Reflections on «possible constitutions of Europe» can have two directions. On the one hand, one can wonder about the legal form of the European Union: the fact that it is no longer a confederation of states, but not yet a federal state, requires a legal classification, for which a new concept of Verfassungsverbund was created in Germany, that is, a constitutional union. On the other hand, the question arises as to which national constitutions, or which parts of these constitutions, or which individual norms of these constitutions are best used to build a constitutional order in Europe. Solving this issue is not only a classic mission of comparative jurisprudence, but also of the current law of the European Community, since Article 6 of the Treaty onthe European Union declares certain principles of the Western constitutional state «common to all member states» and orders to consider fundamental rights «arising from common constitutional traditions of member countries, as general principles of Community law». Within the framework of the second way of formulating the question, the following description refers to the experience gained during the use of elements of the German Constitution to build other European constitutions. In this article, we will conduct a comparative legal analysis of the powers of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The possibility of legal review guarantees the supremacy of the constitution by sanctioning theviolation of the law of the constitution by repealing the law. According to the experience accumulated so far, an autonomous and independent constitutional court with the possibility of a constitutional appeal is a good way to protect human rights. Constitutional courts have a part of each existing state monopoly, namely the power of parliament to make laws and the power of the supreme court to interpret and apply laws passed by parliament.