EU Security Research Articles

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.

Стратегічна роль розвитку газотранспортної інфраструктури у забезпеченні енергетичної безпеки ЄС

Стратегічна роль розвитку газотранспортної інфраструктури у забезпеченні енергетичної безпеки ЄС

INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF THE EU IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

Norway's Attitudes to European Integration Within Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of Non-EU European States in the Light of Developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

Norway's Attitudes to European Integration Within Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of Non-EU European States in the Light of Developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

The EU Defense Policy and Caucasus-Caspian Regional Security - Tracing from Crisis Management till Stability: Georgia’s Case

A geopolitical situation in the region, labelled ‘the Caucasus-Caspian Region’ remains unstable since the period of the ‘New Cold War’ entered into force. The region is predisposed toward bloody conflicts and regional war scenarios that still persist. A vivid example of the situation is the brief Russo-Georgia war of 2008, when Russian Armed Forces occupied Georgian territories and Georgia was catapulted into the centre of the international arena as a postSoviet country struggling against the ‘Giant Actor’. These consequences outlined the urgent need of European support and security for Georgians. Backing the ceasefire agreement, between the EU, Georgia and the Russian Federation known as the ‘Sarkozy-Saakashvili-Medvedev Peace Accord’, the EU Military Monitoring Mission in aegis of the EU Defence Policy provision has supervised and overseen how the Accord has been implemented by the involved parties. After having considered the Kremlin decision an imposition of the A2/AD system over the whole Black Sea Basin, including the CaucasusCaspian region, the stalemate between the USA and Russia is being detonated. The confrontation between Great Powers over the regional hegemony determination tailored with security perils – military power and energy security instruments directly hit the European security environment where the EU defence policy could be infrangibly and non-attainable. This might be particularly important as it will cause the key risks and outline the urgent need for emergency of threats. Therefore, the Caucasus-Caspian region generates those threat perceptions that can easily endanger the EU security and defence policy implications or swart the community efforts to deal with crises management outside the area of responsibility.

EU SECURITY & DEFENSE POLICY: THE EVOLUTION OF FORMATION

The task of building an effective security architecture facing the European Union is extremely important in that the approach to its solution will determine the nature of the relations between the countries in the region in the future. An analysis of the processes of building a common security and defense policy (EUSR) of the EU is impossible without addressing the interrelated problems: security in the EU with the European Union's place in the Euro-Atlantic processes and in the world at large. The development of the SPBO has a significant impact on all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, which explains the relevance of its further study by national science. Until the scientific and legal literature has addressed the issue of forming and developing a common security and defense policy in the EU. In many ways, this is explained by the relatively short period of existence of the ESDC as a phenomenon, with the result that, in most cases, the study focused on considering the formation, rather than the functioning, of the ESDC mechanisms designed to prepare the EU component for further work. First of all, we are referring to studies on various aspects of the history and current activities of the European Union. In addition, the authors analyze the common issues of European security: from the problems of building security models for Europe to issues related to the activities of European regional military-political organizations on the security and interaction of European and US countries in the field of the common security and defense policy of the EU. Other authors have considered some aspects in the process of becoming an EU Security Council. However, the existing work does not allow for a holistic picture of the process of forming and developing a common foreign and security policy of the EU, in turn, the continued development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU necessitates the development of new aspects of identified issues and generalizations. In this article, the author focuses on highlighting the main stages of the EUSF formation and its importance for the effective functioning of the EU as a whole. There are four main stages in the development of the common security and defense policy: the first stage (1992-1997) is the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties; the second stage (1998-2002), when the EU declared its intention to form an ESDP in Saint-Malo (1998), as well as the decisions taken at the Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, Lachen summits; the third stage (since 2003), the Berlin Plus agreement was reached (March 2003). The Council of Europe adopted the first European Security Strategy (December 2003); and the final stage began with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Within this framework, the European Union is trying to adequately respond to some of the new challenges that emerge in the process of globalization, shaping European identity.

The Role of Great Britain in the Process of Formation of Relations EU–NATO: History and Modernity

The article presents the results of a study of the UK’s involvement in the European Union–NATO relations process during 1990–2010s in the context of establishment the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The methodology of the study was formed by a systematic approach, methods of historical analysis, historical-genetic, periodization, comparative-historical, etc. An interdisciplinary approach made it possible to use certain methods of other sciences, in particular, political science (institutional comparative analysis, event analysis), elements of political modeling and forecasting. It is stated that the British leadership has been in the position of preserving the integrity of the Atlantic co-operation system since the early 1990s. The UK’s position as a staunch supporter of Atlanticism has become one of the decisive and at the same time controversial factors in the creation of the EU Security and Defense Council. Until the second half of the 1990s, British governments opposed the EU’s provision of military and political resources and supported the WEU as a «European support» for NATO. The Blair government’s consent to the transfer of WEU functions to the European Union opened the way for establishing a direct relationship between the union and the Alliance. The signing of the Berlin Plus Agreement with the European Union in 2002–2003 was one of the main elements of NATO’s reform. The political and strategic crisis of NATO in the early 2000s reinforced the relevance of a purely European defense structure. However, the inability of the EU to deploy military resources, the resistance of the Atlanteans, led to a general failure of the autonomy of the CSDP. During the Cameron governments, London openly favored the formation of a NATO Response Force, rejecting the development of EU military resources. Although in the context of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, Europeans’ attention has shifted from the EU’s military capabilities to traditional Atlantic security structures, the strengthening of the Union’s military mechanisms following Britain’s exit has not been ruled out. The United Kingdom is directly involved in the strategic weakness of the EU as a subject of the European and world security system, in a NATO-dependent operational and resource plan. At the same time, Brexit can complicate the task of unifying security, weakening the difficult EU–NATO relationship. Key words: Great Britain; EU; NATO; Common Security and Defense Policy; USA.

The End of Transatlanticism? EU Security and Defence Policies and the ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Debate from a Historical and Contemporary Perspective

This article examines whether calls for European ‘strategic autonomy’ in response to Trump’s rhetoric are qualitatively different from earlier disagreements in US-EU relations. By doing so, it re-assesses Geir Lundestad’s concept of “Empire by Invitation” to illustrate constraints for the development of such an autonomy especially in defence affairs. We argue that the US’s involvement in European defence affairs was never an invitation to ‘empire’, as the invitational aspect was based on consent. A process has been accelerated by the Trump presidency whereby this consent has shifted towards strategic estrangement. However, the article argues that the reactive and intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy continues to hamper more autonomous policy planning in CSDP matters – different readings about cyclical disruptions in EU-US relations notwithstanding. The article finally discusses how the introduction of new CSDP mechanisms impacts on this debate. LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/martijn-lak-71793013/

Europejska agenda czwartego rządu Angeli Merkel

The article analyses the Angela Merkel government’s attitude towards far-reaching plans to rebuild the EU of the French president in three key areas: EU architecture, refugee issue and security policy and towards two non-EU players on the continent: Russia and Turkey. The article is trying to prove that the head of the German government, preferring the unity of the EU rather than integration, will looking for compromise with Macron, taking into account different from the French one positions of other EU countries, and will try to stop the wave of the refugees from Africa through agreements with African countries. Regarding the Turkish autocrat, to avoid provocation, A.Merkel will attempt pragmatic relations. Also regarding Russia, even though it poses a threat to the security of the EU, she will consider (as the requirement of the moment) to establish a network of lively relations with the Putin state.

Assessing the influence of France and Germany on EU foreign and security policy

This article assesses the influence of the Franco-German partnership on the development of an EU foreign and security policy since the 1990s, in order to see whether political cohesion between the two member states is a necessary and sufficient condition for the EU to emerge as an actor in the international arena. Based on a methodology using secondary literature in a systematic way, the argument unfolds in three parts: first, the article looks at the political cohesion between the two member states in terms of both the building and the content of the EU’s foreign and security policy. Then, it seeks to establish a correlation between Franco-German cohesion and the existence of an EU position, or lack thereof. Finally, the last section explains why the Franco-German cohesion is a necessary but insufficient condition for the EU to gain actorness, by looking at other variables pertaining to: domestic politics, European politics and the international environment. Four models of interaction between the Franco-German cohesion and these other variables are developed: effective consensus; ineffective consensus; diffuse consensus; blocking dissensus.

США І «ПІВНІЧНИЙ ПОТІК-2» У СУЧАСНІЙ ПОЛІТИЧНІЙ КАРИКАТУРІ

The article describes the features of representation of the US policy as to the building of the North Stream-2 gas pipeline in modern political cartoons. The US position as to the project is looked in several contexts: the USA and Russian competition on the European and Ukrainian gas markets, a global confrontation between both countries; security of EU and NATO countries, especially Germany, from Russia's energy and political pressure. The following main arguments in the US administration rhetoric against the Nord Stream-2 are highlighted: the pipeline disintegrates the European Union; opposes the interests of the countries of Western and Eastern Europe; causes a split within the NATO countries; makes Germany an energy hostage of the Kremlin; causes the environmental risks; is an instrument of Russia's hybrid war against Western countries and Ukrainian. The author traces the diplomatic attempts are being made by the United States for preventing the building of Nord Stream-2, US' lobbing for amendments to the EU Gas Directive, the system of American sanctions against both Russia and Gazprom's European business partners.The analyzed political cartoons focus on the negative attitude of the United States to the Nord Stream-2 as an instrument of increasing Russia's political influence on European countries. They also demonstrate the threat of loss of energy independence by Germany. The cartoonists often explain the American opposition to the Nord Stream-2 project by the struggle of the US and Russia for European gas markets. The most frequent personages of the cartoons are the President of the USA Donald Trump, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The cartoons contain little symbolism, allegories, metaphors and do not need the searching of hidden contents. As usual, they are very straight, unambiguous in interpretation, clearly tied with the political context and current situation.

Differentiated (Dis)integration in Practice: The Diplomacy of Brexit and the Low Politics of High Politics

AbstractThis article advances a practice approach to differentiated (dis)integration in European security and defence in light of Brexit. We propose that understanding how differentiation in the area of security and defence is given meaning on the ground requires examining the everyday social practices of officials and military professionals. Therefore, we focus on the ‘low politics’ of security and defence cooperation in Europe. We do so by entering the diplomatic engine room in the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). We show how arguments that Brexit will either be the ultimate death blow to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or that it will be the catalyst for deeper military cooperation fail to take account of the social dynamics and the historical path of security and military cooperation in Europe. Future research on differentiation should pay particular attention to how such dynamics play out in the everyday social negotiation of meaning among practitioners.

Bringing Gender In? EU Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit

In this article, we identify Brexit as a critical juncture, wherein the EU has had the opportunity to reflect on and reinforce its identity, as a promoter of gender issues within the security domain. It draws on this identity from a foundational myth of the EU as gender equality polity, resulting in the creation of a socio-legal order and sustained discourse on gender inclusivity in all policy areas. Existing scholarship has drawn attention to the EU’s particular success in gender equality promotion in the areas of social inclusion at member state level, including in the UK. But, is the EU’s reach comprehensive beyond this policy sphere? We examine the ways in which gender is manifested in the area of foreign policy, an area where the UK has consistently shown some leadership on the integration of gender perspectives in its foreign policy through its international development programmes and the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. It is therefore timely to consider what impact Brexit has on EU policies, practices and the promotion of gender equality in this policy domain. Using a critical feminist lens, this article looks at the evolution of gender equality as a dimension of EU foreign and security policy in the context of EU–UK relations, and the divergences, opportunities and constraints that are crystallised by the Brexit process.

Autonomy in intergovernmentalism: the role of de novo bodies in external action during the making of the EU Global Strategy

ABSTRACTIs the new intergovernmentalism well positioned to explain the inter-institutional dynamics of EU external action, as reflected by the policy-making process of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS)? This article argues that, despite the divisive and crisis-ridden dynamics in European integration and external action, de novo bodies such as the HR/VP and the EEAS have increased their autonomy in the traditionally intergovernmental EU foreign and security policies. By tracing the making of the EUGS through 39 interviews with officials from EU institutions and member states, this article argues that the increased autonomy of the HR/VP and the EEAS in external action has also facilitated the parallel convergence of initiatives in security and defence. The value of the EUGS should thus be found in the ad intra integration dynamics it has generated; particularly when, ad extra, it embodies a more troubled environment for EU external action.

Overcoming Dissent: Socialization in the EU's Political and Security Committee in a Context of Crises

AbstractVarious crises have plagued the EU's foreign policy over the last decade. As some member states increasingly question the founding principles of the EU, it is reasonable to expect that national representatives serving in preparatory bodies in the EU are forced to operate under stricter instructions from their capitals. Nevertheless, strong adherence to the coordination reflex and problem‐solving ethos is still prevalent within the political and security committee (PSC), the main policy coordination body within EU foreign policy. In order to understand this counterintuitive puzzle we conducted interviews with 20 PSC representatives. We found that national representatives primarily internalize and adhere to the rules and practices at the level of the group (procedural norms) rather than the founding principles of the EU (constitutive norms). Contrary to existing research, we argue that a theoretical distinction between these norms is necessary in order to understand fully how crises and contestation affect microlevel socialization.

The politics of development and humanitarianism in EU externalization: Managing migration in Ukraine

This paper draws from research in Ukraine to analyze how development and humanitarianism are integral to spatial projects of migration management. As a country of origin, transit and destination for migrants that now borders four EU member countries, Ukraine’s integration with the EU has been made conditional upon its willingness to cooperate in managing migration. The EU has externalized significant aspects of migration and border management to Ukraine, making investments in the country’s capacity to selectively control—even detain—cross-border migration in line with EU security priorities. Discourses and practices of development are central to the installation, justification and management of EU externalization in transit areas of migration. In concert, the spatial practices of humanitarian institutions maintain migrants’ survival while also managing their exclusion from EU common space. This paper discusses the spatial politics of development and humanitarianism in EU externalization by addressing: (1) the humanitarian management of migrant detention in Ukraine; (2) the uses of development through the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy to outsource migration management to Ukraine; and (3) the roles of development and humanitarian discourses, programs and institutions in implementing the externalization of migration management to Ukraine.

Astrategic Europe

AbstractThis article argues that the existing literature on EU foreign, security and defence strategy has paid insufficient attention to two basic prior questions: what is strategy? And what constitutes good strategy? Judged against a baseline definition of good strategy, the EU lacks an agreed assessment of its external environment, struggles to prioritize competing foreign policy objectives, avoids difficult foreign policy choices, and often lacks the ways and means necessary to achieve its goals, yet is reluctant to modify its objectives. These problems reflect the EU's character as a polity: differences amongst member states and the primarily intergovernmental nature of EU foreign, security and defence decision‐making fundamentally constrain the Union's ability to develop and implement external strategy. The EU is better understood as an astrategic actor: an actor without a strategy in the proper meaning of the word and one that will continue to find it difficult to develop such a strategy.

Lithuania in European Union common security and defence policy context

EU Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that encompasses 29 nations is gaining momentum. The aim of this study is to acknowledge ongoing developments in EU CSDP and define their impact for Lithuanian defence and security policy. Comparative scientific literature and document analysis method was used throughout this study. Article firstly reviews a path of EU CSDP developments, outlines roles and responsibilities of EU structures and examines current activities in CSDP framework with the focus to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Second part is devoted to consider Lithuanian’s role in current EU CSDP context, to outline decisions that Lithuanian authorities made to implement new PESCO initiative. Study reveals that: CSDP remains adaptive framework for EU; established procedures ensure CSDP is in compromise with all of nations; PESCO initiative signals positive outcomes while reinforcing idea of “EU Strategic autonomy”. Furthermore it was indentified that: approved National Security Strategy backs current EU initiatives; PESCO could provide flexible response options without duplicating NATO’s efforts; national participation in PESCO initiatives will enable improvements in cyber security and will enable rapid access for possible EU and NATO troops deployments; participation in PESCO negotiation phase reached given political aims to seek more extensive projects and position nation within core members of EU. Lithuanian policies’ shift for deeper engagement in CSDP is likely shaped by recognition that strategic trans-Atlantic partnership is not certain anymore, as well as UK role at post-Brexit period as 3rd party. <b></b> <b></b>

ISIS Cohort Transnational Travels and EU Security Gaps: Reconstructing the 2015 Paris Attack Preplanning and Outsource Strategy

ABSTRACT We explore the underappreciated role of organizational tactics in terrorist violence in an understudied single case: ISIS’s execution of the November 13, 2015 Paris attacks. It is one of the first systemic reconstructions of the journeys made by two ISIS strike cohorts in the coordinated attacks, as teams traveled from the Levant to Europe. In contrast to other high-profile attacks, terrorism scholars have not undertaken a detailed reconstruction of this event, even while open source information is now available. By examining the transnational travels of foreign terrorist fighters, we identify ISIS’s distinctive terrorist outsourcing strategy in which operatives used their experiences to adapt to changing security conditions, while EU governments revealed limited responses. Both elements in this tightly-knit dynamic—terrorist outsourcing savvy using FTFs and EU security policy failures—were necessary to achieve this high-profile attack. The essay contributes to descriptive empirical and theoretical knowledge of terrorist tactical innovation and adaptive operational learning, as these capacities are enhanced by on-the-ground organized networks to increase organizational (versus lone-wolf) campaign success. By using a single case interdisciplinary and exploratory framework, terrorism studies can delve deeper into superficially understood phenomena to isolate concepts with future cross-case value, such as cohorts and tactical adaptation.

China’s External Energy Security: Energy Trade and Investment Along the ‘Belt and Road’

Abstract As the world’s largest energy consumer, China’s energy security policies have significant implications for global, regional and national energy governance. However, the legal dimension of China’s external energy security remains understudied, with most attention in the energy law literature focused on EU and US energy security. This Special Issue studies the legal aspects of Chinese external energy cooperation by focusing on energy trade and investment under the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ – the Chinese foreign policy concept aiming to promote regional and global economic integration through infrastructure interconnectivity. Three research questions govern the Special Issue. How does China’s external energy policy rely on, and impact on, regional and global energy market governance? How does China seek to protect its foreign energy investments? How does China’s external energy policy impact on host countries’ energy and investment laws?