European Accounting Review Research Articles

Harmonization of accounting standards in the EC

(1993). Harmonization of accounting standards in the EC. European Accounting Review: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 387-396.

The use of cost information by managers when making short-term decisions

(1993). The use of cost information by managers when making short-term decisions. European Accounting Review: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 432-436.

Commentary on the article by David Alexander ‘A European true and fair view’

(1993). Commentary on the article by David Alexander ‘A European true and fair view’. European Accounting Review: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 95-98.

New European insurance accounting rules

(1992). New European insurance accounting rules. European Accounting Review: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 401-406.

An analysis of the subsidiarization process of multidivisional companies

(1992). An analysis of the subsidiarization process of multidivisional companies. European Accounting Review: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 462-464.

Accounting for a theatre: implementing a management accounting system in a cultural institution

(1992). Accounting for a theatre: implementing a management accounting system in a cultural institution. European Accounting Review: Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 465-469.

Relationships between financial accounting research, standards setting and practice in Germany

(1992). Relationships between financial accounting research, standards setting and practice in Germany. European Accounting Review: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 27-38.

The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions

T HIS study empirically examines the effects of increases in the level and enforcement of insider-trading regulations in the 1980s on corporate insiders.1 The main goal of the insider-trading regulations is to prevent insiders from trading on the basis of material, nonpublic corporate information. In addition, regulations require that insiders report their transactions to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and refrain from generating short-term profits by trading in their own firms' stocks. Regulations also prohibit insiders from short selling the securities of their firms.

The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the FirmJack Carr and Frank MathewsonJack Carr Search for more articles by this author and Frank Mathewson Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 33, Number 2Oct., 1990 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467207 Views: 23Total views on this site Citations: 25Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Marie-Laure Vandenhaute, Kris Hardies, Diane Breesch Professional and Commercial Incentives in Audit Firms: Evidence on Partner Compensation, European Accounting Review 29, no.33 (Jul 2019): 521–554.https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2019.1642223Niels Philipsen, Qi Zhou Business Restrictions in the Legal Professions: Do We Need More Market Integration?, (Jan 2016): 211–238.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48273-5_9Camille Chaserant, Sophie Harnay Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation, European Journal of Law and Economics 39, no.22 (Oct 2013): 431–449.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-013-9420-1Gregory K. Dow Partnership markets with adverse selection, Review of Economic Design 18, no.22 (Jun 2013): 105–126.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0145-yCamille Chaserant, Sophie Harnay Déréglementer la profession d'avocat en France ?, Revue internationale de droit économique t.XXIV, no.22 (Jul 2010): 147–183.https://doi.org/10.3917/ride.242.0147Nuno Garoupa Providing a Framework for Reforming the Legal Profession: Insights from the European Experience, European Business Organization Law Review 9, no.33 (Feb 2015): 463–495.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752908004631N. Garoupa, F. Gomez-Pomar Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees over Contingent Fees, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24, no.22 (Nov 2007): 458–475.https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm063Nuno M. Garoupa Regulation of Professions in the US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2005).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.640502Benito Arruñada Managing Competition in Professional Services and the Burden of Inertia, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2005).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.859245John Romley, Eric L. Talley Uncorporated Professionals, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.587982Mark Davies The Regulatory Crisis in the Solicitors' Profession, Legal Ethics 6, no.22 (May 2015): 185–216.https://doi.org/10.1080/1460728X.2003.11424190Nuno M. Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.394305Jack Carr, Frank Mathewson Law Firms, (Jan 2002): 1155–1158.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_217Larry E. Ribstein Partnership, (Jan 2017): 1410–1413.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_268Larry E. Ribstein, Bruce H. Kobayashi Joint Ventures, (Jan 2017): 1034–1038.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_196Peter Bardsley, Katerina Sherstyuk Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2001).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.292188Stanley B. Malos, Michael A. Campion Human Resource Strategy and Career Mobility in Professional Service Firms: A Test of an Options-Based Model, Academy of Management Journal 43, no.44 (Aug 2000): 749–760.https://doi.org/10.5465/1556365LAURENCE VAN LENT THE ECONOMICS OF AN AUDIT FIRM: THE BENEFITS OF PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE, The British Accounting Review 31, no.22 (Jun 1999): 225–254.https://doi.org/10.1006/bare.1998.0087Mark Davies Wither mutuality? A recent history of solicitors’ professional indemnity insurance, International Journal of the Legal Profession 5, no.11 (Mar 1998): 29–61.https://doi.org/10.1080/09695958.1998.9960441Peter Newman P, (Jan 1998): 1–198.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14286-6_1Tadiboyina Venkateswarlu Law and Economics Course Readings: A Survey of North American Universities, The American Economist 41, no.11 (Mar 1997): 89–93.https://doi.org/10.1177/056943459704100110Benito Arru�ada The economics of notaries, European Journal of Law and Economics 3, no.11 (Mar 1996): 5–37.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00149081Richard A. Posner The sociology of the sociology of law: A view from economics, European Journal of Law and Economics 2, no.44 (Dec 1995): 265–284.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01541067Stanley B. Malos, Michael A. Campion An Options-Based Model Of Career Mobility in Professional Service Firms, Academy of Management Review 20, no.33 (Jul 1995): 611–644.https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1995.9508080332Steven C. Hackett Heterogeneity and Share Contracting in Medical Group Practices, International Journal of the Economics of Business 2, no.11 (May 2011): 103–121.https://doi.org/10.1080/758521099

Norms of Cooperation

A longstanding tradition in the social sciences contrasts instrumental rationality and social norms as alternative ways of explaining action. Rational choice theory defines action as the outcome of a practical inference that takes preferences and beliefs as premises. An explanation in terms of norms depicts a socialized actor whose behavior is not outcome oriented, since when acting in accordance with a norm one does not engage in a rational calculation nor does one pay very much attention to the consequences. Attempts at bridging the gap have either tried to establish that social norms are rational, in the sense of being efficient means to achieve individual or social welfare, or that it is rational to conform to norms, thus reducing compliance to utility maximization. The first reductionist strategy makes a typical post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, since the mere presence of a social norm does not justify inferring that it is there to accomplish some social function. Besides, it does not account for the fact that many social norms are inefficient, as in the case of discriminatory norms against women and blacks, or are so rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to successfully accommodate new cases. Even if a norm is a means to achieve a social end, such as cooperation, retribution, or fairness, usually it is not the sole means. Many social norms are underdetermined with respect to the collective objectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according to a criterion of greater or lesser efficiency in meeting these goals. Such an ordering would be feasible only if it were possible to show that one norm among others is the best means to attain a given social objective. Often, though, the objectives themselves are defined by means of some norm. Consider as an example norms of revenge; until not long ago, a Sicilian man who "dishonored" another man's daughter or sister had to make amends for the wrong by marrying the woman or pay for his rashness with his own life. The objective was to restore the family's lost

The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans

The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans

Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence

Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some EvidenceAuthor(s): Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. ZimmermanSource: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3, (Oct., 1983), pp. 613-633Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/725039Accessed: 29/06/2008 23:14

Separation of Ownership and Control

ABSENT fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.1 Our goal is to explain the survival of organizations characterized by separation of "ownership" and "control"-a problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith to Berle and Means and Jensen and Meckling.2 In more precise language, we are concerned with the survival of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions. We argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of

Education, Income, and Ability

Current estimates of the contribution of education to economic growth have been questioned because they ignore the interaction of education with ability. Whether the neglect of ability differences in the analyses of the income-education relationship results in estimates that are too high was considered in an earlier paper by one of the authors (Griliches 1970), and a negative answer was conjectured. In this paper, we pursue this question a bit further, using a new and larger body of data. Unfortunately, a definitive answer to this question is hampered both by the vagueness and elasticity of "education" and "ability" as analytical concepts and by the lack of data on early (preschooling) intelligence. The data examined in this paper are based on a 1964 sample of U.S. military veterans. The variables measured include scores on a mental ability test, indicators of parental status, region of residence while growing up, school years completed before service, and school years completed during or after service. These have allowed us to inquire into the separate effects of parental background, intelligence, and schooling. The basic problem and analytical framework can be set out very simply. Let income be a linear function of education and ability, or, Y a + P1E + P(2G + u, where Y is income, E is education, G is ability,

The Optimum Enforcement of Laws

All prescriptions of behavior for individuals require enforcement. Usually the obligation to behave in a prescribed way is entered into voluntarily by explicit or implicit contract. For example, I promise to teach certain classes with designated frequency and to discuss matters which I, and possibly others, believe are relevant to the course titles. By negotiation, and in the event of its failure, by legal action, I and my employer seek to enforce the contract of employment against large departures from the promised behavior. Performance of some kinds of behavior is difficult or impossible to enforce-such as promises to be creative, noble, or steadfast in crisis-and as a result such contractual promises are either not made or enforced only when there is an uncontroversially flagrant violation. The influence upon contract, and upon economic organization generally, of the costs of enforcing various kinds of contracts has received virtually no study by economists, despite its immense potential explanatory power. When the prescribed behavior is fixed unilaterally rather than by individual agreement, we have the regulation or law, and enforcement of these unilateral rules is the subject of the present essay. Departures of actual from prescribed behavior are crimes or violations, although one could wish for a less formidable description than "criminal" to describe many of the trifling offenses or the offenses against unjust laws. My primary purpose is to construct a theory of rational enforcement, a theory which owes much to Gary Becker's major article on the subject (1968). In the conclusion the problem of explanation, as distinguished from prescription, will be commented upon.

Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds

ECONOMISTS have long agreed that the rate of interest on a loan depends on the risks the lender incurs. But how lenders estimate these risks has been left largely to conjecture. This paper presents and tests a hypothesis about the determinants of risk premiums on corporate bonds. By risk premium is meant the difference between the market yield on a bond and the corresponding pure rate of interest. My hypothesis is as follows: (1) The average risk premium on a firm's bonds depends first on the risk that the firm will default on its bonds and second on their marketability. (2) The "risk of default" can be estimated by a function of three variables: the coefficient of variation of the firm's net income over the last

The Economies of Scale

THE theory of the economies of scale is the theory of the relationship between the scale of use of a properly chosen combination of all productive services and the rate of output of the enterprise. In its broadest formulation this theory is a crucial element of the economic theory of social organization, for it underlies every question of market organization and the role (and locus) of governmental control over economic life. Let one ask himself how an economy would be organized if every economic activity were prohibitively inefficient upon alternately a small scale and a large scale, and the answer will convince him that here lies a basic element of the theory of economic organization. The theory has limped along for a century, collecting large pieces of good reasoning and small chunks of empirical evidence but never achieving scientific prosperity. A large cause of its poverty is that the central concept of the theory-the firm of optimum size-has eluded confident measurement. We have been dangerously close to denying Lincoln, for all economists have been ignorant of the optimum size of firm in almost every industry all of the time, and this ignorance has been an insurmountable barrier between us and the understanding of the forces which govern optimum size. It is almost as if one were trying to measure the nutritive values of goods without knowing whether the consumers who ate them continued to live.

Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory

A modification of economic analysis to incorporate incomplete information and uncertain foresight as axioms is suggested here. This approach dispenses with “profit maximization”; and it does not rely on the predictable, individual behavior that is usually assumed, as a first approximation, in standard textbook treatments. Despite these changes, the analytical concepts usually associated with such behavior are retained because they are not dependent upon such motivation or foresight. The suggested approach embodies the principles of biological evolution and natural selection by interpreting the economic system as an adoptive mechanism which chooses among exploratory actions generated by the adaptive pursuit of “success” or “profit.” The resulting analysis is applicable to actions usually regarded as aberrations from standard economic behavior as well as to behavior covered by the customary analysis. This wider applicability and the removal of the unrealistic postulates of accurate anticipations and fixed states of knowledge have provided motivation for the study.

Labor and Labor Conditions in the French Glass Industry, 1643-1789

Previous articleNext article No AccessLabor and Labor Conditions in the French Glass Industry, 1643-1789Warren C. ScovilleWarren C. Scoville Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 15, Number 4Dec., 1943 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/236763 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1934 The University of Chicago PressPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Tim Simpson Scintillant Cities: Glass Architecture, Finance Capital, and the Fictions of Macau’s Enclave Urbanism, Theory, Culture & Society 30, no.7-87-8 (Dec 2013): 343–371.https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276413504970Alnoor Bhimani Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason, European Accounting Review 3, no.33 (Jan 1994): 399–442.https://doi.org/10.1080/09638189400000030

Large-Scale Production in the French Plate-Glass Industry, 1665-1789

Previous articleNext article No AccessLarge-Scale Production in the French Plate-Glass Industry, 1665-1789Warren C. ScovilleWarren C. Scoville Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 50, Number 5Oct., 1942 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/255933 Views: 3Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1942 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Jason Nguyen Building on Credit: Architecture and the Mississippi Bubble (1716–1720), Grey Room 71 (Jun 2018): 40–67.https://doi.org/10.1162/grey_a_00241Brian P. Simpson John Law’s Financial Scam and the South Sea Bubble, (Jan 2014): 171–185.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137331496_8Tim Simpson Scintillant Cities: Glass Architecture, Finance Capital, and the Fictions of Macau’s Enclave Urbanism, Theory, Culture & Society 30, no.7-87-8 (Dec 2013): 343–371.https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276413504970Alnoor Bhimani Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason, European Accounting Review 3, no.33 (Jan 1994): 399–442.https://doi.org/10.1080/09638189400000030John U. Nef The Industrial Revolution Reconsidered, The Journal of Economic History 3, no.11 (Feb 2011): 1–31.https://doi.org/10.1017/S002205070008236X