Over the past few decades, a number of philosophers, psychologists, and other scholars have used the concept of narrative as a basis for thinking about personal identity and ethical responsibility. It has been argued that, ethically, we should strive to achieve the unity that we discover in creating narratives about our lives. More recently, critical reactions to narrative theories have taken the form of a specific anti-narrative discourse. This article presents arguments in defense of the theory of narrative identity, based on the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, in whose thinking narrative is a central concept. The presented study defends the thesis that narrative identity is not an arbitrary contingent mental construct, but is necessarily present in human existence and is associated with the hermeneutic understanding of man as a temporary being capable of reflexive activity, constructing meanings, assessments, and goals. It is argued that narrative identity theory successfully addresses the problem of personal identity and the related question of the ethical responsibility of the subject by creating a narrative unity of the life project of an individual, in which the interrelationship between the concepts of personal identity, narration and evaluation is built. Section 1 analyses MacIntyre's concept of narrative and explains its significance for solving the problem of personal identity. Section 2 explicates the key characteristics of narrative identity: holisticity, intelligibility, teleology and the principle of self-care; it also provides responses to the criticisms of opponents who oppose the narrative concept of personal identity. Section 3 presents arguments in defence of Taylor's assertion that the ethical horizon of our existence presupposes the desire for narrative unity of the individual.
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