Shame in Ethical Discourse:Vichian Echoes in Bernard Williams Daniel Canaris The affinities between the thought of Bernard Williams (1929–2003) and Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) have been well noted by scholars of Vico, who have stressed the similarities in their treatment of sensus communis and the emotions.1 Although Williams rarely cites Vico, the fact that such strong correspondences exist is most likely the result of Williams’ intellectual debt to Isaiah Berlin, who led the revival of interest in Vico’s thought in the second half of the twentieth century.2 This article argues, however, that the points of contact between Vico and Williams run deeper than mere passing resemblances and structure their respective responses to the rationalist assumptions of their contemporaries. Both thinkers eschew reductive attempts to ground human society upon a stable rational foundation and instead insist upon considering the contingencies in which justice emerges. Importantly, the emotions figure prominently in their respective accounts. While theorists before Vico such as Machiavelli and Hobbes had already stressed the constitutive function of emotions, especially that of fear, Vico anticipates Williams by reflecting upon the positive role that shame can play in inculcating stable and enduring ethical principles which fear is unable to provide on its own. Although Vico’s treatment of the mechanisms underlying the experience of shame is rooted in [End Page 76] Neo-Platonic metaphysical assumptions, he nonetheless shares with Williams an appreciation that shame is not merely a heteronomous emotion predicated upon the expectations of others and the fear of discovery. Vico describes how primitive man, in a complete isolation and asociality, was able to experience shame through the perceived disapprobation of an imagined deity. This account of Vico’s is then related to Williams’ awareness of the potential of an internalised “imagined observer” in instilling shame. In his groundbreaking Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams laments that there has been a general failure to move beyond reductionism, that is to say, the perceived necessity to legitimize ethical discourse by hinging it upon “an Archimedean point.”3 For Williams, philosophers have been unwilling to embrace the diversity of ethical experience and have instead sought to identify singular notions as the constitutive principle of ethics. In his view, this reductionist orientation of modern moral philosophy is an eccentricity because the nature and scope of other forms of philosophy and intellectual inquiry have for the most part long been modulated under the recognition that philosophy is unable to provide definitive answers to even the most basic questions.4 The reluctance of the modern moral philosopher to part with this reductionist orientation is seen in part as an expression of the fear that, without such a foundation, ethics would necessarily give way to a scepticism whereby ethical notions would lose their injunctive force. Williams seeks to demonstrate that such fears, however deeply entrenched in our modes of philosophising, are misplaced as they erroneously presuppose that ethical scepticism is a “natural state.” While it may be theoretically possible to conceive of individuals who, unmoved by the rational appeals to moral conduct, isolate themselves from human society and reject all moral strictures, in reality for the vast majority of individuals, it is virtually impossible to completely suspend ethical judgements.5 Thus Williams asserts that, as we all participate in an ethical world of some sort, it is a mistake to assume that moral philosophy should be articulated as if its intended audience were otherwise deprived of all ethical notions.6 The aim of moral philosophy, therefore, should not necessarily be that of providing a justification to an amoral person of adhering to [End Page 77] ethical principles. Indeed, even if we were to suppose that our audience were completely amoral, Williams doubts that a lasting ethical agreement could ever be reached. It might prove difficult to even discuss ethics with an individual who is completely amoral as we have no grounds upon which we can trust our amoral interlocutor. If we were to assume that this trust could be engendered by some sort of cataclysmic external event that makes it in the immediate self-interest of the amoral interlocutor to reach some form of ethical agreement with us, the integrity...
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Mar 1, 2023
Hallvard Lillehammer 
Open Access
