Epistemological Consequences Research Articles

Decolonizing Philosophy of Technology: Learning from Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches to Decolonial Technical Design

The decolonial theory understands that Western Modernity keeps imposing itself through a triple mutually reinforcing and shaping imprisonment: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge, and coloniality of being. Technical design has an essential role in either maintaining or overcoming coloniality. In this article, two main approaches to decolonizing the technical design are presented. First is Yuk Hui’s and Ahmed Ansari’s proposals that, revisiting or recovering the different histories and philosophies of technology produced by humankind, intend to decolonize the minds of philosophers and engineers/architects/designers as a pre-condition for such decolonial designs to take place. I call them top-down approaches. Second is some technical design initiatives that, being developed alongside marginalized/subalternate people, intend to co-construct decolonial sociotechnical solutions through a committed, decolonizing, and careful dialog of knowledge. I call them bottom-up approaches. Once that is done, the article’s second half derives ontological, epistemological, and political consequences from the conjugation of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Such consequences challenge some established or not yet entirely overcome understandings in the philosophy of technology (PT) and, in so doing, are meant to represent some steps in PT’s decolonization. Even though both top-down and bottom-up approaches are considered, the article’s main contributions are associated with (bottom-up) decolonial technical design practices, whose methodologies and outcomes are important study cases for PT and whose practitioners (i.e., decolonial designers) can be taken as inspiring examples for philosophers who want to decolonize/enlarge PT or make it decolonial (that is, a way of fostering decoloniality).

Melville's Quixoticism and the Modern World-System

Melville's Quixoticism and the Modern World-System

Two Ways to God in Thomas Aquinas and Michel Henry

Abstract One can discern passages in the writings of the Scholastic doctor Thomas Aquinas and the contemporary French phenomenologist Michel Henry which can be interpreted as putting forth very similar ways for grasping the existence of God. These “ways to God” can be fruitfully compared from the point of view of their philosophical starting points as well as of their consequences for theological epistemology. The purpose of the present essay is to pursue this comparative work and to see what philosophical-theological fruit it can yield.

From an Aristotelian Ordo Essendi to Relation: Shifting Paradigms in the Study of Religions in the Light of the Sociology of Knowledge

Abstract The article raises the question of how the multiplication of topics, turns, and perspectives in the currents of the study of religions can be explained. After the concept of a paradigm shift (Thomas Kuhn) is introduced, the study examines the epistemological consequences of the question What is religion? It is based on analyzing the practice of defining “religion” in German-language encyclopedias of the past three centuries. Surprisingly, the structure of these articles is largely persistent throughout this long period and consists mainly of etymology, definition (Wesensbestimmung), and a typology of “religion.” From this, an Aristotelian paradigm can be deduced. The claim for universality entailed in this paradigm ultimately led to a crisis and since the 1960s the study of religions has developed alternative approaches that emphasize aspects of human interaction, communication, and reciprocal relationships. I propose to subsume these new perspectives under the term “a relational paradigm.” Examples and consequences for this paradigm are offered in the conclusion.

“Decolonizing” Curriculum and Pedagogy: A Comparative Review Across Disciplines and Global Higher Education Contexts

Drawing on the global interdisciplinary literature on decolonizing curriculum and pedagogy (DCP) in higher education, we critically examined the idea of decolonizing in the context of disciplines and universities around the world. Based on a critical analysis of 207 articles and book chapters published in English and centering a geopolitics of knowledge frame, we present three themes: (a) decolonizing meaning(s), (b) actualizing decolonization, and (c) challenges to actualizing, all related to DCP. We observed three major meanings of decolonization and four ways to actualize DCP that were associated with geographical, disciplinary, institutional, and/or stakeholder contexts. We argue that while there are similarities within the literature, ultimately the meanings, actualizations, and challenges of DCP are contextual, which has political and epistemological consequences. We end by offering directions for education research on DCP, revealing the possibility for a field or discipline of decolonial studies.

The normal distribution, an epistemological view

The role of the normal distribution in the realm of statistical inference and science is considered from epistemological viewpoint. Quantifiable knowledge is usually embodied in mathematical models. History and emergence of the normal distribution is presented in a close relationship to those models. Furthermore, the role of the normal distribution in estimation of model parameters, starting with Laplace’s Central Limit Theorem, through maximum likelihood theory leading to Bronstein von Mises and Convolution Theorems, is discussed. The paper concludes with the claim that our knowledge on the effects of variables in models or laws of nature has a mathematical structure which is identical to the normal distribution. The epistemological consequences of the latter claim are also considered.

Evidential pluralism and evidence of mechanisms in the social sciences

Is evidential pluralism possible when we move to the social sciences, and if so, to what degree? What are the analytical benefits? The answer put forward in this article is that there is a tradeoff between how serious social science methodologies take the study of mechanisms and the analytical benefits that flow from evidential pluralism. In the social sciences, there are a range of different approaches to studying mechanisms, differentiated by (1) the degree to which the ‘process’ is unpacked theoretically, and (2) whether the approach takes seriously the particular nature of social phenomena and the epistemological consequences that flow from this, as in realist approaches to the study of mechanisms, or whether more neopositivist-based foundational assumptions are adopted. Depending on which approach to study mechanisms is used, evidential pluralism is either: easy but superficial, very productive but challenging, or almost impossible because of the fundamental differences between the types of claims being made and the forms of evidence used.

How to Meet Your Needs when a Regression Disappoints

This paper spells out methods of data analyses that can help to move a research project forward in cases when the initial regression results did not work out. Following this discussion of data analysis methods to get the “right” specification, the remainder of the paper considers some epistemological consequences of engaging in pre-regression data analyses. The main point stresses that current research practice is unnecessarily deficient.

N. R. Hanson and von Uexküll: A Biosemiotic and Evolutionary Account of Theories

This paper proposes a biosemiotic conception of theories, as non-intentional organic theories, which is based on an analysis and comparison of philosopher Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of theories and zoologist Jakob von Uexkull’s theory of organisms. It is argued that Hanson’s proposals about scientific theories and their relation to observation are semiotic in nature and that there exists a correspondence between Hanson’s depiction of the relationship between theories, observation, and reality and von Uexkull’s views on the relationship between organisms and their environments. This correspondence supports an account of theories that depicts them as organic extensions of our perceptual physiology. Among the epistemological consequences of this account are the following: (1) The kind of correspondence that is established through theories between a subject and reality is related rather to a subject’s actions than to a faithful representation of every aspect of the world, (2) it suggests a strong emphasis on the creative aspects of knowledge acquisition, and (3) it urges a reassessment of the evolutionary epistemology of theories.

Is color experience linguistically penetrable?

I address the question of whether differences in color terminology cause differences in color experience in speakers of different languages. If linguistic representations directly affect color experience, then this is a case of what I call the linguistic penetrability of perception, which is a particular case of cognitive penetrability. I start with some general considerations about cognitive penetration and its alleged occurrence in the memory color effect. I then apply similar considerations to the interpretation of empirical studies of color perception in speakers of different languages. I argue that findings such as differences in categorical perception in speakers of different languages do not show that language affects color experience. They therefore do not support the claim that color experience is linguistically penetrable. But even if we grant that color experience is different in speakers of different languages, I argue that this might still not be a case of linguistic penetration. Finally, I consider some epistemological consequences of the assumption that speakers of different languages have different color experiences.

What is the Relation between Semantic and Substantive Epistemic Contextualism?

Epistemic Contextualism is generally treated as a semantic thesis that may or may not have epistemological consequences. It is sometimes taken to concern only knowledge claims (as the assertion that the word “know” means different things in different contexts of use). Still, at other times it is taken to regard the knowledge relation itself (as the assertion that knowledge itself has no single univocal nature). Call the former view Semantic EC, the latter view Substantive EC, and the idea that the plausibility of Semantic EC presupposes that of Substantive EC, the “Presupposition Thesis.” Numerous authors argue against the Presupposition Thesis on the grounds that an understanding of the nature of knowledge is no more required to understand the meaning of knowledge assertions than an understanding of the self, for instance, is needed to understand the meaning of sentences containing “I.” These authors then offer additional arguments for the same conclusion, using further comparisons between “know” and other indexicals, as well as between “know” and quantifiers, gradable and modal adjectives. Herein, I defend the Presupposition Thesis by arguing against these authors’ claims (based as they are on these types of comparisons) that Semantic EC is plausible without the supposition of Substantive EC.

Epistemological Consequences of Frege Puzzles

Frege puzzles exploit cognitive differences between co-referential terms (such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’). Traditionally, they were handled by some version of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which avoided disruptive consequences for epistemology. However, the Fregean programme did not live up to its original promise, and was undermined by the development of theories of direct reference; for semantic purposes, its prospects now look dim. In particular, well-known analogues of Frege puzzles concern pairs of uncontentious synonyms; attempts to deal with them by distinguishing idiolects or postulating ‘narrow contents’ or elaborate forms of context-sensitivity are inadequate or semantically implausible. Although ascriptions of knowledge, belief, and other attitudes are ubiquitous in epistemology, epistemologists have not properly come to terms with the surprising consequences of anti-Fregean semantic accounts of attitude ascriptions. In ‘A Puzzle about Belief ’, Saul Kripke shows that natural-seeming disquotational principles for ascribing belief lead to apparently unacceptable consequences, including outright contradictions, in problem cases. Such disquotation principles, I argue, are best regarded not as conceptual connections but just as heuristics in the psychological sense, quick and easy ways of assessing belief ascriptions, usually accurate under normal conditions but far from 100% reliable. I discuss similar heuristics for ascribing knowledge and other attitudes. That the principles have a merely heuristic status need not be pre-theoretically manifest to their users. This view vindicates Kripke’s conclusion that it would be wrong-headed to draw semantic conclusions from Frege puzzles. I discuss the epistemological consequences of an anti-Fregean approach to Frege puzzles, including for Kripke’s cases of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, but also for evidence, for epistemic modalities, and for epistemic and subjective conceptions of probability. Anna Mahtani’s recent identification of Frege puzzles for the ex ante Pareto Principle as used in welfare economics provides an interesting example. I suggest a model-building methodology as the most promising way of handling at least some of the difficulties. A final issue is the choice between different anti-Fregean approaches to semantics, from very coarse-grained intensional approaches on which sentences express functions from (metaphysically) possible worlds to truth-values to more fine-grained hyperintensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible or impossible worlds to truth-values or else Russellian structured propositions. Some of the hyperintensional theories violate semantic compositionality. More generally, since our attitude ascriptions rely on heuristics, they should be expected to exhibit some level of error; although hyperintensional approaches may be able slightly to reduce the level of postulated error, they do so at the cost of vastly increased theoretical complexity, and so have weak explanatory power. Methodologically, a simple intensional approach does better.

Religious Experience and Testimony

The paper considers the problem of the transfer of religious experience, consisting of two elements: the problem of the features of individual religious experience and the problem of testimony in relation to religious experience. Religious experience seems to be more difficult to transfer through testimony than other types of experience. The search for the causes of these features leads either to the assertion that these are features of the religious experience itself, or to the assertion that these are features of a certain type of testimony. Based on these features and, most often, adopting the first option, opponents of theism try to reduce religious experience to cognitive distortions and disorders, and supporters of theism try to create a special epistemological description of this experience in order to protect it. The author made an attempt to substantiate the thesis that difficulties in transferring religious experience arise in special specific cases and only due to the features of the transfer of experience, and not due to the features of religious experience as such. These statements are based on the approach proposed by the author to the analysis of objects of religious, scientific, and everyday experience. This approach combines natural and supernatural objects of experience into a single class of objects. The most significant feature of the approach is the assertion that such unique supernatural objects of experience as miracles differ from other objects of experience only epistemically, but not ontologically. Considering the epistemological consequences of this approach, the author comes to the stated theses.

Por uma realidade conectada: apontamentos genealógicos sobre as conexões tecnológicas e um possível sentido comunicacional

O artigo pretende analisar as conexões tecnológicas sob o ponto de vista filosófico e antropológico, retomando o debate natureza/cultura com o intuito de problematizar possibilidades de um sentido comunicacional em emergência na realidade contemporânea. O texto aposta em uma genealogia do que se entende por conexão e suas imbricações epistemológicas entre diversos operadores conceituais como natureza, cultura, comunicação, técnica e tecnologia, com objetivo de resgatar esse sentido comunicacional. Para que se possa contribuir com a discussão sobre o tema, será invocado o suporte filosófico de Edgar Morin, Vilém Flusser, Carlos París, Bruno Latour e as considerações epistemológicas de Circo Marcondes Filho para se pensar o sentido comunicacional.

Prospecto para un desarrollo “artificial” de la filosofía

espanolEn este articulo se analizan algunas alternativas posibles para el devenir de la filosofia. Los pronosticos de la filosofia continental y la filosofia analitica suponen dos caminos. Un tercero lo ofrece la eventualidad de una filosofia desinstitucionalizada y asistematica. A partir de ellas intentara derivarse una cuarta opcion, la cual, si bien inusitada en su contextura futurista al prospectar una potencial utilidad de las tecnologias de inteligencia artificial al quehacer filosofico, serviria al proposito de dar unas pautas para una reivindicacion civilizatoria de la filosofia, si bien con importantes consecuencias epistemologicas en relacion con los metodos de produccion academica presentes EnglishIn this article some possible alternatives for the evolution of philosophy are analyzed. The forecasts of continental philosophy and analytic philosophy assume two paths. A third is offered by the eventuality of a deinstitutionalized and unsystematic philosophy. From them, a fourth option will try to be derived, which, although unusual in its futuristic context when prospecting a potential utility of artificial intelligence technologies for philosophical work, would serve the purpose of giving guidelines for a civilizing claim to philosophy, although with important epistemological consequences in relation to the present academic production methods

GEOGRAPHY IN THE BIG DATA AGE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL RESONANCE OF CURRENT DEBATES

abstract Although much has been written about the challenges of big data, there has been little reflection on the historicity of such debates and what we can learn from it. With this in mind, the aim of this article is to situate the epistemological debates over big data in geography historically. We focus on the three most relevant topics in current discussions around big data that have significant historical resonance, namely its methodological challenges, its scientific value, and its positionality. We conclude by arguing that understanding the historical resonance of current big data debates is helpful to find new ways to question its epistemological consequences.

Le cancer radio-induit, le kangourou, et le petit lapin. Ou « la déclinaison radiobiologique du mythe de la Licorne Rose »

The linear no-threshold (LNT) model, which has become a dogma in its own right, leads to affirming the existence of the harmfulness of low doses of ionizing radiation as long as their harmlessness could not be demonstrated. It seems important to understand how we came to make dogmatic a scientifically “non-theory”. We propose in this article, after having shown how much RLSS stems from a myth and not from a scientific approach, to expose its origins and genesis, essential to the understanding of its current character of so-called incontestable truth, then to illustrate the worrying practical and epistemological consequences that this reference to RLSS entails. We rely for this on the critical analysis of some of the epidemiological studies that claim to demonstrate or confirm it.

Interpretivism without Judgement-Dependence

In a recent article in this journal, Krzysztof Poslajko reconstructs—and endorses as probative—a dilemma for interpretivism first posed by Alex Byrne. On the first horn of the dilemma, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to an ideal interpreter (and thus loses any connection with actual folk psychological practices). On the second horn, the interpretivist takes attitudes to emerge in relation to individuals’ judgements (and thus denies the possibility of error). I show that this is a false dilemma. By taking a model-theoretic approach to folk psychology, and marrying interpretivism with dispositionalism, interpretivists can viably reject the notion of an ideal (or canonical) interpreter—and relativize attitudes to actual lay interpreters—without taking on board the unacceptable epistemological consequences of allowing that attitudes are judgement-dependent.

Memória

O presente trabalho extrai uma consequência epistemológica de uma posição ontológica sobre a memória. A posição ontológica é obtida com base na análise dos usos ordinários do termo memória visando inferir qual deve ser o seu uso legítimo, concluindo, em congruência com Klein, que toda memória é episódica. Dada tal posição ontológica, deriva-se uma posição epistêmica gerativista, concluindo que a memória é uma fonte básica de conhecimento análoga à percepção.

The Epistemology of a Positive SARS-CoV-2 Test.

We investigate the epistemological consequences of a positive polymerase chain reaction SARS-CoV test for two relevant hypotheses: (i) V is the hypothesis that an individual has been infected with SARS-CoV-2; (ii) C is the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 is the cause of flu-like symptoms in a given patient. We ask two fundamental epistemological questions regarding each hypothesis: First, how much confirmation does a positive test lend to each hypothesis? Second, how much evidence does a positive test provide for each hypothesis against its negation? We respond to each question within a formal Bayesian framework. We construe degree of confirmation as the difference between the posterior probability of the hypothesis and its prior, and the strength of evidence for a hypothesis against its alternative in terms of their likelihood ratio. We find that test specificity—and coinfection probabilities when making inferences about C—were key determinants of confirmation and evidence. Tests with < 87% specificity could not provide strong evidence (likelihood ratio > 8) for V against ¬V regardless of sensitivity. Accordingly, low specificity tests could not provide strong evidence in favor of C in all plausible scenarios modeled. We also show how a positive influenza A test disconfirms C and provides weak evidence against C in dependence on the probability that the patient is influenza A infected given that his/her symptoms are not caused by SARS-CoV-2. Our analysis points out some caveats that should be considered when attributing symptoms or death of a positively tested patient to SARS-CoV-2.