU-NATO relations? (3) How do selected EU member states assess these projects? (4) To what extent can the project to establish a European Security Council with the participation of Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Poland compete with and usefully complement the EU Strategic Compass project? The first part of the analysis presents the implementation process of the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union until 2022. The second part analyzes the goals, priorities, and assumptions of the Strategic Compass, the implementation of which is intended to lead the EU to strategic autonomy by 2030.

Lessons from EU Space Programmes for Collective Defence

The European Defence Fund (EDF) has been interpreted by a number of scholars as a step beyond intergovernmental cooperation and towards the introduction of supranationalism in defence policy. We suggest that past developments in space policy can be a guide for developments in the defence area given the functional dependencies between the two fields and their institutional similarities. Based on this, we believe that the Commission will be unable to convert its new authority over the EDF into actual influence over use of force. On the contrary, the EDF may signal that European defence industrial policy is increasingly motivated by civilian and predominantly commercial considerations, dissociated from the operational objectives of national defence policies. Like the EDF, the European Union’s (EU’s) space programmes involve the supranational financing of militarily relevant capabilities. We argue that Member States have accepted supranationalism in space policy insofar as the Commission was able to civilianize matters of industrial governance and keep them separate from the conduct of military operations. We show that the EU implemented civilian programmes in areas that were otherwise driven by national militaries. In instances where civilianization was impossible, Member States’ security interests are preserved through intergovernmental modes of decision-making, even within purportedly ‘community’-driven processes. Member States have also retained significant control over future developments by exploiting a web of overlapping institutions and hazy task allocation. spillover, neofunctionalism, space policy, European Defence Fund, defence industry, industrial policy

THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON TRANSFERS OF DEFENCE-RELATED PRODUCTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY AND A NON-EXHAUSTIVE MODEL OF IMPLEMENTATION

The European Directive on the intra-community transfer of defence products from 2009 established mandatory steps to be taken in order to simplify the necessary documentation and to create a federated framework linking Member States’ national approaches and regulations. The regulatory document emerged as a result of the need to distinguish between import-export and transfer operations and, further, to secure the defence-related supplies within the European Union. The Directive introduced a new licensing system, based on general, global and individual licenses, encouraging the Member States to use general licenses for simple transfers of defence products between Member States, while maintaining control over their key security interests. From the perspective of the new European Defence Fund, the application of the Directive is difficult and measures should be taken to secure a more uniform implementation at Member States’ level, at least from the perspective of transfers associated with research and development and innovation.

Convenient, but controversial: Why the European Defence Fund should not be expanded as the Commission becomes geopolitical

Convenient, but controversial: Why the European Defence Fund should not be expanded as the Commission becomes geopolitical

The European defence fund: a step towards a single market for defence?

ABSTRACT The European Defence Fund (EDF) is considered a game changer for European defence. The unprecedented co-funding of research and development expenses of cutting-edge defence systems is functional to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the EU’s Strategic Autonomy. This paper analyses the factors that enabled a partial shift from intergovernmental to supranational governance in the European defence market, applying the lens of the new intergovernmentalism theory. The cost of non-cooperation in defence and the Brexit impact will be taken into account to explain the observed shift. The paper highlights the role of the Commission in the integration of the European Defence Agency’s activities with those of the newly created DG for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS). It also examines the extent to which diverging strategic industrial interests of Member States and of industrial players seek to prevent a deeper integration of the European defence market.

Market Size and the Political Economy of European Defense

There is an intense debate in international relations scholarship on whether the benefits accrued by arms production globalization outweigh the risks of depending on foreign suppliers. Europe is an interesting case: although regional protection could help Europeans mitigate exposure to global actors, the prospect of regional integration generates concerns about autonomy within Europe itself. We depict European defense cooperation as a “two-level playing field,” whereby market size informs a country’s hedging between global-external and European-internal competitors. First tiers push for defense market integration because they expect to be strengthened vis-à-vis global players but also because market size gives them a competitive advantage over fellow Europeans. Second tiers resist market integration, as they worry it might lead to first-tier dominance. To probe our hypotheses, we examine the behavior of two first tiers (France and Germany) and two second tiers (Poland and Sweden) in the context of the European Defense Fund.

Intergovernmental mechanisms for security and defense R&D funding in the European Union

The need to create a new technological base through joint efforts is well understood both in the EU member states and in the Union itself, but the situation has not changed at all for a long time. Over time, Member States have come to realize that instead of increasing funding that does not address inefficiencies in this area, it is necessary to reduce duplication of efforts to develop loosely coupled capacities, platforms and systems. Since 2016, at the level of the European Union, a sufficiently integrated system has been formed, which makes it possible to coordinate the actions of the member states on funding scientific research for defense needs, as well as, by identifying the highest priority research areas for all EU member states, to co-finance such research from the EU budget. The most striking examples of such measures are the European Defense Fund and the financing from it of projects of the member states, implemented in the framework of PESCO. Such measures are predominantly intergovernmental in nature, but contribute to the formation of a single European market for scientific research by stimulating cross-border research projects.

INTRODUCTION THE FUTURE OF THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

INTRODUCTION THE FUTURE OF THE EU’S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

European procurement schemes and the European Defence Fund (EDF): how should academic research develop?

ABSTRACT Because of the recent deterioration of security and stability in the world, disruption of supply chains due to COVID-19, paying attention to national security and defence industries became of supreme importance for the stable development of European defence and security within both the Allied and the European frameworks. This article addresses the current trends in European security cooperation, with a narrower focus on national military-industrial complexes and defence industrial cooperation in the European Union (EU). The article analyses a few academic books on the subject and a wider academic/professional debate in order to illustrate which aspects of coverage are beneficial, which are missing with respect to the objectives of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and which spheres need to be developed further. The primary suggestion is to increase interdisciplinarity and the empirical/military capabilities side of defence research designs. In this way, a more significant impact and participation in policy shaping and capabilities development can be achieved.

PESCO: A Force for Positive Integration in EU Defence

Differentiation, or what some have called the ‘negative starting point’ of integration, has always been the norm in EU defence policy. Driven by both endogenous and exogenous (f)actors, political leaders in the European Council are nevertheless mindful of the need for Member States to cooperate in more structured ways to better protect their citizens against security threats. For this reason, a package of harmonizing measures has been developed with remarkable speed since 2016. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the most prominent innovation in this field. Given the high levels of politicization in defence it is perhaps surprising that PESCO has produced the most inclusive expression of enhanced cooperation, even if it is the most flexible of the differentiated integration mechanisms provided by the Treaties. This is largely the result of a German push for inclusivity, which prevailed over a French desire for a higher level of ambition. Monitored by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) and increasingly driven by the Commission’s Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), which manages the European Defence Fund (EDF), PESCO is a force that generates ‘positive integration’ by de-fragmenting the defence market in the European Union. This article builds on empirical research that maps the varied clusters of Member States lining up behind different types of defence capability development projects. It observes a process of coagulation across the microcosm of PESCO, coupled with formal expressions of differentiated integration, both vertically and horizontally, and offers explanations for these trends. European Union, differentiated integration, defence, PESCO

INTRODUCTION EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS

Sociotechnical Imaginaries of EU Defence: The Past and the Future in the European Defence Fund

AbstractIn this article we investigate how a particular vision of the future of EU defence has embedded itself into different arenas of EU politics over decades, and is currently gaining material expression in the European Defence Fund (EDF). Through an historiographic approach, we traced the development of a particular narrative on security, innovation, research, and economic growth based on fears of technology gaps and dependence on the US, and a belief in the potential of military R&D to produce civilian benefits. We provide an alternative reading of the emergence of the EDF by drawing on literature within Science and Technology Studies, in particular the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, to highlight wider socio‐political dimensions of defence technologies and expand debates on EU defence.

The European Commission’s new role in EU security and defence cooperation: the case of the European Defence Fund

ABSTRACT European Defence is in a new and formative phase in which the European Union’s long list of defence acronyms has steadily grown. One of the most noticeable new policy initiatives is the European Commission’s European Defence Fund (EDF). This article consequently investigates and outlines the establishment of the European Defence Fund and the European Commission’s new role within the field of security and defence through the lens of revised neofunctionalism. This article thus asks how and through what steps did the EDF come about; and secondly how can neofunctionalism explain the dynamics involved in the establishment of the European Defence Fund. The analysis uses a process-tracing method and draws on interviews with relevant policymakers and officials in Brussels as well as official EU documents. The conclusions argue that the ever-increasing involvement of the European Commission in a policy field close to national sovereignty is starting to blur the traditional dichotomy between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making. In this way, this study contributes to the growing literature on the weakening of intergovernmentalism within the EU security and defence policy field.

Settling it on the multi-level parliamentary field? A fields approach to interparliamentary cooperation in foreign and security policy

Interparliamentary cooperation in EU foreign and security policy, once the paradigmatic example of competitive relations between parliamentary levels, has recently evolved towards more cooperative dynamics. This evolution provides an interesting context in which to examine the conditions that facilitate or hinder cooperation in the EU multi-level parliamentary field. This article takes inspiration from Fligstein and McAdam’s sociological theory of fields, arguing that certain field conditions (power, preferences, field environment, and social skill) can influence patterns of cooperation in a parliamentary field. The theoretical argument is assessed using two empirical cases: institutionalised cooperation in the Interparliamentary Conference on foreign policy, security and defence; and policy-specific cooperation during negotiations over the controversial European Defence Fund. The findings indicate that a relative ‘settlement’ of the parliamentary field does not necessarily translate into mutually reinforcing parliamentarism. On the contrary, certain properties in the field continue to impair the quality of democratic oversight in this burgeoning domain.

PESCO, CARD, EDF: Strategy, Analysis, and Financing in the European Union Security Guaratee

In the article the authors analyze the institutional basis for strengthening the EU security and the implementation of specific projects designed to expand cooperation between the Member States in the defence and security sectors. The point at issue is about Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). The relevance of the comprehensive study of PESCO, CARD, EDF, which activities are aimed at ensuring the strategic component of cooperation, the analysis of the defence sector and funding priorities in the security sphere of the Union have been proved. The authors claim that PESCO has become a key strategic initiative of the EU, CARD allows coordinating the development of military capabilities in the Member States; the EDF was created to coordinate, increase investment and improve defence interoperability between EU member states. The challenges faced within the functioning of these initiatives have been analyzed. It is alleged that a key challenge for the CARD is the unwillingness of Member countries to share national defence plans, as well as the available and potential coordination and harmonization of defence planning within NATO’s Defence Planning. The peculiarities of specific projects financed within the European Defense Fund (“Ocean 2020”, “Eurodrone”, “SPIDER”, “EuroSWARM”, “TRAWA”, “ACAMSII”, “Gossra”, “Vestlife”) have been analyzed. There is continued progress in the field of the EU security and defence: numerous defence projects have been initiated under PESCO; there is a synchronization of defence planning through the CARD; the investments in defence are stimulated by financing the defence research projects through the EDF, the improving military mobility is continuing; coordination of the EU-NATO cooperation is improving, etc.

How can the European Commission help Europe’s defence industry? By making the most out of what it is already doing

ABSTRACT The European Commission's proposal for the €13 bn European Defence Fund (EDF) to incentivise collaborative defence research and capability development projects with EU funding was an ambitious statement of policy intent to drive forward European defence cooperation. However, the summer 2020 EU budget negotiations left it with only about 60% of that amount over the 2021-2027 period. This debate contribution argues that despite this curtailment in resource and ambition, the European Commission can still maximise the EDF's impact to benefit European defence industry by ensuring that the various defence industrial policy activities it is already leading are achieving their full potential, incentivising EU governments to acquire and use the capabilities developed through the Fund, and maintaining coherence amongst existing research projects, capability development projects, and joint capability requirements.

Doubtful Ally or Ally Full of Doubts? The Course of Transatlantic Relations under Donald Trump’s Presidency

Donald Trump’s “America-fi rst” diplomacy has undermined the foundations of many alliances, including a transatlantic relationship on which post-war liberal order would rest. Under the current American presidency, EU–US relations are facing signifi cant challenges whose implications are still far from clear. The list of discrepancies between the allies are growing ever longer and the American administration’s decisions are antithetical to those taken by Brussels and other European capitals. Divisions, among other things, have occurred over policies towards the Paris Climate Agreement, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Middle East approach. The special relationship between Europe and United States can no longer be taken for granted. In this presented paper, the author has looked beyond current political disagreements in order to focus on the long term factors underlying the “special relationship”. The rationale behind this research is the dawn of great power politics that happens during the transition from uni-to-multipolar order. America’s disengagement from (and defunding of) the global scene means that the European Union will have to adjust to a world with numerous centres of power and different sources of threat. Ursula von der Leyen announced, upon assuming office in December 2019, that she would lead a “geopolitical Commission” engaged in tackling global challenges. All of this in the face of the fi rst American administration in post-war history that opposes European integration. Due to the space limit (and deservedness for sole attention), the security and defence dimension of transatlantic cooperation will only be briefly mentioned. Regardless of any comments made by former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker that the European Union will not create an alternative model to NATO1, the creation of a Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO) and the establishing of a European Defence Fund cannot be omitted. Enhanced European defence will be essential for a “healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States”2. That partnership will, almost certainly, become more transactional.

EU security and defence cooperation in times of dissent: analysing PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in the shadow of Brexit

ABSTRACT Has the United Kingdom(UK) Brexit referendum been a catalyst for more European Union security cooperation? How significant are post-referendum initiatives in security and defence? What are the implications of Brexit for European Union (EU) and UK security and defence? This article analyses EU post-Brexit strategic choices following the launch of the EU Global Strategy (2016). EU autonomy in security and defence requires close cooperation with third countries, including Norway and post-Brexit UK. It remains to be seen whether the EU and the UK can forge a new bespoke security and defence relationship that delivers mutual benefits through shared strategic ambitions, while also protecting their various interests. We suggest there will be serious collateral damage to UK-EU security and defence cooperation if post-Brexit trade negotiations descend into acrimony and mistrust, especially in the event of “no-deal” once the “transition period” ends. This would undermine European security and the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy in world affairs and have serious implications for both UK and EU security. We conclude that the EU needs to work with the UK on a plan to achieve global strategic autonomy, or both risk reduced influence in the wider world in the years ahead.

Addressing the “headwinds” faced by the European arms industry

ABSTRACTThe European arms industry is challenged by several adverse “headwinds.” Fragmentation leads to costly duplications and, in conjunction with stagnating budgets and sharply increasing costs, prevents firms from exploiting economies of scale and learning. This is exacerbated by size differentials vis-a-vis the leading US arms manufacturers and competition from emerging producers. As some “headwinds” are self-enforcing, far-reaching industrial and policy responses are required to improve the industry's outlook. As exports may not indefinitely compensate for low domestic demand, there is an economic imperative for further cross-border collaboration and consolidation. Despite various EU policy initiatives, progresses regarding the European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence Technological Industrial Base have been relatively slow. It remains to be seen whether the European Defence Fund will be the proclaimed “game-changer,” raising competitiveness of the European arms industry. At the same time, the UK's withdrawal from the EU adds uncertainties.

European Defence After Brexit: A Plus or a Minus?

The departure of the UK from the EU is taking place at a time when the Union is ramping up its own ambitions in the field of security and defence. The EU is pursuing the goal of strategic autonomy to make itself a more influential actor on the world stage. It has initiated a number of programmes, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, with the aim of spending its defence euros more productively. These European initiatives may well drive the UK further away from the EU as they embody the very integration that had driven the UK to distance itself from the Continent in the first place. Yet this article will argue that the EU still needs to engage the important military capabilities of the UK to be successful in its new ventures and that the UK will also be exposed to many of the security threats that will keep the EU busy in the future.