European Charter Of Fundamental Rights Research Articles

좋은 행정 구현을 위한 청문절차 개선과제

The hearing system in the context of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights is crucial in achieving ‘Good Administration.’ While recognized as a fundamental component of administrative procedures in South Korea, its practical utility appears to be limited. This article aims to emphasize the institutional problems and propose improvements in the current administrative review system, particularly focusing on realizing good administration. Firstly, the current selection process of hearing panelists does not ensure professionalism and fairness, often prioritizing government officials. It is suggested to adopt a comparative approach, akin to the U.S. Administrative Law Judge system, where a lawyer's qualification is a prerequisite. Additionally, establishing an independent administrative review body to guarantee operational independence is recommended. Secondly, there is a concern regarding the expansion of criteria for conducting hearings. For discretionary reviews, granting individuals the right to request a review is vital, rather than relying solely on the judgment of administrative agencies. Also, recognizing the need for a review in cases of refusals of profitable administrative actions is essential. Thirdly, concerning the hearing process itself, it is reasonable to publish the panelists' opinions in the interest of the involved parties, expand their rights to access information, and generally open up hearings to enhance transparency. Fourthly, concerning the effectiveness of hearing outcomes, it is deemed more suitable to operate with an acknowledgment of practical enforceability rather than bestowing legal binding force upon hearing outcomes. Lastly, to ensure the effectiveness of objections in alignment with recent amendments to the Administrative Basic Act, it is reasonable to introduce hearings within the objection process. Considering ways to link hearings with the results of administrative appeals is also necessary for the substantive realization of the hearing system.

Which Labour Rights Are Fundamental Rights? Horizontal Direct Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

The paper provides a short overview from a labour law perspective of the scope of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (I.) and the Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law regarding the horizontal direct effect of certain Charter provisions (II.). On this basis, it seeks to assess the practical relevance of the Court’s case law (III.). Finally, it explores how the Court determines the horizontal direct effect of Charter provisions and illustrates that operation by offering a specific example regarding employment relationships (IV.). European Charter of Fundamental Rights, Direct Effect, Horizontal Effect, Annual Paid Leave, Work From Home, Remote Work, Safety and Health, Display Screen Equipment

Vulneración de Derechos Fundamentales por la obligada transposición de normativa europea. El conflicto entre el deber de colaborar con la Administración sancionadora y el derecho a no declarar contra uno mismo

The judgement we present is interesting from a double perspective: (i) as adelimitation of the substantive right to remain silent before the initiation of an administrative sanctioning procedure. The judgement analyzes the balance between the citizen’s duty to collaborate with administrative authorities —particularly in cases of conducts related to highly regulated sectors such as the operation of the stock market— and the substantive right not to declare coercively or not to contribute to self-incrimination. In this sense, the ECJ has traditionally extended the guarantees ofthe criminal process to administrative sanctioning procedure when the result thereof is of such an entity that it may lead to the imposition of administrative sanctions «of a criminal nature». Secondly (ii), from a procedural point of view, it is interesting to analyze several spheres of protection of fundamental rights within the EU. The controversy arises asa result of a question of unconstitutionality raised by the Italian Corte di Cassazione. The judge of constitutional guarantees, in turn, refers a preliminary ruling of interpretation and validity of European law itself with respect to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. And the European judge builds his doctrine based on that of the ECHR by applying the «homogeneity clause» of article 52.3 of the Charter. Thus, to resolve the same violation of the fundamental rights at stake, there are atleast three different circles involving four high courts.This second aspect will focus our attention.

Body examinations of underage children committing crime - A Swedish perspective

The enforcement of a sentence requires that, at the time of the crime, the suspect has reached the age of criminal responsibility according to the Swedish Criminal Code (SFS 1962:700) as well as the Conventions on the Rights of the Child and also implicit in other international agreements. Similarly, until 2017, the Swedish Young Offenders Special Provisions Act (SFS 1964:167) required that for the use of coercive measures, a person who was on reasonable grounds suspected of a crime which might lead to a prison sentence had to have reached the age of criminal responsibility. The requirements for a body examination were extended at the time in the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure (SFS 1942:740) to also include situations where there is an uncertainty concerning the suspect’s age. The extension regarding body examinations was a consequence of the aftermath of the refugee crisis of 2015. Uncertainty concerning the age of a person seeking asylum had led to discussions on what methods to use in order to determine a person’s age. The issue was also raised in criminal cases where the age of a suspect was unclear and concerned, more precisely, the burden of proof regarding the age of a suspect and the legal grounds for a body examination when estimating a suspect’s age. In this article I will with reference to the fundamental principles of proportionality, predictability, equal treatment and consistency scrutinize the legal grounds for a body examination when there is an uncertainty concerning age and the suspect claims to be under the age of criminal responsibility in relation to Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child that states that ‘the best interests of the child shall be…’ and similarly in Article 24:2 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights ‘the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration’. Furthermore, I will explore what impact the practice of a body examination in those specific situations may have from a gender and diversity perspective. At the extension of the requirement of the legal grounds for a body examination in 2017, the child’s best interests were not taken into consideration. From a gender and diversity perspective, this extension implies the preservation of a prevailing structure that men with a foreign background commit more crimes than men and women born in Sweden.

Amministrazione digitale algoritmica e garanzie procedimentali

The use of Artificial Intelligence systems, and in particular algorithmic decisions, constitutes a great potential for the Public Administration, also in view of the principle of impartiality and good performance under Article 97 of the Constitution and the right to good administration under Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. To this end, however, it is necessary to identify the conditions of admissibility for the legitimate use of algorithms, and the rules of the administrative procedure must be adapted to the new tool in order not to lower the standard of protection of the citizen.

Enhancing Economic and Social Rights Within the Internal Market Through Recognition of the Horizontal Effects of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights

Enhancing Economic and Social Rights Within the Internal Market Through Recognition of the Horizontal Effects of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights

Restricting Access to Legal Content in House Rules: The Platform’s Freedom To Conduct a Business as a Counterargument To Limit Users’ Freedom of Expression

This chapter focuses on platforms’ protection against (unjustified) interference with the free drafting of house rules, viewed through a lens of European fundamental rights protection. It discusses the difference in protection of two fundamental rights in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: article 16’s freedom to conduct a business and article 17’s right to property. The articles’ subject of protection (“the essence of the right”) will be mapped by analyzing the CJEU’s case-law between respectively 1974 and 1979 until 2020 and the outcome of this analysis will be applied to the process of running a platform. It will show that article 16, rather than article 17, covers platforms’ house rule-drafting. However, it is unlikely that restrictive measures will interfere with the freedom’s essence. To be justifiable, measures that do not interfere with the essence must live-up to the principle of proportionality. Therefore, subsequently, the question arises whether potential measures live up to this principle. To prevent a purely normative answering of that question - due to the fact that a standardized test does not exist - the Unfair Contract Terms Directive’s unfairness test will be used as interpretational guidance. It is concluded that measures limiting a platform’s contractual freedom can, and most likely will, be justifiable to protect platform users’ freedom of expression. That opens the door for future legislation. Outside the direct realm of platforms, this chapter demonstrates that the freedom to conduct a business has been reduced to an empty shell, or rather, a shell that has never been inhabited. Apart from the situation where an undertaking would be able to demonstrate that a proposed measure would mean the end of the business, the freedom to conduct a business does not provide any effective protection.

European “Freedoms”: A Critical Analysis

AbstractFaced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting vulnerable refugees’ and migrants’ rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when economists such as Amartya Sen have revised their approach to economic growth and prosperity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so‐called democratic deficit. Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self‐respect and capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life.

Refining the Concept of the Right to Data Protection in Article 8 ECFR – Part III

There may be no other fundamental right of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) that raises more questions on the precise object and concept of protection than the right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR. A prominent example is the principle of purpose limitation. The preceding parts of this three-parted series has shown how this ambiguity creates various problems both on the conceptual level of fundamental rights as well as on the level of ordinary law (esp. the GDPR). However, it has also been shown how a re-connection of data protection law to concepts of risk regulation helps to clarify these ambiguities. On this basis, the third and last part of this series will draw several conclusions for the interpretation of the GDPR. In particular, this third part will focus on the following aspects: First, the actual room for maneuver of the EU legislator transposing the proposed concept for Article 8 ECFR into ordinary law (especially the GDPR). Second, the implications for interpreting the principle of purpose limitation with particular respect to the legal basis (Art. 5 sect. 1 lit. a and b and Art. 6 sect. 1 and 4 GDPR). Third, the phenomenon of the multitude of overlaying risk assessments, beginning with the assessment on an abstract-general basis conducted by the legislator to the variety of individual-specific risk assessments that the controllers and processors have to carry out (when applying the legal norms). Fourth, the possibility to make these risk assessments scale. The three-parted series will conclude with an outlook on further ambiguities to be clarified. Keyboards: Article 8 ECFR | Fundamental Right to Data Protection | Precautionary Principle | Risk-Based Approach | GDPR | Regulating Risks | Effects on Public and Private Actors

Refining the Concept of the Right to Data Protection in Article 8 ECFR – Part II

There may be no other fundamental right of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) that raises more questions on the precise object and concept of protection than the right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR. A prominent example is the principle of purpose limitation. The preceding first part of this three-parted series has shown how this ambiguity creates various problems both on the conceptual level of fundamental rights as well as on the level of ordinary law (esp. the GDPR). However, it has also been shown how a re-connection of data protection law to concepts of risk regulation may help clarify these ambiguities. On this basis, the second part of this series demonstrates in detail why data protection laws apply a risk-based approach and why this protection strategy is more effective than a harm-based approach. Further, it is possible to assess whether data protection laws apply certain concepts of the precautionary principle and/or the risk-based approach (in the Anglo-Saxon meaning), and if both, which elements of the law may belong to which strategy. The concept proposed in this chapter will promote, focusing on the principle of purpose limitation, a combination of both strategies leading not only to more effective but also more proportionate protection. The last chapter of this second part will demonstrate why all this makes the fundamental right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR indispensable with respect to the other fundamental rights. Keywords: Article 8 ECFR | fundamental right to data protection | precautionary principle | risk-based approach | GDPR | regulating risks | effects on public and private actors | scope of application | principle of purpose limitation | consent | data protection by design | data protection impact assessment

Pushing Back on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability Rules

For more than two decades, internet service providers (ISPs) in the United States, the European Union (EU), and many other countries have been shielded from copyright liability under “safe harbor” rules. These rules apply to ISPs who did not know about or participate in user-uploaded infringements and who take infringing content down after receiving notice from rights holders. Major copyright industry groups were never satisfied with these safe harbors, and their dissatisfaction has become more strident over time as online infringements have grown to scale. Responding to copyright industry complaints, the EU in 2019 adopted its Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market. In particular, the Directive’s Article 17 places much stricter obligations on for-profit ISPs that host large amounts of user contents. Article 17 is internally contradictory, deeply ambiguous, and harmful to small and medium-sized companies as well as to user freedoms of expression. Moreover, Article 17 may well violate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the United States, Congress commenced a series of hearings in 2020 on the safe harbor rules now codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In May 2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued its long-awaited study on Section 512, which recommended several significant changes to existing safe harbor rules. The Study’s almost exclusively pro–copyright industry stances on reform of virtually every aspect of the rules notably shortchanges other stakeholder interests. Congress should take a balanced approach in considering any changes to the DMCA safe harbor rules. Any meaningful reform of ISP liability rules should consider the interests of a wide range of stakeholders. This includes U.S.-based Internet platforms, smaller and medium-sized ISPs, startups, and the hundreds of millions of Internet users who create and enjoy user-generated content (UGC) uploaded to these platforms, as well as the interests of major copyright industries and individual creators who have been dissatisfied with the DMCA safe harbor rules.

Refining the Concept of the Right to Data Protection in Article 8 ECFR – Part II: Controlling Risks through (Not To) Article 8 ECFR against the Other Fundamental Rights (Esp. by the Principle of Purpose Limitation)

There may be no other fundamental right of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) that raises more questions on the precise object and concept of protection than the right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR. A prominent example is the principle of purpose limitation. The preceding first part of this three-parted series has shown how this ambiguity creates various problems both on the conceptual level of fundamental rights as well as on the level of ordinary law (esp. the GDPR). However, it has also been shown how a re-connection of data protection law to concepts of risk regulation may help clarify these ambiguities. On this basis, the second part of this series demonstrates in detail why data protection laws apply a risk-based approach and why this protection strategy is more effective than a harm-based approach. Further, it is possible to assess whether data protection laws apply certain concepts of the precautionary principle and/or the risk-based approach (in the Anglo-Saxon meaning), and if both, which elements of the law may belong to which strategy. The concept proposed in this chapter will promote, focusing on the principle of purpose limitation, a combination of both strategies leading not only to more effective but also more proportionate protection. The last chapter of this second part will demonstrate why all this makes the fundamental right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR indispensable with respect to the other fundamental rights. The online version of the first part of this series can be found at https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/EDPL/2020/4/7.

Refining the Concept of the Right to Data Protection in Article 8 ECFR – Part III: Consequences for the Interpretation of the GDPR (And the Lawmaker’s Room for Maneuver)

There may be no other fundamental right of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR) that raises more questions on the precise object and concept of protection than the right to data protection in Article 8 ECFR. A prominent example is the principle of purpose limitation. The preceding parts of this three-parted series has shown how this ambiguity creates various problems both on the conceptual level of fundamental rights as well as on the level of ordinary law (esp. the GDPR). However, it has also been shown how a re-connection of data protection law to concepts of risk regulation helps to clarify these ambiguities. On this basis, the third and last part of this series will draw several conclusions for the interpretation of the GDPR. In particular, this third part will focus on the following aspects: First, the actual room for maneuver of the EU legislator transposing the proposed concept for Article 8 ECFR into ordinary law (especially the GDPR). Second, the implications for interpreting the principle of purpose limitation with particular respect to the legal basis (Art. 5 sect. 1 lit. a and b and Art. 6 sect. 1 and 4 GDPR). Third, the phenomenon of the multitude of overlaying risk assessments, beginning with the assessment on an abstract-general basis conducted by the legislator to the variety of individual-specific risk assessments that the controllers and processors have to carry out (when applying the legal norms). Fourth, the possibility to make these risk assessments scale. The three-parted series will conclude with an outlook on further ambiguities to be clarified. The first part of this series is online accessible at https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/EDPL/2020/4/7.

Limits of Personalization of Default Rules

Abstract The ‘personalization of the law,’ based on new technological possibilities such as algorithmic analysis of Big Data, is said to be the wave of the future. Especially default rules seem to be particularly apt for personalization, because they are – at first glance – supposed to mirror what the parties would have wanted. This article aims to unveil the limits of preference-based personalization of default rules. In the first part, I attack default rule personalization on theoretical grounds. I analyze the theoretical underpinnings of default rule personalization, which I describe as ‘empirical subjectivism,’ and I challenge this position with arguments from classical and behavioral law and economics. I thereby develop the opposite explanatory model: ‘normative objectivism.’ The arguments presented also provide new insights of default rule analysis which are valid well beyond the personalization debate. The ‘default rule paradox,’ ‘pushing vs pulling default rules,’ or the analysis of default rules as ‘property rules’ and as ‘rules of civility’ are some examples. In the second part, I attack default rule personalization on constitutional grounds with particular focus on the Constitutions of the United States and Germany, as well as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. So far, neither default rules nor personalization have received a detailed analysis based on constitutional principles. My article provides this analysis with regard to the principles of freedom and equality. I show how personalization reduces freedom in the private and public sphere, because the so-called choice- or agency-dimension of freedom will be significantly limited. In broader terms, the paternalistic tendencies of personalization will trigger the replacement of the ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘citizen’ by the ‘consumer’ as role-model of societal organization. Economically, this development will be accompanied by a shift from capitalism to what I call ‘micro-socialism.’ With regard to the principle of equality, I analyze how personalization leads to inequality by distinguishing ‘intra-preference-classifications’ and ‘inter-preference-classifications.’ I then present justification problems, especially with regard to discriminations that trigger strict and intermediate scrutiny. Finally, I sketch out how personalization would dissolve the essence of the principle of equality and thereby trigger a shift ‘from contract to contact’ or ‘from association to accumulation,’ which is no less important than the previous societal shift ‘from status to contract’ or ‘from community to association.’ In sum, the article combines different discourses around default rules, personalization, and constitutional law, and thereby provides new insights in each of them.

THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON'S RIGHT TO DEATH AND IT’S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia ensures the right for a person to live, but there are no articles of law in the regulatory enactments of the Republic of Latvia that guarantee the right for the person to choose to die. These laws and regulations also guarantee each person’s right to dignity. It is necessary to rate the non-recognition of the right to death, in conjunction with the obligation of the State to make sure to respect the dignity of each person, their cross-compliance.

Legacy samples in Finnish biobanks: social and legal issues related to the transfer of old sample collections into biobanks

Biobank operations started officially in Finland in 2013 when the Biobank Act defining and regulating biobank operations came into force. Since then, ten biobanks have been established and they have started to collect new prospective samples with broad consent. The main corpus of biobank samples, however, consists of approximately 10 million “legacy samples”. These are old diagnostic or research samples that were transferred to biobanks in accordance with the Biobank Act. The focus of this article is on ambiguities concerning these legacy samples and their transfer in terms of legality, human rights, autonomy, and social sustainability. We analyse the Finnish biobank operations in the context of international regulation, such as the European Convention of Human Rights, the Oviedo Convention, European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the GDPR, and EU Clinical Trials Regulation, and show that the practice of using legacy samples is at times problematic in relation to this regulatory framework. We argue that the prevailing interpretations of these regulations as translated into the Finnish biobank practices undermine the autonomy of individuals by not giving individuals a right to consent or an actionable right to opt-out of the transfer of these legacy samples to the biobank. This is due to the fact that individuals are not given effective notification of such transfers. Thus, issues regarding the legal status of the biobank samples and the social sustainability of biobank operations remain a challenge for biobanks in Finland despite governmental efforts to create pioneering, comprehensive, and enabling legislation.

Copyright and Internet Service Provider “Liability”: The Emerging Realpolitik of Intermediary Obligations

Online service providers are increasingly the focus of renewed efforts to enforce copyright online in the European Union (EU). Traditionally, these providers benefitted from safe-harbour immunity to the extent that their role in assisting online enforcement was relatively minimal. In light of recent proposals for reform, and the spread of the ‘blocking injunction’ in the EU, this traditional position is coming under pressure. That pressure finds expression by way of a principle of accountability, leveraged by the entertainment industry and policymakers alike to carve out new obligations for these intermediaries, under the existing legal framework. This article focuses on the position of these intermediaries under Art.16 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Protecting the freedom to conduct a business, this provision has come to underpin a discourse of commercial fundamental rights, argued to have the capacity to curb the spread of obligations via accountability. This article takes a sceptical view, arguing that lessons from judicial approaches to the blocking injunction at the Member State level, indicates that the discourse of commercial fundamental rights may well overstate the strength of this rights-paradigm as a counter to obligations generally. This article is under embargo until 23/4/2021. Copies can be obtained directly from the International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law

Climate Change, Human Rights and Access to Justice

This paper discusses, if and how the challenges of climate change could be brought in a case before the Court of Justice of the European Union. It concentrates on the admissibility of such a case and finds in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights the lever to overcome the obstacles which Article 263 tfeu places in front of members of the civil society. It discusses successively the questions of the Union act which might be tackled, the questions whether individual persons are directly and whether they are individually concerned by climate change decisions; and it ends with a short concluding remark.

Credible champions? Transatlantic relations and human rights in refugee crises

ABSTRACTThe United States and Europe have sustained one of the most durable alliances in the post war period. A central facet of the transatlantic relationship has been the joint commitment to human rights, demonstrated by the enshrinement of human rights in founding documents such as the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence, the Treaty of European Union, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Living up to the ideals of universal human rights is another matter, and that has been sorely tested with the Syrian refugee crisis. This paper examines the impact of crisis on US-EU relations and transatlantic support for human rights. By comparing the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999 with the contemporary Syrian refugee crisis of 2015, I show how transatlantic cooperation in this area has weakened owing to the withdrawal of US leadership and fragmentation within the EU.

Is the EU Disinformation Review Compliant with EU Law? Complaint to the European Ombudsman About the EU Anti-Fake News Initiative

The EU’s approach to fake news, as epitomised by the European External Action (EEAS) Service East Stratcom Disinformation Review, violates the rights to freedom of expression and due process of those accused of distributing disinformation. The EU Disinformation Review is a publication of the European External Action Service (the European Union’s diplomatic service) to target fake news and online disinformation. Following our request for access to documents, EEAS conceded that the EU Disinformation Review uses an “ad hoc” methodology for conducting its fact-checks, which makes it an outlier in the international fact-checking community led by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Despite being a well-intentioned initiative to respond to the challenges posed by pro-Kremlin disinformation, the EU should ensure the respect of fundamental rights when engaging in fact-checking. The EU Disinformation Review seeks to control the right to freedom of expression by labelling publishers as “disinforming outlets” and their content as “disinformation,” creating a chilling effect on the work of journalists that is central to democracy. The right to freedom of expression is expressed in Article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The labelling of publishers as “disinformation outlets” is contrary to principle of the freedom of press established by the European Court of Human Rights: “[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’ role of providing information on current events, opinion and ideas.” In addition, the methodology used by EEAS in the EU Disinformation Review is “ad hoc,” which constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to good administration in Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the ad hoc design and operation of the EU Disinformation Review fails to ensure the review acts “impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.” First, publications are not provided with the right to be heard or proper notice. The EU Disinformation Review’s homepage offers an opportunity to contact the Task Force report a suspected mistake in a fact-check but the page is only available in English, in violation of the principle of multilingualism, and no notice if given to outlets accused of being “disinforming outlets” before or after fact-checks of their content are published. Second, the EEAS does not fulfil its duty to motivate. EEAS is given a broad margin of discretion to identify disinformation, but fails to do so according to a consistent methodology. Therefore, EEAS cannot justify, on the basis of objective criteria, its choice of which content to review and how to determine its truth or falsehood. To comply with EU law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights, the EEAS should develop and make public (1) a methodology for selecting partnerships and reviewing fact-checks in line with international standards and (2) a notice and response mechanism for journalists, publishers and citizens whose content is being reviewed. If EEAS is unable to comply with the above, the EU Disinformation Review should be shut down.