Epistemological Project Research Articles

Review of Sensual Excess: Queer Femininity and Brown Jouissance by Amber Jamilla Musser (NYU Press)

In <i>Sensual Excess,</i> Amber Jamilla Musser develops an epistemological project that calls into question modes of producing knowledge around black and brown bodies, especially in relationship to femininity and queerness. In doing so, she interrogates the kind of racialized understandings of femininity produced by what Hortense Spillers has called "pornotroping" in order to draw a contrast to something Musser calls "brown jouissance." She is looking for those places where fleshly experience exceeds the ideological constraints of the pornotropic image, developing an epistemology based not on the visual, but on the affective experiences of the flesh. In doing so she analyzes Lyle Ashton Harris’s <i>Billie #21</i> (2002), Judy Chicago’s <i>The Dinner Party</i> (1979), Kara Walker’s <i>A Subtlety</i> (2014), Mickalene Thomas’s <i>Origin of the Universe 1</i> (2012), Cheryl Dunye’s <i>Mommy is Coming</i> (2012), Amber Hawk Swanson and Sandra Ibarra’s <i>Untitled Fucking</i> (2013), Carrie Mae Weems’s <i>From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried</i> (1995–1996), Nao Bustamantes’s <i>Neapolitan</i> (2003), and Maureen Catabagan’s <i>Crush</i> (2010–2012).

Inwiefern ist die Phänomenologie eine ‚realistische‘ Philosophie?

AbstractIn what way is Phenomenology a realistic philosophy? To give an answer to this difficult question I propose to understand Phenomenology as the project of a universal epistemology and operative realism. This means especially to conceive Phenomenology not as a dogmatic doctrine but as an open (free from any bias) method and methodology. I propose the following solution: in one and the same procedure Phenomenology explores the possibilities and limits of human cognition and thus, at the same time, gives an answer to the question in what way Phenomenology is a realistic philosophy. Therefore the answer to this question can’t be given by a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’; it can only be given in form of an extensive research process and its results. Moreover, one can say that every serious realism must proceed in the same manner: every realistic position has to justify itself by an extensive epistemology

A ORDEM METACONSTITUCIONAL DE DIREITOS HUMANOS E SEUS DESAFIOS NO MUNDO GLOBALIZADO

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as perspectivas de implantação de uma ordem metaconstitucional de direitos humanos, na qual o regime jurídico de proteção dos direitos fundamentais transcende as fronteiras do estado soberano. Para tanto, é necessário investigar os impactos do fenômeno da globalização neodarwinista que se projetam sobre a formação de uma ordem universal kantiana de direitos cosmopolitas. É nesse sentido que o presente trabalho pretende demonstrar que a proteção dos direitos humanos no mundo globalizado caminha entre duas grandes perspectivas autoexcludentes, quais sejam, de um lado, o projeto epistemológico neoliberal da ordem unipolar americana e, do outro, o projeto epistemológico metaconstitucional da ordem mundial multipolar. Em consequência, é importante examinar os desafios que o mundo globalizado apresenta à formação de uma ordem metaconstitucional de direitos humanos inspirada na força normativa do direito cosmopolítico kantiano de curso universal.

PERFECTION IN THE BALANCE OF DESCARTES’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECT

Abstract This article redresses the function of the theodicy in Descartes’s epistemological project. In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes establishes the meditator’s knowledge as attainable through the proper use of the freedom of the will in the act of judgment. This freedom implies a will that is at once perfect in its likeness to God’s own will and only perfectible in its propensity to err in its judgments. The theodicy is thus necessary to sustain the balance between the (unlimited) perfection of God and the (limited) perfection of the meditator.

Mary Astell on Bad Custom and Epistemic Injustice

Mary Astell is a fascinating seventeenth‐century figure whose work admits of many interpretations. One feature of her work that has received little attention is her focus on bad custom. This is surprising; Astell clearly regards bad custom as exerting a kind of epistemic power over agents, particularly women, in a way that limits their intellectual capacities. This article aims to link two contemporary sociopolitical/social‐epistemological projects by showing how a seventeenth‐century thinker anticipated these projects. Astell's account of bad custom shows that she was attuned to the kinds of institutional or structural explanations theorized by Sally Haslanger, and that she acknowledges that bad custom—as an institutional or structural explanation—is intimately linked with epistemic injustice, albeit a kind not yet captured by contemporary social epistemologists. I call this form of epistemic injustice found in Astell epistemic internalization injustice. I argue that the epistemic significance of Astell's notion of bad custom is that it enables us to understand how bad custom conditions human relations in such a way as to result in epistemic injustice. Through coming to understand her notion of bad custom, we can expand our understanding of social epistemic phenomena like epistemic injustice.

Estilos de razonamiento, prácticas científicas y epistemología histórica

Se analiza, desde una perspectiva filosófica, hasta qué punto los estilos de razonamiento científico (erc) propuestos por el filósofo Ian Hacking son, en sus palabras, unas herramientas conceptuales relevantes para historiadores y filósofos. En otros términos, se pondrá en cuestión si los erc en sí mismos devienen un recurso que permite integrar la historia con la filosofía de la ciencia. Esto podría ser el caso si nos tomamos en serio la crítica que ha hecho el sociólogo Martin Kusch a la perspectiva de erc, al sostener que estos son un proyecto de epistemología histórica (eh), aunque la entiende desde una visión teórica, que deja de lado, en gran medida, una reflexión sobre el papel que desempeñan las prácticas científicas en la indagación epistemológica. Así, se argumentará a favor de que los erc sí son un recurso para articular la historia con la filosofía de la ciencia (son la base de una eh), siempre y cuando se comprendan como un conjunto de prácticas que se originan, se atrincheran y se despliegan a lo largo de la historia de la empresa científica. En consecuencia, la eh por la que se aboga es una epistemología que toma al conocimiento práctico como uno de sus pilares.

C.S. Peirce

Modelling knowledge and medical reasoning can be an epistemological project especially now, as medicine seems to reach a scientific status. Through his work on semiotics, abductive reasoning and pragmatism, CS Peirce (1839-1914) offers a series of original solutions. These solutions can give an account of (be considered as a theorical ground for) most of the medical activity in various fields such as the evaluation of the students, the knowledge bases and expert systems, the formal descriptions languages (ontologies), and the evidence-based medicine. By mean of this article, we aim at introducing the medical doctors to this complex but lighting thought on a profession which now uses all the most modern resources of knowledge engineering.

THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY

ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.

EPISTEMOLOGÍA CRAIGUIANA Y EL ROL DE LAS INTUICIONES EN EL TEORIZAR EPISTEMOLÓGICO*

RESUMEN El uso de las intuiciones como evidencia es ubicuo en la epistemología, pero no poco controvertido. Por más de una década y media, algunos epistemólogos experimentales han cuestionado esta apelación a las intuiciones epistémicas. Estos filósofos explotan los métodos de la psicología experimental, en particular métodos de encuestas, para poner a prueba cuán ampliamente compartidas son algunas intuiciones. Dado su compromiso con la relevancia de la investigación empírica a la construcción de teorías filosóficas, estos filósofos califican como naturalistas metodológicos. Pero algunos naturalistas metodológicos que también recomiendan renunciar a esa apelación de la intuición como evidencia no basan su caso en encuestas. En este artículo considero dos desafíos fundamentales a la práctica estándar de apelar a las intuiciones que estos filósofos naturalistas plantean y argumento que un proyecto epistemológico inspirado en el trabajo de Edward Craig le permite, en principio, al epistemólogo que comparte ese naturalismo metodológico lidiar con ellos. De todas formas concluyo que, independientemente del éxito del enfoque Craiguiano, las intuiciones tienen un rol que jugar en el teorizar epistemológico en relación a la adjudicación entre enfoques.

Wilhelm Dilthey’s Views on Autobiography

ABSTRACTThe paper examines the role of autobiographical literature in Dilthey’s ‘critique of historical reason.’ The purpose of the essay is (1) to offer an in-depth analysis of Dilthey’s concept of autobiography, (2) to place it into the larger framework of his lifelong epistemological project, and (3) to investigate the influence of Dilthey’s ideas on an early study of autobiography, Georg Misch’s History of Autobiography in Antiquity. The key argument is that Dilthey’s choice of the genre of autobiography to model his theory of understanding was not only a symptom of his misguided epistemological attempts, as many have suggested, but a potential cause of them. The article concludes that the inconsistencies of Dilthey’s argument regarding the value of autobiographical self-reflection for historical knowledge are most pronounced in the work of those who applied Dilthey’s concepts to the interpretation of actual autobiographical material, such as Georg Misch.

Beyond Witches, Angels and Unicorns. The Possibility of Expanding Russell's Existential Analysis

This paper attempts to be a contribution to the epistemological project of explaining complex conceptual structures departing from more basic ones. The central thesis of the paper is that there are what I call “functionally structured concepts”, these are non-harmonic concepts in Dummett’s sense that might be legitimized if there is a function that justifies the tie between the inferential connection the concept allows us to trace. Proving this requires enhancing the russellian existential analysis of definite descriptions to apply to functions and using this in proving the legitimacy of such concepts. The utility of the proposal is shown for the case of thick ethical terms and an attempt is made to use it in explaining the development of natural numbers. This last move could allow us to go one step lower in explaining the genesis of natural numbers while maintaining the notion of abstract numbers as higher order entities.

Two notions of metaphysical modality

The paper explores the project of an ambitious modal epistemology that attempts to combine the a priori methods of Chalmers’ 2D semantics with Kripke’s modal metaphysics. I argue that such a project is not viable. The ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad composed of (1) Modal Monism, (2) Two-Dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “Metaphysical Kripkeanism”. I present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time. There is a fundamental incompatibility between Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism and Kripke’s modal metaphysics. Specifically, Chalmers’ conceivability entails possibilities that a Kripkean rejects as genuinely metaphysical. However, three positive stances in modal epistemology emerge from the combinations that the triad allows. One of those offers a promising way forward for 2D modal epistemologies. But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to.

Humanism's Secret Shadow: The Construction of Black Gender/Sexuality in Frantz Fanon and Hortense Spillers

Humanism's Secret ShadowThe Construction of Black Gender/Sexuality in Frantz Fanon and Hortense Spillers William M. Paris Sylvia wynter begins her 1979 essay "Sambos and Minstrels" by stating, "The incredible inventiveness of black culture is not to be understood outside the imperative task of transformation, of counterresistance to the resistance of the Real world, to the quest of the marked excluded blacks to affirm themselves" (149). What does it mean to be excluded from the "Real world"? And how is this exclusion effected? In this article I bring together the seemingly disparate threads of Balibar's and Derrida's critiques of European humanism as an epistemological project and Fanon's and Spillers's attempts to reinvent that project from the position of black gender and sexuality. I argue that while European humanism has constructed the black body as an object of knowledge rather than a subject, Balibar, Derrida, Fanon, and Spillers show that humanism has been a dynamic rather than static project. Thus, it is possible to ask whether an alternate dynamism can be found in the shadow of humanism. The first half of the article concerns the interpretation of humanism in Europe through Balibar and Derrida in order to demonstrate why antihumanism or posthumanism fails to radically change the field of knowledge generated by humanism. The second half of the article moves explicitly to the question of how gender and sexuality have been mobilized to exclude black bodies from being human subjects of knowledge. The crucial step I take with Fanon's reversals of European humanism and Spillers's elaboration of [End Page 81] "ungendering" in chattel slavery is to show how these two thinkers introduce invention into the continued abstraction of European humanism. Black gender and sexuality, as abjected, constitute a radical site of questioning human reality and, thus, are a necessary component for enacting a humanism that is no longer solely the property of the West and Europe. Taken together, these four thinkers allow us to comprehend the difficult work of inventing a humanism "made to the measure of the world" (Césaire 1972, 56). The Epistemological Project of Humanism Humanism is no stranger to critique. We need not go to Frantz Fanon and Hortense Spillers to find critiques of humanism as Janus-faced, provincial, and, when mobilized politically, violent.1 Yet humanism remains the background assumption in philosophical thought and political practices in the West. It seems that every move away from "humanism" toward a posthumanism or antihumanism remains shadowed by what was meant to be surpassed. But this should not be surprising. The epistemological endeavor of Renaissance humanitas was already a transvaluative pursuit of human knowledge supposedly freed from the presupposition of a divine, transcendent God (Osamu 2006, 264). "Man" was no longer imago Dei. The effect of this separation was to make the "humanism" of Man a search for his essence that did not presuppose what that essence would be. Critiquing humanism for presupposing that Man was white, European, and male misunderstands its genealogy. Humanism endeavored to make Man free by freeing the knowing subject from the essentialism of theology and the determination of any stable substance. Thus, to say that humanism is no stranger to critique is to remind us that humanism is critique, is transvaluation, it is not a stable epistemological object, but a dynamic. Therefore, attempts to go beyond humanism often repeat its originating aims. The split from the transcendent authority of God was made possible by instituting another split in the field of knowledge between humanitas and anthropos. What is now known as anthropology was constructed as an institution upon the encounter with the soon-to-be colonized "New World" and the customs of people presumed to be in the shadow of European civilization. If before there was God and His subjects, now there were the knowers and the known. Étienne Balibar confirms this epistemological dynamic of humanism with the added insight that the production of knowledge is coextensive with the production of political reality (2005, 15). Humanism, for Balibar, is traversed by an "epistemological cut" (2005, 18) that produces the "we" who investigates and produces knowledge. This "we" is cut because humanitas...

A SOCIOLOGIA NEGRA DE EDUARDO DE OLIVEIRA E OLIVEIRA

This article aims to analyze aspects of the public intellectual production of the Black sociologist Eduardo de Oliveira e Oliveira in the mid-1970s, especially the USP’s Fortnight of Blacks (1977), a key event in his trajectory of thought and sociological action. We consider that his work helped to constitute the intellectual foundations of Black political struggles in Sao Paulo and Brazil in the 1970s through an epistemological project, composed, on the one hand, of a discussion about the epistemic place of Blacks as subjects of knowledge, and on the other hand, of a critical dialogue with the Paulista Sociological School, the Brazilian Black Movement and references to African American Studies in the United States.

The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-Genocide Society, Politics, and History

The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-Genocide Society, Politics, and History

Attempts on the ‘life’ of Johannesburg: Ivan Vladislavić’s Use of the City Portrait Genre

This article examines the changing practice of urban portraiture in reference to a selection of postmillennial texts written by Ivan Vladislavić. These generically diverse texts trace and reflect on transformations sweeping Johannesburg after the fall of Apartheid, to some extent a metonymic representation of South Africa. An immediate impulse to inquire whether and, if so, how the writer explores the boundaries of portraiture, derives from an explicit textual and visual thematisation of the practice in two of Vladislavić’s works, i.e. the collection of “verbal snapshots” entitled Portrait with Keys and his joint interdisciplinary project, TJ&amp; Double Negative, involving the writer and David Goldblatt, a South African photographer. The article concentrates primarily on the uses and adaptations of the city portrait genre. Vladislavić’s foregrounding of the genre category invites us to consider a series of questions: How does Vladislavić proceed with the appropriation and transformation of the traditional practice of city portrait? Do the portrayals of Johannesburg merely address the past? To what extent does Vladislavić propose contemporary adaptations of the practice? What happens to such categories as realism, accuracy, and likeness? What knowledge does portraiture generate? Finally, the article reflects on whether Vladislavić responds to the need for a new epistemological project in rendering the urban.

Негативная гносеология в греческом аристотелизме XVII века

The article studies the project of critical epistemology on the periphery of Europe, which is considered as an alternative to the project of critical ontology in the center of Europe. It is proved that this critical, or negative epistemology was based on two presumptions: on the concept of power as not decision-making, but as making control over the variety of decisions, and on the representation of speech not as a statement but as an establishment of the boundaries of consciousness. These presumptions date back to the unique social and political situation in the Orthodox world, which transformed the conventions of classical rhetoric into epistemological tools. In the struggle of various political forces to master this instrumentation, the concept of power as internal speech or intellectual attitude in relation to the diversity of events was developed, and the realization of power was understood as negative epistemology, allowing facts to be established not as simple events but as true and right events. The classical concepts of Aristotle were turned into topoi, describing reality not as an aggregate of ontological statuses, but as a set of epistemological problems. The study of this phenomenon based on the works by Theophilos Corydalleus and Gerasimos Vlakhos allows to explain common origins of the key problems of Eastern European religious philosophy (such as iconicity, personalism, and philosophy of the Divine name), which are otherwise perceived as fragmented and anomalous.

After the Kantian Analytic/Synthetic Contrast: Social Epistemology from Hegel to Derrida and Fricker

In this article, I lend support to Miranda Fricker’s work in social epistemology from a post-Hegelian point of view. In Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing, Fricker writes that, at times, social power, rather than the actual possession of knowledge, determines whether a speaker is believed. I will develop Miranda Fricker’s project in feminist epistemology by examining the post-Kantian linguistic sign with a view to showing how G. W. F. Hegel and Jacques Derrida transform the Kantian analytic/synthetic contrast in their semiologies. Epistemic injustice arises not only from cultural stereotypes and impoverished categories of identity but, also, from the dynamic way that language generates meaning.

On the Politics of Coalition

In the wake of continued structural asymmetries between women of color and white feminisms, this essay revisits intersectional tensions in Catharine MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State while exploring productive spaces of coalition. To explore such spaces, we reframe Toward a Feminist Theory of the State in terms of its epistemological project and highlight possible synchronicities with liberational features in women-of-color feminisms. This is done, in part, through an analysis of the philosophical role “method” plays in MacKinnon’s argument, and by reframing her critique of juridical neutrality and objectivity as epistemic harms. In the second section, we sketch out a provisional coalitional theory of liberation that builds on MacKinnon’s feminist epistemological insights and aligns them with decolonizing projects in women-of-color feminisms, suggesting new directions and conceptual revisions that are on the way to coalition.

Hill's Heuristics and Explanatory Coherentism in Epidemiology.

In this essay, I argue that Ted Poston's theory of explanatory coherentism is well-suited as a tool for causal explanation in the health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology for more than half a century as one of Hill's viewpoints, it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems by integrating epidemiologic evidence with a diversity of other error-independent data. I propose that computational formalization of Hill's viewpoints in an explanatory coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal explanation in the health sciences. As an example, I briefly introduce Paul Thagard's ECHO system and offer my responses to possible objections to my proposal.