The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-36

Abstract

EVER since its unhappy denouement, Ethiopian crisis has been turned into a kind of morality play. As an example, a review of a recent work on crisis concluded that the verdict of history is likely to confirm [Haile Selassie's] view that invasion of Ethiopia was a crime and policy of Britain and France a foolish and in end pointless betrayal of principles.' Without attempting an analysis of pros and cons of policy of appeasement, which is quite another matter, this essay will try to demonstrate that orthodox judgment on British policy is far too simplistic, ignoring as it does powerful military considerations.2 The clash of Italian and Ethiopian troops at Walwal on undefined frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on December 5, I934, had been seized upon by Mussolini as point of departure for conquest of Ethiopia. Italian intentions were clear as early as February I935, when large forces were dispatched to Eritrea. The British Services came into Ethiopian picture for first time in an important way on July 5, I935. On this day Italo-Ethiopian arbitration commission, meeting at Scheveningen in Netherlands, reached an impasse; it adjourned on ninth sine die. On fifth Sir Maurice Hankey, indispensable secretary of cabinet (as well as of Chiefs of Staff and Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committees), informed service chiefs that prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, wished them to bear in mind military implications of Britain's carrying out requirements of Article i6, sanctions article, of League of Nations Covenant. On July 30 chiefs of staff stated their position: exercise of economic pressure almost invariably lead to war with Italy, as would any steps taken to interrupt Italy's communications