Testimonial Kinds: The Source Factor

Abstract

Abstract In this article, I argue that the nature of testimony necessitates that we distinguish between testimonies that are based on the informant's sense perception, inference, or on a longer testimonial chain. I further argue that this distinction has epistemic significance, in that it helps us better understand how reliable certain classes of testimonies are and how reliable certain individuals are, based upon the epistemic source that their testimony is ultimately grounded in. I begin the article, in Section 1, by drawing attention to the existence of several different terms for testimony found within the Islamic philosophical tradition. In Section 2, I argue that the essential difference between these terms has to do with the epistemic source that grounds the speaker’s testimony. In Section 3, I move on to explicate how this distinction helps us better understand the reliability of testimony and how it impacts our evaluation of the reliability of different speakers in different contexts. In Section 4, I use this distinction to challenge the necessary condition of speaker competency. Finally, in Section 5, I use the distinction to undermine the belief-transmission view in the epistemology of testimony.