Epistemological Consequences Research Articles

The Tropic-Concepts of Life: Jacques Derrida’s Contribution to the Question of Metaphor in the Life Sciences

In the field of life science there is a growing awareness of the metaphorical tenor of many of its key concepts and the problems that arise from them, as in the now-controversial case of the genetic ‘program’. In the seminar Life Death (2019) Derrida addresses this question from Georges Canguilhem’s difficulties in establishing a clear distinction between metaphor and concept, precisely with regard to the notion of ‘program’, concluding that this difficulty ‘demand[s] a recasting of this division and of the law of this division’ between metaphor and concept. Beginning with these pages from Life Death, the present essay aims to reconstruct the deconstruction of this opposition and its epistemological consequences by going back to the Derridean essay ‘White Mythology’ (1971), to which Derrida refers in the seminar and in which the question of metaphor in the life sciences had been addressed in a critical confrontation with Bachelard and Canguilhem.

Misinformation and higher-order evidence

This paper uses computational methods to simultaneously investigate the epistemological effects of misinformation on communities of rational agents, while also contributing to the philosophical debate on ‘higher-order’ evidence (i.e. evidence that bears on the quality and/or import of one’s evidence). Modelling communities as networks of individuals, each with a degree of belief in a given target proposition, it simulates the introduction of unreliable mis- and disinformants, and records the epistemological consequences for these communities. First, using small, artificial networks, it compares the effects, when agents who are aware of the prevalence of mis- or disinformation in their communities, either deny the import of this higher-order evidence, or attempt to accommodate it by distrusting the information in their environment. Second, deploying simulations on a large(r) real-world network, it observes the impact of increasing levels of misinformation on trusting agents, as well as of more minimal, but structurally targeted, unreliability. Comparing the two information processing strategies in an artificial context, it finds that there is a (familiar) trade-off between accuracy (in arriving at a correct consensus) and efficiency (in doing so in a timely manner). And in a more realistic setting, community confidence in the truth is seen to be depressed in the presence of even minimal levels of misinformation.

Land Art Submerged: Betty Beaumont’s Ocean Landmark and Art History Beyond Proximity

Abstract Comprising 17,000 blocks of coal fly-ash, Betty Beaumont’s Ocean Landmark (1978–1980) is an artificial reef located off the coast of Fire Island, New York. This essay analyses the visual inaccessibility of the work and its reliance on an assemblage of media to highlight its significance for conceiving political, ecological and cultural meanings of the ocean. Land art’s fascination with the limits of visuality, the site/non-site dialectic and relationship with industry will provide a framework for this aim. Ocean Landmark’s situatedness and association with industrial ecology signals the wider juridical and political lack of transparency in industrial activity in the ocean spaces framed as sites of unseen environmental extraction. Demonstrating the political and epistemological consequences of a lack of visibility, it challenges the assumptions of total sensorial and epistemic access, highlighting the limitations of anthropocentric positions in and beyond the ocean.

The metaphysics and epistemology of conscious perception

Some metaphysical disjunctivists about conscious perceptual experience argue that their position has attractive, anti-sceptical, epistemological consequences. Perceiving a particular round red ball is a matter of being in a conscious condition, which serves as the ground for judgement that that thing is round and red, that is inconsistent with the falsity of that judgement. For it consists in a relation of acquaintance with that very thing and its shape and colour. Hence the ground for judgement suffices for its truth in a way that contributes to understanding the status of the judgement as knowledgeable. Here I explore an analogous way in which it might be argued that the metaphysics of conscious perception may have epistemological benefits. This concerns, not the fact that such experience consists in the relational presentation of particular worldly objects and their perceptible properties, but the fact that it consists in their presentation from a particular point of view. This is what enables perception of those particular worldly things, rather than any others, and makes sense of their continued existence unperceived. For this point of view may evidently change, independently of the existence and nature of what is presented on any specific occasion, leaving those very things as they are, although now unperceived.

Naturalizing skepticism

AbstractNaturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms of skepticism. To that end, it outlines some assumptions underlying many attempts to naturalize epistemology. It contrasts these approaches to traditional epistemology and identifies the reasons offered by naturalistic epistemologists to dismiss traditional skeptical challenges. Next, it argues that the problem of skepticism can be sensibly stated within a naturalistic setting. Finally, it contends that there are distinctively naturalistic strategies to argue for skepticism and diagnoses the prospects of naturalism vis‐à‐vis these kinds of skeptical challenges.

Epistemological Implications of John Mbiti’s Conception of African Time

This paper makes an attempt to critically explore the concept of time in African understanding as developed by John Mbiti. Specifically, the paper will look at the epistemological implications of Mbiti’s claim that Africans do not have future dimension in their understanding of time. However, as we will highlight, a close examination of such position bears significant epistemological consequences. To that effect, the paper, first examines Mbiti’s categorization of time in African perspective, whereby we will explore dual-dimension of time in traditional Africa as suggested by Mbiti versus linear dimension understanding of time. That will be followed by a detailed discussion against Mbiti’s position and the epistemological ramification of his claim.

“Wait, really, stop, stop!”: Go-along interviews with visually disabled people and the pitfalls of ableist methodologies

Despite the growing interest in walking methods in disability research, their methodological difficulties are rarely examined. Therefore, we debate the challenges of doing go-along interviews with visually disabled people when geographically studying blind experience with urban space. The article is divided into two parts. The methodological part examines the difficulties we encountered to contribute to the critical discussion of the ableist nature of both methodologies and post qualitative inquiry, and their interconnection with ableist conceptions of walking, talking, and space. Second, we discuss the epistemological consequences of go-along interviews, which have the potential to challenge existing thinking, ableist conceptions of space, and, consequently, the given discipline. The result is a constructivist conception of science that modifies human geography through visual disability and visual disability through human geography.

An Awkward Signal: The ‘Petroleum and Minerals’ Imprint on the First Conference on Accounting, Governance and Sustainability

ABSTRACT This essay was prompted by an ‘atypical’ announcement, regarding an Accounting, Governance and Sustainability Conference co-organized by the American Accounting Association (AAA) and the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals. I mobilise an epistemological base, drawing on Naomi Oreskes’ recent work, to question the logic and the appropriateness of associating Petroleum and Minerals’ interests with an academic conference on the topic of sustainability. My point is that significant epistemological consequences ensue when a ‘mere’ association of words arouses skepticism regarding the extent of conflict of interest surrounding an event being aimed at fostering knowledge production and dissemination processes on the theme of sustainability. One feature of my argument is that involving explicitly as co-organizer, in the frontstage, a university whose name carries the wording ‘Petroleum and Minerals’ constitutes an awkward signal, which is a disconcerting occurrence given the strong influence of ‘signaling theory’ in the eyes of many AAA members, who adhere to mainstream economic-based accounting research.

Social Science as a Project

It is increasingly common to conceive of scientific research as something that can be planned, managed, and assessed by applying modern techniques of project management. Expecting research to follow certain standardized procedures to achieve clearly defined goals has a long tradition, in particular, in the natural sciences and has arguably contributed to the acceptance of science as an authoritative force that makes tangible contributions to social progress. For the social sciences, however such a narrow understanding of scientific research causes serious problems. Social science research doesn’t always fit in the logic of project management. Moreover, attempts to adjust research practices to correspond with external, managerial experiences are far more consequential and damaging to the social sciences. This article interrogates the prospects and consequences of project thinking in the social sciences and discusses the likely epistemological consequences. To do so, it will recapitulate the historical and social developments that lead to the adoption of managerial principles in social science research and contrasts them with the philosophical principles that underpinned the scientification of thinking about the social.

Does matter have non-dispositional intrinsic qualities? Sydney Shoеmaker against quidditism

The article discusses the problem of the existence of the fundamental non-dispositional intrinsic qualities of matter (quiddities) and arguments for two opposite views, quidditism and dispositionalism (causal structuralism). In support of quidditism, arguments by Howard Robinson, John Foster and Philip Goff are deployed. These arguments highlight the incoherence or unintelligibility of the doctrine that the whole reality is just a network of causal relations without any qualitative filler in the nodes of the network. Sydney Shoemaker’s influential argument for dispositionalism, in the article “Causality and Properties”, is analysed and responded. The case is made that Shoemaker’s objections against the existence of fundamental properties whose identity “consists of something logically independent of their causal potentialities” can be neutralised on the assumption that our world is operated by ontologically fundamental laws of nature in virtue of which quiddities have constant causal potentialities. Quidditism with this assumption makes it possible to know all the same properties of matter as dispositionalism, viz., dispositional properties and spatiotemporal relations. So, pace Shoemaker, it has no “disastrous epistemological consequences”. Although such quidditism expands (as compared with dispositionalism) ontology by attributing matter not only with knowable dispositional properties (causal structures) but also with quiddities, which are in a sense unknowable, this ontological exuberance is justified by the need to avoid the vicious regress of powers entailed by dispositionalism.

The Experience of the Unconscious from Freud to Jung: on Telepathy and Synchronicity

Our object of study in this article, succinctly, shows the evolution of the concept of telepathy in the psychoanalytic field, as well as the concept of synchronicity in the Jungian field; For this we will verify concepts that are close to the latter, such as projective identification, transitional object, within the Kleinian and Winnicottian universe. Bion’s considerations on “Finite space and infinite space, such as Jung’s use of the concept of “participation mystique”. To accomplish this goal we intend to make a survey of the historical evolution of the concept of synchronicity. We will begin with the primary sources, and in a second moment we will make a bibliographic survey of the developments that occurred after the death of Jung until the present day, on these proposed themes, and the possible enrichment through interdisciplinarity with other sciences. We will try to identify at the end of our reflection, some epistemological consequences that may benefit the evolution of Freudian and Jungian metapsychology and its consequences for the epistemology of analytical practice. We intend to illuminate some objective and intersubjective aspects of therapeutics. What types of communication are possible? What kind of looks? What types of listening? What kinds of relationships can we establish between the forms we compare the forms of communication in transference, compared to telepathy and synchronicity?

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL NORMS IN THE MODERN PERIOD OF SYSTEMATIC AXIOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION

The aim of the article is a theoretical and legal analysis of the historical interpretation of law in the context of doctrinal views, its justification and comparison with other theories. Achieving this goal involves: establishing the methodological value of the historical interpretation of law; show the need to follow a historical approach to the interpretation of law. The novelty of the article is to substantiate the practical value of the historical interpretation of law in the modern period of systemic axiological transformation and development of digital technologies. It is proposed to use the historical method of interpretation of legal norms in connection with digitized access to historical sources of law, in particular to the catalog and content of legal principles that were developed in different periods and continue to be the foundation of modern legal systems. The interpretive process gives the judge broad discretion. Voltaire's fear would find expression in the judicial environment if the methods of interpretation of legal norms were weak, applied subjectively or simply exploited in order to achieve the desired goal. Then there would be a real possibility that in some cases the courts would usurp the functions of the legislature and call into question their own legitimacy. Only an accurate interpretation of the text of the law and its implementation in accordance with the intention and purpose of the legislator can regulate social relations and contribute to the development of society and the state. The analysis of the theory of historical interpretation of legal norms shows that the historical- critical analysis of law is interdisciplinary and relies on the growing amount of scientific literature as an approach to teaching and learning. It has been argued that historical approaches to the interpretation of legal norms are useful and effective for studying the relationship between internal and external contextuality in legal research. It is proved that due to the historical reconstruction of the genesis of the rule of law it is possible to explain the main factors, which probably explain the technical and legal features of legal interpretation. The formation of the rule of law in some way depends on socio-economic, political, cultural changes in society at a certain stage of its historical development. Which, in the end, affects our understanding of law and its epistemological consequences. Thus, for an adequate explication of the concept of legal technique of interpretation of legal norms, a relevant conceptual scheme that takes into account its characteristics is required.

A Theoretically Informed Critical Review of Research Applying the Concept of Liminality to Understand Experiences with Cancer: Implications for a New Oncological Agenda in Health Psychology.

Liminality was described more than 20 years ago as a major category explaining how cancer is experienced. Since then, it has been widely used in the field of oncology research, particularly by those using qualitative methods to study patient experience. This body of work has great potential to illuminate the subjective dimensions of life and death with cancer. However, the review also reveals a tendency for sporadic and opportunistic applications of the concept of liminality. Rather than being developed in a systematic way, liminality theory is being recurrently 're-discovered' in relatively isolated studies, mostly within the realm of qualitative studies of 'patient experience'. This limits the capacity of this approach to influence oncological theory and practice. In providing a theoretically informed critical review of liminality literature in the field of oncology, this paper proposes ways of systematizing liminality research in line with a processual ontology. In so doing, it argues for a closer engagement with the source theory and data, and with more recent liminality theory, and it sketches the broad epistemological consequences and applications.

Seeing and telling the invisible: problems of a new epistemic category in the second half of the eighteenth century

ABSTRACT The invisible object, in the eighteenth century, is not an evidence. It is the result of textual and semantic learning. Which concrete strategies are used to construct and depict objects out of sight? How do we make them a cognitive reality acceptable to a scientific community? This paper first highlights the conditions for the emergence of a field of microscopic knowledge and its epistemological consequences. Then we consider the microscopic gaze in terms of learning, situated between the act of observation as such and discursive practices. We conclude by studying a concrete case of “negotiation of the invisible” in a correspondence between Carl Linnaeus and John Ellis concerning corpuscles observed in mushroom infusions.

Methodological Naturalists Need Not Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism

In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism.

The limits of live fact-checking: Epistemological consequences of introducing a breaking news logic to political fact-checking

This article analyses the novel form of live political fact-checking, as performed by the Norwegian fact-checking organisation Faktisk.no during the Norwegian parliamentary election campaign in 2021. The aim of the study was to investigate the epistemological consequences of introducing a breaking news logic to political fact-checking. Through methods of participatory observation, interviews and textual analysis, the study finds that Faktisk.no used several strategies to bridge the ‘epistemic gap’ between the logics of breaking news and political fact-checking. Combined, these strategies pushed the live fact-checking towards a confirmative epistemology, implying that the live political fact-checking confirmed (1) knowledge already believed to be true and (2) hegemonic perspectives on what constitutes important and reliable information. The findings thereby point to a potential reorientation of political fact-checking from being a critical corrective of political elites to confirming the perspectives and knowledge base of the same elites.

Post-performance: Pandemic Breach Experiments, Big Theatre Data, and the Ends of Theory

All became data during the pandemic. Lockdowns made manifest what had developed for some time: that theatre has become inextricably entangled with digital cultures, the performing arts being increasingly encountered as a growing stock of multimodal fragments, textual discourses and networked communications. And, it is argued, it is precisely this appearance of theatre as (big) data that might prove to be the game-changer post-pandemic, and that this game-changer might be solely an epistemological one: what is known about theatre, how that knowledge is organized, and who is involved in organizing this knowledge, are rapidly changing. Based on an exemplary analysis of the discourses of legitimation that compensated for the loss of presence in German theatres, and the associated imperative to innovate production, this article estimates the epistemological consequences of theatre returns as data to advocate for a reconceptualization of theatre beyond performance.

Music in the Middle: A Culture-Cognition-Mediator Model of Musical Functionality

Music is both universal, appearing in every known human culture, and culture-specific, often defying intelligibility across cultural boundaries. This duality has been the source of debate within the broad community of music researchers, and there have been significant disagreements both on the ontology of music as an object of study and the appropriate epistemology for that study. To help resolve this tension, I present a culture-cognition-mediator model that situates music as a mediator in the mutually constitutive cycle of cultures and selves representing the ways individuals both shape and are shaped by their cultural environments. This model draws on concepts of musical grammars and schema, contemporary theories in developmental and cultural psychology that blur the distinction between nature and nurture, and recent advances in cognitive neuroscience. Existing evidence of both directions of causality is presented, providing empirical support for the conceptual model. The epistemological consequences of this model are discussed, specifically with respect to transdisciplinarity, hybrid research methods, and several potential empirical applications and testable predictions as well as its import for broader ontological conversations around the evolutionary origins of music itself.

О том, как когнитивная семантика Гегеля фундирует «IV правило экспериментальной философии» Ньютона и тем самым подрывает «конструктивный эмпиризм» ван Фраасена

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason developed an insightful, incisive semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference to particulars, which justifies important consequences for epistemology and philosophy of science; it holds altogether independently of transcendental idealism and remains cogent today. Disentangling this cognitive semantics from transcendental idealism is Hegel’s achievement. Here I demonstrate that this cognitive semantics directly and powerfully undergirds Newton’s methodological Rule IV, thus further supporting Newton’s causal realism regarding gravitational force. I first consider Newton’s Rule IV of experimental philosophy and its role in his justification of causal realism regarding gravitational force (§ 2). Then I summarise this cognitive semantics (§ 3) and show how it is embedded within Rule IV and thus strongly supports Newton’s rule (§ 4). This result exposes a crucial, previously unrecognised fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s core argument for his anti-realist “constructive empiricism”, a fallacy central to many common objections to causal realism, especially in the sciences (§ 5). This problem reveals a second inadequacy of constructive empiricism, in short, that it, so to speak, is itself “empirically inadequate”, insofar as it is not at all adequate to Newton’s classical mechanics (§ 6). This inadequacy highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newtonian mechanics (§ 7). Furthermore, this cognitive semantics contributes to an improved “semantic interpretation” of scientific theories, in part because it undercuts the mistaken idea that physical laws literally “lie” (§ 8). In these regards, Newton, Kant and Hegel provide crucial insights for contemporary history and philosophy of science (§ 9).

Sharpening the tools of imagination

Thought experiments, models, diagrams, computer simulations, and metaphors can all be understood as tools of the imagination. While these devices are usually treated separately in philosophy of science, this paper provides a unified account according to which tools of the imagination are epistemically good insofar as they improve scientific imaginings. Improving scientific imagining is characterized in terms of epistemological consequences: more improvement means better consequences. A distinction is then drawn between tools being good in retrospect, at the time, and in general. In retrospect, tools are evaluated straightforwardly in terms of the quality of their consequences. At the cutting edge, tools are evaluated positively insofar as there is reason to believe that using them will have good consequences. Lastly, tools can be generally good, insofar as their use encourages the development of epistemic virtues, which are good because they have good epistemic consequences.