From Scepticism to Liberalism? Bernard Williams, the Foundations of Liberalism and Political Realism

Paul Sagar

doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12173

Abstract

Bernard Williams was an ethical sceptic, but he was also a proponent of liberalism. To what extent can one finally be both? This article explores this question through a particular emphasis on Williams, but seeks to draw wider lessons regarding what ethical scepticism should and should not amount to. It shows how ethical scepticism can be reconciled with a commitment to what Williams, following Judith Shklar, called ‘the liberalism of fear’, which is revealed as an ecumenical outlook for different stripes of ethical sceptic. The article concludes by drawing some lessons for the recent ‘realist’ turn in political theory.

Highlights

After examining Williams’s account of the liberalism of fear I return to the question of ethical scepticism and suggest that Williams is best read as offering an alternative to Hume, while rejecting a more thoroughgoing scepticism that might be considered
While Williams’s ethical scepticism differed from the Humean outlook, and from a stronger sceptical view associated with the younger Nietzsche, his political philosophy remains open to all these camps, regardless of disagreements over what follows from believing that our values lack ultimate support
Conclusions for Political Realism The recent growth of interest in political realism has to a large extent derived from sympathy with Williams’s insistence that political philosophy should reject political moralism as a misunderstanding of what both political theory and political practice must properly be

Summary

Introduction

After examining Williams’s account of the liberalism of fear I return to the question of ethical scepticism and suggest that Williams is best read as offering an alternative to Hume, while rejecting a more thoroughgoing scepticism that might be considered. Examining matters at this point allows us to appreciate Williams’s central suggestion that it is a serious mistake to think that there is any separate, second-order level of critical reflection with potentially destabilising implications for ethical and/or political practices tout court.

Results

Conclusion