Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Research Articles

Eurasian Regionalism as a Research Agenda. Interview with Dr. Mikhail A. Molchanov, University of Salamanca, Spain

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Molchanov is a prominent Canadian political scholar, professor and publicist. He has worked as a senior policy analyst for the Government of Canada and a professor of political science at several Canadian universities. He held a visiting professor appointment at the American University of Sharjah, UAE, and several visiting research appointments at the United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies, Waseda University and Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo, Japan, and at the United Nations University Institute of Comparative Regional Studies (UNU-CRIS) in Brugge, Belgium. Dr. Molchanovs research focuses on international relations in Eurasia and international political economy of regional integration. His research projects have been supported by the United States Institute of Peace, The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), the United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS), Japan Foundation, Soros Foundations, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the New Brunswick Innovation Foundation. In 2011, he was awarded the Japan Foundations prestigious Japanese Studies Fellowship, and in 2012, elected Foreign Member of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine. He is the winner of the inaugural Robert H. Donaldson prize of the International Studies Association for the best paper study of the post-communist region. He sits on the Board of the Global and International Studies Program, University of Salamanca, Spain. Dr. Molchanov has published extensively on comparative politics and international relations of the post-communist states. He has authored and co-authored 7 books and nearly 120 articles and book chapters, including, most recently, Eurasian Regionalisms and Russian Foreign Policy [Molchanov 2016a], and Management Theory for Economic Systems [Molchanov, Molchanova 2018], as well as Eurasian Regionalism: Ideas and Practices [Molchanov 2015], Russias Leadership of Regional Integration in Eurasia [Molchanov 2016b], The Eurasian Economic Union [Molchanov 2018a], New Regionalism and Eurasia [Molchanov 2018b], Russian Security Strategy and the Geopolitics of Energy in Eurasia [Molchanov 2019], and Eurasian Regionalisms and Russias Pivot to the East: The Role of ASEAN [Molchanov 2014]. In his interview Dr. Molchanov talks about the formation of Eurasian studies in the U.S., Europe and the post-Soviet states, leading scientists in this area and periodicals. Special attention is paid to the perception of the Eurasian space in Western countries, to the prospects for further institutionalization of the Eurasian Economic Union, to the partnership between Russia and China and to Russia - EU relations.

STATE PROGRAM FOR NATO-UKRAINE COOPERATION 2001-2004: PRIORITIES AND TASKS IN THE CONTEXT OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

The State Program for NATO – Ukraine Cooperation 2001-2004 is analyzed, its priorities and features in the context of the development of bilateral relations are determined. It has been established that the content of the program has become a logical continuation of the previous one and should, in the short term, ensure the fullest / best possible implementation of terms of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership (1997). It is shown that the President of Ukraine, as well as the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) and on its behalf, the State Interagency Commission for NATO – Ukraine Cooperation, have overseen the implementation of the program. The author notes that its adoption took place during the intensification of Ukraine's foreign policy activities aimed at deepening constructive cooperation with the European Union (EU), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. The program played an important role in the path to the state's declared accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. During this period, it became one of the main directions of the state policy on national security in the context of the formation of the new architectonics of European security of the 21st century. It is claimed that in the political area the program was meant to ensure the implementation of national policy on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, to increase the level of independence guarantees, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukrainian borders, its national security, as well as to promote the principles of democracy, respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, the rule of law in Ukraine. Keywords Ukraine, NATO, Euro-Atlantic Integration, national security, Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU).

The Euro-Atlantic Brand

“Euro-Atlantic” as a political power brand name was employed possibly for the first time in a 1985 speech by Bettino Craxi, then president of the European Council, when he spoke about “Italy's Euro-Atlantic role.” Its political usage was codified in the label Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a group formed in 1997 and which now numbers fifty “partner” governments. EAPC is the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. (The NACC was created as an adjunct to NATO six years earlier in the first flush of post–Cold War Europe.) Among EAPC partners are not only eleven far-flung (and non-Atlantic-riparian) governments of the former Soviet Union—from Armenia to Uzbekistan—but also the six republics of the former Yugoslavia. Russia itself is listed among the partners, although its leaders remain highly suspicious of the NATO parent.

An international tabletop exercise on critical infrastructure protection: the lessons identified

In 2007, a TableTop eXercise (TTX) on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) was held in Sofia, Bulgaria. It was organised by the Civil Protection Committee (CPC) of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The aim of the TTX was to identify gaps in existing policies and capabilities for the protection of the civil population and Critical Infrastructures (CIs) and to provide nations and international bodies with recommendations and tools to address those gaps. This paper briefly discusses the set-up of the TTX and the lessons identified.

Historical dictionary of NATO and other international security organizations

The Historical Dictionary of NATO and Other International Security Organizations covers the Atlantic Alliance's origins, structure and organization through a list of acronyms and abbreviations, a chronology, an introductory essay, a bibliography, and over 1,000 cross-referenced dictionary entries on its Secretaries-Generals, its Supreme Allied Commanders-Europe, plus all affiliated organizations created to enhance NATO's reach in a broader Euro-Atlantic security architecture (e.g. North Atlantic Consultative Council, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russia Charter; NATO-Ukraine Charter, and NATO-Mediterranean Dialogue Partners).

NATO science for peace and security program

A little-known science program administered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), called NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program, has a successful record of stimulating collaboration by experts from NATO countries with experts from countries from the former soviet block of countries (called partner countries) and several countries of the Middle East (called Mediterranean Dialogue countries). The former countries are associated with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the latter through the Mediterranean Dialogue. Grants are given to experts for a number of scientific objectives: short-term scientific exchange, organized workshops and training, and longer term sustained research or meetings. SPS program objectives until 2006 were carried by the previous program called Committee for the Challenges for Modern Society (CCMS) Program. The current priorities of SPS are:

Assessing the Status of PAP-DIB Implementation

Four years have already passed since the heads of state and government convened in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at the NATO Istanbul Summit and endorsed the Partnership Action Plan–Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB). Since that meeting, the Partner nations have embarked on political and conceptual endeavors to implement the ten objectives laid out in the PAP-DIB document as they felt appropriate, and at their own speed. This article will outline some considerations on how the achievements of any Partner nation in PAP-DIB implementation can be assessed.

NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks

In 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson stated that, “for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Caucasus is of no special relevance.” Up until now, this attitude has not changed fundamentally, even though the region obviously attracts the Alliance’s attention more than it did in the 1990s. NATO’s stance toward the South Caucasus has always provoked much more and stronger reactions in Russia than in the political, media, and public realms of the Alliance’s member states. In 1999, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), an Ad Hoc Working Group on Prospects for Regional Cooperation in the Caucasus was established, placing primary focus on defense and economics issues, civil and emergency planning, science and environmental cooperation, and information activities. However, to date there is no overall comprehensive format for NATO cooperation with the South Caucasus that would even come close to its “strategic partnership” with the EU, its concept of “special relations” with Russia and Ukraine, the Mediterranean Dialogue, or the South East European Initiative. Only in 2004—i.e., a full thirteen years after the dissolution of the USSR, which was closely followed by the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—U.S. diplomat Robert Simmons was appointed as NATO’s first Special Envoy for the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The prospects for joint initiatives with NATO are inevitably negatively influenced by the fact that the armies of all South Caucasian republics are far from meeting NATO standards and requirements, even though especially Georgia and Azerbaijan have been declaring that they hope to introduce and achieve these standards sooner rather than later. This applies to such issues as democratic control of the armed forces, soldiers’ human and civil rights, as well as their social status. At times in these nations, soldiers did not even receive victuals, and their low pay was disbursed with monthlong delays or not at all. This not only led to low morale within the armed forces, massive conscientious objections, and desertions of considerable numbers of troops, but

The Challenges of Being Ten: Reflections on the Uniqueness of the PfP Consortiuim

From the start, as was articulated in William Cohen’s inaugurating speech at the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council meeting in June 1998, there was newness: “The establishment of a ‘Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes’ is a contribution to our enhanced Partnership for Peace and, in particular, a means of placing greater emphasis on defense and military education and training—a top priority within the Partnership.” There were two key elements of freshness here. The first was to emphasize military training as something that could be described as a priority at all. The second was to build on the assumption that military training and education could be improved by being placed in closer proximity to research and policy advice. To that date, defense

Initiation of the Consortium by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen during an intervention at the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Defence Ministers (EAPC-D) in Brussels, Belgium, on June 12, 1998

Initiation of the Consortium by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen during an intervention at the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Defence Ministers (EAPC-D) in Brussels, Belgium, on June 12, 1998

The South Caucasus: Problems of Stability and Regional Security

Abstract: The establishment of irrevocable democracy, the rule of law, free market economic relations, and the protection of fundamental human rights have not yet assumed key significance in the South Caucasus countries. Consequently, all pressing problems of the region continue to intensify, keeping the region politically and economically unstable. Given contending geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, the region may develop into a center of clashes jeopardizing the currently manageable political instability. The focus of this article is to highlight the main threats to regional security and stability. Key words: Nagorno-Karabakh, NATO, South Caucasus Opposing Foreign Policy Vectors Division lines separating Armenia from the region became particularly pronounced in 1999, when the other Caucasus republics, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, walked out of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty (CST), declaring their intentions to instead integrate with Euro-Atlantic security structures. In 2003, the CST was reorganized into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), formed as a counter to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the eastward expansion of European influence. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus whose foreign policy serves the goals of the CSTO, and Armenian authorities see it as the only international framework ensuring the country's national security. On the other hand, Georgia and Azerbaijan are striving to minimize threats to their security by seeking the development of relations with NATO. Armenia's only relations with NATO, through its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), have been a part of Moscow's attempt to initiate cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. Armenian authorities state that the country's defense system stems from the assumption of NATO-CSTO dialogue. It is obvious that Armenia also hopes for the implementation of a June 18, 2004, decision of the CSTO's Collective Security Council, the core of which is a structural transformation of a one-level individual partnership, effective under the frameworks of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace program (PfP) into the format of a two-level individual-collective partnership with NATO. This is because every CSTO member country is also a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (CEAP), whereas Armenia is the only CSTO member developing an IPAP with NATO. There is little doubt that regional stability will be possible in the South Caucasus when the three states of the region belong to the same international security system. The harmonization, synchronization, and coordination of the foreign policy priorities of the three states can prevent the South Caucasus from developing into a hotbed of geopolitical clashes. This means that Armenia should revise its foreign policy. Armenia's IPAR however, is not sufficient, and the country should declare its intention to join NATO. While doing this, Armenia should continue to develop its place in and relationships with international and regional organizations, which in the future may take on key security functions. Under these conditions, Armenia's membership in GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) would indicate Yerevan's desire to take up a realistic foreign policy. If Armenia continues to remain isolated from the regional integration processes, the divergences in the interests of the three states will continue to deepen, and the line that separates confronting geopolitical blocs and security systems will run along Armenia's borders. Unfortunately, the authoritarian regime presently in power in Armenia has reduced its foreign policy to tighten its grip. As a result, Armenia has become the main conduit of Russian policy in the region, thus restricting its foreign policy to the bounds of the Kremlin's interests. The recent redeployment of Russian military forces and hardware from Georgia to Armenia reflects Armenia's continuing economic and political isolation, and is evidence of the growing polarization in the region. …

NATO Crisis Management: Cooperation with PfP Partners and Other International Organizations

Crisis management and conflict prevention, including crisis response operations that do not fall under Article V of the NATO Charter, have been major themes in the continuing adaptation of the Alliance to the post-Cold War security environment. This article focuses on a key aspect of the adaptation of NATO crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms: cooperation with Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners and with other key international organizations that contribute to international peace and security and, in particular, recent developments in NATO–EU relations. The Strategic Concept adopted in Rome in 1991 emphasized the importance of crisis management, and the revised Strategic Concept adopted in Washington on 24 April 1999 identified crisis management and conflict prevention as ‘fundamental security tasks’ of the Alliance. It stated: “... in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area: Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.” Alliance members noted that NATO’s preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO’s partners, and that it will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and NATO’s links to other organizations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage.

The EAPC/PfP as an Instrument to Combat Global Terrorism

There is no multilateral security framework whose mandate has not been reexamined – and, in many cases, fundamentally redefined – in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.1 The search for an effective response at a multilateral level to global terrorist networks and the organized crime structures supporting these networks mirrored the extensive national measures and bilateral efforts undertaken to enhance homeland security. While it has been fashionable in academic circles to refer to the blurring of the distinction between national and international security, the magnitude and the nature of the terrorist attacks delivered the most convincing argument in favor of merging and intensifying the coordination between domestic intelligence, foreign policy, and defense policy. The invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was the swiftest multilateral response to the terrorist attacks on the United States masterminded by the al Qaeda network. On 12 September 2001, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) adopted a package of measures designed to combat the scourge of terrorism. Within a week of the terrorist attacks, more than thirty countries had offered disaster relief assistance to the United States through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Center. By December 2001, the EAPC had adopted the new EAPC Action Plan for 2002–2004 based on innovative counter-terrorist approaches suggested in a joint Finnish–Swedish “food-for-thought” paper.2 One year later, at the Prague Summit, the EAPC member states endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT), including practical mechanisms and an action plan ranging from intensified consultation and information sharing and increased prepared-

Resolution adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on 15 November 1999 concerning the armed intervention in Kosovo

Respecting and Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law The Assembly, Commending NATO's decision to intervene to stop massive human rights violations in Kosovo; Appreciating the contribution of the countries in the region of South-Eastern Europe — members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council — to this intervention; Stressing that the use of force has long been subject to restraints under international humanitarian law (IHL), and praising the Government of the Netherlands for its role in the adoption of the pioneering Hague Conventions on the laws of war in 1899 and 1907;

NATO Enlargement

The 'New Nato'In May 1997, George A. Joulwan, a general in the United States army and supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, paid the traditional farewell visit to Canada before relinquishing his official duties. In the nature of things, this was an occasion to show the flag for NATO, to review the state of play with the Canadian government, and to thank the Canadian forces for their support and co-operation.A burly, engaging figure, Joulwan enthusiastically presented the 'new NATO' to a meeting organized by the Atlantic Council of Canada. In direct, vivid language, he described how NATO was reaching out to its former adversaries -- to Poland, Hungary, Russia, and the whole array of countries that had once been encompassed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (more commonly called the Warsaw pact). Of course, the 'new NATO' had kept the attributes that had enabled it to give its members political confidence and military security for over forty years, the firm base on which Europe's unprecedented half-century of prosperity, tranquillity, and freedom had been built. Given his audience, he did not need to spell out that the popular desire in central and eastern Europe for a similar measure of freedom and prosperity was what finally brought the cold war to an end.While the new NATO had not abandoned the vigilance and solidarity of the past, Joulwan was at pains to demonstrate that it now went well beyond collective defence. Through a series of special instruments devised for the purpose, NATO had reached out to Russia and its other interlocutors east and south of the Oder. It had initiated a deep, continuing institutional dialogue with those countries and, perhaps more important, had started to work closely with a number of them on matters of military management, including civilian control, training, doctrine, communications, equipment, and peacekeeping techniques.Joulwan took considerable and justifiable pride in how the new NATO programmes with their elaborate titles -- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (subsequently transformed into the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council), Partnership for Peace, and Combined Joint Task Forces -- grew and developed during his time as supreme commander. They not only created a pool of common knowledge and a capacity to work together among the military forces involved, but, by fostering a habit of co-operation, they also helped to overcome the fears and suspicion of the past. Almost 30 non-NATO countries had missions accredited to NATO headquarters in Brussels with ready access to its senior managers, current thinking, and specialized programmes. Those missions were both means to achieve closer collaboration and symbols of growing ties.All this was quite impressive -- a series of measures that were working and held promise for the future. But when the bluff and confident general was asked how the enlargement of NATO would strengthen security and co-operation in Europe- specifically, what the addition of new members would contribute to the new NATO -- he was momentarily at a loss: 'Oh, that is a political question ...' He quickly rallied, affirming his support for NATO's official policy with standard words about 'extending stability' to central and eastern Europe. What he did not do was try to define the concrete benefits that would accrue to NATO members beyond those already conferred by the current outreach programmes.It was a telling moment. Joulwan's hesitation puts him in good company. Some specialists in Europe and the United States complain that these issues have not been sufficiently aired there, although their debates look very lively indeed compared to the relatively few voices raised in comment or advocacy in Canada.(f.1) In fact, there is now an extensive literature on NATO expansion, in scholarly journals and general publications, in western Europe and particularly in the United States. What is striking about this debate is that a large proportion of the military and security experts, and many interested historians and students of politics, find little to commend in NATO enlargement. …

NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the OSCE

NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the OSCE