EU Africa Research Articles

The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali the Consistency of the EU Africa policy

The EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis offers a good opportunity to assess the consistency of the EU’s Africa [Africa as used here refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—the region of the EU’s most extensive external policy] policy in the post-Lisbon era. Against the background of the EU’s external policy objectives with special reference to SSA, this Article will particularly offer a comprehensive overview of the legal and policy dynamics of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This will be discussed especially with reference to how they relate to (in)consistency in implementation as illustrated in the EU’s role in the recent Mali crisis. Although the EU initially made a decision to deploy an EU Training Mission to Mali, the EU did not activate the peacekeeping dimension of the CSDP as required at an advanced stage of the crisis. Instead, this gap was filled by France’s unilateral military intervention in Mali. The EU’s inertia in this regard raises the question of the consistency of its external policy instruments and policy objectives towards the region. Without excluding other possible contributing factors, the analysis submits that the ‘partial’ activation of the CSDP in Mali is mainly attributable to the constitutional specificity of the CSDP especially its lack of permanent and planning conduct structures. In any event, it is argued that these do not render the EU’s role in Mali less inconsistent both in the light of the relevant EU external policy instruments and objectives towards SSA in general, and in the light of the CSDP objectives in particular. In general, the Article uses Mali as a case study to illustrate the extent and therefore the limits of the consistency of the EU’s CSDP and its overall policy towards SSA especially post-Lisbon. Whilst acknowledging the current limits of the law in this context, the Article nevertheless argues that the dire implications of inconsistency for the effectiveness of the EU’s policies and for the credibility of the Union make a search for practical, if not legal solutions, a political imperative. This is necessary especially if the EU wants to protect or indeed rebuild its credibility as an international actor in general, and as an effective partner for crisis management in SSA, in particular [The EU’s credibility in much of the African Caribbean and Pacific states, especially SSA is reportedly already at an all-time low (Mackie J et al. in Policy Manag Insights ECDPM 2, 2010)].

EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU–Africa Relations

This article examines regionalism in the context of the EU inter-regional relations with Africa. It especially focuses on the EU–African Union (AU) relationship. It evaluates this relationship using a typology based on the policy diffusion literature and challenges the notion that the AU is a model of the EU. It addresses the institutionalisation of Africa’s own regional integration process in the context of the EU’s broader external relations practice, which prioritises support for local processes. Rather than a model, the article argues that the EU is best placed to serve as mentor to the AU as the latter seeks to foster regional integration in Africa. By mentoring, the EU is able to fulfil its overarching external relations commitments to local ownership, and realise deepened further integration in Africa.

Analyzing the effect of biofuel expansion on land use in major producing countries: evidence of increased multiple cropping

AbstractEstimates on impacts of biofuel production often use models with limited ability to incorporate changes in land use, notably cropping intensity. This review studies biofuel expansion between 2000 and 2010 in Brazil, the USA, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Mozambique, South Africa plus 27 EU member states. In 2010, these countries produced 86 billion litres of ethanol and 15 billion litres of biodiesel. Land use increased by 25 Mha, of which 11 Mha is associated with co‐products, i.e. by‐products of biofuel production processes used as animal feed. In the decade up to 2010, agricultural land decreased by 9 Mha overall. It expanded by 22 Mha in Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mozambique, some 31 Mha was lost in the USA, the EU, and South Africa due to urbanization, expansion of infrastructure, conversion into nature, and land abandonment. Increases in cropping intensity accounted for 42 Mha of additional harvested area. Together with increased co‐product availability for animal feed, this was sufficient to increase the net harvested area (NHA, crop area harvested for food, feed, and fiber markets) in the study countries by 19 Mha. Thus, despite substantial expansion of biofuel production, more land has become available for non‐fuel applications. Biofuel crop areas and NHA increased in most countries including the USA and Brazil. It is concluded that biofuel expansion in 2000–2010 is not associated with a decline in the NHA available for food crop production. The increases in multiple cropping have often been overlooked and should be considered more fully in calculations of (indirect) land‐use change (iLUC). © 2013 Society of Chemical Industry and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

How Not To Sell Electric Vehicles

vehicles (EVs). Governments all over were chorusing to the same tune. United States President Barack Obama pledged to put 1 mn EVs on the roads by 2015. German Chancellor Angela Merkel envisioned the same for Germany by 2020. The Chinese government gives out lavish subsidies of up to RMB 60,000 ($ 9,684) for buyers of pure EVs and in India, the Prime Minister unveiled the National Electric Mobility Mission Plan (NEMMP) that lays the roadmap for 7 mn full range EVs (including two-wheelers) to be on the road by 2020. The same overture is also heard in Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, South Africa and several EU member states. However, just two years after Obama made his significant address, the sales figures show that the consumers are blatantly ignoring the loud symphony of the EV choir. Our forecasting partner, LMC Automotive, projects that global sales of hybrid and EVs are expected to be less than 2 mn passenger units in 2013, or only about 2.9 % of global passenger vehicle sales. Going forward, growth of New Energy vehicles is expected to increase at a sluggish pace, especially for pure EVs. Hybrids outsell EVs by 14:1 today, and hybrids are forecast to still outsell EVs by nearly 4:1 by 2020. By 2020, combined global sales of hybrids and EVs are expected to reach 4.2 mn passenger car units, or just 4.5 % of global passenger vehicle sales, of which EVs make up only 1 %. Needless to say, that is not an impressive figure for a technology that many governments around the world are banking on. The Obama administration, meanwhile, has recently come out to recognise that his ambitious vision may be a misfire. So what went wrong? A myriad of reasons have been offered such as limited driving range, lack of charging infrastructure for EVs and, of course, the price premium placed on this technology forerunner. Of the host of reasons, let’s focus on the selling dynamics of the EVs. Findings from our studies globally have put a light on reasons, why the consumers aren’t biting. Learning from the selling experiences of the EV bastions will provide some direction on how the Indian automakers can (or not) market EVs to the consumers here.

Shares Differences of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Calculated with GTP and GWP for Major Countries

The global warming potential (GWP) and global temperature potential (GTP) are two common metrics to calculate the CO2equivalent of greenhouse gases (GHGs). If the country’s GHG emissions are calculated with GTP instead of GWP, the shares of the EU, USA, Japan, Canada and South Africa rise in the period 1990–2005, and those of Brazil, Australia, China, India, Mexico and Russia decrease. From 2015 to 2030, the projected shares of the EU, USA, Japan and China will increase, but those of Russia, Canada, Australia, India, Mexico and Brazil will decrease. The reduced shares of Brazil and Australia and increased share of the EU might be one of the important reasons that Brazil and Australia suggested to adopt GTP instead of GWP as early as possible, but the EU opposed it. CitationWang, C.-K., X.-Z. Luo, and H. Zhang, 2013: Shares differences of greenhouse gas emissions calculated with GTP and GWP for major countries. Adv. Clim. Change Res., 4(2), doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2013.127.

Deep Integration in north–south relations: compatibility issues between the EU and South Africa

Deep Integration (DI), defined as the abolishment of ‘behind the border’ trade restrictions, has been a major focus of activity within the European Union. More recently, Deep Integration has also been included in the negotiations of new bilateral and regional trade agreements. This paper chooses the current EU–South Africa negotiations as a case study and argues that these tendencies may become a dangerous restriction for the economic policy space of the South African government. We will discuss selected issues of Deep Integration projects – in particular corporate governance and competition policies – with a ‘comparative capitalism’ framework as the analytical backdrop. [Intégration forte dans les relations nord-sud: questions de compatibilité entre l'UE et l'Afrique du Sud.] L'intégration forte, définie comme la suppression des restrictions commerciales au-delà des frontières, a été un objectif majeur au sein de l'Union européenne (UE). Plus récemment, l'intégration forte a également été incluse dans les négociations de nouveaux accords commerciaux bilatéraux et régionaux. Cet article a choisi les négociations actuelles entre l'UE et l'Afrique du Sud comme cas d'étude et soutient que ces tendances pourraient devenir une restriction dangereuse aux marges de manœuvre du gouvernement sud-africain. Certaines questions relatives à des projets d'intégration forte seront discutées – en particulier la gouvernance des entreprises et les politiques de concurrence – le cadre analytique choisi étant le contexte d'un « capitalisme comparé ». Mots-clés : intégration forte; capitalisme comparé; relations nord–sud; gouvernance des entreprises; politique de la concurrence

Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power’

‘Normative power’ is an increasingly popularised concept in the study of EU external relations in fields including military policy, human rights, and international trade. Defined by Manners, it acknowledges the normative foundations of the European project, examines how Europe acts to (re)shape internationally accepted norms, and makes the claim that Europe ought to influence external partners' conception of ‘normal’ behaviour in pursuit of a just global order. This article, however, argues that a moral economy perspective is central to a critical reorientation of the concept of normative power towards appraisal of discrepancies between nominal EU norms and material EU policy outcomes. Examining Europe's ‘normative power’ in its relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, it demonstrates how a moral economy of ACP–EU ties has been instituted in negotiation with European ethical norms as to solidarity with ‘the poor’. Nevertheless, the moral economy of ACP–EU ties is seen not to be ‘moral’ in terms of outcomes for vulnerable citizens in ACP countries. Rather the embedding of moral norms concerning pro-poor ‘development’ has rationalised asymmetric economic ties. ‘Normative power’ is understood as the EU's utilisation of moral norms in the public legitimisation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gain in its relations with external ‘partners’.

Dispatches

Dispatches

European development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa

This article examines the impact of the growing Chinese presence in Africa on the EU’s international role and more particularly on European development policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. The Chinese Africa policy is based on fundamentally different principles than the European model with regard to sovereignty and aid conditionality, offering an alternative to the dominant European approach. In this article we will argue that, although the European development model towards sub-Saharan Africa has never been entirely in line with its proclaimed principles, the “China factor” contributes to an adaptation of this European policy towards a more pragmatic and less normative strategy. Yet, this does not imply a complete overhaul of the European normative discourse which is still the most important source of legitimacy of the European development policy. It does however highlight the importance of an open and honest dialogue between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa, in particular on the merits of the European model for the development of the region and its countries.

Improving Africa’s benefit from space applications: The European–African partnership

There is little overview of how space applications are utilized by African actors and how cooperation between Africa and Europe is organized and conducted. This article aims briefly to provide such an overview and concretely to make recommendations for institutional actors in European–African partnerships on the use of space applications for sustainable development. The Africa–EU partnership is analysed from a political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal standpoint and respective policy recommendations are drafted on this basis. No other continent can benefit more from space applications than Africa. It will be partnerships like the one between Europe and Africa that will be crucial for realizing this great potential.

Private sector development as poverty and strategic discourse: PSD in the political economy of EU–Africa trade relations

ABSTRACTPrivate sector development (PSD) has emerged as a core component of donor strategies aimed at making free markets work for ‘the poor’ through assistance to business sector capacity in low-income states. PSD initiatives cannot be understood, however, as technical exercises aimed solely at promoting development through business competitiveness. Instead they serve as normative concessions through which developmentally questionable market-opening has been rationalised by donors in pursuit of lucrative commercial opportunities in emerging economies. Examining the European Union's (EU) PSD framework in bilateral relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, the article examines the utilisation of PSD discourse in the ‘development branding’ of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). PSD discourse is seen to facilitate a ‘double-veiling’ of asymmetric ACP–EU trade ties via legitimising images of equitable market-opening and the trickle-down of business wealth to ‘the poor’. Nevertheless, the reality of reciprocal trade structures combined with Europe's anaemic PSD resources bears little resemblance to the strategic illusions of PSD. In particular, the interventions of Europe's Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) in cotton and textiles sectors in East Africa are seen to have dubious outcomes for ‘development’ in ACP former colonies.

AFRICA–EU: Third Summit

AFRICA–EU: Third Summit

AFRICA–EU: Brussels Conference

Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical SeriesVolume 47, Issue 9 p. 18827C-18828B AFRICA–EU: Brussels Conference First published: 02 November 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2010.03480.xCitations: 1Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume47, Issue9November 2010Pages 18827C-18828B RelatedInformation

The Problematics of the EU's Ethical (Self)Image in Africa: The EU as an ‘Ethical Intervener’ and the 2007 Joint Africa–EU Strategy

Against the background of decades of limitedly successful Western international state-building efforts and in light of the recent heightened attention to (state-building in) Africa, this study investigates the feasibility of less international involvement instead of more. To make such assessment convincingly, the involvement needs to be identified as counterproductive to the achievement of peaceful well-functioning societies, and the counter-productivity is to be located in the involvement as such and not just linked to its defective implementation. To this effect, this paper proposes the conceptual framework of the EU as an ‘Ethical Intervener’ as an instrument to deconstruct the EU's well-intended Africa policies into the mechanisms (‘Inequality Mechanism’ and ‘Intervener-Centric Mechanisms’) that are potentially detrimental to the achievement of these ethical goals. The conceptual framework is applied to some of the defining policy documents in EU–Africa relations of the last decade, thus incorporating the most recent developments such as the focus on the principles of ownership, equality and partnership. In conclusion, we reflect on the feasibility of less international involvement by differentiating between the avoidable and unavoidable problematics in today's state-building efforts.

EurAfrica: Strengthening the Special Relationship

The increasing number of agreements between the EU and African states reveals a trend toward a ‘One Europe, One Africa’ policy. The EU has gained from the Lisbon Treaty new competencies for independent external action, and coordination on Africa policy has increased in the Council, mainly due to convergence between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. However, EU policy towards Africa still lacks coherence and direction and many EU Member States still privilege bilateral links with African countries. There is still an opportunity for the EU to increase its ‘actorness’ in Africa. First, the EU should take advantage of the economic crisis to create new institutional links between the EU and Africa. Second, the EU should focus on its visibility and act to strengthen private and civil society ties. Despite weaknesses, there are clear indications that the coherence of the EU's Africa policy is improving.

Towards an Effective Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security: Rhetoric or Facts?

Peace and security are a key dimension of the Joint Africa--EU Strategy, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007. In view of its revision in 2010, a series of shortcomings and some successes can be identified in relation to four main strategic objectives: enhancing the political dialogue on common threats, building a global security partnership, promoting a people-centred approach, ensuring coordination among instruments and resources. In order to make the new peace and security partnership work, the EU is now called upon to address both external and internal challenges: supporting the development of effective African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, promoting better governance and transparency standards on the continent and establishing a common EU Africa policy.

How comparable is so-called standard fracture fixation with an identical implant? A prospective experience with the antegrade femoral nail in South Africa and Europe

Background The utilisation and consequences of standardised operative procedures may importantly differ between different healthcare systems. This is the first investigation comparing the treatment and outcome of femoral shaft fractures stabilised with an identical implant between trauma centres in 2 continents (Europe, EU and South Africa, SA). Methods Following standardised introduction of the technique, the prospective, observational multicentre study enrolled 175 patients who underwent intramedullary fracture fixation using the antegrade femoral nail (AFN) for femoral shaft fractures. Eleven EU hospitals recruited 86 patients and 1 SA centre 89 patients in the study period. Comparison of epidemiologic data, operative characteristics as well as subjective (e.g., pain, SF-36) and objective (e.g., X-ray, range of motion [ROM]) 3-month and 1-year outcomes were performed ( p < 0.05). Results Compared to EU centres, several significant differences were observed in SA: (1) on average, patients operated on were younger, had less concomitant diseases and had more severe open fractures; (2) operative stabilisation was more often undertaken by young, unsupervised residents, with shorter operating and intraoperative fluoroscopy times; (3) mean hospital stay was shorter, with less recorded complications, but a higher loss to follow-up rate. Non- or malunion rates and subjective outcomes were similar for both groups, with the physical component of the SF-36 at the 1-year follow-up not fully restoring to baseline values. Conclusions Our investigation demonstrates the importance of several major differences between 2 different regions of the world in the treatment of femoral shaft fractures, despite involving only high level trauma centres and using an identical implant. The intercontinental comparison of results from clinical studies should be interpreted very carefully considering the heterogeneity of populations and clinical settings.

The EU–Africa Energy Partnership: Towards a mutually beneficial renewable transport energy alliance?

The European Union's EU–Africa Energy Partnership, with respect to its emphasis on transport fuels, aims to ensure that Member States can fulfil agreed upon commitments to sustainable energy via the importation of biomass grown in sub-Saharan Africa. This policy aims to reduce the dependence of developing sub-Saharan nations on fossil-fuels, while ensuring the global proliferation of alternative transport energy generation as a means to combat climate change. Though the policy seems equitable in theory, and indeed mutually beneficial, several important issues arise. The paper examines the EU–Africa Energy Policy in the context of biofuels in particular, with a view to identifying potential flaws and imbalances and making policy recommendations. Aside from establishing critical uncertainties, the study adduces environmental science, historical comparanda and economic theory in order to assess the various threats associated with aspects of the policy, especially in light of previous policies that have stifled the development of sub-Saharan economies. In addition, the paper has substantial relevance to developing and newly industrialized nations in Asia and South America also seeking to invest in biomass cultivation and production.

What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa

This article analyses the ways in which rapidly emerging narratives of EU–UN cooperation in military crisis management are rewriting and re-authorizing European practices of military intervention in Africa. By problematizing the underlying assumptions, this article points to the increasing significance of uncertainties about the location of contemporary political life, the location of ‘crisis management’, and thus to the diverse effects of a crisis management approach to African conflicts. Hence, this article problematizes and challenges a range of powerful normative claims about ‘EU crisis management’. The emerging narratives are practices of knowledge and space that shape EU–Africa relations and that create new spaces of intervention, thus establishing and enabling relations of authority and control. Last, the article discusses briefly how such practices worked in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA (European Forces in Chad and the Central African Republic).

GENERAL: Africa–EU

GENERAL: Africa–EU