1.My doctoral supervisor, John W. Chapman, spent his career analyzing why Western Europe developed an open, prosperous, dynamic society. In one way or another every seminar was about that, with our readings ranging over cultural history, economic history, sociology, social psychology, psychology and, yes, even philosophy. What happened in West?, he would inquire again and again, seeing parts of truth in diverse writings of Douglas North, Clifford Geertz, Zevedei Barbu, Jean Beachler and Fernand Braudel, to name just a very few. In end, he was never able to weave all strands into a narrative that, in his judgment, did justice to problem (or perhaps he glimpsed that it would take over 2000 pages to do so). Deirdre Nansen McCloskey's three-volume work, culminating in Bourgeois equality, is in my view most compelling grand narrative answering Chapman's query to date. I am entirely convinced on critical points: that astonishing betterment since (roughly) 1800 is fundamentally a product of market-tested innovations of open society, and of absolutely critical role of moral and ethical notions of bourgeois dignity and equality. On these and many other matters, I have learned immensely from McCloskey's great work, for which I am deeply grateful.To criticize this polymath's sweeping, learned treatise would seem churlish-and foolish, for there doubtlessly are piles of records and works that show folly of disputing its claims. Yet, despite McCloskey's attractive grand synthesis, I remain unconvinced about some important matters. The heart of my worries concern a puzzle posed by McCloskey's narrative, puzzle of place of virtue in a diverse and open society. From about 500 BCE to about 1790 CE, McCloskey writes, the ethical universe was described in Europe as composed of seven principal virtues, resulting by recombination in hundreds of minor and particular (p. 188).1 And, she continues, Ethical philosophy since sudden decline of virtue ethics in late eighteenth century has focused [....] [on] how we treat other people, which concerns only part of virtue (p. 190). McCloskey realizes, I think, importance of rule-based morality for open society, quoting Milton Friedman on importance of conforming to basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and ethical custom (p. 231). Still, conformity with rules of society is distinct from virtue. The puzzle I wish to address, then, is manifest: liftoff of Great Enrichment coincided with rise of other-concerned rule-based ethics, yet at core of McCloskey's narrative is importance of virtue and character, which faded in ethical philosophy just as Great Enrichment really got going. Perhaps this simply demonstrates how confused philosophical reflection is-abandoning virtue as a core concept in morality just as it was about to change world. Perhaps just as owl of Minerva took off, philosophy focused on poor pigeon of rules of justice. I think not. Certainly a rule-based morality-a social morality based on rules, or social norms, shared by group to which all expect that others will conform-does not itself make for a prosperous, dynamic, open society.2 But I am convinced that we cannot have one without it, and such a morality is more important than a socially recognized set of virtues -which we simply do not have in diverse societies that spurred Great Enrichment. I do not claim that McCloskey entirely overlooks rules of social morality but I believe that because main foil of Bourgeois equality is institutionalist explanations of Douglas North and his coworkers, she tends to underappreciate place of moral and social rules in grounding of an open society.2.2.1. Two well-known lines of reasoning have driven most political philosophers and social scientists away from stress on virtue that characterizes McCloskey's narrative. …
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Jan 1, 2017
Veronika Horielova 
Open Access