EU Crisis Management Research Articles

Chapter One: EU Crisis Management: Ambitions and Achievements

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international community's capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily – its level of ambition – and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements under the ESDP: The EU's Evolving Practice

The conduct of EU military and civilian crisis management operations in third states within the context of the European Security and Defence Policy has presented the EU with new administrative and operational challenges in recent years, including the need to defi ne the international legal position of such operations and their personnel during their presence abroad. In some cases, the EU has entered into agreements with host states to determine the legal status of EU crisis management operations, while in other cases the application of already existing arrangements has been extended to them. The status agreements negoti- ated directly by the EU confer more extensive privileges and immunities on EU operations and their personnel than current international practice in this area would warrant. Despite opposition to this policy within the EU, it has remained in place under the two model status agreements adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2005 to serve as a basis for negotiations with prospective host states in all future EU operations. Even though no norm of international law compels the EU to request only such privileges and immunities as are absolutely necessary for the purposes of an operation, its practice of negotiating extensive privileges and immunities does not sit well with the growing emphasis on the accountabil- ity of peace support operations. This article offers an overview of the evolution of the EU's practice of concluding status agreements in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy and examines the key provisions of the two model status agreements.

THE CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ESDP

AbstractBetween 2002 and 2007, the Council of the European Union has entered into more than 70 international agreements with third parties pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union in order to address various legal and practical matters relating to the conduct of EU crisis management missions in third countries. The purpose of this article is to examine the Council's practice in the implementation of Article 24 of the Treaty and to assess the widely held view that the international agreements concluded under this provision offer conclusive proof of the EU's status as an independent subject of international law. Even though the Council's recent practice does indeed suggest that it concludes international agreements on behalf of the Union as such, this does not lay to rest all uncertainties surrounding the EU's nature as an international legal person.

The EU Status of Forces Agreement: Continuity and Change in the Law of Visiting Forces

The present paper provides a legal analysis of the EU Status of Forces Agreement of 2003 (EU SOFA) in the form of a commentary on its individual provisions. The EU SOFA was signed by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of the EU on 17 November 2003 in the margins of the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in Brussels. The purpose of the Agreement is to define the legal position of the military and civilian personnel, as well as the forces and headquarters, deployed by one Member State of the EU in the territory of another Member State in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). While the EU SOFA is for the most part based on the relevant provisions of the NATO SOFA of 1951, it departs from the text of the NATO SOFA in several key respects. In particular, the drafters of the EU SOFA decided to address the legal position of the different categories of military and civilian personnel operating in the context of the ESDP within the framework of a single agreement, the EU SOFA, rather than follow the precedent set by NATO and define the status of different categories of personnel in separate legal instruments. Accordingly, the EU SOFA is divided into four parts. The first part contains those provisions which apply to all military and civilian personnel covered by the Agreement. The second part applies only to military and civilian personnel seconded by the Member States to the institutions of the EU, while the third part applies to headquarters and forces, as well as the military and civilian personnel working with them. The fourth part of the Agreement consists of the final provisions. Even though the division of the EU SOFA into these four parts constitutes an effective method, in principle, of accommodating the different rules and procedures applicable to different categories of personnel operating in the context of the ESDP, it leads to certain ambiguities in the text. Regrettably, the EU SOFA also fails to adequate distinguish between national contingents acting on behalf of their respective sending States on the one hand and military and civilian personnel acting in an international capacity on behalf of the EU on the other hand. Despite these and other shortcomings, the EU SOFA makes an important contribution to the development of the EU's crisis management capabilities. By addressing some of the key legal and practical questions raised by the presence of military and civilian personnel belonging to the Member States of the EU abroad, the EU SOFA facilitates their transit and temporary deployment throughout the territory of the EU for the purposes of the ESDP. On a more general level, the EU SOFA also confirms the pre-eminent position of the NATO SOFA as a model for multilateral status of forces agreements governing the legal position of visiting forces deployed among politically equal partners.

Organising for Nation Building

As countries and international institutions become increasingly involved in nation-building efforts, committing personnel and resources for prolonged periods of time, they often face major capabili...

Human Rights Aspects of EU Crisis Management Operations: From Nuisance to Necessity

How do we explain under which conditions the EU is likely intervene in one crisis situation and not in another? To what extent have human rights considerations been factored into these operations thus far? This article seeks to answers these questions and describes the decision-making process with respect to EU involvement in crisis management operations and the instruments at the disposal of the EU, with a particular focus on human rights policy. An overview and analysis of current and past civilian and military crisis management operations points to three factors that help to explain EU involvement in crisis situations, namely: norms, interests and institutions. It concludes with suggestions to better integrate human rights into future operations. This article is written in a personal capacity and does not reflect EU positions.

Managing Crises in the EU: Some Reflections of a Non‐EU Scholar

In recent years the EU has been increasingly involved in development and implementation of crisis policy as a component of its development and security policy. This process is seriously complicated by the EU architects, who had never conceived it as a crisis management institute. Therefore they failed to design built‐in organisational capacities into the Union to mitigate and respond to crises. In addition, the EU‐agreed overarching concept of crisis as such and EU crisis in particular is missing. Both issues remain a primary question on research and policy agendas. Provided below are some of the author's considerations and comments on these issues. It is argued that, despite the existing divergence in crisis interpretations in the EU, coherent conceptualisation is possible and approaches to this are introduced. Practical implications of generic crisis conceptualisation for EU crisis management policy are analysed. Within this context three major lessons from international experience, including that from the USA and Russia, are emphasised. These concern the issues of organisational flexibility, learning from earlier major crises and comprehensive training of crisis decision units critical for efficient crisis management policy.

Understanding EU Crisis Decision‐making: The Case of Chechnya and the Finnish Presidency

Why did the European Union accept a limited policy risk by adopting sanctions against a difficult target, Russia, in the Chechnya conflict and what does this case tell about the EU's crisis management practice? The explanation of the decision is based on problem framing, the exertion of power and the justifications of decision‐making. The analysis shows that occasionally the Union may adopt a bold policy, if a situation is framed as a grave crisis, a strong leadership of large members emerges advocating a firm response and pressures of public opinion preclude passivity; in addition, the policy is considered justified by groupthink based on anticipation, by institutional arguments as well as lessons learnt, which are likely to lead to stronger commitments. Yet the policy is likely to be a bounded one because of constraining values and goals, previous institutional commitments and practices, countervailing policy lessons and rational recognition of the Union's limited influence. Moreover, a bold policy may prove to be inconsistent over time. As a rule the pivotal role of large EU members, established practices as well as the decentralisation and consensus‐seeking tendencies combine to limit the Union's crisis response to a restricted and supporting diplomatic and economic role. The ongoing efforts to enhance the EU's crisis management capacity are yet to change significantly these habitual patterns.

Partnership for peace: The sine qua non for Irish participation in regional peacekeeping

The Irish government entered Partnership for Peace (PfP) in December 1999, five years after the Partnership was founded. This article seeks to demonstrate the reasons for that decision, and in particular to illustrate the importance for Ireland of participation in PfP, as a forum for preparing countries to participate in regional peacekeeping under NATO or the EU/WEU. Evidence to support the importance of PfP is drawn from the changing nature of peacekeeping and NATO involvement in this field, the involvement of the continental neutrals in PfP, the importance of interoperability through the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of PfP and the link between PARP and planning for EU crisis management missions. It is also argued that the preponderance of evidence about the value of PfP helped to overcome the domestic inertia in the Irish debate on PfP and neutrality. Membership has helped both to marginalize the issue of neutrality internationally and to highlight domestic constraints of personnel and equipment in view of Ireland's wish to play a role in European security structures.

A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union

Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which amends the treaty on European Union, establishes that the Western European Union shall provide the European Union with access to an operational capability for “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.” Making reference to 1992 WEU Petersberg Declaration, these tasks are commonly known as Petersberg operations. This provision constitutes the integration of a part of the “WEU acquis” into the framework of the European Union, even though there is no institutional integration between the two organizations or legal interweave between their constituents treaties. The decision-making mechanism for Petersberg operations must be considered in relation to the new CFSP set of acts and it involves considerable interplay between the European Council, the Council and the WEU Council of Ministers. Several problems might arise from the different voting systems of these institutions and a specific question is posed by the more restricted composition of the WEU with respect to the EU, namely the five EU member States which are not fully-fledged WEU members. The development of an EU crisis management capability could have several positive consequences, both on an inter-European level and externally.