Abstract In Loftus' (included in this issue) commentary on our article, she agreed with many of our conclusions concerning allegations in he said, she said legal cases. However, she focused some criticism on our coverage of recovered memory evidence. It appears that the main difference in our perspectives was not related to the science of memory but rather was one of education versus advocacy in the legal system. Porter, Campbell, Birt, and Woodworth (this issue) provided a review of the psychological science relevant to understanding the validity and characteristics of memories for crimes - or alleged crimes - from the distant past. We feel strongly that psychology has the potential to improve legal decision-making and avoid miscarriages of justice in historical cases. We agree with Loftus (this issue) that to a large extent this potential already has been realized in the related application of findings on eyewitness memory and identification in the courtroom. It is widely recognized in both the and legal communities (as reflected in the Sophonow Inquiry) that eyewitness errors have directly contributed to wrongful convictions. Much more controversial is the use of uncorroborated memory reports by complainants concerning incidents that may have happened decades ago, that serve as the main evidence in many trials. This issue is further complicated when the evidence is based on recovered memories of the alleged incident. In the Porter et al. article, we noted that Canadian courts have responded to historical memory evidence in a highly inconsistent fashion. Since the writing of Porter et al. (this issue), the situation has been improving. Starting in December, 2002, the National Judicial Institute (based in Ottawa) - an organization dedicated to the development and delivery of educational programs for all federal, provincial, and territorial judges - has organized an annual Wrongful Convictions conference at which judges are provided with a wide range of information on factors contributing to erroneous convictions. Along with eyewitness researcher Rod Lindsay and other psychologists, the first author of the present paper has had the opportunity to speak with numerous judges and lawyers about psychological science and its relevance to credibility assessment in the courtroom. In the long run, this educational approach involving large numbers of the judiciary is likely more effective than expert psychological testimony in any given case. In her commentary, Loftus (this issue) chose to focus most of her attention on the sections of our paper that dealt with recovered memories, and little on the sections dealing with continuous memories, intentionally false allegations, etc. From this, we assume that Loftus agreed with our conclusions on these other important issues. Although she stated that while strongly agreeing with some of their conclusions, I disagreed with others, in reading her commentary we only were able to uncover one major disagreement with our conclusions and this dissension was not scientific in nature (we will return to this point later). However, our views differed concerning whether to argue explicitly to keep dubious claims of repression out of the courtroom. That is, instead of making a policy recommendation (i.e., keep such and such evidence out of the court), we stuck to providing a review and scientifically founded guidelines. In our view, it is not our role as psychologists to make policy decisions for the legal system, just as it is not our role to comment on whether recovered memory evidence should be admissible in the courtroom. We argue that this is simply not our question to answer. Rather, our role as psychological researchers is to provide the relevant information to legal decision-makers to assist them in policy and case decisions. On the flipside, imagine if lawyers started telling us how to do good science. …
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