Epistemological Function Research Articles

Ist die Unterscheidung von nomothetischen und idiographischen Wissenschaften noch zeitgemäß?

Abstract This paper discusses C.G. Hempel's contention according to which universal laws fulfil the same 'theoretical function' in natural and historical science. To this end, the author differentiates between system ·building and genetically structured sciences. Their modes of presentation are respectively hierarchically ordered theory and narrative. These two basic ways of arranging our knowledge are led back to a difference in explanation, of a pragmatic, not logical nature, that is, to the difference between subsumtion and ascription. Whereas in the systematic organization of knowledge, the basic underlying theory sets the exact conditions, under which a fact can be described as explained, such an epistemological directive function of laws is not to be found in genetic organization.

Husserlowska krytyka psychologizmu w aksjologii

Husserl’s contribution to the investigation of problems concerning the epistemological and ontological status of value resulted in the creation of a new well defined solution. The starting point of this conception was the refutation of sensualistic psychologism. By granting to emotional acts possession of content which points to intentional objects Husserl revealed their epistemological function and ability to objectivise. The new interpretation of emotions attributing existence not only to affective inner states of the self but also to conscious acts that transcend beyond the self introduced a conception of value conceived as an objective correlate of emotions. Values may consequently be said to have been the universe of the objects whose existence was not determined by individual psychological emotions. This meant that Husserl’s professed axiological objectivism. By assigning objective character to value Husserl outlined a new field of investigation that may be called ontology of value. It concerned both problems of existence and problems of qualitative and structural characteristics of value.

Man as Infinite Spirit by James A. Robb

BOOK REVIEWS 997 media. Obviously, some would disagree with the placement of those priorities. Which should come first, evangelization or service? That question only makes sense in the context of a well-developed ecclesiology, something still in the making. Regrettably, the book does not explore the religious education dimension and to that extent the term " Christian Education " in the title has to be taken in a very restricted sense. This lacuna only highlights the need for a sound theology of education, an urgent need as this inquiry into Catholic education in India shows. University of Dayton Dayton, Ohio MICHAEL DoNNELLAN Man as Infinite Spirit. By JAMES A. RoBB, 1974 Aquinas Lecture. Milwaukee : Marquette University Press. Pp. 64. $2.50. In this highly personal essay based upon his rethinking of the ontology and epistemology of St. Thomas Professor James Robb argues that in Thomistic philosophy the following proposition is true: "A human being is an infinite spirit." The force of the argument hinges on an analysis of the objects of intentionality as demanded by Aquinas's epistemology. Robb suggests that St. Thomas, although freely using the categories and language of Aristotle, provided an analysis of human nature that none of the Aristotelian commentators prior to St. Thomas had found in the Aristotelian texts. Moveover, Robb argues that it has taken 700 years for scholars to do justice to the profound insight and uniqueness of Aquinas's teaching on human nature. Robb agrees with the suggestions of Maritain, Gilson, and Pegis denying that Aquinas's position is strictly Aristotelian. Nevertheless, he proposes that we go beyond their work which placed emphasis on the "intensified existential dimension" of Aquinas's ontology of man, which in turn translates out as "incarnate finite spirit." To substantiate his claim that man is an " incarnate infinite spirit " Robb presents an elucidation of the nature of intentionality as found in Aquinas's texts, dealing especially with the ontological (" existential ") status and the epistemological function of the intellectus agens. Much stress is laid upon the concept of immateriality as the fundamental characteristic of beings capable of intentionality. Although at times difficult to follow, the argument appears to go something like this: I. There are objects of intentionality. 2. The intellectus possibilis knows whatever is intelligible. 2 (i). In Aquinas's ontology, there are no limits to what is intelligible. 2 (ii). Being is intelligible. 2 (iii) . Being is finite and infinite. 998 BOOK REVIEWS 8. The intellectus agens as an " abstractive power " is a necessary con clition for knowledge. 4. There is a necessary relation between the " reception " of concepts in the intellectus possibilis and the "actuality" of the intellectus agens. 5. Human knowers possess an epistemological power as fully actualized as the inteUectus possibilis is potential. 6. The object of intentionality-Being-has an infinite dimension. 7. The intellectus agens is infinite. ("That is to say, it-the intellectus agens- is actually, somehow, the likeness of all that is or can be." p. 10.) The structure of the argument depends upon the nature of intentionality, which, regretfully, Robb does not explicitly mention until the very end of the essay. Infinity is necessarily related to the concept of "immateriality ," which in turn is the basis of intentionality in Aquinas's ontology. As there are degrees of immateriality (e. g., God-as-knower, human person-asknower , dog-as-knower), so too are there degrees of infinity. Obviously, the isomorphism between knower and object known is fundamentally important for Robb's analysis. " Man, like any intellectual being, is open unreservedly to the infinity of being, truth and goodness." (pp. 41-42) The status of the intentional object and the relation of isomorphism are crucial for Robb's argument. Yet one wonders if this concept of " infinity " says anything more than the concept of "immateriality." And this latter concept as used in Aquinas's thesis of intentionality is, I am afraid, ill dire need of close elucidation. Furthermore, one might ask the questiondoes " immateriality " demand a total and complete isomorphism between object known and knower? Obviously, in knowing" red," the knower does not become red. Why, then, in knowing "being "-which has an infinite dimension-must the intellect be infinite? Put differently...