EU-NATO Cooperation Research Articles

The impact of the war in Ukraine on the common security and defense policy of the European Union

The emergence of the war in Ukraine, conditioned by the occupation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the invasion of the Russian Federation in 2022, is, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the event that will have the greatest geopolitical implications on the international arena, including on the European Union, especially on politics of common security and defence. The ongoing war have a number of long-term implications for the security and stability of the European continent. The degree of possibility of some of the consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian war will be negligible and will be a subject of debate for academics and Western political leaders for many years to come. The purpose of this article is to highlight the main aspects that intervened in the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union as a result of the outbreak of a Ucranian war. Thus, the steps taken by the EU to ensure peace on the European continent will be analyzed. Also, some aspects of EU-NATO cooperation in the context of the war in Ukraine will be highlighted.

“It’s the Economy, Stupid!” and the Integration of EU Defence Policy

In the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany was not the only one to undergo “Zeitenwende” in Europe. The European Union (EU), as a whole, also witnessed an unprecedented surge in its determination to bolster its security and defence efforts. Using collective funds, EU countries, for instance, have been providing lethal arms to Ukraine and have committed to joint procurement of ammunition and missiles to assist Kyiv. Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market has pro-actively carried to the European capitals the message about the need for the “war economy mode.” To what extent does recent progress in EU defence policy represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s self-perception and its approach to external policy? More concretely, can we realistically describe a stronger and more robust EU defence policy as being firmly rooted in a shared political and strategic vision? The paper examines relevant transformations, including recent developments, and argues that they are closely intertwined with the economic rationale, which is empirically distinct from a politico-strategic vision. This has implications for EU-NATO cooperation.

NATO and the CSDP after the Ukraine War: The End of European Strategic Autonomy?

Abstract The paper debates the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It argues that the invasion has changed dramatically Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan and deepening frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into NATO, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO (hereafter also referred to as the Alliance). The aim of this article is to try to answer some of these questions, by providing an initial assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and the CSDP, and to sketch out potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security. More specifically, the paper will try to answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict on the Alliance? How did the war impact on the CSDP and the Union’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Where is EU-NATO cooperation heading as a result of the war? Will the conflict ramp up cooperation between the two organizations or will European defence efforts be channelled mostly through NATO? Will EU leaders grab the momentum created by the war to further institutional integration also in security and defence and or will the war turn into another missed opportunity to promote a more effective burden-sharing in transatlantic security?

EU-NATO Cooperation in the Area of Crisis Management: Case of Kosovo

Abstract EU-NATO relations have come to the spotlight particularly due to the increasing focus of the EU on strengthening its military dimension as part of its evolving Common Security and Defense Policy. In this context, Kosovo provides a very interesting case concerning the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO in the area of crisis management given that the EU maintains in Kosovo the largest civilian mission launched to date (i.e. EULEX) which can also make use of a limited number of executive powers whereas NATO has deployed KFOR as a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo since 1999. This article aims at elucidating the relations between EULEX and KFOR on the ground amidst the lack of a formal agreement on the coordination of strategic efforts between NATO and the EU at the military strategic level.

Development of the European Union Autonomous Command and Control Capability in the Context of European Security and Defence Cooperation

"The development of the command and control capability for the crisis management operations conducted by the European Union has been a constant element in the context of European security and defence cooperation. The particular profile of the regulatory framework governing the activities performed under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy has led to a specific EU capability building process. The formulas promoted in relation to both civilian and military components have taken various forms. However, the constant trend is to consolidate the options that the EU can employ in generating and conducting its own operations. They will add to the EU-NATO cooperation framework, developed from the earliest moments of the launch of European military operations. The developments in terms of the potential to generate and lead mixed civil-military commitments have been placed on similar coordinates. In practice, the stage in the development of the EU’s command and control capabilities attests to the existence of a comprehensive and equally complex instrument that the EU can employ in managing its own operational commitments."

Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology

ABSTRACT With the growing density and the plethora of security organisations on the regional and international level, the research programme on interorganisational relations has received increasing scholarly attention. The complexity of European security – in light of the Ukraine conflict since 2014, Russia’s more assertive foreign policy behaviour, and on-going crisis management operations in the Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East – has revived EU-NATO cooperation. The analysis from the perspective of member states and how they can be positioned in the EU-NATO interorganisational relations, however, has received little exploration. This article, therefore, addresses the roles and positions of member states within the relations between the EU and NATO as Europe’s prime security organisations. Member states have numerous political strategies at their disposal to trigger, strengthen or obstruct interorganisational relations, ranging from forum-shopping to hostage-taking and brokering. Drawing on insights from regime theory, network analysis, organisation theory and interorganisationalism, this article proposes a typology of member states in EU-NATO cooperation. Against the backdrop of this special relationship, the typology is developed which aims to detect and illustrate member states’ positions and strategies.

A Weakening Transatlantic Relationship? Redefining the EU–US Security and Defence Cooperation

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship. When analysing European security and defence, the article also shows that it is misleading to regard European integration as something to be subordinated to NATO. Nevertheless, a European security deficit does exist due to differing perspectives among member states on how the EU process should relate to NATO. The article, therefore, concludes that strategic autonomy can only be developed with close EU–NATO cooperation. Furthermore, a more multipolar world order where the EU no longer can rely upon a transatlantic security community to the same extent as before challenges the EU’s role as a defender of multilateralism and poses new challenges to the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

Matching risk assessment and capabilities: Challenges to Central and Eastern European member states

Located on the eastern flank of the EU, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have a specific perception of risks and threats and hence unique views on how to guarantee their security. This is particularly relevant with regard to their attitudes towards Russia. As members of both the EU and NATO, the CEE countries are in favour of stronger EU–NATO cooperation in security and the non-duplication of these organisations’ efforts. Some of the countries see NATO as the key guarantor of their security. For several reasons, CEE countries have serious deficits in their defence capabilities and rely heavily on collective ones.

Оборонные проекты PESCO и НАТО: координация или конкуренция?

The EU’s PESCO projects and NATO’s High Visibility Projects are aimed at strengthening the defence capabilities of the member states of these two structures, creating new military technologies, jointly purchasing equipment and weapons, optimizing countries' defence spending and coordinating the transformation of their armed forces structures in accordance with collective interests. At the same time, the projects of the EU and NATO have different tasks that align with the foreign policy goals of these different in nature structures. Due to the participation of various states in each of them, primarily the United States in NATO, a number of contradictions between them remain. However, most of them are offset by the EU–NATO cooperation. The latter has significantly intensified since 2016. Two bilateral declarations were signed and two packages of measures for their implementation were adopted. The parties have strengthened political cooperation, interaction during operations, coordination of defence planning, they jointly develop projects for the formation of military infrastructure, develop deepen military-technical cooperation in areas of common interest. The article analyzes the PESCO and High Visibility Projects projects, compares them and identifies the links and differences between them. It is substantiated that, despite the various tasks, in the conditions of the modern transformation of the world order and the evolution of threats to their member states, the EU and NATO are expanding coordination in defence planning and developing a division of responsibilities between the two. The PESCO and High Visibility Projects are being implemented in full synchronization with each other, with the participation of a number of EU member states, but not-NATO members, in NATO projects and vice versa. Rather, the projects complement each other, although the scope of PESCO is much broader due to the peculiarities of the nature of the European Union as a regional integration association. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is a spatial approach. It is substantiated that the EU and NATO, both being already transnational political spaces, form a superstructure space of EU-NATO cooperation, in which the actors of the first level – these two structures themselves – and the second level – the states – interact more intensively than with external actors, participate in the struggle for power, redistribution of resources, form the identity of this transnational space. It is concluded that in the future, coordination between the PESCO and High Visibility Projects, as well as between the EU and NATO in general, will expand.

Mosty a ich vplyv na vojenskú mobilitu

The ability to rapidly deploy forces to a particular area and ensuring theThe ability to rapidly deploy forces to a particular area and ensuring thefreedom of movement and mobility are fundamental prerequisites for thesuccess of any military operation. Hence improved military mobility in Europehas become one of the flagships for EU-NATO cooperation. This cooperationaddresses several problem areas and challenges in relation to militarymobility, including the insufficient load capacity of bridges. The aim of theresearch is to analyse the current state of the bridges of the road network ofthe Slovak Republic, focused on their load capacity, in the context of militarymobility. When crossing every 2,200 m of road in Slovak republic, the militaryunit statistically encounters a bridge. However only about 54% of all bridgesmeet the requirement for a minimum level of load capacity.

INTRODUCTION EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION EU AND NATO: SECURITY RELATIONS

PESCO, CARD, EDF: Strategy, Analysis, and Financing in the European Union Security Guaratee

In the article the authors analyze the institutional basis for strengthening the EU security and the implementation of specific projects designed to expand cooperation between the Member States in the defence and security sectors. The point at issue is about Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). The relevance of the comprehensive study of PESCO, CARD, EDF, which activities are aimed at ensuring the strategic component of cooperation, the analysis of the defence sector and funding priorities in the security sphere of the Union have been proved. The authors claim that PESCO has become a key strategic initiative of the EU, CARD allows coordinating the development of military capabilities in the Member States; the EDF was created to coordinate, increase investment and improve defence interoperability between EU member states. The challenges faced within the functioning of these initiatives have been analyzed. It is alleged that a key challenge for the CARD is the unwillingness of Member countries to share national defence plans, as well as the available and potential coordination and harmonization of defence planning within NATO’s Defence Planning. The peculiarities of specific projects financed within the European Defense Fund (“Ocean 2020”, “Eurodrone”, “SPIDER”, “EuroSWARM”, “TRAWA”, “ACAMSII”, “Gossra”, “Vestlife”) have been analyzed. There is continued progress in the field of the EU security and defence: numerous defence projects have been initiated under PESCO; there is a synchronization of defence planning through the CARD; the investments in defence are stimulated by financing the defence research projects through the EDF, the improving military mobility is continuing; coordination of the EU-NATO cooperation is improving, etc.

Germany Going ‘Midstream’: Balancing vs Leadership in EU-NATO Cooperation

As one of the founding states of the European Union (EU) and a long-standing member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Germany has made significant contributions to both organisations and to European security. Despite being frequently accused as a free rider, this article claims that Germany takes the position of balancer in the EU-NATO relationship whereby it facilitates cooperation through mediating between both organisations and their member states. This article analyses Germany’s role and conceptualises it as balancer in interorganisational relations. As a member of both organisations, the debates concern how Germany can make effective use of its geographical, cultural and economic positions to contribute to European security. It takes a ‘midstream’ position in which it balances between the EU and NATO and among other member states. This article argues that due to its expansive network of bilateral and minilateral relations, Germany emphasises its role as balancer by using its diplomatic skills to broker among fellow member states. A well-working and amicable EU-NATO relationship is indispensable for its own interests. This paper therefore takes into account its particular position and capabilities as well as its multilateral linkages to examine how Germany positions itself as balancer in the EU-NATO relationship.

Cyber security in the national security & defence sector of Ukraine: todayʼs challenges and ways to avoid possible threats

Development of strategic communications is necessary for the effective preparation and use of the Armed Forces, for the coordination of actions of state bodies in defence matters, as well as for the purpose of forming and strengthening the confidence of Ukrainian society in the stateʼs military policy. The basic elements of strategic communications of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces are public relations, public relations in the military sphere, public diplomacy, information and psychological operations.
 In turn, one of the components of the information operations system is cyberspace actions. The strategic importance of actions in cyberspace is due to the fact that cyber threats today, with devastating consequences, pose no less danger than direct military intervention. In 2016, during the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the first ever EU-NATO security cooperation agreement was signed, in particular on hybrid wars and cyberattacks. Cyberspace, along with land, air, sea, and space, has been recognized as a new operational space, and cyber-operations (cyberattacks) are an integral part of the hybrid war. Also, cyber weapons in terms of scale of successors are compared with weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, cyber security is one of the top priorities for the state.
 The article is devoted to the research of actual problems of providing the cyber security of the Armed Forces units of Ukraine in the current conditions of development of the information society and during hybrid threats from the Russian Federation side. The authors explain the basic concepts and definitions of the scientific field and explain conceptual approaches to cybersecurity and propose some ways to improve the existing cybersecurity mechanism or how to enhance it.

Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: A Win-Win Approach

La politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) de l’UE a été lancée dans les années 1990 en tant que quête pour une « autonomie ». Quinze années d’efforts n’ont pas permis d’atteindre cet objectif. La cohérence des États membres de l’UE dans leurs relations sécuritaires avec les États-Unis a toujours été affectée par les divergences entre les objectifs du Royaume-Uni et de la France. Mais à mesure que les dirigeants européens relancent la PSDC post-Brexit, que la « Stratégie globale européenne » de 2016 redécouvre les vertus de « l’autonomie stratégique » et que le monde tournoie avec un président américain qui semble remettre en cause les fondements de l’Alliance atlantique, il est temps de repenser radicalement les relations entre l’UE et l’OTAN. Cet article soutient qu’à plus long terme, c’est par le renforcement des relations UE-OTAN que l’autonomie stratégique de l’UE deviendra possible et qu’un lien transatlantique plus fort verra le jour. Une proposition gagnant-gagnant.

The Wind in the Sails of EU-NATO Cooperation: How Strong and Where To?

Les relations entre l’UE et l’OTAN ont clos le chapitre de l’indifférence mutuelle et ouvert celui de la portée stratégique. Les instruments de l’UE peuvent compléter le dispositif de défense de l’OTAN comme en témoignent des études de cas portant sur la mobilité militaire, la guerre hybride et la sécurité maritime. Le plus large débat sur l’autonomie stratégique devrait également avoir lieu au sein de l’OTAN et produire un discours sans ambiguïté sur la manière dont les Européens peuvent être stratégiquement autonomes tout en étant transatlantiques. Il s’agirait avant tout de franchir une nouvelle étape, dans l’intérêt des deux partenaires.

Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations?

ABSTRACTThe EU’s common security and defence policy was launched in the 1990s as a quest for ‘autonomy.’ Fifteen years of efforts failed to deliver. The coherence of the EU member states in their security dealings with the US was always vulnerable to the incompatible objectives of the UK and France. But as EU leaders post-Brexit re-launch CSDP, as the European Global Strategy rediscovers the virtues of ‘strategic autonomy,’ and as Europe juggles with a US president who questions the basis of NATO, it is time to re-think the relations between the EU and NATO. Brexit has the potential to strengthen the coherence of the EU member states in their quest for autonomy. This might seem to weaken the transatlantic bond. This paper will argue that, in the longer term, it is through the transcendence of the EU-NATO relationship that a genuine strengthening of that bond will emerge.

EU–NATO cooperation: the key to Europe’s security future

ABSTRACTThe re-launch of the EU’s security and defence project in the wake of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump has focused the spotlight on the relationship between NATO and the EU. This article reviews the detailed aspects of that relationship as studied in the various contributions to this special issue. It argues that, over and above cooperation on the ground, the key issue to be addressed, which is usually skated over in the “big picture” literature on this question, is: where is all this heading? Is there a move towards a clear EU–NATO division of labour (if so, will it be geographic or functional?); or are the allies seeking a radical new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans for the stabilisation of the European neighbourhood? The paper argues that EU “strategic autonomy”, as called for in the Global Strategy document of 2016, can only be achieved through the Europeanisation of NATO itself.

Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU–NATO relations: the added value of practice approaches

ABSTRACTMuch scholarly work seeking to explain the EU–NATO relationship emphasises conflicting national or institutional interests, strategic individuals, and operational inefficiencies and overlaps. This article offers an alternative account of how both the everyday and the extraordinary in EU–NATO security cooperation can be identified and analysed by applying practice theory. Despite the “Cyprus issue”, which has left EU–NATO cooperation under Berlin Plus in political stalemate, regular interaction involving civilian and military EU and NATO staff at all levels and various sites has increased over the past decade. The article shows how a practice take is well suited to uncover the practical logic at work in these, predominantly informal EU–NATO encounters; how practices are established, enacted, and also abrupted. Furthermore, it discusses how shared “background conditions” – skills and experience – facilitate practices, learning, and community-building but also competition and rivalry.

European security as practice: EU–NATO communities of practice in the making?

ABSTRACTEuropean security is at a critical juncture and many have called for a more coherent and efficient response, involving both the EU and NATO. However, the primary tool for EU–NATO cooperation, “Berlin Plus”, has been stuck in a political quagmire since the mid-2000s, making a lot of scholars to conclude that this cooperation is obsolete and outdated. This article is challenging this view by analysing a range of informal but regular interaction patterns that have emerged. Using practice theory, it sheds new light on and explores how EU and NATO staff at all levels engage in informal practices on various sites in headquarters in Brussels and in field operations. A study of EU–NATO cooperation as practice focuses on the everyday, patterned production of security as well as what makes action possible, such as (tacit) practical knowledge and shared “background” knowledge (education, training, and experience). The article also discusses the extent to which shared repertoires of practice may evolve into loose communities of practice that cut across organisational and professional boundaries.