Essential Facilities Doctrine Research Articles

The “Essential Facility” Doctrine: Legal Limits and Antitrust Considerations

The essential facility doctrine provides a basis for imposing antitrust liability for a firm's refusal to provide a rival access to something “essential” for competition in a particular market. For marketers, development of this legal doctrine seems curiously at odds with accepted notions of competition and strategic advantage. Its increasing application suggests its importance. The authors trace the origins of the doctrine from law relating to refusals to deal and analyze its current application in the Federal judiciary. They then discuss implications for public policy and marketing.

Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?

Previous articleNext article No AccessTerminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?David Reiffen, and Andrew N. KleitDavid Reiffen Search for more articles by this author , and Andrew N. Kleit Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 33, Number 2Oct., 1990 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467212 Views: 13Total views on this site Citations: 21Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1990 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Marissa Beck, Fiona Scott Morton Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers, Review of Industrial Organization 59, no.22 (Aug 2021): 273–302.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-021-09832-zThomas Nachbar Platform Effects, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2021).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3775205Nikolas Guggenberger The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the Digital Economy: Dispelling Persistent Myths, SSRN Electronic Journal 13 (Jan 2021).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802559Marissa Beck, Fiona M. Scott Morton Evaluating the Evidence on Vertical Mergers, SSRN Electronic Journal 14 (Jan 2020).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554073Catherine Tucker Digital Data, Platforms and the Usual [Antitrust] Suspects: Network Effects, Switching Costs, Essential Facility, Review of Industrial Organization 54, no.44 (Feb 2019): 683–694.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-019-09693-7Catherine E. Tucker Digital Data, Platforms and the Usual [Antitrust] Suspects: Network Effects, Switching Costs, Essential Facility, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2019).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3326385Albert J. Churella Delivery to the Customer's Door: Efficiency, Regulatory Policy, and Integrated Rail-Truck Operations, 1900–1938, Enterprise & Society 10, no.11 (Feb 2015): 98–136.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1467222700007862Albert J. Churella Delivery to the Customer's Door: Efficiency, Regulatory Policy, and Integrated Rail-Truck Operations, 1900–1938, Enterprise and Society 10, no.11 (Feb 2015): 98–136.https://doi.org/10.1093/es/khn105Francine Lafontaine, Margaret Slade Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, Journal of Economic Literature 45, no.33 (Jul 2007): 629–685.https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.45.3.629Anne Gabelmann, Wolfgang Groß Telekommunikation: Wettbewerb in einem dynamischen Markt, (Jan 2003): 85–130.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57341-5_6Stephen F. Ross, Stefan Szymanski The Law & Economics of Optimal Sports League Design, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452861Felipe Balmaceda, Eduardo H Saavedra Vertical Integration and Shared Facilities in Unregulated Industries, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.585424Anne Gabelmann, Wolfgang Gross Telekommunikation: Wettbewerb in einem dynamischen Markt, (Jan 2000): 83–123.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-00770-9_5Lawrence J. White U.S. Public Policy toward Network Industries, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.164500Nicholas Economides, Lawrence J. White One-Way Networks, Two-Way Networks, Compatibility, and Public Policy, (Jan 1998): 9–29.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5483-7_2Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93, no.2323 (Nov 1996): 12749–12755.https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.93.23.12749David A. Butz Most-Favored Treatment Provisions as Nondiscrimination Guarantees, International Journal of the Economics of Business 2, no.11 (May 2011): 65–86.https://doi.org/10.1080/758521097Nicholas Economides, Lawrence J. White Networks and compatibility: Implications for antitrust, European Economic Review 38, no.3-43-4 (Apr 1994): 651–662.https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90100-7Gregory T. Gundlach, Paul N. Bloom The “Essential Facility” Doctrine: Legal Limits and Antitrust Considerations, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 12, no.22 (Dec 2018): 156–169.https://doi.org/10.1177/074391569101200202 George Bittlingmayer The Stock Market and Early Antitrust Enforcement, The Journal of Law and Economics 36, no.1, Part 11, Part 1 (Oct 2015): 1–32.https://doi.org/10.1086/467263 Timothy J. Brennan Refusing to Cooperate with Competitors: A Theory of Boycotts, The Journal of Law and Economics 35, no.22 (Oct 2015): 247–264.https://doi.org/10.1086/467253