European Competition Policy Research Articles

Strategic Response of European Airlines to Market Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis

The airline market is constantly evolving and requires managers to adopt strategies to meet the changing demands and organizational requirements of the sector. As a result of its liberalization, the European market has transformed from a set of national protected sectors to a single sector. Although the market has grown over the last two decades, the industry has faced difficulties due to various economic, safety, environmental, and health issues, which have recently emerged. This study analyzes the airlines’ strategic responses to increased competition from the turn of the century to 2019, excluding the pandemic period, to focus on market dynamics driven by European competition policy. A five-pillar strategic framework highlighting common strategies and divergences between major European network carriers is outlined through a multi-case analysis of major European markets. The sample includes France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Results have managerial implications that highlight the importance of strategic adaptability in an industry landscape that continues to evolve. Managerial implications fall into the following three categories: strategic positioning, cost optimization, and business diversification.

Sustainability and Competition Policy in Europe: Recent Developments

Sustainability and Competition Policy in Europe: Recent Developments

EU Competition Policy: Benefits and Problems in terms of Harmonization, Convergence, Mutual Recognition

The following paper attempts to answer the question in several chapters, each based on researchers’ articles of independent areas in competition studies from an economic point of view, EU public policy and competition law. Firstly, there will be provided theories of scholars, who offer general pros and cons of harmonization, convergence and mutual recognition of institutions, later in the theoretical chapter, I show some concepts about EU competition policy. Then, following the idea of the paper, in order to understand benefits and problems of European competition policy area, it is important to define and analyze the competences of each level of authority inside EU relating to the ensuring fair competition on market. After uncovering competences, I provide exact results, which EU competition policy promotion caused or theoretically may cause through the timeline from the when this policy was under the power of only member states independently, to making this area commonly and similarly regulated in EU. Keywords: EU, Competition Policy; Article 101; Convergence; Harmonization.

Application of the DEMATEL Model for Assessing IT Sector’s Sustainability

Understanding what are the IT sector’s business opportunities under distorted market conditions is a growing interest in sustainability research. This article investigates how to assess the IT sectors sustainability through a multicriterion assessment. For the assessment of the IT sector’s European and Slovenian competition policy, the DEMATEL technique was chosen. Fifteen economical performance indicators of IT sectors companies in 2015–2019 were selected for analysis. Given the multiplicity of criteria addressed in the sustainability issues, a multi-criteria analysis was used with the assistance of experts. In this research, the DEMATEL technique was developed for problem solving, for the assessment of the concentration of business entities that affect the competitive situation of economy. Results showed that comparison of the DEMATEL method with fuzzy and probability theories proved that it is possible to measure IT sector’s HHI-based performance.

Re‐establishing needed limits: European competition policy's role in European healthcare systems and the lessons of the Dôvera case

AbstractEuropean competition policy's first interactions with national healthcare systems emerged after 2000 without much controversy as only those healthcare regimes with clear market‐orientated elements were subject to EU competition rules. After 2010 however, this began to be challenged as a result of pressures from the private sector, various marketization reforms in Europe as well as pressures from within the EU itself. The question therefore re‐emerged: would EU competition law, and its ‘state aid law’ part especially, now be pushed into social solidarity‐orientated healthcare, including those that were subject to some degree of marketisation? This article examines this question through two important recent competition law cases from Belgium and Slovakia, but with a focus on the latter. Despite the apparent limits placed on European competition law's place in healthcare in the 2000s, European Commission and the Court of Justice were called upon to reassert some limits on its role in healthcare and social solidarity‐based regimes in particular. Together, the Iris‐H and Dôvera cases resolve those political and institutional problems that such a competition policy‐based intrusion into healthcare would have created.

New Times for Competition Policy in Europe: the Challenge of Digital Markets

New Times for Competition Policy in Europe: the Challenge of Digital Markets

State Aid and Competition in the European Banking Markets

I investigate whether bank bailouts since the outbreak of the financial crisis affected competition in the European banking markets. Using a unique dataset on large bank rescues I compare the development of market power of rescued and non-rescued banks between 2000 and 2018. I find that bank bailout coincides with a substantial drop of six percentage points in the Lerner index. Effects are heterogeneous and driven by bank rescues directly after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 and not by bank rescues triggered during the European sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010. My findings cast positive light on European competition policy as banks do not appear to have capitalized on rescue money in terms of market power. Protecting competition in European banking markets remains a topical policy issue in light of rising levels of market power and potential public interventions in the course of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Geo-blocking Regulation: Antitrust or Consumer Protection?

The author attempts to show that the seeming absorption of a large-scale, general geo-blocking prohibition in the field of competition law (antitrust) is unsystematic, and can negatively influence the further development of European competition law and policy and related goals. The positive implications of the GBR regime in the area of consumer protection law (and for trade regulation as such) are not negated. The author, however, attempts to underscore the fact that, in certain constellations, legislative instruments should be very clearly designated, their nature and scope concisely labelled. Formal oversights, such as omission of clear denominations or even plain wrong designations can – in certain circumstances – lead to functional consequences. For this reason the author stresses the view that the GBR is a legislative instrument of market regulation and consumer protection and has no real appreciable link to antitrust.

Sizing up the competition: explaining reform of European Union competition policy in the Covid-19 era

ABSTRACT Ensuring fair competition has long been a core pillar of the European Union (EU). In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, however, the EU has diverted significantly from its traditional commitment to market-based competition, notably in state aid and foreign subsidies. This article explores change and continuity in post-Covid-19 European competition policy (ECP) by considering both the radicality and permanence of these changes. Using process-tracing based on primary documents, secondary materials, and personal interviews, this article examines recent shifts in EU competition policy, probing three causal factors: 1) digitization of the global economy; 2) geopoliticization of competition regulation; and 3) Brexit. We argue that the Covid-19 crisis has brought these pre-existing challenges to ECP to the fore and, thereby, created space for policy entrepreneurs in EU member state governments and institutions to push for greater promotion and protection of European industry in the internal market while reinforcing supranational competition enforcement.

The paradox of scrap and the European steel industry’s loss of leadership (1950–1970)

According to Neil Rollings and Laurent Warlouzet, the historical analysis of the European competition policy has been a priority in the research on institutions but the reaction of companies to these policies has received less attention. This study highlights the importance of analyzing how public policies affect business strategies in innovation. More specifically, how the policy adopted by the High Authority of the ECSC regarding the scrap market influenced the strategies implemented by the steelmakers in the innovation of their production processes. The High Authority banned exports and established maximum prices and a system to equalise internal prices with import prices. This policy was considered a success by both institutions and companies. It decisively influenced the scrap price to be maintained at affordable levels in Europe. But this success in resolving the scrap problem created a larger one as it delayed innovation. This was the scrap paradox suffered by Europe.

Political Economy of the European Union: Competition Policy

This article explores the effect of European Competition Policy as the means of the EU in global political economy. The actorness of the EU in global politics and its relations with its surroundings have always been a question that is asked. Within a political economy context, competition policy can be identified as an important tool for the EU in its external relations that proves the actorness of the EU. It both helps to increase the chance of domestic producers to reach foreign markets and regulates foreign firms and their products within the single market. Thus, the competition policy carries the EU up in the international political economy and helps the EU to be recognized as an international actor. Within the Single Market, the EU exercise an exclusive power through competition policy. Externally, competition policy is one of the most effective international powers that EU exercises as it has the ability to regulate international mergers or even initiate cartel investigations. Alongside assessing the competition policy, this study focuses especially on some selected international cases of which the EU is a party through its competition law. It is argued, in this article, that the international power of the EU stemmed considerably from its competition policy, which is integral in the global political economy.

Political Economy of the EU Competition Policy

This article explores the effect of European Competition Policy as the means of the EU in global political economy. Competition policy can be identified as an important tool for the EU in its external relations. It both helps to increase the chance of domestic producers to reach foreign markets and regulates foreign firms and their products within the single market. Thus, the competition policy carries the EU up in the international political economy and helps the EU to be recognized as an international actor. Within the Single Market the EU exercise an exclusive power through competition policy. Externally, competition policy is one of the most effective international powers that EU exercises as it has the ability to regulate international mergers or even initiate cartel investigations. Alongside assessing the competition policy, this study focuses especially on some selected international cases of which the EU is a party through its competition law. It is argued, in this article, that the international power of the EU stemmed considerably from its competition policy which is integral in global political economy.

The Future of Competition Policy in Europe – Some Reflections on the Interaction Between Industrial Policy and Competition Law

The paper explores the interaction between industrial policy and competition law, in particular merger control in Europe. It reflects on the tensions, actual and perceived, between these two policies and critically assesses the substantive and institutional solutions that have been proposed, in particular in the recent Franco-German Manifesto for a European industrial policy fit for the 21st Century.

Új játék, új szabályok: Az e-kereskedelemmel kapcsolatban alakuló európai versenyjogi gyakorlat

The rapid development of e-commerce leads to specific new phenomena in the distribution chain of goods and services, businesses are trying to adapt this new distribution channel to their products and existing distribution methods and make use of it or to restrict its use. The intensity of the development of e-commerce in Europe is not uniform. Due to the diff erent characteristics of national markets and their structure, certain features of e-commerce are more problematic in some Member States than elsewhere. It can also be observed that where e-commerce is more widespread, national competition authorities are also more active. The purpose of this study is to comprehensively review the current European competition regulatory framework and cases concerning the vertical aspects of online distribution of goods and to present the emerging European jurisprudence and competition policy in this context. The main conclusion of the study is that currently many issues related to e-commerce, which are relevant from the competition law point of view, are still open. In many cases, it is unclear whether the restraints observed distort competition at all, and whether the benefi ts may compensate consumers for the disadvantages caused by restrictions. Th e future assessment of these issues and the responses given to them at European level are, to a large extent, influenced by the competition law enforcement of competition authorities of the Member States and the current review of vertical rules.

Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

ABSTRACTThe ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Germany, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and argue that most of the reform’s elements point into the right direction. However, some upcoming challenges may have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, we discuss whether European competition policy should follow the paragon of the German reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to be already well-established.

Competition Policy Reform in Europe and Germany – Institutional Change in the Light of Digitization

The ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Germany, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and argue that most of the reform’s elements point into the right direction. However, some upcoming challenges may have been over-looked so far. Furthermore, we discuss whether European competition policy should fol-low the paragon of the German reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to be already well-established.

Competition Cases Involving Platforms: Lessons from Europe

Some academics and intellectuals who lobby for an “antitrust counterrevolution” steeped in politics and not economics implicate the power of large technology platforms (“tech platforms”) in terms of “structural dominance”. The notion, it is sometimes heard, can be traced to a European culture of strong competition policy known as “ordoliberalism”. In this short policy note, I clarify that attempts to search guidance for an “antitrust counterrevolution” in European competition policy are misguided. I first explain why there are no parallels to draw between the ongoing US “political” antitrust revival and European competition history. I then move on to describe that the dominant feature of European competition law is experimentalism, not structuralism. I finally share my personal understanding of the contemporary European approach to competition policy in the tech sector. This note was initially submitted as a public comment to the US Federal Trade Commission hearings on competiition and consumer protection in the 21st century.

Business history and European integration: How EEC competition policy affected companies’ strategies

This introduction to the special issue on business responses to European competition policy considers the development of research in the field of European competition policy. It is argued that existing analyses have concentrated on the development of policy over time and that we know surprisingly little about the response of business to the demands of competition policy. This is important because it is apparent that ever stricter legal provision has not removed the problem and where there appears to be a considerable degree of recidivism. The aim of the special issue is to begin to address these issues by examining the response of different companies and sectors to the existence of EEC/EU competition policy.

"온라인 플랫폼 관련 유럽연합 경쟁법과 경쟁정책 — 온라인 플랫폼에 대한 규제 현황을 중심으로 —"

"온라인 플랫폼 관련 유럽연합 경쟁법과 경쟁정책 — 온라인 플랫폼에 대한 규제 현황을 중심으로 —"

Competition Law through an Ordoliberal Lens

Ordoliberalism is a German school of economic thought that advocates regulation of the free market economy based on a set of state-imposed rules guaranteed by the economic constitution, to impose a competitive order in society. It proposes an alternative method to pure laissez-faire and state-planned economy for the better regulation of the market economy, where the goals are the protection of the competitive process and individual freedom. In this paper I submit that ordoliberalism, an indigenous European competition policy, is an adequate economic and analytical tool upon which to base the practice and decision-making of competition law. My aim is twofold: to contribute to the discussion on what ordoliberalism is, in general, and in particular concerning competition policy , and offer a fresh perspective on an ordoliberal-oriented competition policy.