EU-Russia Research Articles

Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad

Kaliningrad is argued to raise profound questions regarding the role, power and influence of marginal actors in EU–Russian relations as well as international politics at large. Such entities may have to confine themselves to a totally subordinated position but they can also gain, as seems increasing to have been the case with Kaliningrad, considerable influence. As spaces in-between, or as potentially emergent third spaces that significantly problematise the idea of territorial sovereignty, they do not only influence – by blurring borders and various conceptual categories – the setting of local or regional agendas. They may also impact upon the very constitution of subjectivity, in the cases of both the EU and Russia. In this essay these processes are tackled, above all by scrutinising how margins are understood in both common and theoretical discourses with the departures unfolding then explored in the case of Kaliningrad.

The EU–Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed

The EU–Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed

So far, so good? Russia and the ESDP

The progression from a European Security and Defence Initiative to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not left Russian policy–makers indifferent. The Yeltsin administration greeted the emergence of the European Union as a new player in European security, seeing it as a potential challenge to NATO and American influence. President Putin’s emphasis on developing trust and cooperation with the West has changed the Russian perspective on the ESDP. Russian interest in dialogue and functional cooperation with the ESDP now stems primarily from a wish to add substance to the still nascent EU–Russia partnership, which Putin has chosen as Russia’s foremost external priority. In view of the imbalance between EU and Russian economic capacities, the security sphere appears as the most promising area of cooperation on which to found a meaningful long–term partnership. This article traces the evolution of Russian perceptions of the ESDP since it was first launched in June 1999 and outlines the development of EU–Russia relations in this field, which has given Russia the most advanced mechanism for interaction with the ESDP available to a non–EU country. It explores prospective areas of cooperation, as they are viewed by each side, and looks into issues of potential discord. Finally, the article considers the future of Russia–ESDP cooperation in the light of Russia’s revitalized partnership with NATO.

The Northern Dimension — One Pillar of the Bridge Between Russia and the EU

Although Russia is not an applicant for membership of the European Union, it is linked to European integration in many ways. The EU Tacis programme, started at the beginning of the 1990s, provided early assistance for Russia’s transition to a market economy and market–oriented international integration. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, which came into force in 1997, was a milestone, as were mutual cooperation strategies developed by each of the sides at the end of the 1990s. Naturally, Russia’s internal reform progress and its preparation for WTO membership are also significant for EU–Russia relations. Current steps towards creation of the Common European Economic Space, uniting the EU and Russia, represent a new level of cooperation.In addition to EU programmes and projects, which are purely Russia–related, Russia also figures large in the so–called Northern Dimension (ND) policy of the EU. The role of the ND in the network of EU–Russia institutions and programmes, where the above–mentioned general elements are only small parts of the whole, needs further clarification. It so happens that the most promising opportunities and demanding challenges of the ND policy begin with the letter ‘e’. Omitting some key areas, such as economy and education, sub–sections of this article will be devoted to energy, environment, eDimension, enterprises and EU enlargement.

The Common European Economic Space Between Russia and the EU: an Institutional Anchor for Accelerating Russian Reform

The prospect of bringing the European Union and Russia closer together within a Common European Economic Space (CEES) tops the agenda in the EU–Russia dialogue, confirming that the EU views Russia as a strategic partner. This article argues that the CEES is not only positive for Russian economic growth, but that it is a condition for acceleration of sustainable growth and higher productivity in Russia. The aim of the EU in building the CEES is not to force Russia into a particular mould, but to offer a model for economic and legal integration, which can help to boost Russian economic performance. Both the EU and Russia have achieved internal unities, bringing together huge diversities of nations, cultures, and religions. The time has now come to close the gap opened between Russia and the rest of Europe at the beginning of the last century. Integration within the CEES opens the way to this objective.

Transport Issues in Post-Soviet Central Asia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asianproducers have been actively and partly successfully looking forcompensating markets. Howeve1; the transport infrastructurewas built to se1ve interests of the Soviet state. New transportCOJTidors to the west, east and south are being constructed orplanned reducing in the long run the transport costs of CentralAsian products, which still today pw1ly use traditional and longerSoviet time outlets (pipelines, railways, ports). For both economicand geopolitical reasons Central Asian states wish tofind alternative transport routes. The EU and geopolitical rivalsof Russia, the USA and China, are helping in this, also Iran hasvested interests in the issue. Still long haulage remain a constantproblem for landlocked Central Asia and the high cost ofmany projects planned (Transcaspian or Chinese pipelines) islikely to postpone them to a distant future.

Russia and Europe

For the first time, in Russia there is no established ideology, there is no censorship and there is no state terror. Lack of land reform is changing Russian agriculture into a ‘garden plot economy’. Rising mortality and a plummeting birth‐rate depict a dramatic demographic trend. The border between the EU and Russia delineates an epidemic faultline. Russia faces de‐industrialisation and the collapse of the infrastructure, and devolution of power faces the choice between decentralisation by design or disintegration by default. A normative divide is opening up between Russia and future EU members, the Baltic States and Poland. The West can influence developments in Russia only to a limited degree.