The current conflict in the Horn of Africa is in many respects both regional and global. It is regional in the sense that its major driving forces are embedded in the nature of the states within this region, although this observation looks like an understatement in view of the fact that these states were themselves created by external forces. The conflict has acquired a global dimension, on the other hand, because of the level of the involvement of external actors, particularly the two superpowers. What are the implications of superpower involvement? At the regional level, this conflict directly concerns four countries, namely Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. One major characteristic of these countries is their possession of a certain proportion of the Somali people, something which .most African historians regard as an accident of history. At this particular level of the conflict, the main issues contested are the ideals of self-determination and territorial integrity. The internationalisation of this conflict has, however, transformed it into a platform of East-West competition, involving the US and the Soviet Union with their allies. In the global context, the conflict touches on the economic, ideological, military and strategic interests of the superpowers. Both the US and the Soviet Union define what takes place in the Horn of Africawithin the perimeters of what they view as their national interests. They have often expressed concern for what they term the 'security' of this region but have not clearly defined what constitutes security for this region. Their notions of security, which to the West imply an absence of communism and to the East liberation from capitalism, do not seem to take into consideration the concrete local situation and the real needs of the peoples of this region. Indeed, most western analysts view security in terms of armaments and force levels, associating any challenge to the status quo with 'Soviet expansionism'. They, however, ignore the significance of internal struggles and the nature of production and distribution of wealth in most Third World countries. Yet it is clear that the 1978-9 Iranian revolution had nothing to do with communism and took place in a country that had the best weapons in the Persian Gulf. Even a little earlier, the 1974 Ethiopian revolution had no connection with Moscow. It was a product of the Ethiopian social formation and the Soviet Union moved in only in 1976, two years after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. The lesson these two cases offer is that a serious analysis of security in any region has to take cognisance of internal struggles. Given the internal and external ramifications of the conflict in the Horn, one is tempted to ask: Can the local states resolve their differences without the