EU Constitution Research Articles

「民生パワー」概念の再検討

The EC/EU has evolved as an international actor, or rather as one of the ‘great powers’ over the issue of peace and international security. This article asks what kind of actor or power the EC/EU has been since the 1970s, with special reference to EC/EU policy towards Saddam Hussein's Iraq (1979-2003).In 1972, François Duchêne described the EC as a ‘civilian power’ in discussing ‘Europe's role in world peace’. The new concept of civilian power was introduced as different from the traditional concept of military power. The EC behaved as a significant actor in external economic affairs. However, the international setting in which the EC developed its international identity changed from the East-West détente to the new Cold War. In 1982, Hedley Bull harshly criticised the notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ as a contradiction in terms, because the EC had yet to be an international actor and because the influence exerted by ‘civilian’ European states was ‘conditional upon a strategic environment by the military power of states’. From the perspectives of ‘the return to power politics’ of the 1980s, Bull was rather advocating a ‘Western European military alliance’. As the Cold War was ending and the EC was transforming into the EU with CFSP, the concept of civilian power re-emerged. Christopher Hill and William Wallace discussed the ‘actorness’ of the EU, which ‘requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy’.Section One of this article examines the conceptual history of ‘civilian power’ from the 1970s to the 1990s. Section Two attempts to apply the concept to EC/EU policy towards Iraq: from Saddam's inauguration in July 1979, through the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-88, the Gulf conflict in 1990-91 and the Operation Desert Fox in 1998, to the de facto collapse of Saddam's regime in April 2003. The EC/EU became deeply involved with the issues revolving around Iraq: oil, hostages/terrorism, economic sanctions, arms transfer, UN peace-keeping, logistical and financial assistance to the US-led multilateral forces, and the issue of a continued UN inspection or a war.The Iraq War broke out in March 2003. International society would effectively disarm Saddam of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and change his undemocratic regime. Some Americans might well be overwhelmed with a success. It would however be naïve to conclude that the EU did not play any role in pre-war and post-war Iraq. At least two significant issues remained in Iraq, the Gulf region and the world: the establishment of a truly international regime of WMD non-proliferation and the promotion of democracy with little use of military force. In terms of capabilities, the EU collectively may still be a civilian power. In terms of expectations, the EU would cease to be such a power. With ten new members joining the EU and with a EU constitution and CSDP in sight, however, the concept of civilian power Europe should be more sophisticated and more effective in describing and analysing EU diplomacy. This must also be the lasting task of European integration theory.

Citizens Should Vote on Secession

Abstract The draft treaty establishing a constitution for the European Union states that each member state may withdraw from the European Union following its own constitutional requirements. We argue that such a rule could lead into an increased use of threat of withdrawal to extract concessions in intergovernmental negotiations. This problem would be exacerbated by national electorates facing an incentive to elect more confrontational politicians. We also suggest a remedy: EU constitution should require that withdrawal from EU membership must be approved by the voters of the withdrawing member state in a referendum.

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting from EU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe. Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gains from trade and specialization for all countries involved, it does so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state. This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe. In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible, the introduction of delayed integration of working migrants and the home country principle for nonworking migrants is a rational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution, which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union, should be amended accordingly. (JEL E 2, F 2, H 0, J 3, J 6)

The Variable Subject of the EU Constitution, Civil Liberties and Human Rights

The Variable Subject of the EU Constitution, Civil Liberties and Human Rights

Postavení České republiky v institucionální struktuře Evropské unie

Text se snaží identifikovat předpokládanou pozici České republiky jako budoucího členského státu Evropské unie od Amsterdamské smlouvy po Evropskou ústavu. Studie analyzuje specifika institucionálního trojúhelníku EU a sleduje jeho kvalitativní a kvantitativní změny. Hodnotí odhadovanou českou pozici po mezivládních konferencích z let 1996 a 2000, včetně ústavní situace v ČR po implementaci přístupové smlouvy a diskusi o návrhu ústavy EU. Speciální pozornost věnuje české pozici v EU s ohledem na Smlouvu z Nice ve srovnání s Ústavou EU. V závěru podává obecný přehled českého postavení v Radě Evropské unie za účelem demonstrace proměny schopností české delegace během procesu rozšiřování.

Some Comments on the Draft EU Constitution's Exit Proposal

This paper comments on the secession provision of the European Union's draft constitution. The author suggests changes to the language of the current draft that would better protect the rights of individuals who live in a nation that is a member of the EU.

The draft EU constitution: Still a work in progress

The draft EU constitution: Still a work in progress

Process, Responsibility and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism

This paper it looks at some of the normative questions which frame debates about the EU constitutional architecture. Its main objective is to identify the core facets of a ‘responsible and inclusive EU constitutionalism’, and to argue for a focus on process, freedom, fairness and democracy as well as formal constitution–building within the debates inside and outside the Convention running up to the Intergovernmental Conference anticipated for 2003/2004. A model using the work of Canadian political theorist James Tully is constructed. The paper applies this framework in order to analyse some aspects of the work of the Convention on the Future of the Union, looking especially at questions of autonomy, representativity, internal dynamics, deliberation, receptiveness, and decision–making. The interim conclusion is drawn that the Convention method contains within itself the seeds of a critical and reflexive approach to EU constitutionalism.

The Draft EU Constitution—First Impressions

The convention on the Future of Europe, which came together in the spring of 2002, completed its work in June 2003. In the event, the various tasks that were set for the Convention by the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 on the Future of the European Union came to be subsumed in the overall task of devising a Constitution for the Union. A sufficient degree of consensus was achieved by the Convention to enable its President, Mr Valery Giscard d’Estaing, to present the outcome of the deliberations of the past 15 months, in the form of a Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, to the European Council of Thessaloniki. So it is through the proposed Constitutional Treaty (referred to hereinafter as ‘the Convention text’) that the specific objectives identified in the Nice and Laeken Declarations, such as those of re-legitimating the Union order and rendering the primary law of the Union more comprehensible to its subjects, now fall to be achieved.

The Draft EU Constitution—First Impressions

The convention on the Future of Europe, which came together in the spring of 2002, completed its work in June 2003. In the event, the various tasks that were set for the Convention by the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 on the Future of the European Union came to be subsumed in the overall task of devising a Constitution for the Union. A sufficient degree of consensus was achieved by the Convention to enable its President, Mr Valery Giscard d’Estaing, to present the outcome of the deliberations of the past 15 months, in the form of a Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, to the European Council of Thessaloniki. So it is through the proposed Constitutional Treaty (referred to hereinafter as ‘the Convention text’) that the specific objectives identified in the Nice and Laeken Declarations, such as those of re-legitimating the Union order and rendering the primary law of the Union more comprehensible to its subjects, now fall to be achieved.

The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union

This article focuses on the contrast between what is referred to as ‘traditional EU constitutionalism’ and ‘new governance’. It begins by outlining this contrast, and describing the basic elements of traditional EU constitutionalism in the context of the recent workings of the Convention on the Future of Europe. The notion of new governance and in particular the origins, spread and significance of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a means of policy-making in the EU are then explained, and the strengths and weaknesses of the OMC briefly outlined. The final section considers how the problems of new governance might be addressed in the context of a renewal of the European constitutional model, and the disappointing results of the Convention in this respect are appraised.

Constitution of the EU — the need or a dream?

Constitution of the EU — the need or a dream?

Open coordination against poverty: the new EU `social inclusion process'

Until the mid 1990s, the notion of Social Europe was primarily associated with the introduction of binding supranational rules aimed at safeguarding and possibly upgrading the social protection systems of the Member States. The political and institutional obstacles to such kind of rules were well known in practice and well understood in theory - especially in the wake of the negative vs. positive integration debate. But 'hard law' seemed to be the only effective strategy of action, given the low impact of weaker institutional tools such as recommendations, on the one hand, and the growing incentives for 'social dumping' generated by the completion of the internal market, on the other hand. The second half of the 1990s witnessed a gradual change of climate and perspective. Binding legislation continued to be seen as a very important ingredient of Europe's social dimension: indeed the debate on fundamental rights and on a possible fully-fledged EU constitution shifted the front of legal ambitions even further. But at the same time another strategy of policy intervention started to be considered and experimented with, resting on a complex mix of soft institutional ingredients, endowed with a strong potential of conditioning the direction of change at the national level. Originally applied in the area of employment, this new approach was then extended to other policy sectors - and most notably, policies to combat social exclusion - under the name of 'open method of coordination' (OMC), coined during the Portuguese Presidency in 2000. The main institutional ingredients of the OMC are common guidelines, national action plans, peer reviews, joint evaluation reports and recommendations. None of such instruments has a binding character, underpinned by legal enforcement powers. Moreover, while providing policy actors with a relatively clear agenda, the mix of these ingredients leaves ample room

EU憲法秩序の形成とニース条約

EU憲法秩序の形成とニース条約

An EU constitution and federalism after nice: A new chance or requiem for a myth?

An EU constitution and federalism after nice: A new chance or requiem for a myth?

Process and Constitutional Discourse in the European Union

The paper presents a three‐step approach to key constitutional issues in the European Union. The first step introduces the main descriptive elements of EU constitutionalism, highlighting some of the principal fields in which constitutional debate is presently clustering. Step two elaborates upon the tensions within EU constitutionalism by presenting a conceptual approach focusing upon the ‘postnational’ and procedural questions. Finally, in the third step, the paper sets out examples in order to demonstrate how the conceptual framework fits more closely with the emerging empirical reality of EU constitutional practices. It focuses upon events surrounding the inter‐governmental conferences at which amendments to the EU treaties are agreed by the member states. The aim of the paper is to locate some of the tensions and relations which hold EU constitutionalism in place, rather than to capture its ?”essence?•.

10.2307/3505103

10.2307/3505103

Postnational constitutionalism in the European Union

The article re-examines the heritage of EU constitutionalism, working from the classic notion of the 'constitutionalization of the treaties' towards a contemporary notion of postnational constitutionalism in the emerging EU polity in which the role of law is problematized. It develops a process-based and non-teleological conception of EU constitutionalism, drawing on the work of Tully and Bankowski/ Christodoulidis. In the article, constitutionalism is deployed as a discursive and dialogic notion, involving the process of accommodating diverse interests within society. The EU itself is understood as contested and contestable in terms of its evolution, and it is suggested that the open-textured concept of postnationalism can usefully capture some of its sui generis elements. Postnational constitutionalism implies, in the EU context, more than designing a good EU constitution, but rather a reconceptualization of the key principles and processes on which constitutionalism must reside.

Voting Power under the EU Constitution

Decision making rules in the EU Council of Ministers need to be revised in light of enlargements since 1958. Under the qualified majority rules, the more countries join, the less the voting power of the large states, leading necessarily to coalition-building process, two possible examples of which are described. The situation would be less paradoxical if the EU were to adopt a single rule, the simple majority vote.