Few observers of Canadian foreign policy would deny that the number and complexity of foreign policy issues is increasing, yet the resources available to manage them are decreasing.(f.1) If we assume that 'old' foreign policy concerns -- non-proliferation, economic diplomacy, alliance politics, and multilateralism -- will continue to be important, Canada is left with three choices: increase the foreign policy budget to reflect the expanding agenda, do more things less well, or assign a lower priority to some issue-areas. This last choice implies a shift in Ottawa's focus away from some traditional functional concerns and geographic areas and towards those areas in which there is a clear and identifiable Canadian interest and where Canada's international policy decisions and programmes can have a maximum impact. The operative term here is maximum impact because the millions of public dollars spent to keep Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia may have satisfied the criterion of identifiable interest but have surely fallen short of maximum impact. In this article I argue that to maximize its influence in an era of fiscal austerity, Canada will have to be more selective about the many international spheres in which it plays. In the search for niches, Ottawa must not only use its resources more efficiently; it must look increasingly to the under-utilized and under-appreciated non-governmental and philanthropic sectors. Moreover, Canada's pent-up 'soft' power that comes from knowledge and ideas, and the information technologies that transmit them further, faster, and with greater effect around the world, must be allowed to flourish.(f.2) A greater exercise of such power -- in effect, energizing the cultural pillar of the foreign policy agenda of Jean Chretien's government rather than, for example, trying to achieve a greater naval presence in the Pacific in support of Canada's commercial interests in the region (as the 1994 defence white paper advocates(f.3)) -- is consistent with niche diplomacy. Foreign policy reviews over the past two years have emphasized that Canada's national interests dictate a global rather than a regional foreign policy and hence a widespread and effective diplomatic presence. At the same time, the various debates leading up to the Canada 21 report, the first two National Forums on Canada's International Relations (1994 & 1995), the final parliamentary foreign policy and defence reports, and Ottawa's programme reviews (I and II), all resonated with the need to 'make hard choices.' Growing domestic fiscal pressures have highlighted a fundamental tension in the conduct of Canada's international relations between a more engaged global player in an age of globalization and interdependence and a more disengaged actor. Despite the conclusions of the parliamentary reviews, this debate is not likely to abate. On the one hand, some (notably members of the Reform party) have questioned how long Canada can enhance its prestige in a number of expensive spheres of influence -- the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Commonwealth, la francophonie, Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and the Group of Seven (G-7), to name just a few simultaneously.(f.4) On the other hand, powerful forces reinforce this internationalism. As noted by the minister of foreign affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in April 1969,(f.5) it is anachronistic to try to draw a clear distinction between international and domestic. Because of economic and post-Cold War security globalization, problems are no longer East-West or North-South in scope. For example, unemployment, transportable diseases (for example, HIV), environmental degradation (for example, global warming) affect both South and North. As nation-states realize that they cannot respond to these challenges alone, increased multilateralism appears to be the only answer. From a narrower Canadian perspective, one need look no further than Canada's growing economic dependence on the rest of the world: in 1995 exports accounted for 37 per cent of national income compared to 17 per cent in 1960. …
Read full abstract