Epistemic Source Research Articles

A Black-Archipelago Anticolonial Canon Speaks Psychology

In Euromodernity, the discipline of western psychology holds a unique place in the global knowledge order. It is the primary epistemic source, the authoritative voice of psychological knowledge. This essay explores epistemic problems with western psychological science and its canonical status. Epistemic selectivism—the failure to address phenomena which are detrimental to all human beings, not only those of concern to western subjects and their subjectivities—is identified as a problem to be solved in the discipline of western psychology. In order to address epistemic failures of western psychology I return to the knowledge that emerges from the geography where Europe launched its project of racial and racist modern life. I review the Black-Archipelago anticolonial canon that speaks psychology. I follow this anticolonial canon because it pierces and penetrates epistemic silences about psychological experience in Euromodernity. Of the plenitude of theories and concepts developed by Black, Caribbean anticolonial thinkers which are of relevance to understanding the psychological effects of Euromodernity I focus in this review on two fundamental ideas—Frantz Fanon’s sociogenic principle and the emancipatory thrust of consciousness. An embrace of the principle of open epistemologies is proposed as a solution to the problem of epistemic selectivism.

Communicating Testimonial Commitment

I argue for the Cooperative Warrant Thesis (CWT), according to which the determinants of testimonial contents in communication are given by the practical requirements of cooperative action. This thesis distances itself from conventionalist views, according to which testimony must be strictly bounded by conventions of speech. CWT proves explanatorily better than conventionalism on several accounts. It offers a principled and accurate criterion to distinguish between testimonial and non-testimonial communication. In being goal-sensitive, this criterion captures the role of weak and robust cooperation in determining the contents to which speakers testify or fail to testify. And, finally, it yields a principled explanation of why testimony entails the epistemic commitments that distinguish it as an epistemic source.

Testimonial Kinds: The Source Factor

Abstract In this article, I argue that the nature of testimony necessitates that we distinguish between testimonies that are based on the informant's sense perception, inference, or on a longer testimonial chain. I further argue that this distinction has epistemic significance, in that it helps us better understand how reliable certain classes of testimonies are and how reliable certain individuals are, based upon the epistemic source that their testimony is ultimately grounded in. I begin the article, in Section 1, by drawing attention to the existence of several different terms for testimony found within the Islamic philosophical tradition. In Section 2, I argue that the essential difference between these terms has to do with the epistemic source that grounds the speaker’s testimony. In Section 3, I move on to explicate how this distinction helps us better understand the reliability of testimony and how it impacts our evaluation of the reliability of different speakers in different contexts. In Section 4, I use this distinction to challenge the necessary condition of speaker competency. Finally, in Section 5, I use the distinction to undermine the belief-transmission view in the epistemology of testimony.

A Philosophical Explanation for the Islamization of Philosophy: How Can Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy Contribute to the Islamization of Philosophy in Iran?

ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the potentials of Mullā Şadrā’s philosophy to explain the possibility of the Islamization of philosophy. This contributes to a more general, yet controversial, project in post-revolutionary Iran, namely the Islamization of knowledge, especially in the humanities. If there would be a mechanism through which Islamization of philosophy – as a historical example and as a field of knowledge that provides theoretical grounds of other humanities – can be plausibly explained, then one might think of Islamizing the humanities, as well. One famous explanation in Iran is based on the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification. It explains how a philosopher is permitted to use the Islamic content in the context of discovery – not justification – and how this helps to Islamize philosophy. In this article, we claim a new explanation which is based on Mullā Şadrā’s transcendent philosophy. Such a philosophical explanation not only acknowledges using the Qur’an and authentic narrations in the context of discovery but also necessitates involving revelation as a philosophical criterion in the context of justification and a highly valid epistemic source in producing the new philosophical content. This provides a strong account of the Islamization of philosophy.

Neurotrans

AbstractThis essay makes the case for neurotrans, which names the nexus of neurodivergence and trans as an epistemic source, a place from which neurotrans people think neurotrans thoughts to pursue a neurotrans world. Bringing the interwoven histories of mental disability and trans experience to bear on HIV/AIDS, the author argues that HIV has long served as a racialized weapon of the state to subjugate neurodivergent and gender variant people, especially those of color. The AIDS crisis, following the rise of antipsychotics in psychiatry, offered the medical industrial complex and the criminal punishment system a new opportunity to surveil and control disabled and trans populations. In addition to racializing gender variance and neurodivergence as threats to white supremacy, the state could now use HIV to justify incarcerating neurotrans people, although carceral spaces, such as hospitals, mental institutions, and prisons, are largely responsible for facilitating HIV transmission. Drawing on the life and activism of Black mad and trans activist Marsha P. Johnson, this essay illuminates the entanglement of mental disability and gender nonconformance and the necessity to center mental disability in trans studies, prioritize neurodivergent people in HIV prevention efforts, and advocate for the participation and leadership of neurotrans people in AIDS activism.

General Editor's Introduction

General Editor's Introduction

Probabilistic reliability analysis for active vibration control of piezoelectric laminated composite plates using mesh-free finite volume method

The implementation of deterministic design approaches in the presence of uncertainty is an adequate design task. Probabilistic methods are then used in structural design procedures, offering structural safety predictions. In this study, reliability-based analysis of a piezoelectric laminated composite plate subjected to the mechanical loads was investigated, accounting for the epistemic source of uncertainty. Material properties of the plate were considered temperature-dependent. The sophisticated mesh-free finite volume approach was employed to actively control the vibration of the temperature-dependent piezoelectric laminated composite plate through the first-order shear deformation principles. The induced vibration was treated as a non-stationary random process, and the generalized failure index was estimated using the first-passage probability concept by adopting the novel asymptotic sampling technique. The veracity of the suggested model was corroborated by alternate approaches in the literature, comprising the finite element approach. Furthermore, the temperature-dependent piezoelectric laminated composite plate with different ply orientations was considered to assess the safety index variation against changes in the ambient temperature and the laminate stacking orientation. The obtained results revealed that with increasing temperature, the reliability of the composite plate reduced. It was also realized that the reliability index is directly correlated with the piezoelectric voltage.

On What We Owe in Attention

A central aim of Sandy Goldberg’s project is to defend a fundamentally epistemic source of normative conversational pressure—one which does not reduce to the interpersonal dimension. A second core aim is to provide an explanation of how expectations are generated by the performances within a conversation. This essay raises several challenges for chapter 2 of his book, ‘Your Attention Please!.’ From various angles, the essay challenges the central idea of that chapter: namely, that by the act of address, a speaker generates an obligation for a hearer to attend to the speaker.

Youth Life Writing, Networked Media, Climate Change: The Challenge of Testimony to the Future

This article examines some of Greta Thunberg’s life writing as an example of the creativity and ingenuity with which some young people engage with the identity category of ‘youth’ in their life writing. It argues that Thunberg’s activism uses personal testimony in order to amplify expertise testimony as an epistemic source that demands action on climate change. This strategic use of life writing produces a paradoxical, but seemingly effective, form of life writing in which Thunberg provides personal testimony to the future. The article analyses how this paradoxical form of testimony is produced by situating Thunberg’s life writing in the context of the social and political investment in youth as an identity genre central to understanding of the human life course, and to how political responsibility is figured in contemporary western democracies. Drawing on theories of new media as an affective site in which life unfolds, rather than being represented, the paper concludes by reflecting on how Wendy Chun’s argument that networks involve the twinning of habituation and crisis mirrors Thunberg’s argument that action on climate change demands that habitual ways of living and acting must be rethought in response to the climate crisis.

Conceptualizing Epistemic Power: The Changing Relationship Between Economic Policy Paradigms and Academic Disciplines

Abstract The ways in which epistemic foundations of academic disciplines shape policy paradigms have been an understudied area. We illustrate such dynamics by focusing on paradigm shifts between economics and legal scholarship. Our case study focuses on the evolution of the Finnish corporate tax policy between 1991 and 2014 to illuminate complex policy diffusion through professions. First, in 1993, Finnish corporate tax policy was aligned with the neoclassical ideas of the time in a lawyer-driven process. Second, in the early 2000s, initiatives from the EU and the OECD provided these lawyers a new epistemic source for broadening their argumentation. Third, in the 2010s, the disciplinary base shifted from legal studies to economics, which coincided with administrative reforms emphasizing quantitative impact assessments. These transformations completed the shift from legal scholarship to economics in tax policy design, paving way to the entrance of economic theoretical arguments to tax policy discussions. Our findings highlight five overlapping and mutually reinforcing factors that shape knowledge production in expert groups that influence economic policy: (1) the extent to which politicians rely on expertise; (2) the balance of power between academic disciplines in evidence-based policy-making; (3) the disciplinary base to which the dominant expert groups rely on; (4) the shifts in the epistemological, ontological and methodological mainstream within particular disciplines; and, (5) the extent to which international organizations are seen as epistemic versus policy-driven authorities.

Against the multilingual turn as paradigm replacement: Reconsidering Kubota’s charge

Abstract In her 2016 paper, entitled, The Multi-Plural Turn, Post-Colonial Theory and Neoliberal Multiculturalism: Complicities and Implications for Applied Linguistics, Kubota proposes a more critical look at neoliberal aspects of the multilingual turn in applied linguistics that, in celebrating individual difference, challenge its status as a transformative discourse. In her argument from paradigm replacement, Kubota posits that because the multilingual turn, to some extent, emerges from the principle of individual accountability in a neoliberal political economy, its discourse must be complicit with the aims of a neoliberal agenda. This paper is a reply to some of the issues she raises in that critique. My argument is two-pronged. First, I take issue with the epistemic characterization of individual accountability as the only source of multilingualism within a neoliberal discourse. Second, I challenge her rejection of a democratic cosmopolitanism as a self-determining antidote to the neoliberal ideal (c.f. Calhoun 2002). This paper concludes that an alternate epistemic source of the multilingual turn unites language speakers in more moral and less economic terms, thereby destabilizing the argument from paradigm replacement.

Online Intellectual Virtues and the Extended Mind

ABSTRACT The internet has become an ubiquitous epistemic source. However, it comes with several drawbacks. For instance, the world wide web seems to foster filter bubbles and echo chambers and includes search results that promote bias and spread misinformation. Richard Heersmink suggests online intellectual virtues to combat these epistemically detrimental effects . These are general epistemic virtues applied to the online environment based on our background knowledge of this online environment. I argue that these online intellectual virtues also demand a particular view of cognitive integration. Online intellectual virtues are incompatible with a popular conception of extended minds proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers . I suggest that if we want to hold on to both a conception of online intellectual virtues and some conception of the extended mind, we have to accept a more gradual theory of cognitive integration along the lines of second-wave theories of the extended mind .

On the Possibility of Knowledge through Unsafe Testimony

ABSTRACT If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that the hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Sanford Goldberg argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Jennifer Lackey and Charlie Pelling criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible.

When Texts Clash: Mīmāṃsā Thinkers on Conflicting Prescriptions and Prohibitions

The Mīmāṃsā mission of disambiguating Vedic texts led the thinkers of the tradition to confront several instances of apparently conflicting Vedic commands. Consider the two cases: ‘give alms daily’ vs ‘do not give alms during ritual X’, and ‘never harm another’ vs ‘sacrifice an animal during ritual Y’. Each command in these two cases is derived from the Vedas and Mīmāṃsā authors thus attempted to resolve such cases of deontic conflict by putting forth hermeneutic solutions, without taking recourse to any other epistemic source. In this paper, I present several instances of conflicting Vedic commands and indicate three distinct types of deontic conflicts as well as their corresponding solutions as identified by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. This study is based on discussions put forth in four important Mīmāṃsā texts: the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra, the Śābarabhāṣya, Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā and Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa. I explain the foundational difference between prescriptions (vidhi) and prohibitions (pratiṣedha / niṣedha) for Mīmāṃsā thinkers, and thereby also discuss several technical conceptions such as paryudāsa, vikalpa, prāpti and bādha among others. In doing so, I attempt to highlight certain fundamental tenets of the vast and intricate hermeneutic framework developed within the Mīmāṃsā tradition.

On Understanding and Testimony

Testimony spreads information. It is also commonly agreed that it can transfer knowledge. Whether it can work as an epistemic source of understanding is a matter of dispute. However, testimony certainly plays a pivotal role in the proliferation of understanding in the epistemic community. But how exactly do we learn, and how do we make advancements in understanding on the basis of one another’s words? And what can we do to maximize the probability that the process of acquiring understanding from one another succeeds? These are very important questions in our current epistemological landscape, especially in light of the attention that has been paid to understanding as an epistemic achievement of purely epistemic value. Somewhat surprisingly, the recent literature in social epistemology does not offer much on the topic. The overarching aim of this paper is to provide a tentative model of understanding that goes in-depth enough to safely address the question of how understanding and testimony are related to one another. The hope is to contribute, in some measure, to the effort to understand understanding, and to explain two facts about our epistemic practices: (1) the fact that knowledge and understanding relate differently to testimony, and (2) the fact that some pieces of testimonial information are better than others for the sake of providing one with understanding and of yielding advancements in one’s epistemic standing.

MEMORY COMPATIBILISM: PRESERVING AND GENERATING POSITIVE EPISTEMIC STATUS

ABSTRACT The contemporary epistemological debate regarding the epistemic role of memory is dominated by the dispute between two different views: memory preservationism and memory generativism. While the former holds that memory only preserves the epistemic status already acquired through another source, the latter advocates that there are situations where memory can function as a generative epistemic source. Both views are problematic and have to deal with important objections. In this paper, I suggest a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge that overcomes objections raised for both preservationism and generativism. I shall call this view Memory Compatibilism. I argue that the proposed view better explains the generative epistemic character of memory.

Augustine’s Development on Testimonial Knowledge

Augustine is probably the first in western philosophy to explicitly defend an account of testimonial knowledge. I argue that he gives testimony, as an epistemic source, different statuses over three stages. First, he says that testimony can yield nothing more than belief (credere); next, he says that it can yield scientia; but in the end, he says that it yields lower level knowledge (notitia), but not scientia, strictly speaking. Along the way, I explain various motivations for Augustine’s innovations, and point out his Platonic, Stoic, and ordinary language sources. I also argue that he takes testimonial knowledge to be justified by inference rather than by default entitlement, and I show that in his last two stages there is an underlying unity that is obscured by shifts in the way he uses the term scientia.

Towards a Transformative Epistemology of Technology Education

Technology Education offers an authentic and invaluable range of skills, knowledge, capabilities, contexts and ways of thinking for learners in the 21st century. However, it is recognised that it occupies a comparatively less defined and more fragile curricular position than associated, but longer established, subjects such as Mathematics and Science. While recognising that no single factor lies behind such a condition, this paper draws upon thinking in the philosophy of technology, technology education and the ontology of artefacts to argue that transformation may be considered as an epistemic source for technology in a similar way to ‘proof’ within Mathematics and ‘interpretation’ within Science. Encapsulating technology's intimate relationship with materials, it is ultimately argued that the transformation of a technical artefact from an ill-defined into a well-defined ontological state constitutes a prime source of technological knowledge for pupils. Moreover, it provides an alternative route into further consideration about the nature of the domain, epistemology and curricular identity of the subject.

Self-Knowledge and Epistemic Virtues: between Reliabilism and Responsibilism

This paper is about the role of self-knowledge in the cognitive life of a virtuous knower. The main idea is that it is hard to know ourselves because introspection is an unreliable epistemic source, and reason can be a source of insidious forms of self-deception. Nevertheless, our epistemic situation is such that an epistemically responsible agent must be constantly looking for a better understanding of her own character traits and beliefs, under the risk of jeopardizing her own status as a knower, ruining her own intellectual life.

The Intellectual Given

Intuition is sometimes derided as an abstruse or esoteric phenomenon akin to crystal-ball gazing. Such derision appears to be fuelled primarily by the suggestion, evidently endorsed by traditional rationalists such as Plato and Descartes, that intuition is a kind of direct, immediate apprehension akin to perception. This paper suggests that although the perceptual analogy has often been dismissed as encouraging a theoretically useless metaphor, a quasi-perceptualist view of intuition may enable rationalists to begin to meet the challenge of supplying a theoretically satisfying treatment of their favoured epistemic source. It is argued, first, that intuitions and perceptual experiences are at a certain level of abstraction the same type of mental state, presentations, which are distinct from beliefs, hunches, inclinations, attractions, and seemings. The notion of a presentation is given a positive explication, which identifies its characteristic features, accounts for several of its substantive psychological roles, and systematically locates it in a threefold division among types of contentful states. Subsequently, it is argued that presentations, intuitive no less than sensory, are by their nature poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justification without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as ‘given’.