EU Policy Coordination Research Articles

The physical completion of the EU’s single market: trans-European networks as experimentalist governance?

ABSTRACT Since the 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, the Commission has emphasised the importance of trans-European networks (TENs) for the physical completion of the single market. Despite the 2004 and 2013 revisions to the TEN-T regulation, redefining and expanding the multimodal network, many projects remain unfinished. This article explores the Commission’s enduring role in EU policy coordination from the perspective of hybrid governance, focusing on the mediating role of high-level ‘European Coordinators’, the use of stakeholders forums, recourse to policy evaluation, and the development of new financial instruments. Drawing on recent audit and evaluations work by the EU institutions, it explores reconfigurations of implementing actors, and engages with notions from the literature on experimentalist governance, including networks, informalism and deliberation. The analysis suggests that the Commission demonstrates resilience as a coordination body in its commitment to ‘physically complete’ the single market, while recognising limitations to its coordination capacity.

Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany

AbstractEuropeanization research found no general convergence towards centralized EU policy coordination, despite decentralized systems' comparatively slow and ineffective position‐taking. Does this finding hold against the threat, urgency, and uncertainty exerted by recent years' polycrisis? We posit that decentralized systems indeed persist, albeit in a three‐step reactive sequence in which situational centralization during crises dialectically reinforces decentralization in the long run. First, the prime minister's office harnesses a crisis to acquire hierarchical control of position‐taking. Second, to exploit the deep expertise of the bureaucracy and maximize its bargaining power on the EU‐level, it co‐opts a lead ministry. Third, due to the institutional underpinnings of the decentralized system, the lead ministry, rather than the prime minister's office, eventually retains the administrative capacities created in crisis. We illustrate this causal mechanism in a comparison of the German government's EU policy coordination during the Eurozone and Schengen crises.

European Governance in Adult Education

This article examines the working of complex intergovernmental policies that have brought about new opportunities and structures in European adult education since the 2008 global financial crisis. Drawing on political sociology, it restricts attention on the Renewed European Agenda for Adult Learning (2011), to examine its historical development, and how it bundles together various governance mechanisms, policy instruments, and social actors to govern the adult education policy domain through policy coordination. This points at regulatory politics as a distinctive quality of European governance in adult education. Then, through Social Network Analysis, it explores in depth one of its policy instrument (i.e., coordinated working groups/networks) and the form of network governance it creates. This analysis pinpoints at the comparative advantage of some organizations (i.e., the ministries of Latvia, Finland and Belgium), which partake in this form of network governance. This produces unpredictable contingency in EU policy coordination.

"Who is going to reform the reformers?" The coordination of the Greek National Reform Programmes

The article studies the impact of the revised Lisbon Strategy -and the National Reform Programmes (NRPs) in particular- on the EU policy coordination of Greece. It is argued that the structures and processes established for the formulation and monitoring of the NRPs reflect some deep-rooted characteristics of the Greek system of governance, namely centralism, politicization, informality and reliance on actors. It is also found that the demise of this policy network was caused not by domestic factors or developments, but by the insistence of Greece's EU partners to fuse the implementation of the Greek NRP with the execution of the 2010 economic adjustment programme. The introduction of this process of coercive-direct Europeanization in Greece (as well as in Ireland and Portugal) signals, inter alia, the emergence of a two-speed Europe 2020. On the other hand, the new reform coordination process in Greece relies on preexisting structures and processes that closely follow traditional patterns.

Procedurally reducing complexity. The practices of German EU policy coordination

Policy coordination in federal states is inherently complex because it includes a multitude of actors at the federal and the sub-state level. If the sub-states want their interests to be included in the final decision, they need to coordinate with the federal level but also amongst themselves. Several individual interests areoverlooked easier than coordinated interests of a group of sub-states. This paper puts forward the argument that during the coordination process, the actors from both levels meet in different constellations where they focus on different aspects of coordination, especially on different actors’ interests separately. This is a strategy which enables them to procedurally reduce the complexity of the decision-making process. In order to empirically investigate this argument, first a thorough definition of coordination as process is provided and operationalized for empirical investigation. It is accentuated that coordination as a process has different dimensions which are relevant for the understanding of the coordination process. This argument is analyzedwith the example case of German EU policy. The empirical data used are original expert interviews with German civil servants responsible for EU policy coordination at the sub-state level. It will be demonstrated that the actors strategically form voluntary coordination constellations which enables them to reduce complexity during the process.

The Unbearable Divergence of Unemployment in Europe

Unemployment in Europe is not only “too high”, it is also too different across countries that belong to a monetary union. In this paper we i) document this increasing heterogeneity, ii) try to explain it and iii) draw from our diagnosis indications as to the appropriate set of policies to reduce unemployment and labour market disparities. Our analysis suggests that the divergence in labour market outcomes across Europe is the by-product of interactions between, on the one hand, shocks of varying size and nature, and, on the other hand, country-specific labour market institutions. We argue that EU policy coordination and conditionality during the Great Recession and the euro area debt crisis did not properly take into account these interactions. We also propose a change in the European policy approach for fighting unemployment.

Unanimity, Consensus and Peripheral Parties as Determinants of EU Policy Coordination in Federal Member States

EU scholars have long argued that regions can shape the integration process, but there is no agreement on why this is so. While some authors consider constitutional powers, intergovernmental relations, or differentiated regional elites as independent variables, those interested in Europeanization argue that the ‘transformative power of Europe’ enticed both central and regional governments to adopt consensual policy styles, akin to those prevailing in the EU. Accordingly, new territorial arrangements would have made effective participation in the integration process possible. However, scholars have failed to pay due consideration to a crucial factor: the decision-making rule employed in the coordination mechanisms. In this article, I argue that cooperation among regions actually depends mostly on whether decisions are taken by consensus or unanimity. Common regional positions and impacts on EU decisions become unlikely if peripheral parties increase the levels of conflict. The arguments build on theoretical warrants taken from actor-centered institutionalism.

The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: centralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination

This paper studies the effects of the Lisbon Strategy on the way in which national executives co-ordinate EU policy at the domestic level. Comparing seven countries (Denmark, the United Kingdom [UK], Austria, Slovenia, Spain, France and Poland) it finds evidence that the Lisbon Strategy has been advancing (further) centralization and politicization in national patterns of EU policy co-ordination, empowering core executives. The Lisbon Strategy's ideational elements (‘grand’ goals and politically visible targets) as well as organizational requirements (Spring Council, national programming and annual reports) are factors behind this phenomenon. These results have implications for the literature on Europeanization, international politics, and governance studies in what is eminently an empirical research agenda about how far and how changes in international governance architectures affect the redistribution of power within national executives.

ORGANIZING THE CORE EXECUTIVE FOR EUROPEAN UNION AFFAIRS: COMPARING FINLAND AND SWEDEN

Examining core executive organization for EU affairs in Finland and Sweden, this article uncovers how change agents used European integration deliberately to strengthen their role in the domestic settings through taking control of EU policy co-ordination. In both countries, EU membership was an exogenous factor that enabled the offices of the PM to secure a more powerful position and advance their own institutional agendas. This strengthened their leadership role and weakened the respective foreign ministries, whose legitimacy in EU co-ordination was undermined by the discourse that matters pertaining to this co-ordination should be treated as domestic policy instead of foreign policy. This discourse proved instrumental in the organizational reforms and core executive restructuring. Both countries also provide evidence of intra-Nordic organizational learning since the Finnish co-ordination system was based on lessons drawn from Denmark whereas the subsequent Swedish reform was inspired and legitimized by changes in Finland.

Over-efficiency in German EU Policy Coordination

The article refers to the controversial debate on the efficiency of German EU policy coordination. On the basis of a five-month participant observation in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the hypothesis of the over-efficiency of EU coordination is developed. Over-efficiency is characterised by a functionally organised but purely technocratic preparation of EU policy without the participation of the general public, political parties, and national parliament. By having considerably increased the efficiency of EU policy coordination in recent years, German policy makers have therefore potentially undermined the acceptance of European integration as a whole.

Missing the Lisbon Target? Multi-Level Innovation and EU Policy Coordination

At its Lisbon Summit in March 2000, the European Council decided to apply the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to innovation policies. The aim is to establish a European Research Area, in which the OMC shall increase the coherence of regional, national and European policies. Until now, however, the OMC has only been applied to a very limited extent. We argue that this development is due to the fact that there are specific conditions for policy coordination in the emerging European multi-level innovation system that have hardly been mirrored by late EU initiatives for a more coherent European Research Area and its new open method of coordination.