Epistemic Subject Research Articles

“Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition

Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argue that in declaring “me too,” the epistemic subject emerges in the context of a polyphonic symphony of victims claiming their status as agents who are able to make sense of their own social experiences and able to convey their knowledge to others.

The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.

The epistemic culture in an online citizen science project: Programs, antiprograms and epistemic subjects.

In the past decade, some areas of science have begun turning to masses of online volunteers through open calls for generating and classifying very large sets of data. The purpose of this study is to investigate the epistemic culture of a large-scale online citizen science project, the Galaxy Zoo, that turns to volunteers for the classification of images of galaxies. For this task, we chose to apply the concepts of programs and antiprograms to examine the ‘essential tensions’ that arise in relation to the mobilizing values of a citizen science project and the epistemic subjects and cultures that are enacted by its volunteers. Our premise is that these tensions reveal central features of the epistemic subjects and distributed cognition of epistemic cultures in these large-scale citizen science projects.

Teachers’ multidimensional role towards meaningful learning: the potential value of interdisciplinary environments

The definition of “interdisciplinary learning environment” gives rise to different interpretations. This article presents and discusses interdisciplinarity in pedagogical practice for the construction of meaningful learning, strengthening the construction of knowledge in personal, scientific and social spheres. Case studies respectively show: the contribution of interdisciplinary work to self-identity and subjective constitution in early childhood; interdisciplinary work in an informal learning environment as a facilitating element towards scientific knowledge consolidation; and the university’s interdisciplinary work in social projects for building a fairer society. In the light of neuroscience, the article discusses aspects of cognitive and social-emotional developments, as well as the approximations and estrangements between the object of study and the epistemic subject. In the so-called Society of Information, the multidimensional character of the teacher’s work becomes a necessity and a challenge, since it is the school’s role to form citizen-students, developing competences to increase students´ academic knowledge and extend it to their personal, professional and social lives.

Lindy Trinkaus Zagzebski teoria autorytetu poznawczego. O potrzebie ufania innym

W artykule autor analizuje teorię autorytetu przedstawioną przez Trinkaus Zagzebski. Teoria ta podkreśla rolę zaufania w uzasadnianiu zdań, m.in. wskazując na ograniczenia stanowiska egoizmu poznawczego, dla którego ideałem jest sytuacja, w której podmiot, uzasadniając swe przekonania, polega tylko na własnych zdolnościach poznawczych. Trinkaus Zagzebski broni uniwersalizmu poznawczego, wg którego już sam fakt, że osoba x, głosi że p, jest prima facie racją za p. W tekście autor wskazuje na słabe punkty uniwersalizmu i konkluduje, że albo uznamy to stanowisko z jego konsekwentnym odrzuceniem tezy o równości podmiotów poznających, albo też mimo wszystko opowiemy się za egoizmem poznawczym. Autor uznaje przy tym, że amerykańska filozofka daje nam wskazówki, jak ulepszyć owo stanowisko, by nie prowadziło ono do twierdzeń sprzecznych z intuicją.

The art of thinking: Method and subjectivity in the Port-Royal Logic

The Logic or the Art of Thinking (1683), also called Port-Royal Logic, is an exemplar of modern reformers in logic and epistemology. Its reformism has a marked influence of Descartes, who introduces the epistemic and logical subject into the ground of justification of knowledge and judgment. A look at the method’s commitments in this text may shed light on the dynamics of the interweaving between epistemology and logic. It is in this perspective that an analysis of the use of the Aristotelian notion of “techne”, as an “art of doing anything well” seems to require attention, since it happens in a logical domain, as the authors make it. In this paper I want to make clear that the mental actions are crucial to a logic as reflexive practice (which determine the intelligibility of the assertive dynamics of the manual). And, because of that, the very expression of “art of thinking” shows itself as non-trivial, that is, as a requirement of method. Keywords: Port-Royal, judgment, Art of Thinking, logical reformism, Cartesianism.

Metacomputable

The paper introduces the notion of “metacomputable” processes as those which are the product of computable processes. This notion seems interesting in the instance when metacomputable processes may not be computable themselves, but are produced by computable ones. The notion of computability used here relies on Turing computability. When we talk about something being non-computable, this can be viewed as computation that incorporates Turing’s oracle, maybe a true randomizer (perhaps a quantum one). The notions of “processes” is used broadly, so that it also covers “objects” under the functional description; for the sake of this paper an object is seen as computable if processes that fully describe relevant aspects of its functioning are computable. The paper also introduces a distinction between phenomenal content and the epistemic subject which holds that content. The distinction provides an application of the notion of the metacomputable. In accordance with the functional definition of computable objects, sketched out above, it is possible to think of objects, such as brains, as being computable. If we take the functionality of brains relevant for consideration to be their supposed ability to generate first-person consciousness, and if they were computable in this regard, it would mean that brains, as generators of consciousness, could be described, straightforwardly, by Turing-computable mathematical functions. If there were other, maybe artificial, generators of first-person consciousness, then we could hope to design those as Turing-computable machines as well. However, thinking of such generators of consciousness as computable does not preclude the stream of consciousness being non-computable. This is the main point of this article—computable processes, including functionally described machines, may be able to generate incomputable products. Those processes, while not computable, are metacomputable—by regulative definition introduced in this article. Another example of a metacomputable process that is not also computable would be a true randomizer, if we were able to build one. Presumably, it would be built according to a computable design, e.g., by a machine designed using AutoCAD, that could be programmed into an industrial robot. Yet, its product—a perfect randomizer—would be incomputable. The last point I need to make belongs to ontology in the theory of computability. The claim that computable objects, or processes, may produce incomputable ones does not commit us to what I call computational monism—the idea that non-computable processes may, strictly speaking, be transformed into computable ones. Metacomputable objects, or processes, may originate from computable systems (systems will be understood here as complex, structured objects or processes) that have non-computable admixtures. Such processes are computable as long as those non-computable admixtures are latent, or otherwise irrelevant for a given functionality, and they are non-computable if the admixtures become active and relevant. Ontology, in which computational processes, or objects, can produce non-computable processes, or objects, iff the former ones have non-computable components, may be termed computational dualism. Such objects or processes may be computable despite containing non-computable elements, in particular if there is an on and off switch of those non-computable processes, and it is off. One kind of such a switch is provided, in biology, by latent genes that become active only in specific environmental situations, or at a given age. Both ontologies, informational dualism and informational monism, are compatible with some non-computable processes being metacomputable.

Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research

Cancer research is experiencing ‘paradigm instability’, since there are two rival theories of carcinogenesis which confront themselves, namely the somatic mutation theory and the tissue organization field theory. Despite this theoretical uncertainty, a huge quantity of data is available thanks to the improvement of genome sequencing techniques. Some authors think that the development of new statistical tools will be able to overcome the lack of a shared theoretical perspective on cancer by amalgamating as many data as possible. We think instead that a deeper understanding of cancer can be achieved by means of more theoretical work, rather than by merely accumulating more data. To support our thesis, we introduce the analytic view of theory development, which rests on the concept of plausibility, and make clear in what sense plausibility and probability are distinct concepts. Then, the concept of plausibility is used to point out the ineliminable role played by the epistemic subject in the development of statistical tools and in the process of theory assessment. We then move to address a central issue in cancer research, namely the relevance of computational tools developed by bioinformaticists to detect driver mutations in the debate between the two main rival theories of carcinogenesis. Finally, we briefly extend our considerations on the role that plausibility plays in evidence amalgamation from cancer research to the more general issue of the divergences between frequentists and Bayesians in the philosophy of medicine and statistics. We argue that taking into account plausibility-based considerations can lead to clarify some epistemological shortcomings that afflict both these perspectives.

Produzir conhecimento é um pensar militante

O que refletiremos neste texto vai de encontro ao que o estudo das relações étnico-raciais na educação no Brasil tem demostrado nos últimos anos, ou seja, não há possibilidade de construção do conhecimento se não tivermos uma postura militante e engajada. Esta postura, não é novidade nas ciências da educação ou nas ciências sociais. Veremos, através de análise bibliográfica, como pensadores e pesquisadores militantes e engajados nos demonstram que o conhecimento se produz na militância e no engajamento. Esta última afirmação, extremamente polêmica nos meios acadêmicos, quer debater com a ideia hegemônica de que para ser científico e objetivo, o sujeito que se envolve com a produção do conhecimento, só o fará se for alçado como sujeito epistêmico, mensageiro de um modo preciso de investigar, armado com conceitos que o direcionam na ação sobre a empiria e na explicação como segurança de objetividade do conhecimento produzido, como aquele que produz verdades e sentidos para a sociedade. Entretanto, como veremos em nossa argumentação, também epistêmica, os sujeitos produtores de conhecimento são mobilizados por uma inquietação intelectual, que tem sua matriz na realidade concreta em que os mesmos estão implicados. Este termo aqui posto pode ser analogamente situado naquilo que Freire (1987) nos diz sobre o fato de que a cultura não pode ser arrancada do sujeito, pois este só existe porque a cultura lhe é constitutiva. Este sujeito de cultura é seu próprio produtor. Implicado em sua realidade, este sujeito não tem como ser objetivado para fora de si.

Interrupting the Coloniality of Knowledge Production in Comparative Education: Postsocialist and Postcolonial Dialogues after the Cold War

The article explores the coloniality of knowledge production in comparative education in and about (post)socialist spaces of southeast/central Europe and the former Soviet Union after the Cold War. We engage in a particular form of decoloniality, or what Walter Mignolo terms “delinking,” to fracture the hegemony of Western-centric knowledge and enable comparative education to gain a global viewpoint that is more inclusive of different voices. Our critique is threefold. First, we engage in rethinking and rewriting socialist past(s) through new and multiple frames to reveal possibilities for imagining postsocialist future(s). Second, we show the relations and the intertwined histories of the spatially partitioned world. Third, we examine how coloniality has shaped our own identities as scholars and discuss ways to reclaim our positions as epistemic subjects who have both the legitimacy and capacity to look at and interpret the world from our own origins and lived realities.

Epistemic authority and autonomy of the epistemic subject

Epistemic authority and autonomy of the epistemic subject

Biologia, conhecimento e consciência: articulações possíveis na construção da aprendizagem

The present paper discusses the contributions of both neurobiology and genetic epistemology to the construction of the knowledge and the consciousness. We also discuss how these construction processes relate to the conservation of the homeostasis mechanisms of living organisms. Here, we rely on the works of Antonio Damasio and Jean Piaget in order to understand the links between the organism and the epistemic subject as protagonists of the acts of to stay alive, to acquire knowledge and to be aware. In spite of the framework adopted, either organic or cognitive, to remain alive requires ongoing interaction between living organisms and the environment. We consider that such interaction is the source of every new imbalance, which leads to new experiences, and those generate in turn new emotional and cognitive development. Insofar, the interaction between living organisms with the environment leads towards a learning journey, including more than only scholar knowledge, which contributes to survival in all levels of the human life.

A Critique of Epistemic Subjectivity

John R. Searle argues that consciousness is a biological problem, and that the subjective feature of consciousness doesn’t exclude the scientific study thereof. In this paper I attempt to show that Searle’s identification of the subjectivity of conscious experience as being merely ontologically subjective, but not epistemically subjective is problematic, as it confuses epistemic subjectivity with axiological subjectivity. Since Searle regards the distinction between epistemic subjectivity and ontological subjectivity as an important basis for scientific studies of consciousness, the unsoundness of his argument weakens his advocacy of Biological Naturalism.

Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?

ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this (happy) possibility may go some distance towards explaining several (unhappy) aspects of our group life as epistemic subjects—in particular, groupthink and group polarization.

Diálogos Gráficos: A Didática do Ateliê de Arquitetura

Este artigo discute uma didática específica no campo da Pedagogia Universitária, no ensino de graduação do curso de Arquitetura e Urbanismo. Entende o diálogo gráfico como um método de produção e construção do conhecimento, e o desenho como elemento constituinte e determinante do processo, na relação professor‑aluno, no ateliê de projeto. Considera o diálogo gráfico como uma forma de inter‑relacionamento, encontro e responsabilidade, envolvendo sentidos e significados próprios da atividade interativa, da reflexão de idéias e das experiências dos sujeitos. Destaca a importância da prática docente, cujo conhecimento específico necessita da interlocução com os conhecimentos pedagógicos. Reconhece o aluno como participante ativo no processo, tornando‑se um desenhador co‑responsável pela construção do conhecimento, sujeito epistêmico da reflexão‑na‑ação. Acredita que o diálogo gráfico, no estudo da epistemologia da prática, pode constituir o estímulo, sob novas formas de diálogo, em outras áreas do conhecimento, desenhando uma educação de melhor qualidade.

WHAT'S SO SPECIAL ABOUT HUMAN KNOWLEDGE?

AbstractUnlike animal knowledge, mature human knowledge is not a natural phenomenon. This claim is defended by examining the concept of such knowledge and showing that it is best analysed in deontic terms. To be knowledgeable is to possess epistemic authority. Such authority is assessable in two dimensions. The first is contextually appropriate truth-reliability. The second is epistemic responsibility in three senses of “responsibility”: accountability, due diligence and liability to sanction. The fact that knowledge can be impugned by non-culpable unreliability shows that, with respect to loss of authority, liability is strict. This entails that mature human knowledge requires some degree of epistemic self-consciousness: in particular, the conceptual capacities for critically examining one's beliefs. Arguments advanced by Kornblith for the claim that there is a vicious regress involved in this requirement are shown to depend on under-described examples. When the examples are fleshed out, we see that the “critical reflection” requirement does not demand constant self-monitoring but only the capacity to recognize and respond to appropriate epistemic queries. Recognizing that the practice of justifying one's beliefs conforms to a default and query structure also dispels the illusion that insisting that epistemic subjects have some sense of their own epistemic powers involves an unpalatable form of epistemic circularity.

RELIABILITY AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGERELEVANT RESPONSIBILITY

Knowledge seems to need the admixture of de facto reliability and epistemic responsibility. But philosophers have had a hard time in attempting to combine them in order to achieve a satisfactory account of knowledge. In this paper I attempt to find a solution by capitalizing on the real and ubiquitous human phenomenon that is the social dispersal of epistemic labour through time. More precisely, the central objective of the paper is to deliver a novel and plausible social account of knowledge-relevant responsibility and to consider the merits of the proposed combination of reliability and responsibility with respect to certain cases of unreflective epistemic subjects.

Extended Cognitive System and Epistemic Subject

Abstract The concept of an extended cognitive system is central to contemporary studies of cognition. In the paper I analyze the place of the epistemic subject within the extended cognitive system. Is it extended as well? In answering this question I focus on the differences between the first and the second wave of arguments for the extended mind thesis. I argue that the position of Cognitive Integration represented by Richard Menary is much more intuitive and fruitful in analyses of cognition and knowledge than the early argument formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. Cognitive Integration is compatible with virtue epistemology of John Greco’s agent reliabilism. The epistemic subject is constituted by its cognitive character composed of an integrated set of cognitive abilities and processes. Some of these processes are extended, they are a manipulation of external informational structures and, as such, they constitute epistemic practices. Epistemic practices are normative; to conduct them correctly the epistemic subject needs to obey epistemic norms embedded in the cultural context. The epistemic subject is not extended because of the casual coupling with external informational artifacts which extend his mind from inside the head and into the world. Rather, cognitive practices constitute the subject’s mind, they transform his cognitive abilities, and this is what makes the mind and epistemic subject “extended”.

Hermann von Helmholtz's empirico-transcendentalism reconsidered: construction and constitution in Helmholtz's psychology of the object.

This paper aims at contributing to the ongoing efforts to get a firmer grasp of the systematic significance of the entanglement of idealism and empiricism in Helmholtz's work. Contrary to existing analyses, however, the focal point of the present exposition is Helmholtz's attempt to articulate a psychological account of objectification. Helmholtz's motive, as well as his solution to the problem of the object are outlined, and interpreted against the background of his scientific practice on the one hand, and that of empiricist and (transcendental) idealist analyses of experience on the other. The specifically psychological angle taken, not only prompts us to consider figures who have hitherto been treated as having only minor import for Helmholtz interpretation (most importantly J.S. Mill and J.G. Fichte), it furthermore sheds new light on some central tenets of the latter's psychological stance that have hitherto remained underappreciated. For one thing, this analysis reveals an explicit voluntarist tendency in Helmholtz's psychological theory. In conclusion, it is argued that the systematic significance of Helmholtz's empirico-transcendentalism with respect to questions of the mind is best understood as an attempt to found his empirical theory of perception in a second order, normative account of epistemic subjectivity.

Explaining the ‘gender-risk effect’ in risk perception research: a qualitative secondary analysis study / Explicando el ‘efecto género-riesgo’ en la investigación de la percepción del riesgo: un estudio cualitativo de análisis secundario

Quantitative psychometric experiments and surveys have been used extensively in the field of risk research to explore the cognitive and cultural determinants of beliefs about environmental risk. We adopt a conceptually novel approach called effects made by gender and conduct an interpretive, qualitative study involving secondary analysis of a data set comprising 11 reconvened focus groups. The groups were initially designed to compare talk about the meanings for people of six different risk cases: climate change, nuclear power and radioactive waste, genetically modified foods and crops, human genetic testing, mobile phone handsets and transmission masts. In-depth findings and insights are presented concerning the dynamic role played by gender binaries, epistemic subject positions and identity-making within the workings of gender discourses. These serve to define everyday realities and (de)stabilize taken-for-granted ‘truths’ of gender difference in risk perception studies. A deeper regulatory role is identified for hegemonic masculinity; in particular, how concern for risk is downplayed when set alongside the cultural and psychological gains made from technological world-making. Care discourses are also part of the matrix of culture-technology-identity relationships responsible for creating effects made by gender.