Ethiopian Troops Research Articles

SOMALIA: Ethiopian Troops Join AMISOM

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 51, Issue 1 p. 20010A-20010C Military SOMALIA: Ethiopian Troops Join AMISOM First published: 27 February 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2014.05538.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume51, Issue1February 2014Pages 20010A-20010C RelatedInformation

Self-Defence, Intervention by Invitaion, or Proxy War? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia

In late 2006, heavily armed Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia with tacit support of the United States. Subsequently, Ethiopia used two legal justifications for its military intervention, namely, an inherent right of self-defense and an invitation from the transitional government of Somalia. If nothing else, it appears Ethiopia and the United States wanted to seek a casus belli for military intervention against Union of Islamic Courts. This article examines whether the Ethiopian intervention can be justified as an exception to the general prohibition of the use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Theodore M. Vestal. The Lion of Judah in the New World: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Shaping of Americans' Attitude toward Africa. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2011. xv + 231 pp. Photo Essay. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. $44.95. Cloth.

BIOGRAPHY Theodore M. Vestal. The Lion of Judah in New World: Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Shaping of Americans' Attitude toward Africa. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 201 1 . xv + 231 pp. Photo Essay. Notes. Selected Bibliography. Index. $44.95. Cloth. present-day Ethiopia, begins this fascinating book, few know just how popular their monarch was in New World (xi). This is valid observation, but we could also say same about younger generation in present-day America. Compared to situation in past, image of Ethiopia in minds of most Americans is much less positive today, and far fewer Americans have memories of Haile Selassie. Vestal claims that the images of Africa and of Africans that American people developed during Haile Selassie's prominence will no doubt be referred to by historians, psychologists, and sociologist - as well as media - as having played part in election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 (xiii). This claim cannot be determined empirically, but this book is nevertheless invaluable for at least three groups of scholars: experts and students of Africa, comparative historians, and political scientists. For Africanists, it contains rich data about long-reigning monarch in northeast Africa which have either been unknown before or not systematically organized. There is much in book about personality and political instincts of Haile Selassie, especially as they pertain to his foreign policies. Comparative historians will benefit from its accounts of monarch's perspectives on pan-Africanism and collective security. And political scientists will have much to learn here about nuances of relationship between weak state in periphery and rising global power. Clearly many Americans were fascinated by Emperor Haile Selassie. In 1954 New York Times wrote that he was a man of courage, intelligence and great humanity (89), and it printed full text of his speech to joint session of U.S. Congress. In period of less than ten years, Haile Selassie was twice named Time magazine's man of year. American presidents who knew Haile Selassie, too, were unreserved in their praise for African monarch. During his first state visit to U.S. in 1954 Dwight Eisenhower described him as a defender of freedom and supporter of progress (53), and he was appreciative of emperor's decision to send Ethiopian troops to fight alongside Americans in Korea. Harry Truman by and large ignored him, perhaps because relationship between two countries was stable and Truman was preoccupied with emerging challenge from Soviet Union. …

The multifarious interlinked causes of conflict in Somalia and the way forward

This article has identified the factors influencing achievement of sustainable peace in former Italian Somaliland (currently known as Somalia) since 1960. The study was conducted with the objective of establishing the internal and external factors influencing sustainable peace in Somalia. The factors studied are clanism, religion, politics, economy, piracy, and peace agreements, United Nations, United States, Italy, African Union, Al-Qaeda and the Arab League. It also explored possible solutions that could be implemented to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia. The study found that the internal factors of clanism and religion can be positively influenced to bring back peace in Somalia while piracy, politics and the economy were seen to be hindering efforts for sustainable peace. On the external factors the study confirmed that the United Nations has not given enough assistance to Somalis to enable them end the continuous conflict and bring sustainable peace. The study also explored solutions that could lead to sustainable peace; some of the suggested solutions include disarming the outlawed groups and the civilians, unified international support on peace initiatives and strengthening local institutions that could be used as vehicles to peace. In the efforts to achieve sustainable peace the report of this study has recommended that Somalia army should be strengthened to be able to protect its people instead of having foreign armies such as Ethiopian troops and AMISOM. The locals should own the peace processes and the agreements should be made in Somalia instead of holding them in other countries. Key words: Somalia, Conflict, causes, politics, peace.

Rethinking State–building in a Failed State

As warships from a dozen nations patrol the waters off Somalia, trying to stem the piratical tide, the international community is once again trying to rebuild a centralized government in Mogadishu ...

Somalia: Prospects for a Lasting Peace

In June 2006, the forces of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. During the six-month rule by the ICU, Mogadishu became relatively stable, but efforts to bring peace did not lead to a major breakthrough. On 28 December 2006, Ethiopian troops captured Mogadishu with little resistance from the ICU. The Ethiopian intervention has led to more chaos and instability in Somalia over the past two years. In November 2008, the Ethiopian government announced that its forces would pull out of Somalia by the end of 2008. In June 2008, the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group dominated by members of the ICU, signed an agreement in Djibouti mediated by United Nations special envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah. The next phase of the Somali conflict is likely to occur between the ARS and al-Shabaab, a group determined to expand its influence and control beyond Mogadishu. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have intensified their attacks in the Gulf of Aden, carrying out attacks on more than ninety commercial ships and successfully hijacking more than thirty-five ships in 2008. The pirates have earned more than $50 million in ransom payments and have released a number of the ships and crew members. The United States, Russia, India, and several other countries have deployed warships to tackle piracy in the Horn of Africa region, although the problem still persists.

SOMALIA: Ethiopian Troops Withdraw

SOMALIA: Ethiopian Troops Withdraw

II. Ethiopia's Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications

Somalia has been without government since 1991. A transitional government was established in 2004 under the presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf, with the backing of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Arab League and the Inter-governmental Agency for Development (IGAD). The Government sat in Baidoa in southern Somalia from June 2005 until December 2006. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of much of southern and central Somalia, including the capital, Mogadishu, but not Puntland and Somaliland. They declared and tried to establish an Islamic State. Somalis were told to comply with stringent Islamic rules or face harsh punishment. In the meantime, efforts to achieve national reconciliation were ongoing under the auspices of IGAD, though without much success. It was reported that on 20 July 2006 Ethiopian troops crossed into Somalia. Ethiopia only admitted to having military trainers to help the Somali Government (estimated to be 400 military personnel). On 21 July, the UIC declared a ‘holy war’ against Ethiopia. In September 2006 the Somali interim President survived an assassination attempt in Baidoa. On 25 October 2006 Ethiopia said that it was ‘technically at war’ with the Islamic Courts. After few days the UIC claimed to have ambushed and killed Ethiopian troops near the Ethiopian border.1

The AU Standby Force and the Challenge of Somalia

Let us recap. In December 2006, in response to what seemed like the imminent fall of the southern city of Baidoa to the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian troops launched an offensive into Somalia in support of the country’s beleaguered interim federal government. Apparently catching the UIC off-guard, Ethiopian soldiers – backed by tanks, artillery, attack helicopters and fi xed-wing ground attack aircraft – quickly drove the UIC forces out of Mogadishu and most of the territory it had previously occupied. The remnants of the UIC fl ed to a rugged, forested corner of southern Somalia on Kenya’s border.

AFRICOM

The US Department of Defense has announced the establishment of a new combatant command for Africa, dubbed AFRICOM. This is in keeping with the US military's wide range of African operations, including the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa and support for Ethiopian troops in operations in Somalia.

Border Pastoralism in Eastern Sudan

Border Pastoralism in Eastern Sudan

The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36

EVER since its unhappy denouement, Ethiopian crisis has been turned into a kind of morality play. As an example, a review of a recent work on crisis concluded that the verdict of history is likely to confirm [Haile Selassie's] view that invasion of Ethiopia was a crime and policy of Britain and France a foolish and in end pointless betrayal of principles.' Without attempting an analysis of pros and cons of policy of appeasement, which is quite another matter, this essay will try to demonstrate that orthodox judgment on British policy is far too simplistic, ignoring as it does powerful military considerations.2 The clash of Italian and Ethiopian troops at Walwal on undefined frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on December 5, I934, had been seized upon by Mussolini as point of departure for conquest of Ethiopia. Italian intentions were clear as early as February I935, when large forces were dispatched to Eritrea. The British Services came into Ethiopian picture for first time in an important way on July 5, I935. On this day Italo-Ethiopian arbitration commission, meeting at Scheveningen in Netherlands, reached an impasse; it adjourned on ninth sine die. On fifth Sir Maurice Hankey, indispensable secretary of cabinet (as well as of Chiefs of Staff and Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committees), informed service chiefs that prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, wished them to bear in mind military implications of Britain's carrying out requirements of Article i6, sanctions article, of League of Nations Covenant. On July 30 chiefs of staff stated their position: exercise of economic pressure almost invariably lead to war with Italy, as would any steps taken to interrupt Italy's communications